Crawford v. Blue et al

Filing 81

Judge William G. Young: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER(Sonnenberg, Elizabeth)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
____________________________________
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CELIA BLUE, individually and in
)
her official capacity as the
)
Massachusetts Registrar of Motor
)
Vehicles, and RACHEL KAPRIELIAN,
)
individually and in her official
)
capacity as the former
)
Massachusetts Registrar of Motor
)
Vehicles,
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)
PETER A. CRAWFORD,

YOUNG, D.J.

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 14-13042-WGY

September 21, 2017
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

I.

INTRODUCTION
Peter A. Crawford (“Crawford”) filed this action against

Celia Blue and Rachel Kaprielian, current and former
Massachusetts Registrars of Motor Vehicles (collectively, the
“Defendants”), under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, for violation of
his rights under the federal and Massachusetts state
constitutions in connection with a speeding ticket and the
ensuing revocation of his Massachusetts operating privileges.
Crawford alleges two separate due process violations: first,

with respect to the nonrefundable $25 filing fee required to
appeal a civil motor vehicle infraction (“CMVI”) under
Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 90C, section 3, and second,
for the suspension of his Massachusetts operating privileges
under the same state law.

The parties filed cross-motions for

summary judgment.
A.

Procedural History

Crawford filed an amended complaint on August 4, 2014.
Compl., ECF No. 6.

Am.

After hearing the Defendants’ motion to

dismiss on November 19, 2014, this Court dismissed the complaint
except for the count alleging a due process violation.
Electronic Clerk’s Notes, ECF No. 12.

The Court later granted

summary judgment after a hearing on April 8, 2015.
Clerk’s Notes, ECF No. 32.

Electronic

On appeal, the First Circuit

remanded the case for a closer examination of the Mathews
factors on Crawford’s procedural due process claim.

J. United

States Ct. Appeals (“J. USCA”) 2 & n.1, ECF No. 42 (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)).
After further discovery, the parties have now filed crossmotions for summary judgment and supporting memoranda.

Pl.’s

Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 57; Pl.’s Mem.
Opp’n Defs.’ Cross Mot. Summ. J. and Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ.
J. (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 74; Defs.’ Mem. Law Opp’n Pl.’s
Mots. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem.”), ECF No. 70.
[2]

The parties have

also submitted statements of fact and counterstatements of fact.
Pl.’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement Undisputed Material Facts Supp.
Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Statement Facts”), ECF No. 58; Pl.’s Resp.
Defs.’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement Material Facts (“Pl.’s Resp.
Facts”), ECF No. 75; Defs.’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement Material
Facts (“Defs.’ Statement Facts”), ECF No. 72; Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s
Local Rule 56.1 Statement Facts (“Defs.’ Resp. Facts”), ECF No.
73.

The Court heard oral arguments on the parties’ cross-

motions on July 14, 2017.1
B.

Electronic Clerk’s Notes, ECF No. 80.

Undisputed Factual Background
1.

Crawford’s Citation

On July 19, 2011, a police officer issued Crawford, a
resident of Rye, New Hampshire, a speeding citation in the
amount of $140 for driving 34 mph in a 20 mph zone in Salem,
Massachusetts.
Facts ¶ 1.

Pl.’s Statement Facts ¶ 1; Defs.’ Statement

Crawford timely requested a hearing challenging the

citation, but did not include the $25 filing fee because the fee
was not mentioned on the ticket.

Defs.’ Statement Facts ¶ 2.

1

The Court had understood that the parties wished to treat
their cross motions as a case stated, see, e.g., TLT Constr.
Corp. v. RI, Inc., 484 F.3d 130, 135 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing
United Paperworkers Int’l Union Local 14 v. International Paper
Co., 64 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1995)), but, at the last minute,
Crawford demurred and the Court has therefore carefully drawn
all reasonable inferences against each moving party in turn, see
Lowel-Light Mfg., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 848 F.
Supp. 278, 281 (D. Mass. 1994).
[3]

On August 2, 2011, the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles
(the “Registry”) responded to Crawford’s hearing request by
mail, informing him that pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws,
chapter 90C, section 3(A)(4), scheduling a CMVI hearing requires
the payment of a $25 court filing fee.

Id. ¶ 3.

Crawford

responded to the letter on August 15, 2011, refusing to pay the
filing fee on the ground that it violated his state and federal
constitutional rights.

Id. ¶ 4.

On August 22, 2011, a Registry

employee called Crawford regarding his citation, explaining the
requirements under the state law, and advised Crawford that the
failure to pay the citation’s assessment would result in the
suspension of his Massachusetts driving privileges, which could
affect his New Hampshire license.

Id.

On January 3, 2012, the Registry mailed Crawford a second
notice regarding his Massachusetts driving privileges, advising
him that his privileges would be suspended, effective February
2, 2012, because he had defaulted on the July 19, 2011 citation,
and informing him that to avoid the suspension, he would have to
pay the citation and late fees or appear at a Registry office.
Id. ¶ 7.

