Holloman v. Deakin et al

Filing 15

Judge Douglas P. Woodlock: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. The clerk shall issue summonses with respect to defendants Gill, Ferrarra, Maine, Mendonsa, Spencer, ODell, Gelb, Ladouceur, Owens, Fedel, Diagneault. The claims against defendants De akin, Clarke, Bender, Russo, Brodbeck, Maenpaa, Thornton, Berdard, Williams, Fasoli, Tocci, Palodian, MacDonald, Rodrigues and Wendover shall be dismissed in 42 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order unless Holloman demonstrates good cause, in writing, why his claims against these remaining defendants should not be dismissed. The clerk shall send the summonses, Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the plaintiff, who must thereafter serve the defendants in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The plaintiff may elect to have service made by the United States Marshal Service. (PSSA, 4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
TAJUAN HOLLOMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
14-12594-DPW

HAROLD CLARKE, et al.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WOODLOCK, D.J.
On June 9, 2014, plaintiff Tajuan Holloman (“Holloman”),
formerly in custody as a pre-trial detainee at the Suffolk County
Jail and currently in custody at MCI Shirley, filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary and
declaratory relief.

By Order dated July 28, 2014, plaintiff’s

motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted and Holloman was
assessed an initial, partial filing fee.

See Docket No. 5.

On

April 8, 2015, plaintiff’s motion to transfer the name of the
lead defendant was granted.

See Docket No. 14.

Because Holloman is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis,
his complaint is subject to preliminary screening.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 (proceedings in forma pauperis); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
(screening of prisoner suits against governmental officers and
entities).

For the reasons state below, the Court directs

summons to issue as to the following eleven (11) defendants:
Gill, Ferrarra, Maine, Mendonsa, Spencer, O’Dell, Gelb,
Ladouceur, Owens, Fedel and Diagneault.

The claims against

defendants Deakin, Clarke, Bender, Russo, Brodbeck, Maenpaa,
Thornton, Berdard, Williams, Fasoli, Tocci, Palodian, MacDonald,
Rodrigues and Wendover shall be dismissed in 42 days of the date
of this Memorandum and Order unless Holloman demonstrates good
cause, in writing, why his claims against these remaining
defendants should not be dismissed for the reasons stated below.
SCREENING
Section 1915 authorizes federal courts to dismiss actions in
which a plaintiff seeks to proceed without prepayment of fees if
the action lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), or if the action
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii).

In forma

pauperis complaints may be dismissed sua sponte and without
notice under § 1915 if the claim is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or factual allegations that are clearly
baseless.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-328;

Denton v. Hernandez,

504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
Section 1915A also authorizes the Court to review prisoner
complaints in civil actions in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity, or officers or employees of a
governmental entity, and to dismiss the action regardless of
whether or not the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if the
complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, fails to state
2

a claim, or seeks relief from a defendant immune from such
relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, the factual allegations in a complaint must
“possess enough heft” to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

"Plausible, of

course, means something more than merely possible, and gauging a
pleaded situation's plausibility is a context-specific job that
compels [the Court] to draw on [its] judicial experience and
common sense."

Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669

F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).

Dismissal

is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth factual
allegations respecting each material element necessary to sustain
recovery under a legal theory.

Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d

301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008).
In conducting the preliminary screening, the Court construes
Holloman's pro se complaint generously.
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972);

See Haines v. Kerner,

Rodi v. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d

5, 13 (1st Cir. 2004).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's civil rights complaint consists primarily of a
recounting of events beginning with Holloman’s 2010 transfer from
the Suffolk County Jail to MCI Concord as a pre-trial detainee
and continuing through several subsequent events occurring at the
3

