DeGrandis v. Children's Hospital Boston

Filing 33

Judge F. Dennis Saylor, IV: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Defendant's motion for reconsideration is GRANTED andplaintiff's LMRA § 301 claim (Count 2) is DISMISSED(Pezzarossi, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
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PAUL DEGRANDIS,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL BOSTON,
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Defendant.
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_______________________________________)

Civil No.
14-10416-FDS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
SAYLOR, J.
This is an employment dispute. Plaintiff Paul DeGrandis has brought suit against his
former employer, defendant Children’s Hospital Boston, alleging that the hospital unlawfully
terminated his employment. The complaint alleges breach of contract; breach of a collectivebargaining agreement under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
185; and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). The Court granted defendant’s motion as to the claim for breach of contract (Count
1) and the claim for breach of the implied covenant (Count 3), and otherwise denied it.
Defendant moved to reconsider the Court’s decision to deny its motion to dismiss with respect to
the claim for violation of a collective-bargaining agreement in violation of LMRA § 301 (Count
2). In the alternative, defendant requested that the case be certified for interlocutory review. For
the following reasons, that motion for reconsideration will be granted and Count 2 will be
dismissed.

I.

Background
A.

Factual Background

The facts are summarized below as set forth in the complaint unless otherwise noted.
Paul DeGrandis is a citizen of Florida. Children’s Hospital Boston is a hospital located
in Boston, Massachusetts.
In September 2003, DeGrandis was hired by Children’s Hospital to work as a carpenter.
His starting salary was $25.80 per hour.
At all times relevant to the complaint, Children’s Hospital was a party to a collectivebargaining agreement with the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 877, AFLCIO. The union represented various labor organizations, including the New England Regional
Council of Carpenters. While working for Children’s Hospital, DeGrandis was a member of the
union. He participated in the union’s central pension fund.
The CBA was originally effective from October 1, 2002, until September 30, 2007. It
was automatically extended each year unless a party gave ninety days’ notice of the agreement’s
termination. The CBA provided in part as follows:
The Hospital shall have the right to discharge, suspend, or discipline any employee
for just cause, which shall include, but not be limited to, the following grounds:
incompetence in performing his assigned duties; abusive or inconsiderate treatment
of patients, visitors, volunteers, or fellow employees; insubordination; material
misrepresentation on employment applications; the use of profane or obscene
language; stealing; unauthorized possession of Hospital property; consumption of
alcoholic beverages or intoxication while in the Hospital or on the Hospital grounds;
unlawful use of drugs or being under the influence of any drug while in the Hospital
or on the Hospital grounds; willful and deliberate destruction or damage to Hospital
supplies and/or equipment; disruption of Hospital routine; fighting; and conduct
detrimental to the best interests of the Hospital, personnel, volunteers, patients, and
visitors.
(Compl., Ex. 1 art. 23.1). In addition, the CBA outlined some of Children’s Hospital’s
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management rights, stating:
Except as there is contained in this Agreement an express provision limiting the
rights or discretion of the Hospital, all rights, functions, and prerogatives of the
management of the Hospital formerly exercised or exercisable by the Hospital
remain vested exclusively in the Hospital administration. Without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, the Hospital reserves to itself exclusively, the
management of the Hospital; the maintenance of discipline, order and efficiency, the
determination of operational policies; the right to subcontract work of a type
normally done by members of the bargaining unit . . . ; the direction of the working
force; the assignment of work; the procedures by which to establish and maintain the
record of hours worked; the right to hire, transfer, and promote; the right to lay off
employees for lack of work; the right, from time to time, and whenever in the
Hospital’s judgment it is necessary, to transfer employees temporarily from one job