Crawford had moved from Nashua to Rye, New Hampshire

in August 2010, Pl.’s Statement Facts ¶ 1, and did not receive
the notice because the Registry sent it to his old address in
Nashua, Defs.’ Statement Facts ¶ 7.

Having received no payment,

the Registry suspended Crawford’s Massachusetts operating
[4]

privileges on February 12, 2012.

Id. ¶ 8.

The New Hampshire

Division of Motor Vehicles declined to renew Crawford’s New
Hampshire driver’s license on April 18, 2012, because the
Massachusetts Registry’s entry of suspension triggered an
electronic report to the National Driver Registry.

Id. ¶¶ 9-10.

Rather than challenge the Massachusetts suspension,
Crawford pursued administrative and judicial remedies in New
Hampshire for the non-renewal of his license.

Id. ¶ 12.

On

June 24, 2014, Crawford sent a letter to the Registry asserting
that Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 90C, section 3 did not
permit the suspension of his operating privileges for failing to
pay the filing fee.

Id. ¶ 13.

A Registry hearing officer,

treating the letter as a post-suspension appeal, issued a
decision denying Crawford’s appeal on the ground that he failed
to pay the $25 filing fee.

Id. ¶ 14.

The decision informed

Crawford that he had a right to appeal to the Board of Appeal on
Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds.
2.

Id.

Filing Fee

Effective July 1, 2009, the Massachusetts General Court
implemented a $25 filing fee for a CMVI hearing before a clerkmagistrate of the district court, partially to offset the costs
associated with providing the hearing.

Id. ¶ 15.

All

violators, except the indigent, must pay the filing fee to the

[5]

Registry to receive a hearing to appeal their citation.2

Id.

In

2009, when the filing fee first took effect, there were
extensive delays in receiving hearings (e.g., between three and
six months in one court, and possibly over six months in other
courts) due to individuals who were unprepared to pay the filing
fee and requested hearings only to receive more time to pay the
citation.

Id.

As a result of these delays, the legislature implemented a
further change, effective July 1, 2010, to have the Registry
collect the filing fee before forwarding a hearing request to
the district court for scheduling.

Pl.’s Statement Facts ¶ 13.

The funds received by the Registry, less $100,000, are
transferred to the district court.

Id. ¶ 14.

Since 2010, if a

motorist fails to pay the filing fee, the hearing request is not
transmitted to the district court.

Id. ¶ 16.

The effect of the

2010 change was to reduce wait times to as little as three
weeks.

Defs.’ Statement Facts ¶ 16.

The Merit Rating Board (the “Board”) and the Registry
jointly administer CMVI matters.

Id. ¶ 17.

Four employees

handle initial receipt of citations, hearing requests, and
payments.

Id.

Another two electronically scan documents into

2

In 2015, the district court granted 368 indigence waivers,
as compared to the 116,825 hearing requests the Registry
received with the filing fee paid (0.32%). Pl.’s Statement
Facts ¶ 18.
[6]

an electronic file.

Id.

Eleven employees handle data entry

related to citations with requests for hearing.

Id.

Additional

employees handle quality control and the financial
reconciliation of payments of filing fees and assessments.

Id.

The Defendants calculate that if an average of fifteen such
employees handled CMVI hearing requests each year, the annual
salary cost would range from $747,314.25 to $986,110.20.

Id.

Based on its 2013 “CMVI Staffing Model,” the district court
determined that each “standard” CMVI (86% of cases) takes 25
minutes from start to finish, with 10.4 minutes spent on the
hearing and 14.6 minutes spent on administrative and clerical
tasks, while a complex case (14% of cases) takes 45 minutes,
with 19.9 minutes spent on the hearing and 24.1 minutes spent on
administrative and clerical tasks.
II.

Id. ¶ 19.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Mulloy

v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 145 (1st Cir. 2006).

“To

succeed, the moving party must show that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s position.”
Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir. 1990).

Rogers v.

If the moving party

satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party
[7]

to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine,
triable issue.
(1986).

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324

But see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 151 (2000)(where the moving party bears the burden of
proof, absent admissions by the non-moving party, summary
judgment is inappropriate as the fact-finder need not credit
evidence favorable to the moving party).

In reviewing motions

for summary judgment, courts must resolve all disputed facts and
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

See Seaboard Sur.

Co. v. Town of Greenfield, 370 F.3d 215, 219 (1st Cir. 2004).
“Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the basic Rule
56 standard, but rather simply require [the court] to determine
whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of
law on facts that are not disputed.”

Adria Int’l Grp., Inc. v.

Ferre Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001).
B.

Massachusetts State Law

Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 90C, section 3 gives
police officers the authority to issue citations for civil motor
vehicle infractions.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90C, § 3(A)(1).

The

recipient of a citation may “either pay the scheduled assessment
or contest responsibility for the infraction by requesting a
noncriminal hearing before a magistrate of the district court.”
Id. § 3(A)(2).