Souza Baranowski Correctional Center from 2010 through 2013.
The fifty-two page complaint is brought against the
following twenty-six (26) correctional officials and employees:
(1) Harold Clarke, former Commissioner of the Massachusetts
Department of Correction (“DOC”); (2) James Bender, former Deputy
Commissioner of the DOC; (3) David Deakin, Assistant District
Attorney for Suffolk County; (4) Bruce Gelb, former
Superintendent of MCI Concord; (5) Lois Russo, former Deputy
Superintendent of Operations at MCI Concord; (6) John Brodbeck,
former Director of Security at MCI Concord; (7) Jorma Maenpaa,
former Director of Security at MCI Concord; (8) Anthony Mendonsa,
Superintendent and former Deputy Superintendent at the Souza
Baranowski Correctional Center (“SBCC”); (9) Luis Spencer,
Commissioner of Correction; (10) Nick Palodian, SBCC mail clerk;
(11) Thomas Tocci, SBCC grievance coordinator; (12) Amy Owens,
SBCC Treasurer; (13) Pamela O’Dell, SBCC grievance coordinator;
(14) Kristie Ladouceur, DOC Administrative Resolutions
Coordinator; (15) Frank Maine, SBCC correctional officer; (16)
Aaron Gill, SBCC Sargent correctional officer; (17) defendant
Ferrarra, SBCC Lieutenant correctional officer; (18) Jeffrey P.
Diagneault, SBCC correctional officer; (19) Sargent Fasoli, SBCC
correctional officer; (20) James C. Thornton, SBCC superior
supervisor; (21) Gregory A. Bedard, SBCC lieutenant with
disciplinary office; (22) Shelley Williams, SBCC captain and

4

shift commander; (23) defendant MacDonald, SBCC Deputy of
Security; (24) Michael Rodrigues, SBCC Deputy Superintendent of
Operations; (25) Thomas Fedel, SBCC disciplinary officer; and
(26) defendant Wendover, SBCC correctional officer.
The complaint contains thirty-two counts under federal and
state law.

Counts I, III, and V are claims for violation of the

Declaration of Rights under the Massachusetts Constitution, Mass.
Gen. Law c. 231A.

In Count VII, a claim concerning the

constitutionality of Mass. Gen. Law c. 276, § 52A is alleged.
The remaining twenty-eight (28) counts, Counts II, IV, VI, VIII XXXII, are claims for cruel and unusual punishment, denial of due
process, denial of equal protection, denial of the right to
petition for redress of grievances and denial of access to the
courts in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The following facts are alleged in the complaint.

On

December 2, 2010, Holloman was detained at the Suffolk County
Jail on Nashua Street.

See Compl., ¶ 31.

The following day, on

December 3, 2010, Holloman was transferred to MCI Concord.
at ¶ 32.

Id.

Holloman alleges that defendants Clarke, Bender and

Deakin knew, or should have known, that their agreement and
approval of such a transfer pursuant to [M.G.L. c. 276, §] 52A
was unconstitutional.

Id.

When Holloman’s defense attorney

communicated to the state court plaintiff’s desire to be returned

5

to the Suffolk County Jail, Assistant District Attorney Deakins
“pressed the court to keep plaintiff at the DOC state prison.”
Id. at ¶ 39.
Upon arrival at MCI Concord, Holloman was placed in
handcuffs and leg irons, placed in segregation without notice or
hearing, and his requests to speak with staff were ignored.
at ¶¶ 33-34.

Id.

Holloman complains that he was left in "inhumane"

conditions for 7 days, id. at ¶ 35, causing severe emotional and
physical distress.

Id. at ¶ 38.

Those conditions included

“sleeping without a mattress, denied to shower, and being
confined to a cell for 24 hours a day without recreation, having
no access to the law library or general library, and having no
access to the telephone to call his attorney or family.”
¶ 35.

Id. at

When Holloman sought to file a grievance and requested

writing materials, he was suddenly transferred, without notice,
to the SBCC maximum facility.”

Id.

Holloman contends that defendants Brodbeck, Maenpaa, Russo,
and Gelb knew, or should have known, that plaintiff was denied
due process and that the conditions constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at ¶ 36.
On or about December 8, 2010, Holloman was housed in a
double-bunked cell with a sentenced inmate. Id. at ¶ 43.
Holloman complained to defendant Burdock who instructed him to
address his concern to Deputy Superintendent Mendonsa.

6

Id.

Holloman’s request to Mendonsa for transfer to single cell was
denied in writing by defendant Mendonsa.

Id.

On three occasions, on or about September 26, 2011,
defendant Palodian refused to mail several of Holloman's letters
to his attorney stating that "CPCS-subcontracted lawyer not
considered legal."

Id. at ¶ 52.

