Spinnato v. Goldman et al

Filing 27

Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM and ORDER entered. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant Goldman's motion to dismiss 13 is ALLOWED in part with respect to the claims for contribution and breach of fiduciary duties while serving as Ansin's attorney and while testifying in the undue influence suit. The motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED. (Geraldino-Karasek, Clarilde)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
JAMES SPINNATO,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARTIN C. GOLDMAN,
Defendant.

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CIVIL NO. 14-12443-PBS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
December 19, 2014
SARIS, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff James Spinnato is the heir and former co-executor
of the estate of Winnie Ansin, an elderly widow he befriended
more than a decade before her death. Martin C. Goldman was
Ansin’s estate attorney and is currently the co-executor of her
estate. Spinnato alleges that Goldman encouraged Ansin’s
relatives to file suit against him for undue influence, despite
repeatedly assuring Spinnato that Ansin’s estate planning
documents were valid and his relationship with her was proper.
Spinnato asserts claims for breach of fiduciary duties,
fraudulent misrepresentation, tortious interference with the
expectancy of a gift, and contribution. He seeks $300,000 in
damages. Goldman has moved to dismiss. After a hearing, the
motion to dismiss is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part.
1

ALLEGED FACTS
The complaint alleges the following facts, some of which are
disputed.
I. Estate Planning of Winnie Ansin
Winnie R. Ansin, a Massachusetts widow, was a client of
Goldman’s from about 1995 until her death in 2011. Goldman, who
resides in Massachusetts, is an attorney with a practice focusing
on probate and estate administration. Goldman prepared a Last
Will and Testament for Ansin, which she signed and he notarized
on August 29, 1995. The heirs listed in that will were Runnae
Spriggs, Kathy Cash, Patti Harrison, Sydney Marie Cash, Charles
Waldrop, Harold Cash, James Cash, and David Cash. All were
Ansin’s distant relatives, and all but Waldrop lived in Texas and
did not regularly see or contact Ansin during the last twenty
years of her life.
Spinnato, who resides in New Hampshire, met Ansin in 1998,
and they became friends soon afterward. Both considered the
relationship akin to mother and son, and they would remain
friends until Ansin’s death. The two frequently met for coffee
and regularly shared meals, and Spinnato sometimes ran errands
for Ansin such as grocery shopping. Around April 2000, Ansin
moved to Brooksby Village, an assisted living facility in
Peabody, Massachusetts, with Spinnato’s help.
Ansin introduced Spinnato to Goldman, her estate planning
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attorney, in 2005. Spinnato and Goldman met each other five or
six times over the years, and Goldman was always cordial and
stated his belief that Spinnato was Ansin’s best friend. He never
mentioned believing that their relationship was improper. Goldman
told Spinnato that Ansin had expressed a wish to give Spinnato
the bulk of her assets either upon her death or prior to it
through the use of joint accounts, and indicated that he approved
of Ansin’s plan.
In 2006, Ansin sought Goldman’s services to change her
estate plan to reflect her relationship with Spinnato. On March
29, 2006, she executed a First Codicil to her will and a Durable
Power of Attorney in favor of Spinnato. Goldman drafted and
notarized both documents. The codicil made Spinnato and Goldman
co-executors of Ansin’s estate, and made Spinnato a major heir of
the estate. The codicil changed several bequests, including
providing that Spinnato and another friend of Ansin’s, Josephine
Pucillo, would receive the $200,000 apartment deposit Ansin had
given to Brooksby Village. Goldman told Spinnato that both
documents reflected Ansin’s true intent, and never suggested that
Ansin was incompetent or subject to undue influence.
Subsequently, Ansin and Spinnato relied on Goldman’s
representations about the validity of the documents to conduct
their estate and long-term financial planning.
Beginning in May 2007, with the advice and assistance of

