Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Devlin et al
Filing
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Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM and ORDER entered. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 58 isALLOWED IN PART. Metropolitan has no duty to defend or indemnifyMatthew Desrosier for his negligent operation of the Ford Taurusbecause h e was driving the Taurus without the owner's consent.The remainder of Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment isDENIED. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike 63 is DENIED AS MOOT.granting in part and denying in part 58 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 63 Motion to Strike (Geraldino-Karasek, Clarilde)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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)
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) Civil Action No. 13-13126-PBS
v.
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SUSAN DEVLIN, MARY DESROSIER,
)
MATTHEW DESROSIER, and JOHN DOE, )
as personal representative of the )
ESTATE OF JOSEPH SIMONE,
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Defendants.
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METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
Saris, U.S.D.J.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
April 2, 2015
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance
Company seeks a declaration that it has no duty to defend or
indemnify for a car accident involving a Ford Taurus insured by
Metropolitan. The Court has already entered default judgment
against Defendants Mary Desrosier (the Taurus’s owner and
policyholder), Matthew Desrosier (who was driving the Taurus at
the time of the accident), and the Estate of Joseph Simone (who
was riding in the Taurus’s backseat). Metropolitan now moves for
summary judgment against Defendant Susan Devlin, who was injured
when the Taurus collided with her vehicle. The company argues
that its insurance policy does not apply here because the
accident occurred while the Taurus was being driven without the
owner’s consent. After a review of the record and hearing,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 58) is
ALLOWED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are undisputed, except where noted. All
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of Defendant Susan
Devlin, the non-moving party.1
Susan Devlin was in her vehicle on October 27, 2010 when
she was rear-ended by a Ford Taurus. The insurance company
conducted an investigation, which revealed the following. The
Taurus was being driven by Matthew Desrosier and belonged to his
mother, Mary Desrosier. At the time of the accident, Matthew had
a suspended license and was not driving the Taurus with his
mother’s consent. To the contrary, Mary had expressly forbidden
Matthew from driving the vehicle under any circumstances.
To recover for injuries suffered during the accident, Devlin
filed a lawsuit in Middlesex County Superior Court against the
Desrosiers and the Estate of Joseph Simone, who was in the
backseat. In her amended complaint, Devlin alleges that Matthew
Desrosier’s negligent operation of the vehicle caused the
1
Metropolitan has moved to strike certain exhibits attached
to Devlin’s opposition to summary judgment. (Docket No. 63). The
Court does not rely on any of these exhibits in its ruling.
Metropolitan’s motion to strike is DENIED AS MOOT.
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accident and her injuries (Count 1). She also alleges that Mary
Desrosier and Joseph Simone were liable for negligently
entrusting the vehicle to Matthew (Counts 2 and 3). Finally,
Devlin alleges that Mary Desrosier was liable for negligently
failing to secure her vehicle from unauthorized use by Matthew.
(Count 4). This lawsuit is still pending in Superior Court.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The role of
summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings and to assess the
proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.”
Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991)
(quotation marks omitted). To succeed on a motion for summary
judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is an
“absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party’s case.”
Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660 (1st Cir. 2000)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. Quinones v. Houser Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 289 (1st
Cir. 2006). A genuine issue exists where the evidence is
“sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to
resolve the issue in favor of either side.” Nat’l Amusements,
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Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995). A
material fact is “one that has the potential of affecting the
outcome of the case.” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355
F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004).
In its review of the evidence, the Court must examine the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Sands, 212 F.3d at
661. Ultimately, the Court is required to “determine if there is
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to
return a verdict for that party.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
Metropolitan’s position is that it has no duty to defend or
indemnify here because Matthew Desrosier was driving the Ford
Taurus without his mother’s consent at the time of the accident.