On October 5, 2011, Holloman filed a mail-related grievance
with defendant Tocci, whose summarily denied the grievance in an
untimely reply.

Id. at ¶¶ 53-57.

On or about October 20, 2011, Holloman was moved to another
housing unit and was again placed in a double-bunked cell with a
sentenced inmate.

Id. at ¶ 45.

Holloman contends that his

request for a single bunk “was ignored, denied, and rejected by
being made subject to punitive treatment and conditions of
confinement placed on Awaiting Action status (“AA”) isolation
segregation to his cell without due process and made to suffer
six months loss of contact visits without due process as
addressed to him by letter from Mendonsa.”

Id. at ¶ 46.

Holloman contends he was forced to speak with his attorney
through a non-contact visiting room window.

Id. at ¶ 47.

Although he contends that he was placed in segregation for six
months without a hearing, id., he alleges that he received a
disciplinary report four days later on October 24, 2011.
¶ 48.

Id. at

Holloman complains that the disciplinary report was

7

dismissed without a hearing on November 1, 2011.

Id.

Holloman

alleges that he received no response to his letter to Spencer
complaining about Mendonsa.

Id. at ¶¶ 49-50.

On October 27, 2011, Holloman attempted to send mail under
the "indigent" mail procedures and his mail was returned on the
ground that Holloman was not indigent under DOC regulations.
at ¶¶ 58-59.

Id.

Holloman believes defendant Owens is responsible

for denying his indigent mail request and failed to respond to
his written complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 60-61.
On January 9, 2012, Holloman filed a grievance related to
Owens’ denial of his indigent mail request. Id. at ¶ 62. O’Dell
denied th grievance and the appeal was denied by Mendonsa.

Id.

LaDouceur concurred with the denial on administrative review. Id.
On June 27, 2012, Holloman had a court appearance scheduled
and Frank Maine refused to “buzz the shower door” for him.
at ¶¶ 64-65.

Id.

Aaron Gill of the security move team, in response

to Holloman's requests to shower, started yelling at plaintiff
and threatened him with bodily harm if he “didn’t lock in.”
at ¶ 65.

Id.

Holloman contends that Gill’s response to his request

to speak with the chain of command was to “command his move team
to use excessive unnecessary force beating plaintiff in his body
with closed fists and knee thrusts while plaintiff was cuffed,
and Gill personally extended multiple knee thrusts to plaintiff’s
groin area...”

Id. at ¶ 66 (the “shower incident”).

8

Holloman

slumped over and was dragged to the booking area where Suffolk
County transportation was waiting.

Id.

Holloman alleges that defendants Maine and Lieutenant
Ferrara observed the shower incident without stopping Gill.
at ¶ 67.

Id.

Holloman complains that he was forced to appear in

court without his legal papers and wearing dirty clothes and
shower slippers.

Id. at ¶ 68.

The following day, on June 28, 2012, a disciplinary report
was filed against Holloman related to the shower incident.
at ¶ 76.

Id.

Holloman contends that the report was filed in

retaliation for his attorney complaining about the shower
incident by letter and phone call.

Id.

The following month, in July 2012, Holloman filed a
grievance concerning the shower incident.

Id. at ¶ 71.

O’Dell

rejected Holloman’s grievance as “disciplinary non-grievable.”
Id.

Holloman contends that O’Dell applied the wrong

classification to the shower incident.

Id.

Gelb denied

Holloman’s appeal. Id. at ¶ 72.
In August 2012, Holloman sought further review from
Ladouceur regarding the shower incident.

Id. at ¶ 73.

Holloman

complained to Spencer about her slow response and believes that
she ultimately rejected his request in retaliation for his
complaining to Spencer.

Id.

During “staff access” on

September 6, 2012, Holloman spoke

9

with Gelb and asked for the “use of force reports” that should
have been written concerning the shower incident.

Id. at ¶ 74.

Gelb refused telling Holloman to go to court, and Gelb
subsequently wrote a letter denying the request.

Id. at ¶ 75.

Holloman complains that on February 21, 2013, while Holloman
was performing his Islamic prayer, Jeffrey Diagneault rudely and
disrespectfully banged on the cell door trying to deliver
Holloman’s mail.

Id. at ¶ 79.

Diagneault stated in a hostile

manner ‘you don’t want your mail.”

