Anderson v. Donahoe

Filing 142

Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM and ORDER entered. The Plaintiff's Motion to Alter Judgment (Docket No. 125 ) is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. The Plaintiff's Motion for Assessment of Pre-Judgment Interest (Docket No. 127 ) is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. The Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Untimely Motion for Attorney's Fees (Docket No. 126 ) is ALLOWED. The Defendants Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No. 128 ) is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in par t.Both parties shall, within fourteen days, supplement the record on the appropriate amount of front pay. Anderson shall, within fourteen days, file a petition for attorneys fees. Any opposition to the petition for attorney's fees shall be filed within fourteen days after that. (Geraldino-Karasek, Clarilde)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
DIPING Y. ANDERSON,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
Civil Action
)
No. 14-13380-PBS
MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster
)
General,
)
)
Defendant.
)
______________________________
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
June 1, 2017
Saris, C.J.
Following a seven-day bench trial, the Court concluded that
plaintiff Diping Anderson’s termination from her employment as a
Postal Police Officer (“PPO”) was retaliatory in violation of
Title VII. The Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions
of law on March 16, 2017. Anderson v. Brennan, No. CV 14-13380PBS, 2017 WL 1032502 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 2017). The Court assumes
familiarity with that decision. Judgment was entered on March
17, 2017. The parties subsequently filed four motions seeking
reconsideration of both liability and remedies.
The Court’s finding of liability stands, but the Court
finds that some reconsideration of the remedies is appropriate.
The Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter Judgment (Docket No. 125) is

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ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. The Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File Untimely Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Docket No.
126) is ALLOWED. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Assessment of PreJudgment Interest (Docket No. 127) is ALLOWED in part and DENIED
in part. The Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No.
128) is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
In September 2013, Anderson was removed from service as a
PPO for failure to perform her duties while assigned to guard
the Brockton postal facility in the aftermath of a building
fire. Anderson’s termination notice stated that, in addition to
her misconduct at Brockton, three prior disciplinary incidents
on Anderson’s record “ha[d] been considered in arriving at this
decision”: (1) her June 24, 2011 seven-day suspension; (2) her
August 29, 2012 Letter of Warning; and (3) her September 26,
2012 fourteen-day suspension.
Anderson brought this suit against the Postal Service
claiming that her removal was unlawfully discriminatory and
retaliatory, in violation of Title VII. At trial, Anderson
presented evidence not only on the circumstances of her removal
but also on the circumstances underlying the three prior
disciplinary incidents cited in her notice of removal. At the
close of evidence, the Court directed the parties to address in
their closing arguments what impact there should be on the
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verdict if the Court found some of the prior disciplinary
incidents to be discriminatory or retaliatory.
In closing arguments, the parties clarified that the only
remedies sought in this case were those stemming from the
removal. The parties were in agreement that Anderson could not
timely seek remedies for any of the prior disciplinary
incidents. However, Anderson argued that the circumstances
underlying the prior disciplinary incidents were relevant to
assessing whether the removal decision was discriminatory or
retaliatory. The Court signaled to the Postal Service that the
Court would only consider remedies based on the removal decision
but that the Court was “very much going to be considering the
progression [of discipline] to see whether the notice of a
removal was appropriate.” The Court asked the Postal Service to
answer, in its supplemental proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the following question: “If I find that one
of them [the prior disciplinary actions], or more, were
retaliatory, and if I find they were a substantial factor in the
decision for removal, what do I do?”
The Postal Service minimally addressed the question in its
briefing: “That decision [by the administrative judge upholding
the seven-day suspension] became final when Plaintiff neither
appealed that decision nor brought an action in federal court
within the time permitted to do so. Any consideration of it now
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is precluded as a matter of law.” Docket No. 121 at 7. For that
proposition, the Postal Service cited Velazquez-Ortiz v.
Vilsack, 657 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2011), Martinez v. Potter,
347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003), and Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
On March 16, 2017, the Court issued its findings of fact
and conclusions of law (“bench trial order”). The Court
concluded that Anderson’s removal was retaliatory. The Court
awarded back pay and emotional distress damages. Anderson, 2017
WL 1032502, at *16–19. The Court also ordered reinstatement of
Anderson not as a PPO, but in the position she held in the
Postal Service prior to becoming a PPO: a full-time window
clerk. Id. at *17.
DISCUSSION
I.

