Labadie v. Worcester Superior Court

Filing 5

Judge Douglas P. Woodlock: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying Emergency Writ of Prohibition (#1). This action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without assessment of the filing fee.(PSSA, 4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
GEORGE LABADIE,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
14-11686-DPW

WORCESTER SUPERIOR COURT,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
For the reasons state below, the Court denies plaintiff’s
Emergency Writ of Prohibition (#1) and dismisses this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without assessment of the filing
fee.
BACKGROUND
George Labadie, an inmate confined to the Old Colony
Correctional Center, filed his self-prepared “Emergency Writ of
Prohibition” naming as defendant the Worcester Superior Court.
Labadie seeks to enjoin criminal proceedings in Worcester
Superior Court, including re-sentencing,1 pursuant to the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
Labadie’s conviction stems from a 2002 robbery of a credit
union and the subsequent arrest of Labadie and his wife, who was
an employee of the credit union.

The Supreme Judicial Court

recently found that on the charge of bank embezzlement, Labadie
was entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the credit union
was not a “bank” within the meaning of G.L. c. 266, § 52.

1

See

The Docket Sheet for Commonwealth v. Labadie, WORC200602474, indicates that on April 30, 2014, Labadie’s original
sentence was revised to 4-5 years.

Commonwealth v. Labadie, 467 Mass. 81, 3 N.E.3d 1093 (Feb. 5,
2014).

The SJC remanded to the trial court for entry of

conviction of the lesser included offense of larcency by
embezzlement in violation of M.G.L. c. 266, § 30) and for resentencing on that lesser offense.
Here, Labadie argues that, as a tactical defense strategy,
the jury was never instructed on the lesser included offense.
Because of this, Labadie contends, he cannot be re-sentenced on
the lesser included offense because this would not have been an
available option at the time of his original sentencing.

Labadie

asserts that the instant Writ of Prohibition is his only recourse
for challenging the SJC ruling.
REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a
threshold review of prisoner complaints in civil actions that
seek redress from a governmental entity or officers or employees
of a governmental entity, and to summarily dismiss any claims
that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A; Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United
States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001).

Because Labadie is

proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his allegations
liberally.

See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972);
2

Rodi

v. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2004).
DISCUSSION
Labadie seeks relief pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a).

Section 1651(a) empowers federal courts to

issue writs of mandamus where "necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions." See In Re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653,
656 (1st Cir. 1993).
However, the Anti–Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, provides
that a federal court “may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized ...,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.” Id.; see Murphy v. Bank of America
N.A., No. 12-11034, 2010 WL 4764591 at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 5 2012)
(“The Anti-Injunction Act is an absolute prohibition against any
injunction of any state-court proceedings unless the injunction
falls within one of the three specifically-defined exceptions in
the statute.”)(citation omitted).

Because of the Anti–Injunction

Act, this Court cannot, and will not, enjoin the state court
criminal proceedings.

Labadie’s remedy is to file an appropriate

appeal in state court.
Even if Labadie’s request was not barred by the
Anti–Injunction Act, it would be barred in accordance with the
abstention doctrine first announced in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971).

Younger abstention is rooted in the

“longstanding policy against federal court interference with
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state court proceedings” and in principles of comity. Younger,
401 U.S. at 43, 44; In re Justices of the Superior Ct. Dept. of
the Mass. Trial Ct., 218 F.2d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2000).

The

Younger doctrine “is a court-made rule of abstention built around
the principle that, with limited exceptions, federal courts
should refrain from issuing injunctions that interfere with
ongoing state-court litigation.” Maymo–Melendez v.
Alvarez–Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2004).

A federal

district court should abstain when the desired relief would
“interfere (1) with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2)
that implicates an important state interest; and (3) that
provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to
advance his federal constitutional challenge.” Rossi v. Gemma,
489 F.3d 26, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2007).
Here, Younger abstention would be appropriate.

First,

granting Labadie’s request would interfere with ongoing state
criminal proceedings.

See Rossi, 489 F.3d at 35.

Second, his

prosecution implicates important state interests of promoting
public safety and retaining authority over state criminal
proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Haws, 131 F.3d 1205, 1210 (7th
Cir. 1997)(applying Younger abstention when state criminal
defendant sought declaratory and injunctive relief); Davis v.
Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that "Younger
itself settled the importance of the state's interest in criminal

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proceedings"); Spencer v. Massachusetts, No. 13-11922, 2014 WL
1404699 at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2014) (applying Younger
abstention when state habeas petitioner challenged two ongoing
state-court proceedings); Jackson v. Worcester Police Dep’t., No.
10-40132, 2010 WL 4273821 at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2010)
(explaining that Younger itself solidified the importance of the
state's interest in criminal proceedings); Massachusetts v.
Azubuko, 616 F. Supp. 2d 174, 177 (D. Mass. 2009)(applying
Younger abstention when state criminal defendant attempted to
remove his case to federal court).
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED
1.

The Emergency Writ of Prohibition (#1) is DENIED; and

2.

This action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
without assessment of the filing fee.

SO ORDERED.
July 28, 2014
DATE

/s/ Douglas P. Woodlock
DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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