to another; the right to promulgate and enforce all reasonable rules and regulations
relating to the operation of the Hospital, care of patients, and safety measures.
(Def. Mem., Ex. B art. 22.1).
Articles 17 and 18 of the CBA set up a grievance and arbitration procedure for “the
settlement of grievances which involve the interpretation and application of a specific provision
of” the CBA. (Id. art. 17.1). Article 17 provided that “[a]ll such grievances will be handled as
provided in this Article.” (Id.). Grievances that were not settled would be submitted to binding
arbitration. (Id. art. 18).
During his employment, DeGrandis was supervised by William Connelly. From 2004
through 2006, DeGrandis received positive employment evaluations. In each year, he met the
job performance standards for his employment. For example, his evaluation in 2004 stated that
“Paul’s knowledge of the tools of his trade are apparent in his work” and “Paul makes an extra
effort to help others.” (Compl., Ex. 2 at 6, 12). His 2005 evaluation stated that “Paul is very
good at completing the work that has been assigned to him.” (Compl., Ex. 3 at 5). His 2006
evaluation stated that “Paul pays attention to priority calls and completes as many as he can as
soon as he can.” (Compl., Ex. 4 at 7).
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DeGrandis contends, however, that Connelly harassed him and used foul language with
him. According to the complaint, “it became clear over time to DeGrandis that Connelly did not
like [DeGrandis] and wanted to terminate his employment.” The complaint alleges that
Connelly reported misleading information to Children’s Hospital to manufacture just cause for
terminating DeGrandis’s employment.
On June 29, 2007, DeGrandis injured himself at work lifting a barrel weighing more than
fifty pounds. His injury was reported to the workers’ compensation carrier. He returned to work
on July 2.
On July 19, DeGrandis injured his left ankle at work. The accident was also reported to
the workers’ compensation carrier. DeGrandis returned to work on July 23.
Shortly after those work-related accidents, Children’s Hospital proposed terminating
DeGrandis’s employment. In response, he filed a grievance through the union.
On July 30, DeGrandis injured his back at the workplace and was unable to work until
August 6. The workers’ compensation carrier was again informed of the injury.
On July 31, DeGrandis, represented by the union, entered into a memorandum of
agreement with Children’s Hospital. That agreement stated:
All parties hereby agree as a full and final resolution of the Union’s grievance for
Mr. Paul DeGrandis over proposed discipline for poor work performance, that any
further failure to comply with the Employer’s generally applicable work standards
during the 12 month period following the date of this agreement shall be grounds for
immediate termination, and that termination on that basis shall not be subject to the
grievance and arbitration provision of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.
(Compl., Ex. 5).
In 2007, DeGrandis received a performance evaluation that stated that he did not meet his
job performance standards that year. The evaluation stated that “Although it has been noted that
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Paul has completed work assigned to him, the work that he does takes a long time, well over the
industry standard for a carpenter.” (Compl., Ex. 6 at 5). It also stated that “Paul[‘s] limited
knowledge in construction of cabinetry has limited him in types of requests he can perform.”
(Id. at 6).
On January 23, 2008, DeGrandis slipped on spilled coffee on a step at work, injuring his
ankle. That injury was reported to the workers’ compensation carrier. He returned to work in
early February 2008.
Shortly thereafter, Connelly assigned DeGrandis to repair, among other things, a broken
shelf. DeGrandis determined that the shelf could not be repaired and needed to be replaced.
which would take more time than he was allotted. He informed his immediate superior of his
determination.
The following day, Connelly complained to DeGrandis that the shelf was still broken.
DeGrandis then made and installed a new shelf.
Connelly then contacted his supervisor, Paul Williams, seeking termination of
DeGrandis’s employment. On February 29, 2008, DeGrandis’s employment was terminated.
According to the termination notice, he was fired for “failure to meet job performance
standards.” (Compl., Ex. 9).
DeGrandis’s employment was terminated ten weeks before his pension vested. The
termination also occurred after he had been injured on the job and had filed a workers’
compensation claim.
B.

Procedural Background

On February 25, 2014, DeGrandis filed the complaint in this case. It alleged (1) breach