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legal counsel, her financial adviser, and a social worker at
Brooksby Village, Ansin began the process of transferring four
assets to Spinnato outside of probate: the Brooksby Village
deposit, a Salem Five account, an Eastern Bank account, and a
Hartford Annuity/UBS Investment account. Ansin made Spinnato a
joint owner of the two bank accounts, and executed a transfer-ondeath agreement for the UBS investment account instructing that
upon her death Waldrop should receive 30 percent of the account
and Spinnato should receive 70 percent. The transfers were
executed with the proper formalities.
On January 24, 2008, Ansin executed a Second Codicil to her
will which made Spinnato the sole beneficiary of the Brooksby
Village deposit and removed Pucillo as a beneficiary. Goldman
drafted and notarized the codicil, and indicated that there was
nothing improper about the change. He was also aware of the
transfer agreements that had been executed for the Salem Five and
Eastern Bank accounts, and indicated to Spinnato and Ansin that
those transfers were legal and proper.
Between 2008 and 2011, Spinnato and Ansin continued their
friendship, and Goldman occasionally checked in with Ansin
regarding her estate planning. No further changes were made to
her will.
II. Probate and Dispute with Texas Heirs
Ansin died on March 26, 2011. Spinnato informed Goldman of

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Ansin’s death, and Goldman said that he would handle the probate
of the estate. Goldman encouraged Spinnato to hire Betsy Rooks as
the estate attorney, but did not disclose that Rooks is his
daughter. Spinnato hired her, and paid the requested retainer.
On April 26, 2011, Rooks filed with the Probate Court a
petition for Probate of the Will, Bond of Executors, and the Will
with Codicils. She represented that the will and codicils were
valid documents, and informed the court that the estate was worth
less than $50,000 because of the assets that had already been
properly transferred outside of probate. On July 7, 2011, Rooks
informed the Probate Court that all interested parties, including
Ansin’s heirs in Texas, had received notice of the petition for
probate and had not objected. The court approved the will and
codicils, and the appointment of Goldman and Spinnato as coexecutors, on October 25, 2011.
Unbeknownst to Spinnato, shortly after Ansin’s death Goldman
contacted her Texas relatives and alleged that Spinnato
wrongfully transferred Ansin’s assets away from them outside of
probate when Ansin was either incompetent or subject to
Spinnato’s undue influence. Goldman also put the Texas relatives
in contact with a Massachusetts attorney who could help them
prepare a case against Spinnato for undue influence. Goldman
assisted the Texas heirs and their attorneys in preparing their
case by using his position as co-executor to obtain documents

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from UBS, Salem Five, and Eastern Bank, and sharing those
documents with them. Goldman told them that the value of Ansin’s
estate actually exceeded $1 million. During this period, Goldman
took no action to close the estate, and did not disclose to
Spinnato any of his communications with the Texas heirs.
In May 2012, the Texas heirs filed suit against Spinnato in
the Superior Court of Massachusetts, alleging that he had
instigated the transfer of the UBS, Salem Five, and Eastern Bank
accounts and the Brooksby Village deposit via undue influence. In
the litigation, Goldman signed an affidavit setting forth facts
which supported the heirs’ claim. In a deposition, he initially
testified that he “didn’t think [Ansin] was under duress” from
Spinnato, but on the following day he stated: “I thought she was
under undue influence from the day I met Mr. Spinnato.” Goldman
also made statements suggesting Ansin was not competent to
execute the legal documents that transferred her assets to
Spinnato. Other witnesses in the case, such as Waldrop, Ansin’s
physician, her social worker, and her friends from Brooksby
Village, testified that they believed Ansin was competent to make
her own decisions and that they never observed her to be under
any duress from her relationship with Spinnato.
As a result of the information Goldman provided to the
heirs, which independently corroborated the claim of undue
influence, Spinnato was unable to secure dismissal of the suit

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against him and instead opted for mediation. He agreed to a
settlement in which he would pay a portion of the non-probate
assets to the Texas heirs. He states that but for Goldman’s
conduct, he would not have had to settle the case for any amount.
Spinnato filed suit against Goldman alleging breach of
fiduciary duty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and tortious
interference with the expectancy of a gift.1 Spinnato also seeks
contribution for a portion of the amount he paid to settle the
Texas heirs’ undue influence suit. He alleges $300,000 in
damages. Goldman has moved to dismiss all of Spinnato’s claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient facts which “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The court “must take the allegations in the complaint as
true and must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiffs.” Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate where the
pleadings fail to set forth “factual allegations, either direct
or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to
sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gooley v.