Specifically, Metropolitan refers to two provisions in the
insurance policy covering bodily injuries, one compulsory under
Massachusetts law and the other optional. The compulsory part
states:
Under this Part, we will pay damages to people injured or
killed by your auto in Massachusetts accidents . . . We will
pay only if you or someone else using your auto with your
consent is legally responsible for the accident.
(Docket No. 58-2:12). The optional insurance part states:
Under this Part, we will pay damages to people
killed in accidents if you or a household member
responsible for the accident. We will also pay
someone else using your auto with your consent
responsible for the accident . . . This Part is
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injured or
is legally
damages if
is legally
similar to
Compulsory Bodily Injury to Others (Part 1). Like the
Compulsory Part, this Part pays for accidents involving your
auto in Massachusetts. Also like the Compulsory Part, this
Part does not pay for the benefit of anyone using an auto
without the consent of the owner.
(Docket No. 58-2:21). Based on these policy provisions,
Metropolitan argues that it has no duty to provide coverage to
Matthew Desrosier, Mary Desrosier, or the Estate of Joseph Simone
in connection with the accident because the Taurus was being
driven by an unauthorized driver.
A. Duty to Defend
At the outset, the Court observes that Devlin’s papers
solely focus on Metropolitan’s duty to indemnify. Nevertheless,
it is well-established that the duty to indemnify is narrower
than the duty to defend. See Home Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 229 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000). If the Court
finds that Metropolitan has no duty to defend, the insurance
company as a matter of course also has no duty to indemnify.
Bagley v. Monticello Ins. Co., 720 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Mass. 1999)
(“If an insurer has no duty to defend, based on the allegations
in the plaintiff’s complaint, it necessarily follows that the
insurer does not have a duty to indemnify.”). For this reason,
the Court will begin by determining whether Metropolitan is
entitled to summary judgment with respect to its duty to defend
the Desrosiers and Joseph Simone.
The legal standards governing an insurer’s duty to defend
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are slightly different than those conventionally applied to a
motion for summary judgment. An insurer’s duty to defend is
determined by examining (1) the insurance policy; (2) the facts
alleged against the insured; and (3) facts known or readily
knowable by the insurer. “An insurer has a duty to defend an
insured when the allegations in a complaint are reasonably
susceptible of an interpretation that states or roughly sketches
a claim covered by the policy terms.” Billings v. Commerce Ins.
Co., 936 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass. 2010). “The duty to defend is
determined based on the facts alleged in the complaint, and on
facts known or readily knowable by the insurer that may aid in
its interpretation of the allegations in the complaint.” Ferreira
v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 13 N.E.3d 561, 566 (Mass. 2014). “In order
for the duty of defense to arise, the underlying complaint need
only show, through general allegations, a possibility that the
liability claim falls within the insurance coverage. There is no
requirement that the facts alleged in the complaint specifically
and unequivocally make out a claim within the coverage.”
Billings, 936 N.E.2d at 414 (quoting Sterilite Corp. v. Cont’l
Cas. Co., 458 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983)). “However,
when the allegations in the underlying complaint lie expressly
outside the policy coverage and its purpose, the insurer is
relieved of the duty to investigate or defend the complaint.”
Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 788 N.E.2d 522,
531 (Mass. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).
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As both parties appear to agree, the claims against Matthew
Desrosier fall expressly outside Metropolitan’s insurance policy.
Massachusetts courts have consistently found that both the
compulsory and optional parts of this policy only provide
coverage to drivers who operate the covered vehicle with the
owner’s consent. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Locke, 624 N.E. 2d 615,
617 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). This remains true even when the
unauthorized driver happens to be a household member. Id.
(explaining that the exclusion for unauthorized drivers “applies
to anyone, including household members.”).
The duty to defend with respect to Mary Desrosier and Joseph
Simone is not quite so straightforward. Under one reasonable view
of the facts learned by Metropolitan during its investigation and
alleged in Devlin’s amended complaint, Mary Desrosier expressly
allowed Joseph Simone to drive the Ford Taurus to pick up a
replacement part for the vehicle. Mary also allowed her son,
Matthew, to go along for the trip, but she failed to tell Simone
that her son was not allowed to drive. As a result, Simone pulled
over at some point and allowed Matthew to switch places with him.