The motorist may contest responsibility by

“making a signed request for a noncriminal hearing on the back
[8]

of the citation and mailing such citation, together with a $25
court filing fee, to the registrar,” which then notifies the
district court to set a hearing.

Id. § (A)(4).

may be appealed to the appellate division.

Determinations

Id. § (A)(5).

If a

violator fails to appear, the Registry will mail a notice
indicating that, “in the case of an operator violation, such
violator’s operators license, learners permit or right to
operate will be suspended by operation of law and without
further notice or hearing at the expiration of thirty days from
the date of the mailing of such notice.”

Id. § (A)(6).

III. ANALYSIS
Two primary questions remain in this litigation: whether
the $25 mandatory filing fee for CMVI appeals under
Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 90C, section 3 and the
suspension of Crawford’s Massachusetts operating privileges pass
constitutional muster under the Mathews balancing test.

The

Court first addresses a standing concern, then the Mathews
factors with respect to both deprivations in turn, concluding
finally with an examination of the Defendants’ immunity defense
to monetary damages.
A.

Standing

Before delving into the Mathews analysis, this Court
addresses a threshold issue.

On remand, the Defendants now

dispute Crawford’s standing to challenge the filing fee, arguing
[9]

that because Crawford never paid the $25 filing fee, he “was not
harmed by the due process violation he identifies.”
12.

Defs.’ Mem.

They argue that because Crawford has narrowed his

constitutional challenge to instances in which the filing fee is
not refunded to prevailing appellants, “Crawford needs to prove
three things to establish a deprivation: that he (1) paid the
$25 court-filing fee, (2) participated in the clerk-magistrate
hearing and was deemed not responsible, and (3) had no
opportunity [sic] recover the $25.”

Id.

It is well-established that to have standing, “a claimant
must present an injury that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant’s
challenged behavior; and likely to be redressed by a favorable
ruling.”

Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 733

(2008) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992)).

Further, “[t]he threshold issue in a procedural

due process action is whether the plaintiff had a
constitutionally protected property interest at stake.”

Mard v.

Town of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–41
(1985); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972)).
The First Circuit has defined the relationship between these two
requirements: “To establish an injury in fact for purposes of
Takings Clause and procedural due process claims, plaintiffs
[10]

must ‘show that they had an identifiable personal stake in the
property rights at issue.’”

Santiago–Ramos v. Autoridad de

Energía Eléctrica de Puerto Rico, AEE, 834 F.3d 103, 106 (1st
Cir. 2016) (quoting Bingham v. Massachusetts, 616 F.3d 1, 7 (1st
Cir. 2010)).
The question thus is whether Crawford had an “identifiable
personal stake” in the $25 filing fee and in his Massachusetts
operating privileges.

It is undisputed that Crawford had a

constitutionally protected interest in his Massachusetts
operating privileges.

See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539

(1971) (“Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state
action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees.”).
The Defendants, however, contend that because Crawford never
paid the $25 filing fee to obtain an appeal, “Crawford’s claim
that he is deprived of a property interest in his $25 is purely
hypothetical.”

Defs.’ Mem. 13.

Contrary to the Defendants’ characterization, Crawford’s
payment of $25 is not a necessary condition of his standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the fee.
personally seeking a refund in this case.

Crawford is not

Whether he can “prove

a legitimate entitlement to a refund,” id. at 12, is in fact
immaterial for the purposes of standing.

The essence of

Crawford’s challenge is that his operating privileges were
revoked due to the inadequate procedures for appealing CMVIs -[11]

an appeal in which the filing fee is an integral part.

This

claim is sufficient to satisfy the threshold procedural due
process requirement that Crawford possess an identifiable
property interest.3

Moreover, the First Circuit has already

declared that Crawford has a constitutionally protected interest
in the $25 filing fee.

J. USCA 2.

Therefore the Defendants’

reformulation of the standing requirement is unavailing.

3

The Defendants’ cited authority is inapposite. In Centro
Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2005), the First Circuit held that the threshold
requirement of a “legitimate claim to entitlement” was not met
where a state statute “ma[de] it pellucid that the plaintiffs
had no legally cognizable right to vie” on an equal footing with
a medical school for a contract to operate a hospital. Id. at
8. No such state statute precludes the existence of a protected
interest here. Nor can the Defendants rely on Boston
Environmental Sanitation Inspectors Ass’n v. City of Boston, 794
F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1986), in which the First Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of a procedural due process claim on the grounds that
the plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of state remedies.
Id. at 13. The court specifically noted that the plaintiffs did
not “allege any facts to suggest that these remedies might be
constitutionally inadequate.” Id.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Defendants base their
challenge on Crawford’s inability to show injury for the
purposes of Article III standing, this Court concludes that the
deterrent effect of the filing fee on CMVI appeals as well as
the revocation of Crawford’s operating privileges that followed
his nonpayment of the filing fee adequately satisfies the
malleable definition of constitutionally sufficient injury
adopted by courts. See Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 918 (1st
Cir. 1993) (“The injury-in-fact inquiry ‘serves to distinguish a
person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation -even though small -- from a person with a mere interest in the
problem.’” (quoting United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 690 n.14 (1973)));
Dimarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1978) (plaintiffs
had standing to challenge hazardous fire conditions even absent
physical injury or death from fire).
[12]

B.