Legal Standard for Altering or Amending Judgment
Federal Rule of Procedure 59(e) provides for the filing of

a motion to alter or amend a judgment no later than twenty-eight
days after the entry of judgment. “Rule 59(e) itself does not
state the grounds on which relief under the rule may be granted,
and the district courts have considerable discretion in deciding
whether to grant or deny a motion to alter or amend under Rule
59(e).” Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190
(1st Cir. 2004). The case law has articulated some circumstances
in which Rule 59(e) relief is appropriate. Id. Among those
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circumstances is when “the movant shows a manifest error of
law.” Kansky v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New Eng., 492 F.3d 54,
60 (1st Cir. 2007).
II.

Consideration of Prior Disciplinary Incidents
The Postal Service argues that the Court made an error of

law by considering the retaliatory nature of prior disciplinary
incidents in finding liability for retaliatory removal. In its
bench trial order, the Court recognized that Anderson’s three
prior disciplinary incidents were not directly actionable
because they were time-barred and unexhausted. Anderson could
not revive and seek a remedy for past unlawful prior
disciplinary incidents by bundling them with the more recent
removal, for which her Title VII claim was timely. See Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 113 (“[D]iscrete
discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when
they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.”); see
also Shervin v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., 804 F.3d 23, 48
(1st Cir. 2015).
However, the Court held that because of the Postal
Service’s explicit reliance on prior discipline in its
progressive discipline system, consideration of the prior
disciplinary incidents was appropriate even if Anderson was only
seeking a remedy for unlawful removal. To recover for
retaliatory removal, Anderson must show that she would not have
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been removed but for engagement in protected activity. One part
of the Court’s reasoning was that Anderson could meet that
causation requirement by showing that she would not have been
removed but for her prior disciplinary incidents, which
themselves would not have been imposed but for engagement in
protected activity.
The Postal Service now cites two cases to attack the
Court’s reasoning. The main case is United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). The plaintiff in that case was
Evans, a female flight attendant who had been forced to resign
from her position in 1968 because of a policy by United that
prohibited female flight attendants from being married. Evans
did not file a timely challenge to the policy, although the
policy was later found to violate Title VII in a case to which
Evans was not a party. Evans was rehired by United in 1972. In
Evans, Evans recognized that it was too late to obtain relief
for unlawfully being forced to resign in 1968 but she claimed
that United’s refusal to credit her with seniority for her
employment prior to 1972 gave present effect to the past
unlawful practice. The Court held that Evans could not recover
under that theory:
Respondent is correct in pointing out that the
seniority system gives present effect to a past act of
discrimination. But United was entitled to treat that
past act as lawful after respondent failed to file a
charge of discrimination within the 90 days then
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allowed by [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)]. A discriminatory
act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is
the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which
occurred before the statute was passed. It may
constitute
relevant
background
evidence
in
a
proceeding in which the status of a current practice
is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely
an unfortunate event in history which has no present
legal consequences.
Respondent emphasizes the fact that she has
alleged a continuing violation. United’s seniority
system does indeed have a continuing impact on her pay
and fringe benefits. But the emphasis should not be
placed on mere continuity; the critical question is
whether any present violation exists.
Id. at 558.
The Postal Service also relies on a more recent Seventh
Circuit decision that suggests that Evans applies to a
progressive discipline system. In that case, the Seventh Circuit
stated, citing Evans, that “[t]his rule [that Title VII does not
allow for untimely recovery] applies even if an old,
unchallenged discriminatory act has a present effect on an
employee’s status in a seniority system, a progressive
discipline system, or some other dynamic employment scheme.”
Barrett v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 803 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir.
2015) (holding that the statute of limitations period for an
FMLA claim begins at denial of FMLA leave request, not when
plaintiff was fired years later as a consequence of her overall
attendance record).
The Postal Service takes Evans, as applied to a progressive
discipline system by Barrett, to mean that Captain Motrucinski
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could properly take Anderson’s prior discipline as lawful when
he was deciding whether to remove Anderson. If so, the Postal
Service argues, a finding of liability cannot be sustained if
Captain Motrucinski’s decision to remove Anderson was reasonable
and nonretaliatory given her prior disciplinary incidents, even
where her prior disciplinary incidents were retaliatory.
It is a difficult question whether Evans and Barrett apply
to this case, as the factual circumstances of those cases are so
distinguishable. Citing this case law, the Postal Service makes
a strong argument that a Title VII plaintiff should be barred
from attacking an old, unchallenged retaliatory sanction that
underpins a termination in a progressive discipline system.
Anderson responds that the Postal Service explicitly looked to
the prior retaliatory discipline in determining that she could
not be rehabilitated and must be terminated, and she emphasizes
that she is not independently challenging the prior disciplinary