1

Spinnato also filed a malpractice claim against Betsy
Rooks, but the parties settled shortly after a hearing on Rooks’s
motion to dismiss.
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Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Typically on a motion to dismiss, the deciding court cannot
consider information outside the four corners of the complaint.
See Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3. The First Circuit recognizes
“narrow exceptions” to this rule “for documents the authenticity
of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public
records; for documents central to plaintiff’s claim; or for
documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.” Id.
DISCUSSION
I. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Spinnato argues that Goldman owed him fiduciary duties in
his roles as both a co-executor and an heir of Ansin’s estate.
Spinnato contends that Goldman violated those duties in three
ways: 1) during Ansin’s life, by failing to disclose to Spinnato
his belief that Ansin’s estate planning documents and outside
probate transfers were invalid due to undue influence; 2) as coexecutor of the estate after Ansin’s death, by failing to
disclose to Spinnato that he was communicating with the banks and
the Texas heirs to aid in their filing of an undue influence
claim; and 3) during the Texas heirs’ undue influence suit, by
falsely testifying that Ansin had been subject to undue influence
when she transferred her assets to Spinnato. Whether Goldman owed
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any fiduciary duties to Spinnato when he took each of these
actions depends upon the legal relationship between the two
individuals at the relevant times. Because the nature of their
relationship shifted over time, the Court will address each
permutation in turn.
A. Goldman as Ansin’s Attorney, Spinnato as Potential Heir
While Ansin was alive and conducting her estate planning,
Goldman was solely her attorney and had no attorney-client
relationship with Spinnato. During Ansin’s life, Spinnato’s only
status was that of a potential heir to her estate. In
Massachusetts, “an attorney is not absolutely insulated from
liability to nonclients. [A]n attorney owes a duty to nonclients
who the attorney knows will rely on the services rendered.”
Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549, 552 (1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted), quoting Page v. Frazier, 388 Mass. 55, 65 (1983)
and Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 404 Mass. 515, 524
(1989). However, “where an attorney is also under an independent
and potentially conflicting duty to a client, we are less likely
to impose a duty to nonclients.” Spinner, 417 Mass. at 552
(internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Page, 388 Mass. at
63.
Because of the potential for conflicting interests,
testators’ attorneys do not owe a duty to prospective
beneficiaries when drafting a will. See Miller v. Mooney, 431

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Mass. 57, 64 (2000). In Miller, the children and heirs of a
decedent sought to sue their mother’s estate attorney for legal
malpractice, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation
“based on erroneous statements he made during their mother’s
lifetime regarding the terms of her will.” Id. at 57-58. The
court stated that “[i]n preparing an estate plan and distributing
property, either through a will or through inter vivos trusts,
attorneys can have only one client to whom they owe a duty of
undivided loyalty.” Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted),
quoting Symmons v. O’Keeffe, 419 Mass. 288, 200 (1995). Assessing
the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court reasoned that
“[i]f a duty arose as to every prospective beneficiary mentioned
by the client, . . . [a]ttorneys could find themselves in a
quandary whenever the client had a change of mind, and the
results would hasten to absurdity.” Miller, 431 Mass. at 64.
Accordingly, “[t]he nature of the attorney-client relationship
that arises from the drafting of a will necessitates against a
duty arising in favor of prospective beneficiaries.” Id., citing
Logotheti v. Gordon, 414 Mass. 308, 312 (1993) (holding that duty
runs to testator, not to heirs at law); cf. Spinner, 417 Mass. at
553 (holding that a trustee’s attorney does not owe a duty of
care to trust beneficiaries in advising the trustee).
Like the plaintiffs in Miller, while Ansin was alive
Spinnato had no personal attorney-client relationship with

