Fenn v. Mansfield Bank
Filing
17
Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: MEMORANDUM & ORDER entered denying 7 Motion to Dismiss (Danieli, Chris)
United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
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RYAN FENN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MANSFIELD BANK,
Defendant.
Civil Action No.
14-12554-NMG
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This case arises out of a dispute between Ryan Fenn
(“plaintiff”) and his former employer, Mansfield Bank
(“defendant”).
Plaintiff contends that defendant misclassified
him as exempt from overtime pay otherwise mandated by state and
federal law and alleges that he was unlawfully terminated
because of his association with his disabled wife.
Pending
before the Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts III and
IV of plaintiff’s amended complaint which concern only the
associational discrimination claims.
For the reasons that
follow, the motion will be denied.
I.
Background
A.
Factual Background
The Court summarizes only the facts stated in the complaint
that are relevant to ruling on the instant motion.
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Plaintiff is a resident New Bedford, Massachusetts.
He
began working for defendant as a “Systems Administrator” in May
2013.
His principal responsibility in that position was to
update defendant’s computer systems.
In January, 2014, plaintiff was told that he would have to
attend a week-long training session in Burlington,
Massachusetts.
Prior to that time, he informed his manager as
well as other employees of defendant that his wife was disabled
on account of her suffering from lupus, Raynaud’s disease and
rheumatoid arthritis.
Plaintiff felt that the distance he would
need to travel for the mandatory training session would create a
hardship for him because of his need to care for his wife in New
Bedford.
Accordingly, he repeatedly asked his manager if he could
either take the training session in Providence, Rhode Island or
online.
Plaintiff’s requests were denied, leading him to
request a meeting with the human resources manager, along with
his manager and the IT manager, about the issue.
At the meeting, held on April 21, 2014, plaintiff described
his wife’s disabilities and expressed the hardship it would
cause him if he were required to commute to the training in
Burlington.
He again requested that he be permitted to take the
class closer to his home in New Bedford or online.
At the
conclusion of the meeting, the human resources manager
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reportedly told him that before making any final decision they
would meet again the following day after considering plaintiff’s
request overnight.
Instead, before the end of the day, defendant abruptly
terminated plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that he was fired
because of his association with his disabled wife and he asserts
that defendant harbored animosity against him for asking for
special consideration.
B.
Procedural History
Plaintiff subsequently filed suit in this Court in June,
2014, alleging both federal and state statutory violations in a
three-count complaint.
In September, 2014, plaintiff filed an
amended complaint that asserted a fourth claim against
defendant.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint raises claims against
defendant for (1) violations of overtime wage laws, specifically
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (Count I) and
M.G.L. c. 151, § 1A (Count II), and (2) violations of employment
discrimination laws, specifically M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16) (Count
III) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(4) (Count IV).1
In November, 2014, defendant filed the instant motion to
dismiss Counts III and IV of plaintiff’s amended complaint.
1
Count IV is incorrectly labeled in the amended complaint as a
second “Count III.”
-3-
II.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
A.
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
Asufficient factual matter@ to state a claim for relief that is
actionable as a matter of law and Aplausible on its face.@
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
In considering the
merits of a motion to dismiss, a district court assesses “the
sufficiency of the complaint’s factual allegations in two
steps.” Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 43 (1st
Cir. 2013).
First, a court ignores conclusory allegations
mirroring legal standards. Id.
Second, it accepts the remaining
factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences
in the plaintiff’s favor, thereafter deciding if the plaintiff
would be entitled to relief. Id.
A complaint does not state a
claim for relief where the well-pled facts fail to warrant an
inference of any more than the mere possibility of misconduct.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Stated another way, a plaintiff’s well-
pleaded facts “must possess enough heft” to establish that he is
entitled to relief. Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d
76, 84 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
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B.
Analysis
1.
Count III: Violation of M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16)
Count III of plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that
defendant violated M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16) when it fired him,
allegedly because of his association with his handicapped wife.
Chapter 151B, § 4(16) establishes in relevant part that an
employer may not
dismiss from employment or ... otherwise discriminate
against, because of his handicap, any person alleging
to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of
performing the essential functions of the position
involved with reasonable accommodation.