sanctions as a basis for liability.
Even if the Postal Service’s argument prevails, the Court’s
finding was not only that Captain Motrucinski relied on prior
retaliatory discipline, but also that Captain Motrucinski’s
removal of Anderson was itself motivated by retaliation against
her protected conduct. See Anderson, 2017 WL 1032502, at *13
(“[I]n light of the lax treatment of similarly situated white
PPOs, removal was disproportionate and supports a claim of
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retaliation particularly in light of the temporal proximity to
Anderson’s EEO complaints.”); see also id. at *16 (“The Court
concludes that Anderson would not have been removed but for her
two prior retaliatory suspensions and that Captain Motrucinski
had a retaliatory motive for her termination.”). In other words,
the evidence at trial showed that Captain Motrucinski’s removal
of Anderson was motivated by retaliation even if her three prior
disciplinary actions were taken as given.
A brief recitation of the relevant facts is helpful. At the
Brockton facility in June 2013, Anderson appeared to be sleeping
in her patrol car despite instructions by her supervisors to
stand outside and keep watch. While these are legitimate grounds
for discipline, the reality in the Boston PPO workforce was that
sleeping on the job was not taken particularly seriously. The
undisputed evidence about two former PPOs Healey and Pasquale
illustrates that point. Anderson’s three prior disciplinary
incidents, if taken at face value, can explain why Anderson
would receive some level of discipline higher than sleeping PPOs
with lesser disciplinary histories would. But the question
remains whether Captain Motrucinski was justified in escalation
to as harsh a punishment as removal, even given Anderson’s three
prior disciplinary incidents. There is no comparator evidence
right on point since there does not appear to have been any
other PPO caught sleeping on the job with a disciplinary history
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comparable to Anderson’s. What evidence exists casts a high
degree of doubt on the appropriateness of removal, even given
these circumstances: only five or six PPOs were terminated
nationwide in the past three years and nobody had been removed
from the Boston PPO service at any time within any witness’s
recollection.
As further evidence, the Court can also consider the past
history of interactions between Captain Motrucinski and Anderson
to find evidence of retaliatory motive. Even if the Court is
precluded from considering the retaliatory nature of Anderson’s
prior disciplinary sanctions as an independent basis for
knocking out the removal, the Court may certainly consider prior
acts of retaliation resulting from Anderson’s EEO filings as
“relevant background evidence” to determining the
decisionmaker’s motive and intent and the context of the
discipline. Evans, 431 U.S. at 558; see also Shervin, 804 F.3d
at 48 (allowing evidence of time-barred discrimination or
retaliation to be considered for “evaluating motive, intent, or
context”).
There is significant background evidence of retaliatory
treatment of Anderson. Captain Motrucinski’s predecessor,
Captain Ford, wanted Anderson “gone” because of her EEO filings.
Ford issued Anderson a seven-day suspension that the Court found
was retaliatory. While Motrucinski himself played no part in
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imposing this discipline, it can be inferred from the close-knit
nature of the PPO workforce that Motrucinski likely knew that
Ford wanted Anderson “gone.” As the First Circuit has held,
“retaliatory animus could be established if a decisionmaker was
shown either to have been influenced by, or to have ratified,
another’s animus.” Shervin, 804 F.3d at 51.
More significantly, Captain Motrucinski was the actual
decisionmaker in another situation that the Court found
retaliatory. On September 11, 2012, Anderson named then-Sergeant
Motrucinski in an EEO pre-complaint counseling form. Just over
two weeks later, on September 26, 2012, then-Sergeant
Motrucinski issued Anderson a Letter of Warning in Lieu of a
Fourteen-Day Suspension for failure to follow instructions,
failure to secure accountable property, and an integrity
violation. The Court found in the bench trial order that the
September 26, 2012 discipline was unjustifiably severe
punishment for misconduct that was generally overlooked for
other PPOs and could not be explained by anything other than
retaliatory motive. Anderson, 2017 WL 1032502, at *15–16.
By itself, the fact that the Brockton incident was six
months after EEO activity (and Anderson’s subsequent removal was
nine months removed) might not permit an inference of
retaliation. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355
F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Three and four month periods have
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been held insufficient to establish a causal connection based on
temporal proximity.”). But the prior history of retaliatory
discipline by Captain Motrucinski makes this a different case.
In short, the most significant past disciplinary incident and
the only part of Anderson’s record that might have justified her
subsequent removal, the fourteen-day suspension, followed so
closely after EEO activity and was so severe that the Court
found it could not be explained by anything other than
retaliatory motive. Moreover, the inference of retaliation is
strengthened by the undisputed evidence that in his time as a
sergeant and then as a captain, Motrucinski never issued a
Letter of Warning, suspension, or removal to any PPO other than
Anderson. Anderson’s previous supervisors also imposed
discipline that could not have been anything but retaliatory.
All that is strong background evidence of retaliation by
Motrucinski that, when combined with evidence that removal was a
disproportionate level of discipline for Anderson’s misconduct
at Brockton, supports an inference of present retaliatory motive
by Motrucinski. The Court’s finding of liability stands.
III. Comparator Evidence
The Postal Service argues that the Court erred in relying
on PPOs Healey and Pasquale as comparators. The Court’s limited
consideration of Healey and Pasquale was appropriate.

