Holloman v. Deakin et al
Filing
243
Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: Memorandum of Decision entered. For the foregoing reasons, CO Frank Maine and Sgt. Aaron Gill are found not to have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, judgment will enter for defendants. So ordered. (McDonagh, Christina)
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 1 of 20
United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
TAJUAN HOLLOMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK MAINE and AARON GILL,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.
14-12594-NMG
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
GORTON, J.
This action involves a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
which plaintiff Tajuan Holloman (“Holloman” or “plaintiff”)
alleges that defendants Correction Officer Frank Maine (“CO
Maine”) and Sergeant Aaron Gill (“Sgt. Gill”) (collectively
“defendants”) used excessive force against him while he was a
pretrial detainee in violation of his rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court presided over a two-day bench trial in late
November, 2018.
The Court now publishes its findings of fact
and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
I.
Findings of Fact
A.
The Parties and Setting
1.
Tajuan Holloman was a pretrial detainee housed at the
Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center (“Souza-Baranowski”), a
-1-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 2 of 20
maximum security state prison in Shirley, Massachusetts, on June
27, 2012.
2.
Souza-Baranowski houses prisoners assigned to the
highest security level of the prison system, as well as pretrial
detainees who have previously served time in the state penal
system.
3.
Souza-Baranowski housed approximately 1,400 inmates and
employed approximately 500 Massachusetts Department of
Correction (“DOC”) staff in 2012.
4.
Souza-Baranowski has approximately 365 video cameras
throughout the prison facility that record 24 hours a day.
The
cameras typically store between 10 to 14 days of footage and can
store up to a maximum of about 20 days of footage depending on
the location and amount of movement recorded.
The cameras
automatically tape over older footage to accommodate new
recordings as the hard drive reaches capacity.
DOC personnel
assigned to Inter Perimeter Security have the ability to
download and save video recordings to an external hard drive or
medium upon request but apparently there is no way to preserve
video on the video recording system itself.
5.
DOC personnel with authority over inmates are organized
in a paramilitary structure, i.e. a strict chain-of-command with
assigned posts and responsibilities.
That structure includes,
in ascending order of rank, Corrections Officer (“CO”), Sergeant
-2-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 3 of 20
(“Sgt.”), Lieutenant (“Lt.”) and Captain.
A Superintendent
supervises the entire prison.
6.
CO Frank Maine and Sgt. Aaron Gill are correctional
personnel employed by the DOC and were assigned to SouzaBaranowski on June 27, 2012.
B.
The Incident on June 27, 2012
7.
On June 25, 2012, an officer at Souza-Baranowski was
stabbed and seriously injured by an inmate.
Correctional staff
responding to the stabbing were also assaulted and injured by
inmates.
8.
As a result of that incident, Souza-Baranowski was
placed on institutional lock-down by order of the
Superintendent.
During such a lock-down, inmates are not
allowed out of their cells except for court appearances and
medical visits.
their cells.
Inmates are not allowed showers and are fed in
Correctional staff have no discretion to permit
showers during a lock-down.
9.
During a lock-down, inmates with scheduled court
appearances are escorted from their cell blocks to “booking”
where they are processed and await transportation to court.
They are escorted by a transport team that consists of at least
two security staff.
10. On June 27, 2012, Souza-Baranowski was still on lockdown.
Holloman was housed on the second tier of the M2 cell
-3-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 4 of 20
block and had a court hearing scheduled for that morning.
He
was to be transported to Suffolk Superior Court by the Suffolk
County Sheriff’s Department.
11. CO Maine and CO Anthony Basso were the two block
officers assigned to M2 that morning for the 7 A.M.-3 P.M.
shift.
12. At some point in the early morning of June 27th,
plaintiff requested that he be allowed to take a shower before
his court appearance.
That request was denied but he was
advised to ask an officer on the 7 A.M.-3 P.M. shift.
13. Later that morning, at about 8:00 A.M., CO Maine
remotely opened the door to plaintiff’s cell and told him to get
ready for court.
Plaintiff walked to the railing just outside
his cell and called to CO Maine, who was located in the control
station on the floor below, to request a shower.
Plaintiff was
dressed in a tank top and shower slippers.
14. It is unclear why CO Maine remotely opened plaintiff’s
cell door at that particular time to allow plaintiff to leave
his cell unaccompanied, rather than escort plaintiff from his
cell to the entrance of M2 block.
