Blake v. Medeiros

Filing 38

Magistrate Judge Donald L. Cabell: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered denying without prejudice 29 Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Russo, Noreen)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

RONALD BLAKE,

Civil Action No. 14-cv-11845-IT

Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SEAN MEDEIROS,
Defendant.

CABELL, Magistrate Judge:
Petitioner Ronald Blake (“Petitioner” or “Blake”), previously convicted in the state court
on charges of armed robbery, assault and battery, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon,
and kidnapping, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court on April 28,
2014. Petitioner subsequently moved on three separate occasions to have counsel appointed to
represent him. [dkt #2, 17, and 25]. The Court denied all three motions without prejudice and
indicated it would be in a better position to assess Petitioner’s request after he submitted his
memorandum in support of his habeas petition. Petitioner did so on November 28, 2014. [dkt
#28]. As briefed therein, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred when it refused to suppress
evidence of an allegedly impermissibly suggestive photo identification procedure. Petitioner also
contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate the
reasonableness of the Commonwealth’s suggested timeline for the crime. Now before the Court
is Petitioner’s fourth motion for the appointment of counsel. [dkt #29].
I.

Legal Standard

There is no constitutional or statutory right to appointment of counsel in a habeas case. Ellis v.
United States, 313 F.3d 636, 652 (1st Cir. 2002); Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.

1986). However, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) permits the Court to appoint counsel for a
financially eligible petitioner in a habeas case whenever the Court “determines that the interests of
justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). The decision to appoint counsel is within the
Court’s discretion, Cookish, 787 F.2d at 2, and while the statute does not set forth specific criteria,
the First Circuit has held that courts may consider “the indigent’s ability to conduct whatever
factual investigation is necessary to support his or her claim, the complexity of the factual and
legal issues involved, and the capability of the indigent litigant to present the case.” Id. at 3. In
deciding whether justice requires the appointment of counsel, the First Circuit has also considered
the likelihood of success on the merits of a petitioner’s claims. See United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d
1058, 1063-64 (1st Cir. 1993). Generally, an indigent litigant must demonstrate “exceptional
circumstances” to justify the appointment of counsel. Cookish, 787 F.2d at 2.
II. Analysis
The Court has reviewed both Blake’s motion to appoint counsel as well as his memorandum of
law in support of his habeas petition. Blake advances three grounds in support of the instant
motion. First, he asserts that he is indigent, second that neither he nor fellow volunteer prisoners
are “adequately trained to litigate a case with this level of complexity” and third, that “[t]he
extraordinary circumstances of this case and the interest of justice justify the appointment of
counsel.”
As a threshold matter, there does not appear to be any dispute that the Petitioner is “financially
eligible.” Blake is currently incarcerated, and he has submitted an affidavit establishing his lack
of assets or income. [dkt #2]. However, the mere fact that Blake may be financially eligible for
appointment of counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) does not establish any exceptional
circumstances warranting appointment. See Cookish, 787 F.2d at 2 (holding that an indigent

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litigant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances to warrant the appointment of counsel).
Moreover, the fact that Blake is not “adequately trained to litigate a case with this level of
complexity” does not establish exceptional circumstances warranting appointment. Rather, lack
of legal training is insufficient to justify the appointment of counsel. Lucien v. Spencer, 534 F.
Supp. 2d 207, 209-10 (D. Mass. 2008) (citing DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir.
1991); Cookish, 787 F.2d at 2-3)). As noted above, the primary ground for relief in Blake’s petition
is that he was denied due process due to a suggestive photo lineup. Blake will be required to
undertake little factual investigation to develop this claim. Similarly, the factual and legal issues
are not complex and Blake appears adequately equipped to present the case. His filings with this
Court are coherent and inform the Court of the relief Blake seeks.
Finally, Blake’s assertion that the “extraordinary circumstances of this case and the interest of
justice justify the appointment of counsel” is nothing more than a conclusory statement, and after
reviewing Blake’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and the Respondent’s memorandum of law,
it appears that Blake is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his petition in its current form.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the interests of justice do not weigh in favor of
appointing counsel at this time. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). As such, Blake’s motion to
appoint counsel is denied, without prejudice.
III. Order
It is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel [dkt #29] is DENIED,
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Donald L. Cabell
DONALD L. CABELL
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: May 19, 2015
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