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of contract; (2) breach of the collective-bargaining agreement under the LMRA; and (3) breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
On July 8, 2014, defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. It contended
that (1) the state-law claims are preempted by the LMRA, (2) the complaint fails to state a
LMRA claim because it does not allege wrongdoing by the union, and (3) the LMRA claim was
not filed within the applicable limitations period. With respect to the LMRA claim, defendant
contended that plaintiff is required to bring a “hybrid” claim against both defendant and the
union, and the claim does not allege wrongdoing by plaintiff’s union. Defendant cited to
Connolly v. Boston Edison Co. for the proposition that plaintiff could only bring a hybrid claim
under the LMRA because he had exhausted the contractual remedies in the CBA. (Def.’s Mem.
Support Mot. Dismiss 14-15 n.5 (citing 2001 WL 575868, at *8 (D. Mass. May 15, 2001))).
On September 11, 2014, the Court issued a memorandum and order, granting defendant’s
motion as to the claim for breach of contract (Count 1) and the claim for breach of the implied
covenant (Count 3), and denying it as to Count 2, the claim for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement in violation of LMRA § 301. The Court concluded that because the
complaint did not allege misconduct by the union, it alleged a straight breach-of-contract claim
rather than a “hybrid” claim under the LMRA. In its memorandum and order, the Court cited to
Ramirez-Lebron v. International Shipping Agency, Inc., 593 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2010), in finding
that a separate cause of action under § 301 is available when an employer has repudiated the
grievance and arbitration procedures of a CBA. The Court concluded that plaintiff’s straight
breach-of-contract claim was permissible because defendant repudiated the grievance and
arbitration procedures in the CBA when it entered into the memorandum of agreement. (Mem &

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Order 15-16).
Defendant has filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the Court’s decision as
to Count 2. It contends that the Court’s holding with respect to Count 2 was erroneous for three
reasons: (1) there was no basis for the Court to consider the issue of repudiation; (2) even if the
issue of repudiation were properly before the Court, the memorandum of agreement did not
constitute a repudiation of the CBA by defendant; and (3) if defendant repudiated the grievance
procedures of the CBA by entering into the memorandum of agreement, then so did the union
when, as plaintiff’s representative, it accepted and endorsed the memorandum of agreement. In
the alternative, defendant requests that the case be certified for interlocutory review.
II.

Standard of Review
“While the Federal Rules do not provide for a motion to reconsider, a district court has

the inherent power to reconsider its interlocutory orders . . . .” Fernández-Vargas v. Pfizer, 522
F.3d 55, 61 n.2 (1st Cir. 2008). “When faced with a motion for reconsideration, a district court
must balance the need for finality against the duty to render just decisions.” Davis v. Lehane, 89
F. Supp. 2d 142, 147 (D. Mass. 2000). “[M]otions for reconsideration are appropriate only in a
limited number of circumstances: if the moving party presents newly discovered evidence, if
there has been an intervening change in the law, or if the movant can demonstrate that the
original decision was based on a manifest error of law or was clearly unjust.” United States v.
Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009).
Here, defendant seeks reconsideration of a motion to dismiss based on a manifest error of
law. On a motion to dismiss, the Court “must assume the truth of all well-plead[ed] facts and
give . . . plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness

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Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.
1999)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its
face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). That is, “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (citations omitted).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Dismissal is appropriate if the facts as alleged do
not “possess enough heft to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer
Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2008) (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
III.

Analysis
Defendant contends that the Court should not have considered the issue of repudiation.

Typically, such a situation arises when a defendant alleges that a plaintiff has failed to exhaust
contractual grievance procedures. Here, defendant contends that there was no such allegation.
In Ramirez-Lebron, the First Circuit explained that repudiation of grievance procedures can be
considered when the employer moves to dismiss based on the failure to exhaust contractual
remedies. 593 F.3d at 133 (“[I]f the employer denies the existence or the scope of its alleged
repudiation in a Section 301 suit and moves for dismissal of the action based on the failure to
exhaust contractual remedies, the issue raised is for the court after appropriate inquiry into the
circumstances.”); see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967) (“An obvious situation in
which the employee should not be limited to the exclusive remedial procedures established by

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the contract occurs when the conduct of the employer amounts to a repudiation of those
contractual procedures. In such a situation (and there may of course be others), the employer is
estopped by his own conduct to rely on the unexhausted grievance and arbitration procedures as
a defense to the employee’s cause of action.” (citations omitted)).
Unlike in Ramirez-Lebron, neither party in this case alleged that plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies, and plaintiff did not raise the issue of repudiation. The
parties in this case went through the formal grievance procedures as outlined in the CBA, and
plaintiff was represented by the union during the process. The result of the process was the
memorandum of agreement that purported to be “a full and final resolution of the [u]nion’s
grievance for [plaintiff].” (Compl. Ex. 5). Plaintiff therefore exhausted his administrative
remedies. Upon reconsideration, it would therefore appear that the issue of repudiation was not
properly before the Court.
Defendant further contends that even if the issue of repudiation were properly before the
Court, the memorandum of agreement was not an act of repudiation. As noted, the Court cited
Ramirez-Lebron in support of its conclusion that a repudiation occurred. That case involved a
“sham secret agreement” entered into by the employer and a small faction of employees, and the
court found that the “union ha[d] not wrongfully refused to process the employee’s grievance.”
593 F.3d at 132-34. Here, there was no such secret agreement; defendant and plaintiff, with the
union as his authorized representative, consented to the terms of the memorandum of agreement.
The memorandum of agreement was the culmination of the grievance procedure, and the
complaint does not allege facts sufficient to support a finding of deceit or bad faith on the part of
defendant in negotiating or agreeing to the memorandum.