This Session of this Court held, in Ayanna v. Dechert LLP,
840 F. Supp. 2d 453, 457 (D. Mass. 2012), that M.G.L. c. 151B,
§ 4(16) is intended to regulate employers’ actions with respect
to handicapped employees and does not afford standing to nonhandicapped employees merely based on their association with a
handicapped person.
The Court, inter alia, relied on the plain
language of the statute which did not encompass “associational”
discrimination and noted that any cause of action for
associational discrimination ought to emanate from the
Massachusetts legislature.
Subsequently, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that “associational discrimination based on handicap
is prohibited under § 4(16).” Flagg v. AliMed, Inc., 466 Mass.
23, 37 (2013).
In so holding, the SJC noted its disagreement
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with the decision in Ayanna to preclude claims of associational
discrimination brought under § 4(16). Id. at 37 n.27. Therefore,
because a federal court “employs the method and approach
announced by the state’s highest court” when it interprets a
state law, the Court must determine if the Flagg decision
encompasses plaintiff’s claim. Perez v. Greater New Bedford
Vocational Technical Sch. Dist., 988 F. Supp. 2d 105, 110 (D.
Mass. 2013).
In Flagg, the plaintiff asserted a claim alleging that the
defendant fired him because it wanted to avoid the obligation to
pay for his wife’s costly medical treatment. Id. at 27.
The
SJC, inter alia, analogized to later-enacted comparable federal
laws and opted to read the statutory language broadly in light
of its remedial purpose as a “wide-ranging law” aimed at
striking against workplace discrimination. Id. at 30, 33-34.
Thus, in concluding that § 4(16) encapsulated associational
discrimination, the SJC stated
[w]hen an employer subjects an otherwise satisfactory
employee to adverse employment decisions premised on
hostility toward the handicapped condition of the
employee's spouse, it is treating the employee as if
he were handicapped himself—that is, predicated on
discriminatory
animus,
the
employer
treats
the
spouse's handicap as a characteristic bearing on the
employee's fitness for his job. The employee is
thereby
subjected
to
the
type
of
prejudice,
stereotypes, or unfounded fear relating to handicapped
individuals that [the statute] seeks to protect
against.
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Id. at 30 (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff contends that the SJC’s holding in the Flagg case
clearly supports finding that he has properly stated a claim
under § 4(16).
Defendant instead urges the Court to rely on the
concurring opinion of now-Chief Justice Gants, who noted the
limited holding of the decision. Flagg, 466 Mass. at 42 (Gants,
J., concurring) (“The court's finding of a cognizable claim here
is based solely on the allegation that he was fired because the
employer feared the medical expenses his spouse was likely to
incur because of her handicap.”).
Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s claim essentially
posits only that he was fired by defendant for demanding a work
accommodation on account of his disabled wife which defendant
was unwilling to allow.
Defendant would be correct, and its
motion to dismiss Count III would be allowed, if that were all
plaintiff’s claim asserted. See id. at 32 n.18 (“we have no
occasion to consider whether an employee with a handicapped
spouse himself is entitled to reasonable accommodation on
account of his spouse's condition”); Id. at 42 (Gants, J.,
concurring) (“the court's opinion does not suggest that an
employer is required under § 4(16) to provide reasonable
accommodation to an employee who is not himself handicapped to
allow the employee to attend to important family matters,
medical or otherwise”).
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Plaintiff’s complaint, however, is not so narrowly pled.
Instead, plaintiff clearly alleges that he was fired because of
his association with his disabled wife, not merely because he
asked for an accommodation on account of her disability that
defendant was unwilling to give.
He contends that his wife’s
disability was a determining factor in defendant’s abrupt
decision to terminate him and that defendant harbored animosity
against him even for asking for the accommodation.
Such
allegations, which the Court is obligated to assume as true at
this stage of the litigation, sufficiently assert that
defendant’s decision to terminate him was “premised on hostility
toward the handicapped condition of [his] spouse” and, thus, was
“because of his association with his handicapped wife.” Id. at
30, 37.
The Court hastens to add, however, that its decision is
based solely on the face of the amended complaint.
If discovery
demonstrates that plaintiff was fired merely because defendant
was unwilling to make an accommodation to his work schedule,
summary judgment in defendant’s favor may well be warranted.
No
such accommodation is owed to plaintiff on account of his wife’s
disability and the Flagg decision cannot reasonably be construed
as an extension of § 4(16) to protect against any such actions
by employers.