In any event, it was
understood that plaintiff was to be escorted to “booking” to
await transportation to court.
15. CO Maine told plaintiff that no showers were allowed
because of the lock-down and ordered him to return to his cell
-4-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 5 of 20
to get dressed for court.
Plaintiff demanded a shower,
requested to speak to a supervisor and refused to return to his
cell.
CO Maine ordered plaintiff to return to his cell several
more times but Holloman refused to comply with those direct
orders.
16. CO Maine called the Level 2 corridor for assistance
where both Sgt. Gill and Lt. Donald Ferrara (“Lt. Ferrara”) were
assigned that morning.
Sgt. Gill took the call from CO Maine.
17. Sgt. Gill promptly proceeded to M2 cell block by
himself and ascended the stairs to the second tier with CO Maine
where they encountered plaintiff in front of his cell.
Holloman
again requested that he be allowed to take a shower but Sgt.
Gill denied the request due to the lock-down.
18. Sgt. Gill ordered plaintiff to get dressed and to get
his legal materials together for court but Holloman refused.
19. Sgt. Gill then ordered plaintiff to “cuff-up”, i.e.
turn around and place his hands behind his back so restraints
could be placed around his wrists.
Plaintiff complied with the
order without resistance.
20. Sgt. Gill and CO Maine escorted plaintiff down the
stairs from the second tier to “the flats”.
They were met near
the entrance of the M2 block by one or two other officers who
had been directed to assist with escorting plaintiff to
“booking”.
Sgt. Gill and one of the other officers each took
-5-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 6 of 20
one of plaintiff’s arms and led him out of M2 block through the
Level 2 corridor to “booking”.
21. At some point, Sgt. Gill called his supervisor, Lt.
Ferrara, to report what had happened and Lt. Ferrara later met
Holloman, Sgt. Gill and the other escorting officer(s) at or
near M2 block and followed the escort to “booking”.
22. When they arrived at “booking”, several inmates also
were awaiting transport and other correctional officers were
present, including CO Brian Dickhaut.
CO Dickhaut offered
plaintiff an opportunity to retrieve his legal materials and
obtain proper footwear for court but plaintiff refused,
commenting that he wanted the judge to see how the guards had
sent him to court.
At no point at “booking” did plaintiff
complain about an assault or any force being used against him
nor did he request medical care.
23. None of the four correctional officers who testified at
trial observed any use of force against plaintiff on June 27,
2012, nor any visible injuries to Holloman.
24. At some point after Holloman was delivered to
“booking”, the Suffolk County officers arrived and he was turned
over to their custody for transport to Suffolk Superior Court.
During that transportation, plaintiff was provided a pair of
state-issued shoes and a state-issued shirt.
-6-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 7 of 20
25. Holloman met his attorney, James Coviello (“Attorney
Coviello”), at the courthouse and told him that his legal
materials had been left behind at Souza-Baranowski.
Holloman
did not tell anyone at the court about an assault or use of
excessive force against him earlier that day at SouzaBaranowski.
26. After spending one night in state custody, Holloman was
returned to Souza-Baranowski the next day, June 28, 2012.
27. On June 29, 2012, Attorney Coviello wrote a letter to
Souza-Baranowski’s Legal Department requesting that Holloman’s
legal materials be protected and returned to him.
That letter
makes no mention of a beating or use of excessive force against
Holloman on June 27, 2012.
The Court finds plaintiff’s
testimony that he told Attorney Coviello about the alleged
beating on June 27, 2012, to be not credible in light of all of
the other evidence at the trial.
C.
Disciplinary and Grievance Process and Prison Policy
Regarding Use of Force
28. On June 27, 2012, CO Maine wrote a disciplinary report
stating that plaintiff had refused direct orders to lock up in
his cell but did not decide what disciplinary charges were to be
issued against Holloman or how those charges were pursued.
29. Holloman was charged with four disciplinary
infractions: 1) refusing a direct order by any staff member, 2)
-7-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 8 of 20
being out of place or in an unauthorized area, 3) conduct which
disrupts the normal operation of the facility or unit and 4)
violating any departmental rule or regulation, or any other
rule, regulation or condition of an institution or community
based program.
30. Holloman received a copy of the disciplinary report
before the disciplinary hearing and requested a copy of the
video recording of the alleged incident pursuant to the
discovery process associated with the prison’s disciplinary
procedure.