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Goldman, and was merely a prospective heir of her estate. Goldman
did not owe him any fiduciary duties in this capacity because he
owed an undivided duty of loyalty to Ansin and the imposition of
duties to Spinnato would have created the possibility of
conflict. Although Spinnato argues that no conflict existed
because both he and Ansin wanted her will effectuated, the
Supreme Judicial Court has stated that “it is the potential for
conflict that prevents the imposition of a duty . . . . [A]n
isolated instance [of] identity of interests between [the
attorney’s client and the nonclients] would not support the
imposition of a duty.” Spinner, 417 Mass. at 554. Consequently,
Goldman’s failure to disclose his concerns about undue influence
to Spinnato during Ansin’s life cannot support a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty.
B. Goldman as Co-executor and Spinnato as Co-executor and
Heir
Spinnato asserts that Goldman’s actions after Ansin’s death
- the failure to disclose communications with the Texas heirs,
and falsely testifying in their suit that Spinnato unduly
influenced Ansin’s estate planning - violated fiduciary duties
owed to Spinnato as both a co-executor and an heir of the estate.
There is no support for the argument that the relationship
between two co-executors gives rise to fiduciary duties. Coexecutors owe duties not to one another, but to the estate itself
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and its beneficiaries. See Alford v. Thibault, 83 Mass. App. Ct.
822, 824 n.2 (2013) (“An executor owes a fiduciary duty to the
beneficiaries of an estate.”); Onanian v. Leggat, 2 Mass. App.
Ct. 623, 625 (1974) (“The fiduciary duty of an executor . . . is
owed to and enforceable by the beneficiaries of the estate . . .
.”); see also Markell v. Sidney B. Pfeifer Foundation, Inc., 9
Mass. App. Ct. 412, 443 (1980) (describing the executor-legatee
relationship as “strictly fiduciary”).
As co-executor, Goldman did owe fiduciary duties to Spinnato
as an heir. “[A] fiduciary owes a duty of full disclosure to his
or her principal . . . .” Passatempo v. McMenimen, 461 Mass. 279,
294 (2012). Specifically, a fiduciary must disclose to his
principal “information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to
him and which . . . the principal would desire to have.” Gagnon
v. Coombs, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 144, 156 (1995), quoting Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 381. As an heir to Ansin’s estate whose
rights might be affected if her estate planning documents were
found to be invalid, Spinnato would have wanted to know that
Goldman contacted the Texas heirs to allege undue influence and
encourage them to file a lawsuit. Goldman’s failure to disclose
such information to Spinnato violated his fiduciary duty of full
disclosure as co-executor of Ansin’s estate. Accordingly,
Spinnato has stated a plausible claim against Goldman based on
the alleged facts.

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However, to the extent that one of Spinnato’s claims for
breach of fiduciary duty rests on Goldman’s testimony during the
undue influence suit, the claim is not viable. The complaint
alleges that Goldman breached his fiduciary duties to Spinnato
during the Texas heirs’ lawsuit by changing his testimony from
the first day of the deposition to the second day, falsely
stating that he believed Ansin had been unduly influenced. Under
Massachusetts law, “communications made in the institution or
conduct of litigation or in conferences and other communications
preliminary to litigation are subject to absolute privilege,” and
cannot form the basis for a civil action against the speaker.
Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 932 (1st Cir. 1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted), citing Sullivan v. Birmingham, 11 Mass.
App. Ct. 359, 367-68 (1981) (holding that although the privilege
originated from policy concerns about defamation claims based on
statements made in the course of litigation, it applies to all
causes of action). Goldman’s testimony is protected by the
absolute witness privilege, and thus cannot form the basis of
Spinnato’s claim against him.
Goldman’s motion to dismiss is ALLOWED with respect to the
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty predicated either on his
testimony or on actions taken during Ansin’s life. The motion is
DENIED with respect to actions taken as co-executor of Ansin’s
estate, in relation to Spinnato as an heir of that estate.
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II. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Spinnato alleges that Goldman made affirmative, fraudulent
misrepresentations to him during Ansin’s life when he stated his
belief in the validity of the estate planning documents which
made Spinnato an heir and of Ansin’s outside probate transfers to
Spinnato. Spinnato also contends that after Ansin’s death,
Goldman fraudulently misrepresented his intent to have the will
and codicils probated as written.
Under Massachusetts law, to state a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation a plaintiff must show that “(i) the defendant[]
made a false representation of material fact with knowledge of
its falsity for the purpose of inducing him to act thereon, (ii)
[the plaintiff] relied upon the representation as true and acted
upon it to his detriment, and (iii) that his reliance was
reasonable under the circumstances.” Rodi v. Southern New England
School of Law, 532 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2008), citing Masingill
v. EMC Corp., 449 Mass. 532, 540 (2007).
The complaint sufficiently alleges each element of
fraudulent misrepresentation. Goldman stated in his deposition
during the Texas heirs’ lawsuit that he believed that Ansin was
under undue influence “from the moment [he] met Mr. Spinnato.”
Consequently, Spinnato argues that Goldman’s representations to
Spinnato about the validity of Ansin’s estate planning documents
and asset transfers to Spinnato must have been knowing