Procedural Due Process

“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332.

To

determine what process is due, courts weigh three factors:
“(1) the private interest . . . that will be affected by the
official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the
fiscal and administrative burdens posed by alternative
procedural requirements.”

Penobscot Air Servs., Ltd. v. Federal

Aviation Admin., 164 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1.

Filing Fee4

This Court first addresses the balancing of the Mathews
factors in Crawford’s challenge to the CMVI appeals filing fee.

4

The parties cite two Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) cases.
First, in Gillespie v. City of Northampton, 460 Mass. 148
(2011), the SJC upheld a $275 filing fee in Superior Court to
challenge a hearing officer’s determination of responsibility
for a parking ticket. Id. at 149. Under that statutory
provision, however, an individual is entitled to a written
appeal, followed by “a live hearing and formal adjudication by
the parking clerk or a designated hearing officer, as a matter
of right, at no cost, and with no restrictions imposed by formal
rules of evidence or discovery.” Id. at 157. Only after these
[13]

In regards to the first factor, the First Circuit noted that
“the private interest at stake, which, though small ($25), is a
precondition to any hearing of the relatively ‘consequential’
and ‘serious matte[r]’ of traffic violations.”

J. USCA 2

(alteration in original) (quoting Gillespie v. City of
Northampton, 460 Mass. 148, 160 (2011)).

The Supreme Judicial

Court in Gillespie, examining the private interest prong, stated
that although alleged parking offenders stood to lose as much as
one hundred dollars, “[t]his is not an entirely insubstantial
interest, but, given the small sums involved, hardly one that
society would regard as ‘precious.’”

Gillespie, 460 Mass. at

156 (citing Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 111 (1982)).
Most courts have noted that “deprivation of a monetary
interest . . . is far less serious a harm than, for example, the
deprivation of employment.”

Dowd v. New Castle Cty., No. 10–82–

SLR, 2011 WL 1419663, at *11 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2011) (citing
City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717-18 (2003))

administrative procedures have been exhausted is an individual
required to pay the $275 filing fee in state court. See id. at
150-51. Second, in Police Department of Salem v. Sullivan, 460
Mass. 637 (2011), the plaintiff was denied a refund of his $25
filing fee after he was ultimately found not responsible for a
traffic citation, and challenged the same statute, Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 90C, § 3, as unconstitutional. Id. at 638. There, the
SJC held that the fee did not violate equal protection under a
rational basis standard, but specifically stated that it would
“not consider the merits of Sullivan’s due process argument”
because it had been waived on appeal. Id. at 639. Neither of
these two cases, therefore, is on point.
[14]

(noting that civil penalties in the amount of “$100 is a small
interest”); see also Sickles v. Campbell Cty., 501 F.3d 726, 730
(6th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that private interests of $20 and
$110.27 “do not begin to approach the kinds of government
conduct that have required a predeprivation hearing, such as a
limitation on the ‘historic’ ‘right to maintain control over
[one’s] home,’ or the termination of government benefits, which
for many people are ‘the very means by which to live’”
(citations omitted)).
The CMVI statistics provide further context.

From 2007 to

2016, the average uncontested citations paid ranged from $129.05
to $136.86 per citation (calculated as the total uncontested
amounts collected by the Registry divided by the number of
uncontested citations).

Pl.’s Aff. Supp. Mots. Summ. J. and

Prelim. and Permanent Injs., Ex. 9, Defs.’ Suppl. Resp. Pl.’s
Interrogs. 15 and 16 (“CMVI Data”) 10, ECF No. 61-9.

In 2015

for example, the $25 fee represented 18% of the average
uncontested citation amount of $135.18.

Id.

Furthermore, while

the number of citations issued has declined from 2007 to 2016,
the total amount of filing fees collected in 2015 was
$2,920,625.

Id.

Finally, though the absolute number of

indigence waivers may be small (368 in 2015), nothing in the
record indicates that the process of granting such waivers is
flawed.

Id.

Nevertheless, in light of the less serious
[15]

interest at issue and the insubstantial size of the filing fee
(particularly given the indigence waiver available to those for
whom the fee represents a real financial hardship), the private
interest is minimal.
The second Mathews factor examines “the risk of erroneous
deprivation accruing under the procedures used by the state; and
the probable benefit of demanding additional procedural
safeguards.”

Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1990)

(citations omitted).

The Defendants appear to misunderstand (or

deliberately mischaracterize) Crawford’s argument, arguing that
“[t]he question is not the risk of erroneous deprivation of the
$25,” but rather “whether there is a risk of erroneous
deprivation [as to] whether an operator has an adequate
opportunity to contest the citation.”

Defs.’ Mem. 17-18.

