Lynch v. United States of America

Filing 17

Magistrate Judge Marianne B. Bowler: ORDER entered. ORDER OF DISMISSAL. Remark: Order of Dismissal mailed to plaintiff on this date. (Patton, Christine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
DANIEL LYNCH,
Plaintiff,

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
14-10656-MBB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
March 9, 2017
BOWLER, U.S.M.J.
In March 2014, plaintiff Daniel Lynch (“plaintiff”), an
inmate at the Federal Medical Center Devens (“FMC Devens”) in
Ayer, Massachusetts, filed a pro se complaint asserting a
negligence claim against defendant United States of America
(“defendant”) based on inadequate medical care during his
incarceration at FMC Devens.

Defendant filed an answer in July

2014 and, after this court received various discovery responses
in September 2014, no activity in this case has occurred.
On January 13, 2017, this court issued a Show Cause Order to
plaintiff requiring him to show cause why this case should not be
dismissed for want of prosecution no later than February 17,
2017.

The Clerk mailed the Order to plaintiff’s address of

record and it has not been returned.
responded to the Order.

To date, plaintiff has not

The Order explicitly advised plaintiff

that a “[f]ailure to comply with this Order may result in the
dismissal of this case for want of prosecution.”

(Docket Entry #

16).
DISCUSSION
“[T]he effective administration of justice requires that
trial courts possess the capability to manage their own affairs.”
Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
2002); accord Vázquez-Rijos v. Anhang, 654 F.3d 122, 127 (1st
Cir. 2011) (“to operate effectively and administer justice
properly, courts must have the leeway ‘to establish orderly
processes and manage their own affairs’”).

Further, “The

authority to order dismissal in appropriate cases is a necessary
component of that capability.”
Inc., 304 F.3d at 4.

Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars,

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)

(“Rule 41(b)”) reinforces and augments this “inherent power of
trial courts to dismiss cases for want of prosecution or
disregard of judicial orders.”

Id.

Dismissal is nonetheless “one of the most draconian
sanctions” and ordinarily employed “‘only when a plaintiff’s
misconduct is extreme.’”

Vázquez-Rijos v. Anhang, 654 F.3d at

127 (quoting Young v. Gordon, 330 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2003)).
It is customarily appropriate only after the court determines
“‘that none of the lesser sanctions available’” is appropriate.
Malot v. Dorado Beach Cottages Associates, 478 F.3d 40, 44 (1st
Cir. 2007).

Factors to consider include “‘the severity of the

violation, the legitimacy of the party’s excuse, repetition of
violations, the deliberateness vel non of the misconduct,
mitigating excuses, prejudice to the other side and to the
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operations of the court, and the adequacy of lesser sanctions.’”
Id. (quoting Benitez-Garcia v. Gonzalez-Vega, 468 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2006)).

It is also appropriate to consider whether the

recalcitrant party received notice and an opportunity to be
heard.

Id.

Here, the docket evidences no activity since September 2014.
In addition to the protracted inaction, plaintiff disobeyed the
Show Cause Order and ignored the warning that a failure to file a
response may result in dismissal.

See Vázquez-Rijos v. Anhang,

654 F.3d at 128 (“we have upheld dismissals for ‘extremely
protracted inaction (measured in years), disobedience of court
orders, ignorance of warnings, [and] contumacious conduct’”).
The Show Cause Order afforded plaintiff notice of the possibility
of a dismissal and gave him an opportunity to be heard within a
defined time period.

See Malot v. Dorado Beach Cottages

Associates, 478 F.3d at 44-45.

Although there exists a “‘strong

presumption in favor of deciding cases on the merits,’”
García-Perez v. Hosp. Metropolitano, 597 F.3d 6, 7 (1st Cir.
2010), plaintiff’s failure to respond to the Show Cause Order
along with the two and a half year period of inaction evidences a
lack of interest in prosecuting this action on the merits.
Considering the totality of events, see Vázquez-Rijos v. Anhang,
654 F.3d at 127 (“court ‘should consider the totality of events’”
when choosing a sanction), including the prejudice to defendant,
a Rule 41(b) dismissal without prejudice, as opposed to the more
draconian dismissal with prejudice, is warranted.
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A final

judgment shall issue dismissing this case without prejudice.

/s/ Marianne B. Bowler
MARIANNE B. BOWLER
United States Magistrate Judge

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