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falsehoods. Similarly, Spinnato contends that Goldman’s statement
that he intended to have the will probated as written was
demonstrated to be false when he contacted the Texas heirs to
encourage an undue influence suit after Ansin’s death. The
alleged facts permit the reasonable inference that Goldman
intentionally made those false statements. Spinnato alleges he
detrimentally relied upon Goldman’s misrepresentations by
organizing his long-term financial planning based upon them.
Additionally, Goldman’s statements allegedly led Spinnato to
forbear taking action to dispel concerns about undue influence
and avoid the Texas heirs’ lawsuit, or otherwise to ensure the
validity and successful probate of Ansin’s estate planning
documents.
Goldman argues that he did not owe Spinnato a duty of care
with respect to any statements about the estate planning
documents and asset transfers. In Miller, a court found that the
beneficiaries to an estate could not sue the decedent’s attorney
for negligent misrepresentations made during the decedent’s life
because the attorney did not owe the beneficiaries a duty of
care. Miller, 431 Mass. at 64. However, here Spinnato does not
allege negligence, but rather claims that Goldman committed the
intentional tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. Though the law
is unsettled in this area, no case law indicates that a
prospective beneficiary cannot assert a claim for fraudulent

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misrepresentation against a decedent’s attorney. Further, after
Ansin died, Goldman allegedly expressed his intent to pursue the
probate of her estate as written in the will and codicils.
“[S]tatements of present intention as to future conduct may be
the basis for a fraud action if . . . the statements misrepresent
the actual intention of the speaker and were relied upon by the
recipient to his damage.” Zhang v. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 606 (1963) (alteration in
original), citing Barrett Assocs., Inc., v. Aronson, 346 Mass.
150, 152 (1963); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 530.
Goldman’s motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to the
fraudulent misrepresentation claim.
III. Tortious Interference with the Expectancy of a Gift
Spinnato contends that Goldman tortiously interfered with
his expected inheritance from Ansin by creating estate planning
documents during Ansin’s life and later undermining those
documents by encouraging the Texas heirs to sue Spinnato for
undue influence. Neither party briefed the claim. A claim for
tortious interference with the expectancy of a gift has three
elements: 1) “[t]he defendant must intentionally interfere with
the plaintiff’s expectancy in an unlawful way”; 2) “[t]he
plaintiff must have a legally protected interest”; and 3) “[t]he
plaintiff must show that the defendant’s interference acted
continuously on the donor until the time the expectancy would
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have been realized.” Labonte v. Giordano, 426 Mass. 319, 320-21
(1997). Unlawful interference “include[s] duress, fraud, or undue
influence.” Id. at 321 n.4.
Massachusetts case law on this tort is scarce, but one case
is roughly analogous to the facts at issue here: In Lewis v.
Corbin, the defendant fraudulently induced a testatrix to execute
a codicil to her will with only one witness, rendering it void.
195 Mass. 520, 523 (1907). The codicil was intended to give a
legacy to the plaintiff, who subsequently sued the defendant in
tort. Id. The court held that the testatrix “was fraudulently
induced [by the defendant] to express [her donative intent]
ineffectually, when she supposed that she had made a legal and
valid codicil. Plainly such fraudulent conduct was a wrong upon
the plaintiff as well as upon the testatrix.” Id. at 525; cf.
Sacramone v. Cranney, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 1106, at *1 (2004)
(unpublished) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant
lawyer accused of tortious interference in part because there was
no evidence he encouraged the testator to incorporate informal
mechanisms into her estate plan that he as a lawyer knew were
unenforceable, in breach of his fiduciary relationship with her).
As alleged in the complaint, during Ansin’s life, Goldman
interfered with her intent to include Spinnato in her will by
fraudulently executing changes to her estate plan that were
favorable to Spinnato despite his existing concerns about undue