In

fact, Crawford is challenging that the $25 must be paid
regardless of the outcome of the hearing.

Crawford expressly

“agrees that the process for challenging the $140 [citation] is
constitutionally adequate except for the $25 . . . ‘filing
fe[e].’”

J. USCA 2.

It is precisely the risk of erroneous

deprivation of the filing fee that this Court must consider, as
explicitly stated by the First Circuit.

J. USCA 2.

Specifically, Crawford argues that the risk of erroneous
deprivation is reflected in the CMVI statistics whenever the
Registry retains the $25 filing fee following a finding of “not
[16]

responsible.”

Pl.’s Mem. 1-2.

In 2015, the percentage of all

hearings that resulted in findings of not responsible was 57.9%,
which in absolute terms is 70,899 hearings.

CMVI Data 10.

Multiplying this number by the $25 filing fee yields $1,772,475
in filing fees collected for hearings that resulted in findings
of not responsible.

Id.

From 2007 to 2016, in absolute terms,

the number of hearings resulting in a finding of not responsible
ranged from 50,287 to 128,358.

Id.

This wide range is due in

large part to the drastic reduction in total citations the
Registry received from the police.

The annual percentages of

not responsible findings has stayed within a relatively narrow
band, ranging from 48.4% in 2011 to 57.9% in 2015, with an
average over the period of 52.9%.

Id.

Crawford suggests two alternative procedures that he argues
would “reduce the 57.9 percent risk of erroneous deprivation to
essentially zero.”

Pl.’s Mem. 11.

First, Crawford proposes

giving refunds to those found not responsible.

Id.

Second, he

suggests waiting to impose the $25 until after the motorist is
found responsible.

Id. at 11.

Either of these two alternative

procedures would drastically reduce the risk of erroneous
deprivation.

Both would eliminate risk of erroneous deprivation

for the entire class of motorists who pay the fee, then obtain a
finding of “not responsible”

Neither fix would eliminate,

however, the risk for those who pay the fee and are mistakenly
[17]

found “responsible.”

Furthermore, the second option – charging

the fee after a finding of responsible – negates some of the
deterrence effect, and therefore may lead to an increase in
frivolous filings.

Nevertheless, the record indicates that both

of these incremental changes are feasible within the existing
administrative system.

Therefore, the second factor, based on

the statistical evidence of the risk of erroneous deprivation
coupled with Crawford’s proposed incremental changes, weighs in
Crawford’s favor.

The cost-benefit analysis for implementing

these alternatives will be examined below.
The key battleground is the third factor, which breaks down
into two components: “the Government’s interest . . . and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”
U.S. at 335.

Mathews, 424

The first component, which considers the

government’s interest, is straightforward and largely undisputed
here.

The Defendants maintain that the Massachusetts state

legislature has a legitimate and compelling interest in
deterring frivolous CMVI appeals that “impose[d] great[] demands
on the resources of the District Court.”

Defs.’ Mem. 17

(alteration in original) (quoting Police Dep’t of Salem v.
Sullivan, 460 Mass. 637, 642 (2011)).

Indeed, courts have

upheld fee requirements as a means to deter frivolous

[18]

litigation.5

See, e.g., Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1288

(6th Cir. 1997) (“The government’s interest in the fee system is
that of reducing frivolous prisoner suits to relieve the strain
that litigation is placing on federal courts and the prison
system in general.”); In re South, 689 F.2d 162, 165 (10th Cir.
1982) (weighing legitimate interests of “recoup[ing] some of the
costs of the bankruptcy system” and deterring frivolous
proceedings in favor of government).

The record shows that wait

times for hearings were reduced from three to six months to
three weeks in one court.6
Facts ¶¶ 15-16.

Defs.’ Mem. 17; Defs.’ Statement

As courts have also held, “[t]he government has

5

The Defendants claim that “[i]t is well-established that
the Commonwealth may condition the opportunity to pursue
judicial review on the payment of a fee designed to offset
administrative costs and deter frivolous filing.” Defs.’ Mem.
14. This argument overlooks a key distinction in the cases
rejecting the right to cost-free access to courts. While the
Supreme Court has held that states may “erect reasonable
procedural requirements for triggering the right to an
adjudication,” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437
(1982); see also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-48
(1973), the Defendants ignore the fact that filing fees in civil
cases are taxable fees that are awarded to prevailing parties,
28 U.S.C. § 1920; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). The Defendants have
not identified a case involving access to courts in which a
court upheld a fee that was never recoverable by a prevailing
party. Cf. Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir.
2017) (upholding deposit required to challenge parking ticket
that is returned to prevailing party).
6

Crawford notes, however, that the number of “not
responsible” findings as a percentage of total citations issued
has been decreasing, which “indicates that legitimate challenges
are being deterred as well.” Pl.’s Mem. 10.
[19]

a powerful interest in the prompt collection of revenue.”

Kahn

v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1222 (3d Cir. 1985) (alteration
in original) (quoting Ueckert v. United States, 581 F. Supp.
1262, 1265 (D.N.D. 1984)).