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Healey and Pasquale were raised as potential comparators
because they were PPOs who did not engage in Title VII protected
activity, as Anderson had. To the extent that the Court’s bench
trial order may have suggested that Healey and Pasquale were
appropriate comparators because they were “white,” clarification
is in order. For purposes of the retaliation claim (as opposed
to the discrimination claim), Healey’s and Pasquale’s lack of
involvement in EEO activity, not their race, was what made them
potential comparators.
The Postal Service argues that Healey and Pasquale were not
similarly situated to Anderson for a number of reasons:
different work duties, different period of employment, and
different supervisors. Those factors certainly all matter when
determining whether purported comparators are similar enough for
comparison purposes. See Anderson, 2017 WL 1032502, at *11
(explaining that for comparator evidence, identicality is not
demanded, but reasonable similarity is required). The Court
acknowledged these differences yet still found that past
supervisors’ treatment of Healey and Pasquale had some probative
value. The Court noted that while the work duties were not
identical, Healey’s and Pasquale’s guard shack duties were
reasonably similar to Anderson’s assignment of keeping watch in
the aftermath of the Brockton fire. While Healey and Pasquale
were caught sleeping earlier in time, their work years
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overlapped with Anderson’s. Above all, the Court determined that
it was the stark difference in treatment that was significant.
Some difference in treatment may have been justified given the
passage of time and the different supervisors, particularly
given evidence of a general increase in PPO responsibilities and
expectations over time. But the significantly harsher treatment
of Anderson compared to that of Healey and Pasquale could not be
fully explained by those differences, permitting an inference of
improper motive.
IV.