After taking over, Matthew rear-ended Devlin. Based on these
facts, Devlin alleges that Mary Desrosier is legally responsible
for the accident. Devlin also alleges that Mary Desrosier was
negligent in failing to secure the car from unauthorized access
by Matthew Desrosier. The amended complaint also alleges that
Joseph Simone negligently entrusted the car to Desrosier whom he
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should have known was an unfit or incompetent driver.
Reading the plain terms of the insurance policy, the Court
cannot conclude that Metropolitan is expressly relieved of its
duty to defend Mary Desrosier and Joseph Simone against Devlin’s
claims. Metropolitan’s insurance policy is potentially applicable
if Mary Desrosier or Joseph Simone were (1) “using” the Taurus;
(2) with the owner’s consent; and (3) are “legally responsible
for the accident.” Each of these elements is at least reasonably
satisfied by the allegations in Devlin’s amended complaint.
First, Massachusetts courts have recognized that a person
can be “using” a vehicle even when they entrust someone else to
drive it for them. See Barnstable Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Lally, 373 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Mass. 1978) (explaining that
negligent entrustment is a “distinct and specific cause of action
. . . derived from the more general concepts of ownership,
operation, and use of a motor vehicle”); Mahoney v. Am. Auto.
Ins. Co., 989 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (“A person
clearly could be ‘using’ an automobile without operating it
personally.” (quoting 6B Appleman & Appleman, Insurance Law and
Practice § 4316, at 343 (rev. ed. 1979)). In this case, for
example, Mary Desrosier could have initially entrusted the Ford
Taurus to Joseph Simone so that he could drive to pick up a
replacement part for the car. Later, Simone also gave permission
for Matthew Desrosier to drive. Based on this fact pattern, both
Mary Desrosier and Joseph Simone could have been “using” the
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vehicle at the time of the accident.
Second, one who negligently entrusts a vehicle to another
can be “legally responsible for the accident” for purposes of
insurance coverage. See Mahoney, 989 N.E.2d at 506; cf. Picard v.
Thomas, 802 N.E.2d 581, 589 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (noting
that the insurance company did not deny that it was obligated to
defend a permitted driver who negligently entrusted the vehicle
to the driver who caused the accident). In Mahoney, for example,
a woman named Jennifer Hill negligently entrusted a rental car to
Ellen Teague, who crashed the vehicle and injured the plaintiff.
989 N.E.2d at 504. The Court stated that Hill was “legally
responsible for the accident” by way of her negligent
entrustment. Id. Nevertheless, it ultimately found that coverage
was excluded for Hill’s negligent entrustment because the rental
car company had expressly forbidden Hill from allowing anyone
else to drive the car. Id. In this sense, Hill’s “use” of the
vehicle was unauthorized by the owner. Id. If Hill had been
authorized by the owner to entrust the vehicle to someone else,
however, the Court said that the question of coverage would be
viewed “quite differently” and that these circumstances “could
trigger” a duty to indemnify.2 Id.
2
Some older cases go even further and suggest that a person
who entrusts a vehicle to a third party against the express
wishes of the owner is still “using” the vehicle with the consent
of the owner. See Boudreau v. Md. Cas. Co., 192 N.E. 38, 39
(Mass. 1934) (“It is of no consequence that Dwyer disobeyed the
owner’s instructions and permitted her son to operate the
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The hypothetical case contemplated in Mahoney matches up
with the allegations in Devlin’s complaint and the facts known to
Metropolitan. Mary Desrosier was allegedly negligent in
entrusting the Ford Taurus to Joseph Simone without informing him
that Matthew could not drive the vehicle under any circumstances.