Id.

Holloman alleges that

when he didn’t answer, Diagneault walked away and called him an
“[expletive] spook.”

Id. at ¶ 80.

After Holloman finished his

prayer, he called out to Daigneault who was delivering mail at
another cell.

Id.

Daigneault returned to Holloman’s cell and

responded to Holloman’s explanation by stating that he “didn’t
give [an expletive about Holloman] praying.”
responds to Daigneault with an expletive.

Id.

Holloman

Id.

Holloman complained about the mail incident to unit officer
Shirley who made a telephone call in Holloman’s presence about
the matter.

Id. at ¶ 83.

Sometime after 8 p.m., unit officer

Shirley delivered Holloman’s mail [which had been opened and retaped closed] stating that Sargent Fasoli said “here’s your legal
mail nothing should come of the situation.”

Id. at ¶ 84.

Holloman alleges that after filing a grievance against
Daigneault, he retaliated by filing a fabricated disciplinary

10

report against Holloman, causing Holloman to be placed in
"awaiting action" status restricted/isolated confinement.
¶ 86.

Id. at

Holloman complained verbally to Rodrigues and in writing

to MacDonald and Gelb, each of whom ignored or dismissed his
grievance.

Id. at ¶

87.

Holloman alleges that he was placed in

various restricted confinement settings including isolation in
his cell, housing in disciplinary segregation with full
restraints, and administrative segregation for approximately
sixty days.

Id. at ¶

88.

The following day, on February 22, 2013, Holloman is denied
access to his mail when Wendover, opening the legal mail in
Holloman’s presence, realizes that the mail contains two books of
stamps.

Id. at ¶ 94.

Although Holloman produced a copy of a

court order stating that he is authorized to have the stamps,
Wendover explained that Holloman is not allowed to receive stamps
and left to check with his supervisor.

Id. at ¶¶ 96-97.

Wendover returned with the court order but confiscated the legal
mail.

Id. at ¶ 97.

O’Dell denied Holloman’s grievance because

Holloman was authorized to receive stamps by mail on only a
one-time basis.

Id. at ¶ 99.

During a disciplinary hearing held on March 7, 2013,
Holloman complains that he was not allowed to call witnesses or
present witness affidavits.

Id. at ¶ 89.

His request for a

continuance to allow him to collect materials for his defense was

11

denied by Thomas Fedel.

Id.

loss of canteen and phone.
appeal.

He was sanctioned to sixty days'

Id. at ¶

91.

Gelb denied Holloman’s

Id.
DISCUSSION

"Generally speaking, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of
action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ by any person
acting ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.’"

Grapentine v.

Pawtucket Credit Union, 755 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 2014).

To

state a claim under that statute, a plaintiff must assert two
allegations: (1) "that some person deprived him of a federal
right," and (2) that such person "acted under color of state or
territorial law."

Id. (citations omitted).

To the extent

Holloman asserts claims pursuant to the Massachusetts
Constitution, the Supreme Judicial Court has "consistently
equated as comparable, both generally and in the prison
environment, the due process protections" of the United States
Constitution and those provided under Articles 1, 10, and 12 of
the Massachusetts Constitution.

Hudson v. Comm'r of Corr., 46

Mass. App. Ct. 538, 543 (1999).
For purposes of preliminary screening, this Court concludes
that Holloman has alleged sufficiently plausible claims for
excessive force, failure to intervene, retaliation and denial of

12

due process.

Thus, this action will be permitted to proceed as

to the claims against defendants Gill, Ferrarra, Maine,
Diagneault (retaliation claim only), Mendonsa, Spencer, O’Dell,
Gelb, Ladouceur, Owens and Fedel.
Notwithstanding this ruling, Holloman's claims against
defendants Deakin, Clarke, Bender, Russo, Brodbeck, Maenpaa,
Thornton, Berdard, Williams, Fasoli, Tocci, Palodian, MacDonald,
Rodrigues and Wendover shall be dismissed in 42 days of the date
of this Memorandum and Order unless Holloman demonstrates good
cause in writing why his claims against these remaining
defendants should not be dismissed for the reasons set forth
below.
A.