Here, it is undisputed that prior to

the implementation of the 2010 change, which required the
payment of the fee in order to secure a hearing date, a
significant number of appeals were filed only to delay payment
of fees.

Defs.’ Statement Facts ¶ 15.

The second part of the public interest prong contemplates a
cost-benefit analysis, and presents a more difficult question.
While the Court acknowledges on prong two that Crawford’s
proposed alternative procedures would drastically reduce the
risk of erroneous deprivation, it is also true that “[a]t some
point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual
affected by the administrative action and to society . . . [is]
outweighed by the [public] cost,” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.

Due

process does not require further protections where “[t]he cost
of providing additional safeguards . . . necessarily outweighs
any benefits gained by the expenditure of money and human
resources.”

Toney v. Burris, 881 F.2d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1989).

Nevertheless, “these rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh the
constitutional right,” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22
(1972) (citations omitted), and “the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency,” id.
[20]

The Defendants note that the government interest at stake
“arises in the broader context of the Commonwealth’s regulation
of motor vehicles,” arguing that “[b]y driving in Massachusetts,
Crawford agreed to participate in this regulatory structure, of
which M.G.L. c. 90C § 3 is part.”

Defs.’ Mem. 14.

In support,

the Defendants point to Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415
(1995), in which the Supreme Judicial Court stated that
“[c]ontinued possession of [one’s operating] privilege is
conditioned on obedience to the Legislature’s comprehensive
regulatory scheme aimed at regulating the motorways and keeping
them safe.”

Defs.’ Mem. 14 (quoting Luk, 421 Mass. at 423).

This argument, which appeals to the logic of constitutional
avoidance,7 relies on the idea that the government must be

7
 Notably, in Markadonatos v. Village of Woodridge, 760 F.3d

545 (7th Cir. 2014), a divided Seventh Circuit examined a due
process challenge to a non-refundable “bond fee” for posting
bail. Writing for three judges, Judge Posner invoked the
constitutional avoidance doctrine to dismiss the due process
claim, stating that the $30 fee was simply part of the “cost” of
the government providing a service. Id. at 547. Analogizing it
to the right to travel, Judge Posner noted that although one has
a fundamental right to travel, one must pay for a passport. Id.
He also reasoned that
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance functions to
minimize friction between courts and legislatures
(including state and municipal legislatures). The
plaintiff asks us to hold that a local government of
Illinois is committing grave violations of his
constitutional rights -- rights that might conceivably
(if implausibly) be traced all the way back to Magna
Carta. That imputation should not lightly be leveled
against a state government entity, even as modest a
one as the Village of Woodridge, Illinois. A saving
[21]

permitted to charge a fee to run a government service that
confers benefits on a large swath of Massachusetts society.
The Court is unpersuaded by this argument for one primary
reason.

If a motorist believes he or she was wrongfully cited,

it is a stretch to say that they “choose” to take advantage of
the appeals process where they face the dilemma of paying the
fine or forfeiting their operating privileges.

Indeed, the

Supreme Court specifically noted in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971), which involved access to divorce courts, that
“[t]he requirement that these appellants resort to the judicial
process is entirely a state-created matter.”

Id. at 383.

It is

precisely in cases such as these, in which the government forces
an individual to proceed through its adjudicative process in
order to exercise a right or defend a protected interest, that
the Court’s due process scrutiny must be at its zenith.

Even

where the government may have an important interest in
implementing a valuable program, the Due Process Clause was
“designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials
no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.”

Stanley v.

construction is available to our court; we should
embrace it.
Id. at 550. 
[22]

Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).

It is against that backdrop

that this Court proceeds to examine the merits of Crawford’s
proposed alternative procedures to reduce the risk of erroneous
deprivation.
Beginning with the first of Crawford’s alternatives, the
Registrar estimates that the cost of scaling up the existing
manual refund system, which currently processes approximately
10,000 refunds, would be $172,000 per year for an expanded
refund department.

Pl.’s Statement Facts ¶ 25.

Crawford adds

that this cost could be reduced by automating the refund
printing process, and points out that “[t]he data already exists
in the Registry’s computer system to enable refund checks to be
printed automatically following findings of ‘not responsible.’”
Pl.’s Mem. 11; Pl.’s Statement Facts ¶¶ 19, 30.

In regards to

the second option, the Registry estimates the cost of
reprogramming at $182,000.

Pl.’s Statement Facts ¶ 32.

In

addition to reprogramming, there are approximately two million
unused citations in the Registry’s warehouse that contain text
indicating that a filing fee is required to obtain a hearing.
The cost of reprinting these citations is estimated to be
$227,740.

Id. ¶ 37.

The combined cost is a one-off cost of

$410,000 to implement the second option.

Crawford compares

these costs against the $1,772,475 in filing fees collected from
70,899 individuals who were found not responsible in 2015 alone.
[23]

This is an extremely close case.

