Jobs First Independent Expenditure Political Action Committee v. Coakley

Filing 18

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (Docket No. 2) is DENIED and defendant Mannals motion to dismiss (Docket No. 11) is DENIED.(Patch, Christine)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
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)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
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MARTHA COAKLEY, Attorney General )
for the Commonwealth of
)
Massachusetts, and BRIAN MANNAL, )
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Defendants.
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JOBS FIRST INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURE POLITICAL ACTION
COMMITTEE and MELISSA LUCAS,

Civil Action No.
14-14338-NMG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This case involves a First Amendment challenge to a
Massachusetts statute that criminalizes false statements made in
relation to any candidate running for public office.

The suit

is brought by Jobs First Independent Expenditure Political
Action Committee (“Jobs First”) and the Treasurer of Jobs First,
Melissa Lucas (“Lucas”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”) against
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley (“Coakley”) and
Brian Mannal (“Mannal”), who was, at all pertinent times, a
candidate for public office (collectively, “defendants”).
Pending before the Court is plaintiffs’ emergency motion
for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to
enjoin the Clerk Magistrate of the Falmouth District Court from
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holding a hearing on December 18, 2014 related to an application
for a criminal complaint brought by Mannal against Lucas for
making false statements about him prior to the election in
November, 2014.

Mannal has also filed a motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ complaint based on Younger abstention principles.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny both
pending motions.
I.

Background
A.

M.G.L. c. 56, § 42

In 1946, M.G.L. c. 56, § 42 was enacted by the
Massachusetts legislature and became law.

It provides, in

relevant part:
No person shall make or publish, or cause to be made
or published, any false statement in relation to any
candidate for nomination or election to public office,
which is designed or tends to aid or to injure or
defeat such candidate.
The statute also (1) prohibits false statements made in
relation to ballot questions set to be submitted to voters and
(2) provides that anyone found to have “knowingly” violated any
provision of § 42 shall be subject to a fine of not more than
$1,000 or imprisonment for not more than six months. M.G.L. c.
56, § 42.
B.

Factual Background

Defendant Mannal is the incumbent representative for the
2nd Barnstable District in the Massachusetts House of
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Representatives.

Mannal is also a practicing criminal defense

attorney who receives appointments to represent clients in
Massachusetts trial courts.
In the lead up to the November, 2014 election, Jobs First
created and published several brochures and press releases
strongly criticizing Mannal’s legislative record.

In

particular, Jobs First circulated multiple brochures criticizing
Mannal’s apparent support for legislation concerning sex
offenders.

In one brochure, voters are encouraged to “[v]ote

against Brian Mannal” after it accuses him of
putting criminals and his own interest above our
families [and wanting] to use our tax dollars to pay
defense lawyers like himself to help convicted sex
offenders.
Another brochure accuses Mannal of
introduc[ing]
legislation
that
weakens
penalties
against convicted sex offenders and uses taxpayer
dollars to help them purge their names from sexual
offender databases.
That same brochure concludes by asking “Why does Brian Mannal
want to put our families at risk?”, and each brochure includes a
small disclaimer that reads “[p]aid for by Jobs First
Independent Expenditure PAC, Melissa Lucas, Treasurer.”

Jobs

First contends, however, that Lucas had nothing to do with the
creation of these published materials.
On October 21, 2014, Mannal filed an application for a
criminal complaint with the Barnstable District Court.
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Mannal’s

application alleges that Lucas published or caused the
publication of false statements by Jobs First in relation to his
candidacy for re-election.

The application also alleges that

the two statements were “designed to injure or defeat” Mannal
and therefore violated M.G.L c. 56, § 42.

It further contends

that “the mailer[s] inferred in no uncertain terms that []
Mannal sought to benefit financially from legislation that he
had filed.”

Mannal asserts that he never handled a sex offender

case and is not certified to do so.
A probable cause hearing on Mannal’s application for a
criminal complaint was scheduled for November 20, 2014 before a
Clerk Magistrate.

On October 27, 2014, plaintiffs filed a

motion to dismiss the application, contending that the statute
was facially unconstitutional.

On October 30, 2014, the

Barnstable District Court transferred the application to the
Falmouth District Court.

At Lucas’s request, the probable cause

hearing was postponed until December 18, 2014.
Mannal narrowly won re-election to his seat in the
Massachusetts House of Representatives on November 4, 2014.
C.

Procedural History

On December 5, 2014, plaintiffs filed a complaint in this
Court seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and
alleging that M.G.L. c. 56, § 42 is facially unconstitutional
(Count I), constitutes viewpoint discrimination (Count II) and
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is unconstitutionally vague (Count III).

The complaint also

alleges that the procedures of the state district courts result
in a violation of substantive and procedural due process (Count
IV) and raises an abuse of process claim against Mannal (Count
V).

On the same day, plaintiffs filed the instant motion for a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction against
the Clerk Magistrate of the Falmouth District Court who,
incidentally, is not a party to these proceedings.
On December 12, 2014, the Court invited the parties to file
supplemental briefing on the implications of the Younger
abstention doctrine on plaintiffs’ motion.

On December 15,

2014, defendant Mannal filed a motion to dismiss based on
Younger abstention.
The Court held a hearing on the subject motions on the day
of this Memorandum & Order.
II.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs contend that they face an imminent threat of

prosecution and arrest for allegedly violating what they argue
is a facially unconstitutional statute.

They assert that § 42

has never been subjected to First Amendment scrutiny and that it
is substantially similar to other state statutes recently struck
down by federal courts in Ohio and Minnesota.