Emotional Distress Damages
The Postal Service argues that the Court erred in awarding

emotional distress damages in reliance on Anderson’s damages
expert, Stuart Grassian. The Court stated in its bench trial
order that it was giving Dr. Grassian “less weight” because of
credibility concerns. Anderson, 2017 WL 1032502, at *18. The
Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr. Grassian to
testify in the first place, and the Court correctly discounted
his testimony and did not adopt the diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder that the Postal Service protests. In any event,
there was credible evidence of emotional distress in Anderson’s
testimony that justified the emotional distress damages.
V.

Calculation of Damages
First, Anderson points out that there was a miscalculation

in the computation of emotional distress damages in the bench
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trial order. The main text of the memorandum contained the
correct figure, $248,164, but the order did not. Anderson, 2017
WL 1032502, at *19. The figure of $248,164 correctly reflects
the Court’s decision in the bench trial order to award back pay
of $223,164 and compensatory damages of $25,000.
Second, Anderson argues that judgment should be altered to
give another six months of back pay. The discrepancy derives
from Anderson’s own imprecise briefing. Anderson’s supplemental
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law asked for three
years of back pay in one part, then 3.3 years of back pay in
another. Docket No. 120-2 at 41. The Court awarded three years
of back pay. Anderson now argues that she is entitled to 3.5
years of back pay because of the extra time that had elapsed by
the time the Court issued its judgment.
The Court has equitable discretion in awarding back pay,
but the First Circuit has also stated that back pay is a
“presumptive entitlement” of a plaintiff who succeeds in a Title
VII case. Johnson v. Spencer Press of Maine, Inc., 364 F.3d 368,
379 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systs.,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1171 (6th Cir. 1996)). The Court exercises
its equitable discretion to award 3.3 years of back pay, which
is the larger of the amounts that Anderson originally sought.
Docket No. 120-2 at 41. That sum is 3.3 years at an annual rate
of $101,987 (her total compensation in 2012), totaling $336,557.
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Subtracting $82,797 in mitigation over that same time period
leads to total back pay of $253,760. Adding emotional distress
damages of $25,000 leads to a total of $278,760.
IV.

Reinstatement to Window Clerk Position
The Postal Service argues that the Court abused its

discretion by ordering the reinstatement of Anderson to her
former position as window clerk.
The Postal Service argues that the Court’s order would
infringe upon the seniority rights of innocent third party
employees and that the Court’s order would force the Postal
Service to violate its collective bargaining agreements. The
Postal Service relies on a statement under oath by a Postal
Service Labor Relations management official. Docket No. 129-1.
That official states that the collective bargaining agreement
for the American Postal Workers Union (which represents window
clerks but not PPOs) does not allow an employee to retain
seniority after more than one year absence from the window clerk
position.
In response, Anderson submits an affidavit that at a
previous redress conference, she previously received offers to
settle this matter by resigning her position as a PPO and
becoming a Postal Service window clerk with seniority intact.
She also states that after her removal, the Northeast Area
Representative for the PPO Union informed her that Postal
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Inspection Service management was offering her a position as a
Postal Service custodian, with seniority intact, in settlement
of her claims.
The relevant provision of the collective bargaining
agreement states that “[e]xcept as specifically provided
elsewhere in this Agreement, a full-time employee begins a new
period of seniority . . . [u]pon reinstatement or reemployment.”
Docket No. 129-5 at 7–8. Elsewhere, the agreement provides that
“[a]n employee who left the bargaining unit . . . and returns to
the same craft and installation . . . will begin a new period of
seniority if the employee returns from a non-bargaining unit
position within the Postal Service, unless the employee returns
within 1 year from the date the employee left the unit.” Docket
No. 129-6 at 4.
There does not appear to be any provision in the collective
bargaining agreement that provides for rehire or reinstatement
of a window clerk with seniority intact. It is not certain how
to reconcile this with Anderson’s allegations that she received
settlement offers of transfer with seniority preserved. All that
is certain is that the Court cannot consider the Postal
Service’s settlement offers in determining the remedy.
Based on both parties’ supplementation of the record on
this point, the Court determines, in its equitable discretion,
that front pay is a more appropriate remedy than reinstatement
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to a window clerk position. However, there is a lack of evidence
in the record about the appropriate amount of front pay.
The Court must exercise caution in determining the
appropriate amount of front pay. “An award of front pay,
constituting as it does, an estimate of what a plaintiff might
have earned had s/he been reinstated at the conclusion of trial,
is necessarily speculative.” Cummings v. Standard Register Co.,
265 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Kelley v. Airborne
Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 355 (1st Cir. 1998)). “[T]he
greater the period of time upon which a front pay award is
calculated in a case involving an at-will employee the less
likely it is that the loss of future earnings can be
demonstrated with any degree of certainty or can reasonably be
attributed to the illegal conduct of the employer.” Id. (quoting
Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 523 N.E.2d 255, 257 (Mass.
1988)).
Anderson was born in 1955, which makes her sixty-two years
old this year. There is no evidence in the record about how many
more years Anderson would have worked as a PPO or whether there
is an ordinary or mandatory retirement age for PPOs. Within
fourteen days, both parties shall supplement the record with
evidence pertaining to the appropriate amount of front pay.