He was informed that no such video recording
existed.
31. There was no testimony with respect to exactly when
Holloman received the copy of the disciplinary report, when he
requested a copy of the video recording or when he was informed
that the video recording did not exist and thus the Court is
unable to determine whether the request for the video was made
within the period during which video recordings are normally
preserved at Souza-Baranowski.
32. Because the Court finds that Holloman readily complied
with the order to “cuff-up”, which does not constitute a “use of
force”, the DOC’s Use of Force Policy is not applicable to this
case and Inter Perimeter Security was not required automatically
to download and save corresponding video recordings. See 103
Mass. Code Regs. 505.07(1), 505.11(3)(a)-(b), 505.13(3).
-8-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 9 of 20
33. Neither CO Maine nor Sgt. Gill had any access to or
control over the video recording system so they cannot be held
personally responsible for the failure to produce
contemporaneous video tapes or any possible spoliation thereof.
That is not necessarily true for other DOC personnel.
34. On July 19, 2012 (22 days after the alleged assault),
plaintiff filed a grievance with the Institutional Grievance
Coordinator (“IGC”) against Sgt. Gill for use of “cruel and
unusual punishment” by “instruct[ing] six officers to take [him]
down” and forcefully handcuffing him before taking him to
“booking”.
The grievance does not mention that Holloman was
punched or kicked by Sgt. Gill or any other COs or that he was
banged against the wall on the way to “booking”.
On July 25,
2012, the IGC received the grievance form and on August 8, 2012,
it determined that the grievance was “non-grievable
disciplinary”.
Plaintiff appealed that determination the same
day.
35. On August 10, 2012, the hearing on the disciplinary
report filed against Holloman was held before hearing officer
Donald Griffiths.
Mr. Griffiths found Holloman not guilty of
any of the charged violations based, in part, on the lack of
video evidence to corroborate the disciplinary report.
The
hearing officer’s report does not mention any accusations by
-9-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 10 of 20
Holloman of a beating or use of excessive force against him on
June 27, 2012.
36. On August 21, 2012, the IGC’s determination that
plaintiff’s grievance was “non-grievable disciplinary” was
affirmed by Superintendent Bruce Gelb.
37. Neither CO Maine nor Sgt. Gill had any involvement or
input into the disciplinary process or grievance procedure other
than the initial filing of the disciplinary report.
D.
Medical and Mental Health Records and Testimony
38. In 2012, the DOC contracted with vendors to provide
medical and mental health services to inmates.
Vendor medical
and mental health staff prepared and maintained plaintiff’s
medical records and DOC personnel had no control over what was
entered into those records.
39. Plaintiff had received medication for anxiety and
depression before June 27, 2012, specifically in February and
April, 2012.
Those medications included Trazodone and Remeron.
40. On June 27, 2012, plaintiff signed a medical release
form of the Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department at the Nashua
Street jail but that form does not contain 1) any information
with respect to medical treatment received by plaintiff while
housed at that facility, 2) any complaints that he made about a
beating or use of excessive force or 3) any physical injuries
-10-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 11 of 20
that he had upon arrival at the Nashua Street jail from SouzaBaranowski.
41. On June 28, July 9 and July 13, 2012, plaintiff spoke
with mental health personnel while incarcerated at SouzaBaranowski.
The visits on June 28 and July 13 were conducted
pursuant to plaintiff’s monthly one-on-one contact with mental
health personnel while the July 9 visit was conducted because of
the institutional lock-down.
The mental health progress notes
for those visits contain no mention of any beating or use of
excessive force against plaintiff but rather indicate that he
was coping adequately with the institutional lock-down and
showed no acute mental health concerns.
42. Natalie Toth, the mental health professional who
conducted the visit on July 9, testified credibly that plaintiff
mentioned something about an incident at court but nothing about
a beating at Souza-Baranowski.
43. The July 13 mental health progress note indicates that
Holloman told personnel that he was not allowed to take a shower
before going to court and that he had to go to court in shower
slippers but does not indicate anything about a beating or use
of excessive force.
44. On July 13, 2012, plaintiff submitted a sick slip
reporting a painful lump on the left side of his neck but the
issue was later reported as being resolved without further
-11-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 12 of 20
attention from medical staff.
The sick slip is silent with
respect to a beating or use of excessive force or any other
physical injuries.