But the relatively simple

adjustment of expanding or automating the existing refund
process to avoid penalizing individuals who are ultimately found
not responsible for the citation tips the balance of the factors
in Crawford’s favor.

See Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1304

(1st Cir. 1995) (Cyr, J., concurring) (“The ease with which an
alternative procedure can be implemented likewise weighs heavily
in favor of an amendment to the [existing procedure].” (citing
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348)).

Accordingly, the filing fee

requirement constitutes a due process violation.
2.

Revocation of Operating Privileges

The second, related issue, on which the First Circuit
declined to take any view, is whether Crawford is entitled to an
injunction restoring his Massachusetts operating privileges.
USCA 2.

J.

Because Crawford declined to pay the filing fee to

appeal his citation, and also failed to pay the citation, he
defaulted on his July 19, 2011 citation pursuant to
Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 90C, section 3.
Statement Facts ¶ 7.

Defs.’

Crawford argues that because his driving

privileges were suspended, “and the notice sent to, but not
received . . . was not reasonably calculated to reach him, his
due process rights were violated on the suspension independent
of whether the fee violates due process.”

Pl.’s Mem. 6.

On

January 3, 2012, the Registry mailed Crawford a second notice
[24]

regarding his Massachusetts driving privileges, advising him
that his privileges would be suspended, effective February 2,
2012, because he had defaulted on the July 19, 2011 citation,
and informing him that to avoid the suspension, he would have to
pay the citation and late fees or appear at a Registry of Motor
Vehicles (“RMV”) office.

Defs.’ Statement Facts ¶ 7.

Because

of the Registry’s clerical error, however, his address was not
updated, and the notice was therefore sent to his old address.
Id.

Crawford did not find out about the suspension until he was

denied a license renewal by the New Hampshire Division of Motor
Vehicles in April 2012.

Id. ¶ 10.

Crawford’s challenge to the suspension of his Massachusetts
operating privileges relies primarily on the failure to receive
notice.

His argument, however, hinges on the misaddressed final

notice sent by the Registry on January 12, 2012.

First, there

is no legal support for the argument that the failure to follow
state procedures always results in a due process violation.
Indeed, courts have held that such a showing alone is not
enough.

See, e.g., Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 746

n.4 (10th Cir. 1991).

Crawford fails to explain why the

publication of the statute, along with the August 2011 notice
and phone call from the Registry, provided insufficient notice
of the impending suspension.

[25]

Courts have noted that clear language in a statute can give
notice, particularly where the individual is aware of the
statute.

Mard, 350 F.3d at 190 (“Mard therefore could have

turned to the statute . . . if she was unclear about the reason
for the Town’s request to attend an Independent Medical
Examination.”).

Furthermore, Crawford had a telephone

conversation with an employee of the Registry, who explained
that failure either to pay or appeal the citation would result
in the suspension of his operating privileges.
Facts ¶¶ 3-4.

Def.’s Statement

The purpose of the due process notice requirement

is to ensure that an individual can take the necessary steps to
challenge a deprivation.

See City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 525

U.S. 234, 240 (1999) (“It follows that when law enforcement
agents seize property pursuant to warrant, due process requires
them to take reasonable steps to give notice that the property
has been taken so the owner can pursue available remedies for
its return.”).

On this record, the undisputed facts clearly

demonstrate that Crawford was given adequate notice.
Crawford argues that there was no separate pre-deprivation
hearing for the license suspension, during which he could have
argued “the unconstitutionality of M.G.L. c. 90C § 3, and the
fact that non-payment of the filing fee, once a hearing has been
requested, is not a statutory basis for suspension.”
17.

Pl.’s Mem.

The Mathews framework provides a more one-sided analysis on
[26]

this issue.

On the first factor, Crawford had a protected

interest in his operating privileges.

Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.

The risk of erroneous deprivation, however, was low, given the
suspension was triggered by the objective fact that Crawford
failed to pay or appeal his citation.

See Mackey v. Montrym,

443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (upholding license suspensions based on
“objective facts either within the personal knowledge of an
impartial government official or readily ascertainable by him”).
Finally, the Defendants correctly note that “Massachusetts has a
substantial interest in securing public safety on its roads by
suspending the operating privileges of drivers who default on
CMVIs.”

Def.’s Mem. 22.

Accordingly, the Mathews factors weigh

against the need for a pre-deprivation hearing on the
suspension.
The Defendants appeal to Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d
38 (1st Cir. 2014), Defs.’ Mem. 23, in which the First Circuit
noted that even in the absence of a pre-deprivation hearing, “an
extensive post-termination appeal system lessens the need for an
elaborate pre-termination process,” Jones, 752 F.3d at 57-58
(citing Mard, 350 F.3d at 192).

When the Registry received

Crawford’s June 2014 letter challenging his suspension, it
treated the letter as a post-suspension appeal, and a hearings
officer in the Driver Control Unit issued a written decision
appealable to the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability
[27]

Policies and Bonds.

