Anderson v. Donahoe

Filing 197

Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. Anderson's motion to amend the judgment (Dkt. No. 191 ) is DENIED and Brady's motion to intervene (Dkt. No. 192 ) is DENIED as moot.SO ORDERED.(Lara, Miguel)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster
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General,
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Defendant.
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___________________________________)
DIPING Y. ANDERSON,

Civil Action
No. 14-13380-PBS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
June 6, 2019
Saris, C.J.
Following a bench trial, the Court found that the
Postal Service’s termination of Diping Anderson (“Anderson”)
from her position as a Postal Police Officer was retaliatory, in
violation of Title VII. Anderson v. Brennan, No. CV 14-13380PBS, 2017 WL 1032502 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 2017). The Court
subsequently awarded Anderson $264,582.12 in attorney fees, made
payable to her trial counsel, James Brady (“Brady”). Dkt. No.
164 at 2. Brady claims he is currently owed $156,877. Dkt. No.
193 at 2. Anderson now asks the Court to amend its judgment with
respect to attorney fees and order that the fee award be held in
escrow pending the resolution of a fee dispute with Brady. Dkt.
No. 191. In turn, Brady has moved to intervene so that he may
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oppose Anderson’s motion. Dkt. No. 192. For the following
reasons, the Court DENIES Anderson’s motion to amend the
judgment and DENIES as moot Brady’s motion to intervene.
This is the second time the parties have raised this issue
with the Court. At the time of the Court’s original award,
Anderson had recently terminated Brady as her attorney. See Dkt.
No. 154. Following the Court’s award of attorney’s fees to
Brady, he moved to intervene in the case, Dkt. No. 157, and
moved to adjudicate an attorney’s lien he filed against Anderson
following his termination, Dkt. No. 159. In opposing both
motions, Anderson “request[ed] that the Court reconsider the
most recent order which directs payment of all fees to Attorney
Brady.” Dkt. No. 165 at 2. The Court denied Brady’s motions,
stating only “I will not be adjudicating the attorneys fees
dispute.” Dkt. No. 168. The Court also declined Anderson’s
request that it reconsider its prior fee award. Id.
Although the motion is not clearly styled as such, the
Court construes Anderson’s motion as one for reconsideration
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). “[M]otions for
reconsideration are appropriate only in a limited number of
circumstances: if the moving party presents newly discovered
evidence, if there has been an intervening change in the law, or
if the movant can demonstrate that the original decision was
based on a manifest error of law or was clearly unjust.” United
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States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009). None of those
circumstances is present here. The only basis for
reconsideration Anderson identifies is her concern that she may
not be able to recover the portion of the award to which she
believes she is entitled unless it is escrowed. If the fee award
is subject to dispute, then Brady is already under an
independent obligation to place the portion of the award in
dispute in escrow. See In re Sharif, 945 N.E.2d 922, 927-28
(Mass. 2011). As the Court has already made clear, however, it
is not going to involve itself in the merits of the parties’ fee
dispute.
Anderson’s motion fails for an additional reason. Motions
to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) must be filed
within 28 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e);
see also Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morell Bauzá Cartagena & Dapena,
LLC, 832 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2016) (applying Rule 59(e) time
limit to motion for reconsideration of attorney fees award). The
Court awarded Brady attorney fees on July 24, 2017. Dkt. No.
161. The Postmaster General moved for reconsideration of the
attorney fees award on July 28, 2017, Dkt. No. 163, which the
Court allowed in part and denied in part on August 3, 2017, Dkt.
No. 164. Yet Anderson did not file the present motion until
January 2019, nearly a year and a half after the Court entered
judgment regarding attorney fees. Anderson did file her motion
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28 days after the First Circuit entered judgment on the parties’
cross-appeals. Dkt. No. 190. But that is not the operative date
for a Rule 59(e) motion. See, e.g., Mancini v. City, 909 F.3d
32, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2018) (28-day period ran from district
court’s entry of judgment). Further, Anderson did not appeal the
Court’s order directing payment of the attorney fees award to
Brady. Thus, Anderson’s motion is untimely.
Accordingly, Anderson’s motion to amend the judgment (Dkt.
No. 191) is DENIED and Brady’s motion to intervene (Dkt. No.
192) is DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS
Hon. Patti B. Saris
Chief United States District Judge

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