Medeiros v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission

Filing 19

Judge George A. OToole, Jr: ORDER entered granting 9 Motion to Dismiss; denying 12 Motion to Appoint Counsel (Danieli, Chris) (Main Document 19 replaced on 4/13/2015) (Danieli, Chris).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-11612-GAO
ROBERT G. MEDEIROS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS GAMING COMMISSION,
Defendant.

ORDER
April 13, 2015
O’TOOLE, D.J.
Proceeding pro se, Robert Medeiros alleges that the Massachusetts Gaming Commission
(“MGC”) improperly denied him an occupational license to drive harness race horses on the
basis of his age. Medeiros was born in 1944. He asserts violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Age Discrimination
Act of 1975 (“ADA”). MGC has since filed a motion to dismiss.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must take all factual allegations in the
complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, conclusory allegations
unsupported by facts are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). As a preliminary matter, Medeiros does
not satisfy these pleading standards. His allegations are threadbare at best.
Medeiros’ claims fail for other reasons as well. For one, Title VII does not create a cause
of action for age-based discrimination. Lennon v. Rubin, 166 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1999). Similarly,
both the ADEA and Title VII only impose liability on employers. Camacho v. P.R. Ports Auth.,
369 F.3d 570, 572 (1st Cir. 2004) (ADEA); Alberty-Velez v. Corporacion de P.R. para la

Difusion Publica, 361 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (Title VII). Nowhere does Medeiros allege that he
had any type of employment relationship with MGC, and it is well settled “that state licensing
and regulatory agencies generally are not regarded as employers vis-à-vis those whom they
license and regulate.” Camacho, 369 F.3d at 578. Accordingly, his claims for age discrimination
under the ADEA and Title VII would fail on these grounds alone.
Moreover, as a branch of the Commonwealth, MGC is immune from private suit for
damages in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Hudson Sav. Bank v. Austin, 479 F.3d
102, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2007). There are situations where a state may be subject to suit, such as
where Congress abrogates its immunity or where the state has consented to be sued. Id. But the
ADEA does not abrogate the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity, Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90-91 (2000), and, to the extent Eleventh Amendment immunity is
abrogated under Title VII, see Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69, 81 (1st Cir. 2009), that
claim fails for the reasons already discussed. In addition, the ADA only allows suits against state
entities for “program[s] or activit[ies] receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 6102.
Neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint contains any allegations that MGC receives
financial assistance from the federal government. See Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F. Supp. 1214,
1222-23 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (explaining that a state program must receive federal financial
assistance, rather than a general benefit, to be subject to a claim under the ADA). Similarly,
Medeiros’ claims for injunctive relief fail as such relief may only be obtained against state
officers sued in their official capacities, and not stage agencies. Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d
89, 92 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Appellants having sued only state agencies, not officials, there is no
basis for invoking Ex parte Young.”).

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For the foregoing reasons, MGC’s Motion to Dismiss (dkt. no. 9) is GRANTED.
Medeiros’ Motion to Appoint Counsel (dkt. no. 12) is DENIED.
It is SO ORDERED.
/s/ George A. O’Toole, Jr.
United States District Judge

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