Mary Desrosier was also allegedly negligent in failing to take
additional steps that would have secured the car from Matthew’s
unauthorized use. Alternatively, Devlin alleges that Simone
further negligently entrusted the vehicle to Matthew Desrosier.
As a result, Devlin is alleging that both Mary Desrosier and
Joseph Simone are “legally responsible for the accident” by way
of their negligent entrustment. Finally, the obstacle to coverage
in Mahoney is not present here. Mary Desrosier and Joseph Simone
both arguably had authority to entrust the vehicle to someone
else. For these reasons, Devlin’s complaint states claims that
could fall under Metropolitan’s insurance policy, thereby
activating a duty to defend, even if a jury does not ultimately
agree with this version of the facts. See Metro. Prop. & Cas. Co.
v. Morrison, 951 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Mass. 2011) (“The nature of the
claim and not the ultimate judgment against the insured triggers
automobile . . . The indemnity is not made contingent upon such a
person living up to the terms of a contract of bailment between
himself and the owner.”); Hurley v. Flanagan, 48 N.E.2d 621, 624
(Mass. 1943) (“Responsibility for operation of the motor vehicle
. . . is the test, not whether the particular operation was with
the express or implied consent of the owner.” (quotation marks
omitted)).
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the duty to defend even though the plaintiff may not succeed and
the claim may, in fact, be weak or frivolous.” (alterations,
ellipses, and quotation marks omitted)).3
The cases cited by Metropolitan are not to the contrary.
Locke and Picard stand for the basic proposition that
unauthorized drivers like Matthew Desrosier are not entitled to
any insurance benefits. See Locke, 624 N.E.2d at 617 (excluding
coverage for unauthorized driver); Picard, 802 N.E.2d at 589
(same). Similarly, in Vergato v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.,
741 N.E.2d 486 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001), the Court simply held that
the “owner” of a rental car is the rental car company. Id. at
489. As a result, only individuals authorized by the rental car
company to drive are “using” the vehicle with the consent of the
“owner.” Id. But these cases do not say anything about providing
benefits to those situated like Mary Desrosier and Joseph Simone,
who negligently entrusted their vehicles to others. As a result,
the Court denies Metropolitan’s motion for summary judgment with
respect to its duty to defend Mary Desrosier and Joseph Simone.
B.
Duty to Indemnify
Given the wide-ranging and disputed versions of the facts
3
At the summary judgment hearing, Devlin also presented an
alternative version of the facts where Mary Desrosier never
entrusted the vehicle to Simone. Instead, Mary negligently left
the keys unattended and unsecured, allowing Matthew to take the
Taurus for a joy ride before rear-ending Devlin. The Court
expresses no opinion as to whether Metropolitan would have a duty
to indemnify Mary Desrosier in these circumstances.
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that may be established at trial, the Court also denies the
motion for summary judgment on Metropolitan’s duty to indemnify
Mary Desrosier and Joseph Simone. See Newell-Blais Post No. 433,
Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co.,
487 N.E.2d 1371, 1374 (Mass. 1986) (“While an insurer’s
obligation to defend its ensured is measured by the allegations
of the underlying complaint, the obligation to indemnify does not
ineluctably follow from the duty to defend . . . The issue of
indemnification must await the completion of trial.” (internal
citations omitted)); House of Clean, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d 302, 310-11 (D. Mass. 2011)
(“The duty to indemnify, unlike the duty to defend, is determined
by the facts as they unfold at trial or in a settlement
agreement, rather than simply the pleadings.”).
IV. ORDER
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 58) is
ALLOWED IN PART. Metropolitan has no duty to defend or indemnify
Matthew Desrosier for his negligent operation of the Ford Taurus
because he was driving the Taurus without the owner’s consent.
The remainder of Metropolitan’s motion for summary judgment is
DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Docket No. 63) is DENIED AS
MOOT.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS
PATTI B. SARIS
United States District Judge
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