Johnson v. Internal Revenue Service

Filing 9

Judge Richard G. Stearns: ORDER entered denying 8 Motion for Injunctive Relief. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order, Plaintiff's Motion is denied. Plaintiff Johnson is directed to serve the Complaint on defendants in this action, if he has not done so already, and defendants are ordered to respond to the Complaint, once served, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (RGS, law1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-11269-RGS
ROBERT G. JOHNSON
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EMERGENCY PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
April 20, 2014
STEARNS, J.
On April 11, 2014, Plaintiff Robert Johnson filed a motion requesting
“Emergency Preliminary Injunctive Relief.” Dkt. #8. Johnson attached a
certificate of service indicating that he sent a copy of the motion, via
registered mail, to the United States Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts, to the Department of Justice in Washington DC, and to the
local office of the Internal Revenue Service, on April 10, 2014.1 For the
reasons set forth below, the court will deny the motion requesting an
emergency preliminary injunction.

Johnson’s prior “(Ex Parte) Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunctive
Relief” was denied without prejudice on March 27, 2014, for lack of service.
See Dkt. #7. There is still no indication on the docket that the Johnson has
served the Complaint in this matter.
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The test governing a request for a preliminary injunction “requires
consideration of (1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the
potential for irreparable harm, (3) a balancing of the relevant equities, and
(4) the effect on the public interest.” Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d
467, 470 (1st Cir. 1995) (collecting cases). “Likelihood of success is the
main bearing wall of the four-factor framework.”

Ross-Simons of

Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996).
Johnson has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, and
thus his request for a preliminary injunction must be denied.2 The only
relief requested in Johnson’s Complaint is “emergency preliminary
injunctive relief to release current wage garnishments with TAXPAYERS
respective employers.” Compl. ¶ 8. Because the relief requested in the
Complaint is, itself, injunctive in nature (and related to tax collection), it is
in fact unlikely that Johnson’s claims will succeed on the merits, even when
viewed with the benefit of the indulgent eye that the court often affords
pleadings drafted by pro se litigants. See, e.g., Instituto de Educacion
Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 209 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000)
“[A]n evidentiary hearing is not an indispensable requirement when a
court allows or refuses a preliminary injunction.” Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
862 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1988).

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(noting that “complaints drafted by non-lawyers are to be construed with
some liberality”).
The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), dictates that, with
limited exceptions, “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). See also Enochs v. Williams Packing &
Navigation Co., Inc., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (“The manifest purpose of
[section] 7421(a) is to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes
alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal
right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund. In this
manner the United States is assured of prompt collection of its lawful
revenue.”).
Johnson did not allege or reference any exceptions to this general rule
in his Complaint or in his most recent motion. Further, his request for
emergency preliminary injunctive relief simply recited the boilerplate
language that “[t]here is a substantial likelihood of success based on the
merits of this case,” but again failed to relay any facts supporting such an
assertion. Pl.’s Mot. (Dkt. #8) ¶ 5. While Johnson did provide some more
factual detail with regard to the “irreparable harm” factor, alleging that the
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current levies will cause immediate harm to him monetarily and to his
employer relationship,3 this cannot cure his inability to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits in the underlying action. It is wellsettled that a taxpayer cannot maintain a suit in contravention of the AntiInjunction act “merely because collection would cause an irreparable
injury, such as the ruination of the taxpayer's enterprise.” Enochs, 370 U.S.
at 6.
ORDER
Plaintiff’s Request for Emergency Preliminary Injunctive Relief is
DENIED. Johnson is directed to serve the Complaint on defendants in this
action, and defendants are ordered to respond to the Complaint, once
served, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Johnson alleges that he and his wife, who is not a party to this action,
“have positions with financial institutions that require Series 7 and 65
licenses” and that the levy action “restricts their ability to do business in
various states . . . and restricts any possibilities in possible advancements or
career moves.” Pl.’s Mot. ¶6.
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