Anderson v. Donahoe
Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM and ORDER entered. The Court DENIES Anderson's motion to alter or amend the judgment, or, in the alternative, re-open the record on remedies (Docket No. 177 ). See ORDER for Details. (Geraldino-Karasek, Clarilde)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
DIPING Y. ANDERSON,
MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
September 26, 2017
Following a bench trial, the Court concluded that the
Postal Service’s termination of Anderson from her position as a
Postal Police Officer (“PPO”) was retaliatory, in violation of
Title VII. Anderson v. Brennan, No. CV 14-13380-PBS, 2017 WL
1032502 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 2017). On the parties’ subsequent
motions, the Court reconsidered the original remedy of
reinstatement and ordered both parties to supplement the record
with evidence on the appropriate amount of front pay. Anderson
v. Brennan, No. CV 14-13380-PBS, 2017 WL 2380166, at *6–*7 (D.
Mass. June 1, 2017). Following briefing on the issues of front
pay and attorney fees, the Court declined to award front pay but
awarded attorney fees. Anderson v. Brennan, No. CV 14-13380-PBS,
2017 WL 3140364, at *2 (D. Mass. July 24, 2017).
Anderson now moves for the Court to alter or amend its
judgment, or, in the alternative, to re-open the evidentiary
record on remedies (Docket No. 177). For the reasons stated
below, the Court DENIES Anderson’s motion (Docket No. 177).
Anderson argues that the court erred in reconsidering its
award of reinstatement because the Court considered evidence
beyond the trial record: namely, an affidavit from the Postal
Service’s Manger of Contract Administration and excerpts from
relevant Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”). Anderson v.
Brennan, No. CV 14-13380-PBS, 2017 WL 2380166, at *6–*7 (D.
Mass. June 1, 2017). In light of that decision, Anderson takes
particular umbrage with the Court’s decision to not consider
supplementary evidence on the issue of front pay. Anderson v.
Brennan, No. CV 14-13380-PBS, 2017 WL 3140364, at *1 (D. Mass.
July 24, 2017) (citing Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1105–06
(1st Cir. 1995) (“once the record is closed, a district court,
absent waiver or consent, ordinarily may not receive additional
factual information of a kind not susceptible to judicial notice
unless it fully reopens the record . . . .”)).
Anderson’s argument fails. First, Anderson failed to raise
Lussier in response to the Postal Service’s submission of
evidence regarding reinstatement. Therefore, Anderson’s argument
is waived. Second, the CBAs on which the Court based its
decision to modify the remedial order are subject to judicial
notice. Cf. Minch v. City of Chicago, 486 F.3d 294, 300 n.3 (7th
Cir. 2007) (recognizing district court’s authority to take
judicial notice of CBA at motion to dismiss stage); Allen v.
City of Chicago, No. 10 C 3183, 2015 WL 8493996, at *8 n.9,
aff’d 865 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2017). Finally, “awards of front
pay are discretionary.” Johnson v. Spencer Press of Maine, Inc.,
364 F.3d 368, 380 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Lussier, 50 F.3d at
1108–09. Anderson had full opportunity to introduce trial
evidence on the appropriate amount of front pay but failed to do
so. For the foregoing reasons, and in light of the discretionary
nature of the requested remedy, the Court declines to exercise
its discretion to re-open the evidentiary record.
The Court DENIES Anderson’s motion to alter or amend the
judgment, or, in the alternative, re-open the record on remedies
(Docket No. 177).
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS________________
Patti B. Saris
Chief United States District Judge
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