Brockton Fire Department et al v. Bernenberg et al

Filing 42

Judge Richard G. Stearns: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. "For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED and plaintiffs' cross-motion is DENIED. The Clerk will enter judgment for defendants and close the case."(RGS, int2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-13216-RGS
BROCKTON FIRE DEPARTMENT and
EDWARD WILLIAMS
v.
ST. MARY BROAD STREET, LLC and
BRIAN BERNENBERG
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
April 13, 2016
Stearns, D.J.
After a kitchen fire at a sober house on Copeland Street in Brockton,
Massachusetts, the Brockton Fire Department, through Lieutenant Edward
Williams, brought an action in the Brockton Housing Court seeking to
enforce the State Sprinkler Law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 148, § 26H, against the
operators of the home, defendants St. Mary Broad Street, LLC and Brian
Bernenberg. Defendants removed the case to the federal district court on
federal question grounds, citing the Federal Housing Act (FHA) as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. In July of 2015, the court stayed a decision, without
objection from the parties, given then-pending legislation amending the

Sprinkler Law.1 See Dkt. Nos. 28, 29. The Legislature, however, did not act
on the proposed amendment. Consequently, the court will therefore turn to
a decision on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
The Sprinkler Law provides that
[i]n any city or town which accepts the provisions of this section,
every lodging house or boarding house shall be protected
throughout with an adequate system of automatic sprinklers in
accordance with the provisions of the state building code. . . .
For the purposes of this section “lodging house” or “boarding
house” shall mean a house where lodgings are let to six or more
persons not within the second degree of kindred to the person
conducting it, but shall not include fraternity houses or
dormitories, rest homes or group residences licensed or
regulated by agencies of the commonwealth.
It is undisputed that more than six unrelated persons reside at the Copeland
Street house, that the home is not licensed by the State, and that the City of
Brockton has accepted the provisions of Section 26H in 1988.
Defendants contend, and the court agrees, that the enforcement of the
Sprinkler Law against the sober home is enjoined by the Massachusetts

The proposed amendment, in conjunction with a proposed
amendment to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, § 9D, would have brought sober
homes under State regulation and mandate the installation of automatic
sprinkler systems.
See 2015 Massachusetts Senate Bill No. 1062
(https://malegislature.gov/Bills/189/Senate/S1062, last visited April 13,
2016).
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Zoning Act (MZA), Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 40A. Section 3 of the MZA provides
in relevant part that
[n]otwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary,
local land use and health and safety laws, regulations, practices,
ordinances, by-laws and decisions of a city or town shall not
discriminate against a disabled person. Imposition of health and
safety laws or land-use requirements on congregate living
arrangements among non-related persons with disabilities that
are not imposed on families and groups of similar size or other
unrelated persons shall constitute discrimination.
The
provisions of this paragraph shall apply to every city or town,
including, but not limited to the city of Boston and the city of
Cambridge.
The Sprinkler Law is unquestionably a “health and safety law.” On its
face, as plaintiffs concede, the Sprinkler Law could not compel the
installation of an automatic sprinkler system2 in a home occupied by a family
of six or more related persons, or in group homes such as student dormitories
and fraternity houses that are expressly exempted by the law. Plaintiffs also
do not contest that the recovering alcoholics and drug addicts hosted by the
sober home qualify as “disabled persons” under the MZA. See S. Middlesex
Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham, 752 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95
(D. Mass. 2010) (SMOC) (“Federal regulations define ‘handicap’ to include
drug addiction or alcoholism that ‘substantially limits one or more major life

Defendants estimate that the installation of an automatic sprinkler
system would cost $42,000, and displace the residents, some of whom would
become homeless, for up to four weeks.
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activities.’”) (citation omitted); Granada House, Inc. v. City of Boston, 1997
WL 106688, at *9 (Mass. Super. Feb. 28, 1997) (“In the present case, the
court concludes that Massachusetts would look to federal law, including the
FHA, in interpreting the phrases ‘disabled person’ and ‘persons with
disabilities’, and that by so doing, the MZA must be read to bar the City’s
discriminatory treatment of a group home for recovering drug and alcohol
users under the Code.”).
Plaintiffs’ argument rests on the assertion that the Massachusetts
Appeals Court has, at least in one instance, upheld the enforcement of the
Sprinkler Law in a sober home context. See Massachusetts Sober Hous.
Corp. v. Automatic Sprinkler Appeals Bd., 66 Mass. App. Ct. 701 (2006)
(MSHC) (upholding the Sprinkler Appeals Board’s decision that group sober
recovery homes constitute “lodging or boarding houses” under the Sprinkler
Law). But, in MSHC the Appeals Court expressly noted that the group home
operator there did not raise, and therefore it did not consider, the
implications of the FHA. Id. at 705 and n.6. One thing should be clear: the
court does not doubt the sincerity of plaintiffs’ representation that their
motive to enforce the Sprinkler Law arises from a genuine concern for the
safety and welfare of the home’s residents. Nor does the court discount the
potentially tragic consequences should an unsuppressed fire erupt in the
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home. For better or worse, however, the MZA unequivocally prohibits the
facially disparate imposition of the Sprinkler Law on a group residence
sheltering disabled individuals. 3
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment
is ALLOWED and plaintiffs’ cross-motion is DENIED. The Clerk will enter
judgment for defendants and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
__________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendants also fault plaintiffs for failing to make a reasonable
accommodation under the FHA that would involve the installation of other
less expensive fire suppression devices. See SMOC, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 95
(Under the FHA, a party can assert a claim for failure to make a reasonable
accommodation.).
Defendants’ willingness to take intermediate
ameliorative steps may offer a reasonable compromise pending any future
action by the Legislature.
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