Limitations Period for Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Because "Section 1983 does not contain a built-in statute of
limitations[,]" "a federal court called upon to adjudicate a
section 1983 claim ordinarily must borrow the forum state's
limitation period governing personal injury causes of action."
Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir.2001).

Under

Massachusetts law, the limitations period for personal injury is
three years. See id.; Mass. Gen. Laws c. 260, § 2A.

"‘Section

1983 claims generally accrue when the plaintiff knows, or has
reason to know of the injury on which the action is based, and a
plaintiff is deemed to know or have reason to know at the time of
the act itself and not at the point that the harmful consequences

13

are felt.’"

Gorelik v. Costin, 605 F.3d 118, 122 (1st Cir. 2010)

quoting Morán Vega v. Cruz Burgos, 537 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir.
2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, Holloman’s Section 1983 claim concerning his transfer
from the Suffolk County Jail to MCI Concord and the SBCC as well
as first double-bunking assignment occurred in 2010.

Holloman

alleges that ADA Deakin advocated for his transfer and that
Commissioner Clark and Deputy Commissioner Bender should have
known that such transfer was unconstitutional.

He further

alleges that Lois Russo, John Brodbeck and Jorma Maenpaa violated
Holloman’s right to due process and should have known that the
conditions of his confinement at MCI Concord were cruel and
unusual.
Because Holloman did not file his lawsuit until June 9,
2014, over six months after the three year statute of limitations
expired, these 2010 claims are untimely unless equitable tolling
principles apply.

Here, Holloman knew of or had reason to know

of the allegedly wrongful acts at the time they occurred, which
is more than three years prior to the filing of his lawsuit.
Therefore, any Section 1983 claims arising out of his 2010
transfer and 2010 double-bunking assignment would be time-barred
in the absence of equitable tolling.

Thus, the claims against

defendants Deakin, Clarke, Bender, Russo, Brodbeck and Maenpaa
are subject to dismissal.

14

Moreover, his challenge to Mass. Gen. Law c. 276, § 52A1 is
subject to dismissal as untimely as well as for failure to state
a claim.

Section 52A provides for the transfer of a pretrial

detainee from a county jail in which he is ordinarily held
awaiting trial to a state correctional institution if he has
previously been incarcerated in such an institution under
sentence for a felony.

See

Kelley v. Cabral, C.A. No. 06-11837-

GAO, 2008 WL 2817100, at *1 (D. Mass. July 21, 2008).

The

transfer of an eligible pretrial detainee from a county jail to a
State correctional institution, under the provisions of § 52A,
requires both the approval of the district attorney and the
authorization of the commissioner.

See MacDougall v. Com., 447

Mass. 505, 508, 852 N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (2006).
B.

Legal Mail Incidents

Plaintiff complains of several incidents concerning his

1

G.L. c. 276, § 52A provides: Persons held in jail for trial
may, with the approval of the district attorney, and shall, by
order of a justice of the superior court, be removed by the
commissioner of correction to a jail in another county, and said
commissioner shall, at the request of the district attorney, cause
them to be returned to the jail whence they were removed. In
addition, such persons, if they have been previously incarcerated
in a correctional institution of the commonwealth under sentence
for a felony, may, with the approval of the district attorney, be
removed by the commissioner of correction to a correctional
institution of the commonwealth, and said commissioner shall, at
the request of the district attorney, cause them to be returned to
the jail where they were awaiting trial. The proceedings for such
removals shall be the same as for the removal of prisoners from one
jail or house of correction to another. The cost of support of a
person so removed and of the removals shall be paid by the county
whence he is originally removed.
15

legal mail in the Fall of 2011 and in February 2013.

“The

fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law.”

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97

S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977).

“An incarcerated prisoner,

like any other citizen, has a constitutionally protected right of
access to the courts.”

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 343, 116

S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).
To have standing to seek relief under this right, however, a
plaintiff must show actual injury by “demonstrat[ing] that a
nonfrivolous legal claim ha[s] been frustrated or ... impeded.”
Id. at 353 (footnote omitted). see also Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d
36, 43 n. 5 (1st Cir.2000) (“a prisoner must show actual injury
in order to demonstrate a violation of the right of access to the
courts”).
Holloman complains that on three occasions in 2011,
defendant Palodian refused to mail Holloman's letters to his
attorney stating that "CPCS-subcontracted lawyer not considered
legal."