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influence, which he only surfaced after her death. Given the lack
of briefing, in light of these allegations the Court DENIES the
motion to dismiss the tortious interference claim at this stage
of the litigation.
IV. Contribution
Spinnato seeks contribution from Goldman for a portion of
the money he paid to the Texas heirs under the settlement
agreement. Spinnato argues that if Goldman truly believed Ansin
to be subject to undue influence and nevertheless executed the
estate planning documents that made Spinnato an heir, then
Goldman is a joint tortfeasor in the alleged undue influence. As
such, Spinnato contends that Goldman is liable to him in
contribution for the settlement of the undue influence lawsuit.
The court may consider the contents of the settlement agreement
to decide Goldman’s motion to dismiss because the document is
referred to in the complaint and is central to Spinnato’s claim.
Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B § 1(a) provides that joint
tortfeasors have “a right of contribution among them even though
judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.”
Where a tort claim has been resolved by a settlement payment from
one tortfeasor, rather than by a judgment, “his right of
contribution shall be barred unless he has either (1) discharged
by payment the common liability . . ., or (2) agreed while action
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is pending against him to discharge the common liability and has
within one year after the agreement paid the liability . . . .”
Id. at § 3(d). The settlement agreement must expressly discharge
the liability against all tortfeasors from whom the settling
tortfeasor will seek contribution. See Med. Prof’l Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Breon Laboratories, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 120, 124-25 (D. Mass.
1997) (holding that plaintiff was barred from seeking
contribution from Breon for settlement of negligence claim
because the settlement agreement did not expressly refer to
Breon, and thus did not discharge Breon’s liability), citing
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B § 4 (“When a release or covenant not to
sue . . . is given in good faith to one of two or more persons
liable in tort for the same injury, [i]t shall not discharge any
of the other tortfeasors from liability unless its terms so
provide.”).
The settlement agreement does not purport to discharge any
liability against Goldman. On behalf of Kathy Cash and the other
Texas heirs, the agreement states that it “hereby release[s] and
forever discharge[s] James Spinnato . . . Individually and as CoExecutor of the Estate of Winnie R. Ansin and as Co-Trustee of
the Winnie Ansin Family Trust . . . and all of his attorneys . .
. his agents, insurers, and employers . . . from all” liability
for any claims they had against him, including those in the undue
influence litigation. Dkt. 25, Ex. D. There is no mention of

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Goldman in the release provision, and no suggestion anywhere in
the agreement that the Texas heirs considered him a joint
tortfeasor with Spinnato. Because a claim for contribution by a
joint tortfeasor is barred unless a judgment or settlement has
discharged the common liability, which has not occurred here,
Goldman’s motion to dismiss Spinnato’s contribution claim is
ALLOWED.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant Goldman’s motion to
dismiss (Docket No. 13) is ALLOWED in part with respect to the
claims for contribution and breach of fiduciary duties while
serving as Ansin’s attorney and while testifying in the undue
influence suit. The motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED.

/s/ Patti B. Saris
Patti B. Saris
Chief United States District Judge

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