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Defendant also contends that the memorandum of agreement was a “last-chance
agreement” that is an acceptable method of settling grievances. The First Circuit has permitted
last-chance agreements as a valid method to resolve grievances, and the court has not considered
such agreements to be a form of repudiation. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pac Corp., 306 F.3d 1162,
1165 n.2 (1st Cir. 2002); Locke v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 764 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2014); see also
Connolly, 2001 WL 575868, at *4. Furthermore, as defendant points out, “[e]ach of the other
circuit courts of appeal recognize and enforce last chance agreements as a valid method of
resolving grievances,” and “not one of these circuits has held that an employer’s use of a [l]ast
[c]hance [a]greement constitutes repudiation of the grievance procedures in the CBA.” (Def.’s
Mem. Support Mot. Reconsider at 6-8).1
Defendant further contends that if the memorandum of agreement constituted a
repudiation, the union would be equally culpable for waiving the grievance procedures without
providing for an alternative. If the union also repudiated the grievance procedures without
providing for a manner to resolve disputes, plaintiff could only bring a hybrid claim under
section 301. Upon reconsideration, the Court agrees with that contention. To prevail on a
hybrid claim, “the plaintiff ‘must prove both that the employer broke the [CBA] and that the
union breached its duty of fair representation, in order to recover against either [entity].’” Balser

1

See Taddeo v. County of Niagara, 413 Fed. App’x 397, 398 (2d Cir. 2011); United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Lukens Steel Co., 969 F.2d 1468, 1470 (3d Cir. 1992); Merck & Co. v. International
Chem. Workers Union Council of United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 94C, 335 Fed. App’x 300,
304 (4th Cir. 2009); International Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 351 v. Cooper Natural Resources, Inc., 163
F.3d 916, 919 (5th Cir. 1999); Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1184 (6th Cir. 1997); Tootsie Roll Indus.,
Inc. v. Local Union No. 1 Bakery, Confectionary & Tobacco Workers’ Int’l Union, 832 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1987);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 959 F.2d 1438, 1440 (8th Cir. 1992); Fuller
v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Runyon, 72 F.3d 137, 1995 WL 736258 (10th Cir. 1995);
Roberts v. Rayonier, Inc., 135 Fed. App’x 351, 356-57 (11th Cir. 2005); McCall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 839 F.2d 664,
667 (Fed. Cir. 1988); U.S. Dep’t of Air Force v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 949 F.2d 475, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

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v. International Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers (IUE) Local 201,
661 F.3d 109, 118 (1st Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Chaparro-Febus v.
International Longshoreman Ass’n, Local 1575, 983 F.2d 325, 330 (1st Cir. 1992)). It is wellestablished that courts determining hybrid claims under § 301 of the LMRA should import the
six-month limitations period from § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 25 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. DelCostello v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70 (1983); Adorno
v. Crowley Towing & Transp. Co., 443 F.3d 122, 126 (1st Cir. 2006). Therefore, even if
plaintiff’s § 301 claim were construed as a hybrid claim, the six-month limitations period would
have run.
Because the Court erroneously considered the issue of repudiation and concluded that the
memorandum of agreement constituted such a repudiation, the motion for reconsideration will be
granted. Plaintiff was required to bring a “hybrid” claim instead of a straight breach-of-contract
claim under § 301 of the LMRA. However, plaintiff’s complaint did not allege wrongdoing by
the union, and, in any event, the six-month limitations period for a “hybrid” claim has expired.
Accordingly, Count 2 will be dismissed.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and

plaintiff’s LMRA § 301 claim (Count 2) is DISMISSED.
So Ordered.

/s/ F. Dennis Saylor
F. Dennis Saylor IV
United States District Judge

Dated: April 30, 2015

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