Compl. at ¶ 52.

At that time, Thomas Tocci failed to

timely respond and then denied Holloman's grievance related to
denial of mail services.

Compl. at ¶¶ 53-57.

On February 21,

2013, while Holloman was performing his Islamic prayer, Jeffrey

16

Diagneault refused to deliver his mail, called him an expletive
based upon Holloman’s race and religion and fabricated a
disciplinary report in retaliation for Holloman’s filing a
grievance against Diagneault.

Although unit officer Shirley

eventually delivered Holloman’s mail, Holloman contends that
“officer Shirley stated that Seargent (sic) Fasoli said ‘here’s
your legal mail nothing should come of the situation.” Compl. at
¶ 84.

Holloman complains that both MacDonald and Rodrigues deny

or ignore complaints from Holloman regarding Daigneault.
¶ 87.

Id. at

Finally, Holloman complains that on February 22, 2013,

despite producing a copy of a court order stating that Holloman
is authorized to have stamps, defendant Wendover confiscated
Holloman’s legal mail because it contained stamps.
Here, Holloman's allegations are plainly inadequate to state
a viable access to the courts claim, as he fails to specify any
actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal action caused by any of
defendants.

Therefore, the complaint fails to state a viable

claim for denial of his right to access to the courts as to
defendants Palodian, Tocci, Diagneault, Fasoli, MacDonald,
Rodrigues and Wendover.
Moreover, as to defendant Diagneault’s alleged derogatory
statements, they do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

DeWalt v. Carter, 224

F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (racist and sexually explicit

17

statements); see also Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539,
546 (6th Cir. 2004) (verbal harassment, absent any resulting
physical injury, generally does not amount to infringement of a
constitutional right actionable under Section 1983); Shabazz v.
Cole, 69 F. Supp. 2d 177, 199–201 (D.Mass. 1999).
C.

Claims against Thornton, Berdard and Williams

Although the case caption of the complaint identifies as
defendants James C. Thornton, SBCC superior supervisor; Gregory
A. Berdard, SBCC lieutenant with disciplinary office; and Shelley
Williams, SBCC captain and shift commander, the body of the
complaint contains no factual allegations as to these three
defendants.

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires a plaintiff to include in the complaint, among other
things, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

This statement must afford the defendant a "meaningful
opportunity to mount a defense."

Díaz-Rivera v.

Rivera-Rodríguez, 377 F.3d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting
Rodríguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1172 (1st Cir.
1995)).

"[I]n a civil rights action ..., the complaint should at

least set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when,
where, and why."

Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v.

Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004).
Here, Holloman has not met the Rule 8(a) pleading

18

requirements for any claims against defendants Thornton, Berdard
and Williams because there are no factual assertions concerning
the conduct of these three defendants.

To the extent any claims

are based upon facts collectively asserted against the
defendants, the complaint fails to clearly link specific factual
allegations of wrongdoing against defendants Thornton, Berdard
and Williams.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED
1.

The clerk shall issue summonses with respect to
defendants Gill, Ferrarra, Maine, Mendonsa, Spencer,
O’Dell, Gelb, Ladouceur, Owens, Fedel, Diagneault;

2.

The claims against defendants Deakin, Clarke, Bender,
Russo, Brodbeck, Maenpaa, Thornton, Berdard, Williams,
Fasoli, Tocci, Palodian, MacDonald, Rodrigues and
Wendover shall be dismissed in 42 days of the date of
this Memorandum and Order unless Holloman demonstrates
good cause, in writing, why his claims against these
remaining defendants should not be dismissed;

3.

The clerk shall send the summonses, Complaint, and this
Memorandum and Order to the plaintiff, who must
thereafter serve the defendants in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The plaintiff
may elect to have service made by the United States
Marshal Service. If directed by the plaintiff to do
so, the United States Marshal shall serve the
summonses, Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order
upon the defendant, in the manner directed by the
plaintiff, with all costs of service to be advanced by
the United States Marshal Service; and

4.

Notwithstanding Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and Local Rule
4.1, the plaintiff shall have 120 days from the date of
the issuance of summonses to complete service.

SO ORDERED.
April 15, 2015
DATE

/s/ Douglas P. Woodlock
DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19