Johnson v. Internal Revenue Service

Filing 19

Judge Richard G. Stearns: MEMORANDUM & ORDER entered granting 12 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying 13 Motion for Injunctive Relief; denying 14 Motion for Judicial Review. (RGS, law1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-cv-11269 -RGS
ROBERT JOHNSON
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
MEMORANDUM ON DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
August 1, 2014
STEARNS, J.
This matter is before the court on the motion of defendant United
States of America to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.1

Subsequent to the filing of the motion to

dismiss, plaintiff Robert Johnson filed a “Repeated Motion for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief,”2 a “Motion for Mandatory Judicial Review,” and a
“Judicial Notice in Support of an Order to Show Cause” with an attached
“Memorandum of Law.” It is not clear whether these filings are intended to

Although the named defendant is the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), the motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the United States,
asserting that it was “improperly named and sued as ‘Internal Revenue
Service.’” Def.’s Mot. (Dkt. #12) at 1.
1

The court dismissed Johnson’s first motion for preliminary
injunctive relief on April 20, 2014. See Dkt. #9.
2

serve as an opposition to the motion to dismiss.3 Nonetheless, the court
will treat them as such as the time to file a formal opposition has expired.
As the court noted in denying Johnson’s prior motion for “emergency
preliminary injunctive relief,” the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a),
mandates that, with limited exceptions, “no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in
any court by any person, whether or not such person in the person against
whom such tax was assessed.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). For this reason, the
Complaint must be dismissed, as further explained below.
In his Complaint, Johnson requests that the court order the IRS to
“release all levies and liens against the TAXPAYERS” and “release current
wage garnishments with TAXPAYERS respective employers.” Compl. ¶¶ 8
& 9. Johnson elaborates on his request in subsequent filings, arguing for:
relief from [the IRS’s] actions to collect on an ACCOUNT that
they have agreed is closed, namely
1) Existing wage garnishments levied against TAXPAYERS with
TAXPAYERS employers
2) Existing levies on all asset accounts in the name of
TAXPAYER
Dkt. #13, at 5 (emphasis in original).

The United States responded to these filings in an opposition dated
July 17, 2014.
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2 

Despite Johnson’s protestations,4 the requested relief squarely places
this action in the category of suits maintained “for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of [a] tax,” prohibited by § 7421(a).
Regardless of whether a taxpayer is ultimately correct or incorrect in his or
her belief that a tax assessment is inaccurate and that a collection action is
as a result unwarranted, the Anti-Injunction Act serves “to withdraw
jurisdiction from the state and federal courts to entertain suits seeking
injunctions prohibiting the collection of federal taxes.” Enochs v. Williams

In response to the court’s denial of his request for an emergency
preliminary injunction, Johnson filed a “conditional acceptance and
repeated motion for preliminary injunctive relief” containing statements
such as the following:
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5. The PLAINTIFF conditionally accepts the courts reference to
the Anti-Injunction Act . . . on proof of claim that
A. this suit seeks to restrain the DEFENDANT in any way for
collecting the taxes due to them from the TAXPAYER
B. this suit seeks to restrain any assessment of the amount due
for the ACCOUNT’
C. the PLAINTIFF ever disputed the amounts due presented by
the DEFENDANT and that the PLAINTIFF did not establish
a private agreement and SETTLEMENT with the
DEFEDANT that setoff, settled, and closed the ACCOUNT
D. that further attempts to collect on an ACCOUNT the
DEFENDANT has agreed is closed is not UNJUST
ENRICHMENT and CONVERSION.
E. the DEFENDANT did not agree to the SETTLEMENT, and
the account between the DEFENDANT and the TAXPAYERS
is not setoff, settled, and closed.”
Dkt. #13 (emphasis and punctuation as in original).
3 

Packing & Navigation Co., Inc., 370 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1962). That the taxpayer’s
belief in the wrongfulness of the levy collection is based on an alleged
contract (here a purported agreement by the IRS to “zero-out” his account)
makes no difference.5 This case does not fall under any statutory or judicial
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, and therefore, if Johnson wishes to
appeal to the courts to resolve his alleged dispute with the IRS, he must
first pay the contested tax and then sue for a refund. See Enochs, 370 U.S.
at 7 (“The manifest purpose of s 7421(a) is to permit the United States to
assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and
to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit
for refund.

In this manner the United States is assured of prompt

collection of its lawful revenue.”).

Johnson has repeatedly requested an “in camera review” of a set of
self-generated documents that he alleges to constitute a contract between
him and the IRS whereby the IRS (by failing to respond) agrees discharge
all of his debts and “close” his account. Whatever the propriety (or lack
thereof) of an ex parte review, Johnson’s claim is a familiar strophic form in
the literature of tax protest. See, e.g., Standifird v. Augustine, 1994 WL
637351, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 30, 1994) (noting that plaintiff’s contract claim
was “frivolous on its face” and that “the plaintiff’s mere ‘presentment’ of the
nonexecuted agreement he drafted to [the IRS] is insufficient to create a
contract between them, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s apparent reliance on
inapplicable provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.”).
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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the United States motion to dismiss is
ALLOWED.

Plaintiff’s various miscellaneous motions are collectively

DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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