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VII. Prejudgment Interest
Anderson asks the Court to calculate prejudgment interest.
The Postal Service concedes that 28 U.S.C. § 2674 generally does
not bar an award of prejudgment interest against the Postal
Service in Title VII cases. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 565
(1988).
“A trial court has discretion whether to award prejudgment
interest on a successful Title VII claim.” Scarfo v. Cabletron
Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 961 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Hogan v.
Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 61 F.3d 1034, 1038 (1st Cir. 1995)
(“Whether prejudgment interest is needed to make a plaintiff
whole is within the discretion of the district court.”).
Here, prejudgment interest on back pay is justified to make
the plaintiff whole. However, prejudgment interest is generally
not awarded on emotional distress damages. See Hudson v.
Chertoff, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1278 (S.D. Fla. 2007); E.E.O.C.
v. Everdry Mktg. & Mgmt., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 213, 223–24
(W.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 348 F. App’x 677 (2d Cir. 2009). Nor is
prejudgment interest appropriate for front pay. Scarfo, 54 F.3d
at 961.
Anderson seeks an annual rate of interest of 1.03%. The
Postal Service does not contest the appropriateness of this
number. The Court will enter an amended judgment following the
supplementation of the record on front pay. At that time, the
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Court will calculate prejudgment interest on the $253,760 back
pay amount at 1.03% compounded annually, running from the filing
of the complaint on August 15, 2014 to the issuance of the
amended judgment.
The total remedy will be $253,760 in back pay, $25,000 in
compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, and front pay to be
determined.
VIII.

Late Petition for Attorney’s Fees
Anderson filed a petition for attorney’s fees three days

late, citing plaintiff counsel’s personal reasons. The Postal
Service argues that attorney’s fees should be denied because the
reason for late filing does not qualify as “excusable neglect.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). The Postal Service also argues that
Anderson failed to meet the pre-filing conference requirement in
Local Rule 7.1(a)(2).
The motion for leave to file is allowed. The filing was
only three days late, there is no evidence of bad faith, and the
Postal Service has demonstrated no prejudice. Anderson should
file her petition for attorney’s fees, with any necessary
supplementation, within fourteen days. Any opposition shall be
filed within fourteen days after that. The parties shall first
confer to resolve or narrow the attorney’s fee issues.

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ORDER
The Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter Judgment (Docket No. 125)
is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. The Plaintiff’s Motion
for Assessment of Pre-Judgment Interest (Docket No. 127) is
ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. The Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File Untimely Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Docket No.
126) is ALLOWED. The Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Docket No. 128) is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part.
Both parties shall, within fourteen days, supplement the
record on the appropriate amount of front pay. Anderson shall,
within fourteen days, file a petition for attorney’s fees. Any
opposition to the petition for attorney’s fees shall be filed
within fourteen days after that.

/s/ PATTI B. SARIS________________
Patti B. Saris
Chief United States District Judge

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