Even under the SJC’s expansive statutory reading,
associational discrimination claims under § 4(16) are limited.
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Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss as
to Count III.
2.
Count IV: Violation of 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(4)
Count IV of plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that
defendant also violated 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(4) when it fired him,
allegedly because of his association with his handicapped wife.
Employment discrimination under Section 12112(b)(4) includes
excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits
to a qualified individual because of the known
disability of an individual with whom the qualified
individual is known to have a relationship or
association.
Thus, unlike the plain language of M.G.L. c. 151B (4)(16), the
ADA explicitly proscribes associational discrimination.
Associational discrimination claims under § 12112(b)(4) are
nevertheless limited as well.
For example, the provision does
not “obligate employers to accommodate the schedule of an
employee with a disabled relative.” Erdman v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 582 F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2009) (drawing distinction
between statutory language in § 12112(b)(4) and (5)).
Thus,
claims under § 12112(b)(4) are limited to instances where
plaintiffs allege they were terminated “because of” the
disability of an associate. Id.; see also Oliveras-Sifre v. P.R.
Dep’t of Health, 214 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that
§ 12112(b)(4) is aimed at protecting “qualified individuals from
adverse job actions based on unfounded stereotypes and
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assumptions arising from the employees' relationships with
particular disabled persons”).
As such, to make out a prima facie case of associational
discrimination under § 12112(b)(4), a plaintiff must establish
that (1) he was qualified for the job when the adverse
employment action was taken, (2) there was in fact an adverse
employment action, (3) at that time he was known by his employer
to have a disabled relative and (4) the “action occurred under
circumstances that raises a reasonable inference that the
disability of the relative was a determining factor” in the
employer’s decision. Stansberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp.,
651 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Den Hartog v. Wasatch
Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Defendant once again selectively reads plaintiff’s complaint
in moving to dismiss Count IV.
Defendant argues that it was not
required to accommodate plaintiff’s request and thus cannot be
liable under § 12112(b)(4).
There is no question that defendant
was under no obligation to acquiesce to plaintiff’s request not
to have to attend the training session in Burlington,
Massachusetts. See Erdman, 582 F.3d at 510 (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.8, App. (“an employer need not provide [an] employee
without a disability with a reasonable accommodation because
that duty only applies to qualified ... employees with
disabilities”)).
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Thus, defendant would have been permitted to reconvene with
plaintiff the following day and deny his request for an
accommodation.
Until plaintiff was explicitly so told, however,
he had no opportunity to accept defendant’s arbitrary decision
and endure the purported hardship.
Had plaintiff then
persisted, defendant would have been within its legal rights to
terminate his employment.
But plaintiff does not contend that he was fired merely
because of an unaccepted request for accommodation.
Instead, he
alleges that his wife’s disability was a determining factor in
defendant’s termination decision, evidenced by the fact that
management originally promised to consider his request
overnight, only to change course and fire him before the end of
the workday.
Plaintiff asserts that sudden decision to terminate him was
motivated by animus and hostility regarding his association with
his disabled wife. See Erdman, 582 F.3d at 510 (remarking that
§ 12112(b)(4) “clearly refers to adverse employment actions
motivated by the known disability of an individual with whom an
employee associates, as opposed to actions occasioned by the
association”) (internal quotations omitted).
Such allegations
sufficiently plead a prima facie case of associational
discrimination under § 12112(b)(4).
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It may ultimately be determined that defendant’s prior
knowledge of the disability of plaintiff’s wife sufficiently
undercuts his discrimination claim. See id. at 511 (holding that
record was “devoid of evidence” indicating that the plaintiff’s
termination was motivated by her daughter’s disability because
the defendant had known about it for years prior to her
termination).
Defendant, however, did not raise the issue in
its motion to dismiss.
Nor is there sufficient factual evidence to consider
properly what non-discriminatory justification might have caused
defendant’s precipitous change of course.
As this case
progresses, plaintiff will need to establish conclusively that
defendant based its termination decision upon some sort of
animosity or prejudice towards plaintiff’s disabled spouse but
such proof is not required at the pleading stage.
Accordingly, when drawing all reasonable inferences in
plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that he has alleged
sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss on Count IV.
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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss
Counts III and IV of the amended complaint (Docket No. 7) is
DENIED.
So ordered.
_/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton____
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated February 12, 2015
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