45. On July 24, 2012, plaintiff spoke to Dr. Johanna Shaw
(“Dr. Shaw”), a psychiatrist at Souza-Baranowski.
Dr. Shaw’s
psychiatry progress note indicates that Holloman told her that
he was stressed, anxious and having difficulty concentrating and
sleeping because of his pending legal case and upcoming court
hearing.
The note does not, however, reflect that he told her
anything about a beating or use of excessive force or any
related physical, mental or emotional injuries.
Dr. Shaw
diagnosed Holloman with depression and anxiety due to his
uncertain legal situation and prescribed Trazodone and Remeron,
the same anxiety medications he had taken before.
46. The Court finds plaintiff’s testimony that he told
medical or mental health personnel at Souza-Baranowski about the
beating and his physical injuries not credible because of 1) the
lack of any medical or mental health records corroboration and
2) the contrary testimony of contract professionals at the
trial.
47. On September 19, 2012, Dr. Shaw again prescribed
Remeron to plaintiff.
She also prescribed Benadryl to help with
plaintiff’s sleeplessness.
-12-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 13 of 20
48. The Court finds that plaintiff has not demonstrated
that the prescription of anxiety medication on September 19,
2012, was related to the alleged beating rather than to his
preexisting anxiety and depression.
49. Based upon a lack of any independent testimony or
medical records corroborating his version of events or
demonstrating that he had sustained physical injuries, the Court
finds that plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that a beating or use of
excessive force against him occurred on June 27, 2012.
50. Based upon a lack of independent corroborating
evidence, together with the contradictory testimony of CO Maine,
Sgt. Gill, Lt. Ferrara and CO Dickhaut, the Court finds that
plaintiff was placed in handcuffs without the use of force on
June 27, 2012.
II.
Conclusions of Law
1.
Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging that Sgt. Gill used excessive force against him in
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial
detainee and that CO Maine failed to intervene in violation of
those same rights.
2.
Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
-13-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 14 of 20
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3.
The parties agree and the Court finds that defendants
were acting under color of state law on June 27, 2012.
4.
Plaintiff thus has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that CO Maine and/or Sgt. Gill
violated his constitutional rights on June 27, 2012.
5.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments permits the government to detain an arrestee pending
a guilty plea or trial if probable cause is found and bail is
denied because that detention constitutes regulation rather than
punishment. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-52
(1987) (explaining that the government’s interest in community
safety is a regulatory objective that can outweigh a pretrial
detainee’s liberty interest in appropriate circumstances).
6.
The mere pretrial detention of plaintiff did not
therefore violate his constitutional rights.
7.
A pretrial detainee may not, however, be subjected to
“punishment” during that detention. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535-36 (1979).
A restriction placed on pretrial detainees
constitutes punishment if 1) it is imposed for the purpose of
achieving a punitive objective, such as deterrence or
-14-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 15 of 20
retribution or 2) it is not reasonably related to a legitimate
nonpunitive objective, such as maintaining prison security or
discipline, or is unreasonably excessive in relation to such an
objective. Id. at 537-39, 561.
8.
In addition to prison restrictions that constitute
punishment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is violated when a pretrial detainee is subjected to
the use of excessive force by a security officer. Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015); Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989).
To prove that a use of force is
excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause, the pretrial
detainee must show that the force was 1) purposefully or
knowingly used against him or her and 2) objectively
unreasonable based on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case and in light of the prison’s legitimate security
interests. Id. at 2472-73 (listing the following factors as
considerations bearing on the reasonableness of the force used:
1) “the relationship between the need for the use of force and
the amount of force used”, 2) “the extent of the plaintiff’s
injury”, 3) “any effort made by the officer to temper or to
limit the amount of force”, 4) “the severity of the security
problem at issue”, 5) “the threat reasonably perceived by the
officer” and 6) “whether the plaintiff was actively resisting”).
-15-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 16 of 20
9.
A security officer can also be held liable for his or
her failure to intervene in appropriate circumstances to protect
a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force by fellow
officers. See Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-Davila, 813 F.3d 64, 73
(1st Cir. 2016).
10. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
however, plaintiffs confined in a jail, prison or other
correctional facility must prove that they suffered physical
injury before they can recover compensatory damages for mental
or emotional injury suffered while in custody. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(e).
The physical injury “need not be significant but must
be more than de minimis”. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627
(9th Cir. 2002); see also Alexander v. Tippah Cty., Miss., 351
F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2003); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279,
1286 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated by 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir.
