Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Devlin et al

Filing 71

Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: ORDER entered. For these reasons, Metropolitan's Motion for Clarification, Docket No. 68 is DENIED. (Geraldino-Karasek, Clarilde)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
)
)
)
) Civil Action No. 13-13126-PBS
v.
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)
SUSAN DEVLIN, MARY DESROSIER,
)
MATTHEW DESROSIER, and JOHN DOE, )
as personal representative of the )
ESTATE OF JOSEPH SIMONE,
)
Defendants.
)
)
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

Saris, U.S.D.J.
ORDER
May 12, 2015
Plaintiff Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance
Company (Metropolitan) moves for clarification regarding this
Court’s previous ruling allowing in part and denying in part
Metropolitan’s motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 67).
Metropolitan points out that the Court has already entered
default judgment against Defendants Mary Desrosier and Joseph
Simone. (Docket Nos. 25, 29). Also, Massachusetts courts
generally hold that an injured third party’s rights “stand no
higher than those of the insured whose rights against the insurer
he seeks to reach.” Cassidy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 154 N.E.2d
353, 356 (Mass. 1958). As a result, Metropolitan argues that, as
the injured third party, Defendant Susan Devlin will have no
right to collect anything beyond the compulsory bodily injury

coverage in Desrosier’s insurance policy.
This line of argument is neither original nor persuasive. It
has been tried before, and regularly rejected in courts around
the country. See Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345
(3d Cir. 1986) (“It would be anomalous to hold that the Griffiths
should not be given an opportunity to establish their case
against Kemper because of a default which they could not
prevent.”); Penn Am. Ins. Co. v. Valade, 28 F. App’x 253, 257
(4th Cir. 2002) (same); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Schulte, 302
F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1962) (same); Westchester Fire Ins. Co.
v. Mendez, 585 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[P]ermitting
another party to proceed is especially powerful in the context of
third-party liability insurance, where the insured may lose
interest and the injured party has the primary motivation to
pursue the claim.”); see also 7A Couch on Insurance § 106:5 (3d
ed. 2014) (“[A] default judgment against an insured and the
driver of his or her car in a declaratory relief action by
insurer would not preclude the injured person’s recovery against
the insurer.”); Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Legeyt, 2008 WL
5784218, at *4 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Dec. 30, 2008) (“Courts have held
that when an insured party is defaulted in a declaratory judgment
action brought by an insurer, the injured party is entitled to
remain in the suit and defend the action brought by the insurer.”
(collecting cases)).

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For these reasons, Metropolitan’s Motion for Clarification
(Docket No. 68) is DENIED.

/s/ PATTI B. SARIS
PATTI B. SARIS
United States District Judge

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