Def.’s Statement Facts ¶ 14.

The

Defendants note that if Crawford had appealed to the Board, he
could have challenged the Registrar’s statutory authority to
suspend his operating privileges.

Def.’s Mem. 24.

In another

session of this Court, Judge Woodlock dismissed a factually
similar due process challenge to a driver’s license revocation.
Packard v. Hinden, No. 05-11906-DPW, 2007 WL 2746799, at *6 (D.
Mass. Sept. 7, 2007).

There, although the plaintiff did not

have a pre-deprivation hearing in Massachusetts, the combination
of a hearing to challenge the underlying ticket in Rhode Island
and post-deprivation procedural protections in Massachusetts
constituted adequate due process.

Id.

Because Crawford was given adequate notice and afforded
sufficient post-deprivation remedies, the Mathews factors weigh
against requiring a pre-deprivation hearing.

The suspension of

his Massachusetts driving privileges, therefore, did not violate
due process.
C.

Immunity

Crawford’s claim for damages against the Defendants in
their official capacity is foreclosed by the Commonwealth’s
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

“As a general

matter, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal courts
against unconsenting states (including ‘official capacity’ suits

[28]

against state hierarchs).”

Rosie D. ex rel. John D. v. Swift,

310 F.3d 230, 234 (1st Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
Crawford also sues the Defendants in their personal
capacities.

“[O]fficials sued in their personal capacities,

unlike those sued in their official capacities, may assert
personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable
reliance on existing law [i.e., qualified immunity].”
Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citations omitted).

Hafer v.

In assessing

a defense of qualified immunity, courts examine: “(1) whether
the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation
of a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right was
‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged
violation.”

Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268-69 (1st

Cir. 2009) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
(2009)).

Courts have discretion to proceed directly to the

second question.

Id. at 269-70.

On the second prong, the

“‘salient question . . . is whether the state of the law’ at the
time of an incident provided ‘fair warning’ to the defendants
‘that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.’”

Tolan v.

Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).

Here, it is undisputed that the

Defendants were merely following the letter of the state law.
Crawford puts forth no evidence suggesting that they should have

[29]

known the state law was unconstitutional.

The Defendants are

therefore immunized from monetary damages.
This brings Crawford’s action against the former Registrar,
Rachel Kaprelian, to an end as Crawford can have no further
claim against her. Judgment will enter in her favor.
D.

Injunctive Relief

The Court having declared that Massachusetts’ nonrefundable
filing fee -- even as to those appellants who prevail in their
CMVI hearings –- denies those appellants procedural due process,
Crawford seeks immediate injunctive relief against the current
Registrar, Celia Blue.

As a matter of discretion, the Court

declines to grant injunctive relief.
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 established the
principle of separation of powers among the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the Commonwealth’s
government, Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, part 1,
article 30, and provided a template for the incorporation of
that same principle in our United States Constitution.

See,

e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme
Court’s Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev.
587, 588-589 (1990) (discussing the influence of this state
provision on the U.S. Constitution).

Massachusetts’s

jurisprudence, however, came to develop a respectful presumption
not as fully developed in its federal counterpart -- the
[30]

rebuttable presumption that once the law is authoritatively
declared, executive agencies will be presumed to follow the law
without explicit order.

Massachusetts Coal. for Homeless v.

Secretary of Human Servs., 400 Mass. 806, 825 (1987) (“[I]t has
been our practice to assume that public officials will comply
with the law declared by a court and that consequently
injunctive orders are generally unnecessary.”); see also Smith
v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 431 Mass. 638, 651
(2000); Boston Elevated Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 310 Mass. 528,
543 (1942).
So here.

Once the Registrar has evaluated her appellate

options (this is, after all, a close case, supra at section
III.B.1), this Court has every confidence that she, in
cooperation with the Massachusetts General Court, will -without federal judicial order -- obey the United States
Constitution and devise a procedure to refund the filing fee to
those held to have been wrongfully cited for motor vehicle
infractions.

How she does it ought be up to her.

She may, of

course, continue to charge everyone who can afford it a filing
fee in order to deter frivolous appeals.

Indeed, she may raise

the filing fee for every appellant to cover the Commonwealth’s
administrative costs in returning the fee to those found to have
been wrongfully cited.

Or perhaps she could devise an even more

[31]

innovative solution.

It is up to her so long as it is

constitutional.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Crawford’s motion for

summary judgment is ALLOWED in part with respect to Crawford’s
due process challenge to the filing fee requirement of
Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 90C, section 3.

Although

this case presents a very close question, the due process
balancing weighs in Crawford’s favor.

On the related challenge

to the suspension of his Massachusetts operating privileges, the
combination of adequate notice and post-deprivation remedies
constitutes sufficient due process.

In this and all other

respects Crawford’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

The

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED insofar as the
current Registrar must now deal with this Court’s declaration of
the constitutional law.

The Court is confident she will do so.

As to remedies, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
ALLOWED and judgment shall enter for both Defendants.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ William G. Young
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE

[32]