1999), reinstated in part on reh’g en banc, 216 F.3d 970 (11th
Cir. 2000); Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999).
The physical injury requirement applies only to claims for
mental and emotional injury and not to claims for compensatory,
nominal or punitive damages. Oliver, 289 F.3d at 630.
11. CO Maine, Sgt. Gill, Lt. Ferrara and CO Dickhaut all
had a duty to report any assault or use of excessive force
against an inmate, any complaint regarding such an assault or
use of excessive force or any visible physical injuries on an
-16-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 17 of 20
inmate and they were subject to discipline for failure to file
such a report.
No such reports were filed by any correctional
personnel with respect to Holloman on June 27, 2012.
12. Given that the Court finds that no force was used
against Holloman on June 27, 2012, let alone excessive force,
and that he complied with Sgt. Gill’s order to “cuff-up” without
resistance, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s due process
right to be free from excessive force was not violated.
Even if
some force was used to place Holloman in handcuffs, he has not
shown through any independent corroborative evidence that the
force was not reasonably related to Souza-Baranowski’s
legitimate interest in escorting a pretrial detainee securely
through the facility during a period of institutional lockdown.
13. Plaintiff has submitted no independent evidence of any
physical injury, such as medical records or testimony from
medical professionals demonstrating that he had reported the
alleged beating.
Absent any evidence of physical injury,
Holloman cannot recover damages for any alleged mental or
emotional injury from the alleged incident pursuant to
§ 1997e(e).
Furthermore, because the Court finds that Holloman
has failed to prove that the alleged beating occurred based on
that same lack of evidence, he also cannot recover any
compensatory, nominal or punitive damages for a use of excessive
force that was not proven.
-17-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 18 of 20
14. Because the Court finds that plaintiff has not proven
that there was a beating or use of excessive force against him
on June 27, 2012, he also cannot recover any damages from CO
Maine for Maine’s alleged failure to intervene to protect him
from that beating.
15. Holloman has not shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the restriction on his access to a shower or
having to leave Souza-Baranowski in a tank top and shower
slippers without his legal materials was the result of
intentional punishment or was not reasonably related to a
legitimate nonpunitive objective.
16. With respect to the restriction on his access to a
shower, the Court concludes that such a restriction was not
impermissible punishment because it was reasonably related to
the legitimate nonpunitive objective of maintaining prison
security and order after a serious stabbing of an officer and
the assault of several others a few days earlier.
17. The Court concludes that 1) neither CO Maine nor Sgt.
Gill was responsible for Holloman leaving the prison facility
for a court hearing in a tank top and shower slippers without
his legal materials, 2) Holloman refused to change into
appropriate clothing and shoes for his court appearance and take
his legal materials for that hearing despite several
opportunities to do so and 3) sending plaintiff to court in a
-18-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 19 of 20
tank top and shower slippers without his legal materials was not
impermissible punishment.
18. Without proving use of excessive force or impermissible
punishment, plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of his
constitutional rights and thus defendants are not liable to him
under § 1983.
19. Although the Court concludes that defendants are not
liable to the plaintiff, it finds the lack of video evidence of
the incident on June 27, 2012, to be disturbing.
Souza-
Baranowski, a high security institution fraught with danger for
both inmates and security staff, should have the capability in
this age of technology to preserve video recordings for longer
than 20 days for the protection of all persons at that
institution.
It is inexcusable that a copy of the video
recording of the incident in the M2 block on the morning of June
27, 2012, was not downloaded and preserved after the filing of
either the disciplinary report or the grievance form.
20. The failure to preserve pertinent video recordings
creates perverse incentives for both security staff and inmates
to engage in misconduct with impunity.
Had this matter been
tried to a jury, the Court would have instructed the jury that
it was entitled to draw an adverse inference against defendants
based upon the failure of DOC staff to preserve that video
evidence.
Although such an adverse inference has not caused
-19-
Case 1:14-cv-12594-NMG Document 243 Filed 12/07/18 Page 20 of 20
this fact-finder to rule against the defendants in this case,
failure to correct the DOC’s video retention procedure may well
have detrimental consequences in the future.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, CO Frank Maine and Sgt. Aaron
Gill are found not to have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Accordingly, judgment will enter for defendants.
So ordered.
_/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton_____
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated December 7, 2018
-20-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?