They further

argue that M.G.L. c. 56, § 42 severely restricts their rights to
engage in political speech and thereby “chills” and “necessarily
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tempers” their First Amendment rights.

Plaintiffs thus assert

that, because their free speech rights are in jeopardy of being
irreparably harmed if a criminal complaint issues, they are
entitled to injunctive relief.
Defendant Coakley filed a brief response that takes no
position on the primary relief sought by plaintiff, namely an
order enjoining the Clerk Magistrate from convening a hearing on
December 18, 2014, and issuing a criminal complaint.

Coakley’s

response merely contends that the Court should issue no
declaration with respect to the constitutionality of the statute
at this stage in the proceedings.

Coakley suggests that such

“ultimate relief” at the preliminary injunction stage is
inappropriate.
Defendant Mannal opposes plaintiffs’ motion and contends
that § 42 and its procedures are distinguishable from the
recently invalidated state statutes in Ohio and Minnesota.
Moreover, he asserts that plaintiffs’ statements in the brochure
claiming that Mannal was “helping himself” through his
legislative record were made with reckless disregard for the
truth and constitute actual malice.

Mannal thus exclaims that

plaintiffs seek a sanctioned right to lie which is not protected
under the First Amendment.

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Mannal also asserts that the Younger abstention doctrine is
applicable to plaintiffs’ claims and that the complaint should
be dismissed.
A.

Legal Standard
1.

Injunctive Relief

Under the familiar standard, a movant seeking injunctive
relief must demonstrate that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely
to
suffer
irreparable
harm
in
the
absence
of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.
Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Medical News Now, Inc.,
645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Winter v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).

Even with this

standard, “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and
drastic remedy” that “is never awarded as of right.” Voice of
the Arab World, 645 F.3d at 32 (quoting Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S.
674, 689-90 (2008)).

An “injunction should issue only where the

intervention of a court of equity is essential in order
effectually to protect” against otherwise irremediable injuries.
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
2.

Younger Abstention

As a threshold consideration, however, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized the tensions inherent in parallel
judicial processes at the state and federal levels and has
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outlined situations where the possibility of “undue
interference” with state judicial proceedings cautions restraint
by federal courts. See, e.g., Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,
134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013).

The Supreme Court has been fearful

that
the restraining [of the state court] would entail an
unseemly failure to give effect to the principle that
state courts have the solemn responsibility, equally
with the federal courts to guard, enforce, and protect
every right granted or secured by the constitution of
the United States.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974) (citation and
internal quotations omitted); see also Mass. Delivery Ass’n v.
Coakley, 671 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2012) (basic notions of
comity and federalism are foundational principles of Younger
abstention).
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971), the Court
invoked this rationale to abstain from enjoining an ongoing
state criminal prosecution. See also Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (in instances where injunctive relief would
be impermissible under Younger principles, “declaratory relief
should ordinarily be denied as well”).1
Accordingly, when faced with a Younger scenario,

1

The Younger doctrine has been expanded well beyond criminal
proceedings to include certain civil actions and administrative
proceedings, although in each instance the state proceedings
must be “judicial in nature.” See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc.
v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989).
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a federal court must abstain from reaching the merits
of a case over which it [otherwise] has jurisdiction
so long as there is (1) an ongoing state judicial
proceeding, instituted prior to the federal proceeding
... that (2) implicates an important state interest,
and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the
plaintiff to raise the claims advanced in his federal
lawsuit.
Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 638 (1st
Cir. 1996) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)); see also Sprint Commc’ns,
134 S. Ct. at 588 (“[w]hen there is a parallel, pending state
criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining
[it]”); Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 32 (1st
Cir. 2004) (state proceedings “should be respected” if federal
rights can be asserted and resolved somewhere in the state
proceedings).
In fact, federal courts must “abstain from interfering with
state court proceedings even where defendants claim violations
of important federal rights.” In re Justices of Superior Court
Dep’t of Mass. Trial Court, 218 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2000)
(collecting cases); see Younger, 401 U.S. at 50-51 (First
Amendment challenge).

Younger abstention thereby ensures that

federal courts will not “needlessly inject” themselves into
ongoing state criminal proceedings. Brooks, 80 F.3d at 637-38.

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It is also significant that a district court is entitled to
raise abstention issues sua sponte. Ford Motor Co. v. Meredith
Motor Co., 257 F.3d 67, 71 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001).
B.

Analysis

Because only Melissa Lucas, and not Jobs First, is named as
a defendant in the state proceeding, the Court will analyze
plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief

with respect to the

defendants separately.
1. Melissa Lucas
Lucas contends that the Court ought not to abstain under
Younger and instead compares the status of the pending state
court proceedings to the scenario in the Steffel case, where the
Supreme Court held that abstention would be inappropriate when a
party faces an imminent threat of actual arrest, prosecution or
other enforcement action.

Undoubtedly in such a context, a

state proceeding is merely hypothetical and Younger abstention
is unwarranted.

Moreover, in that instance a federal court need

not concern itself with disrupting parallel state court
proceedings, as none in fact would be pending.
Unlike the scenario in Steffel, however, this is not a case
in which an individual is being threatened with the prospect of
arrest or state prosecution. See 401 U.S. at 475.

Here, the

machinery of the state judicial system has unquestionably been
invoked and set in motion and a parallel proceeding is pending
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against Lucas. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41; see also Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2339 (2014)
(referencing that the district court stayed the action under
Younger while state administrative proceedings were pending).
Thus, serious concerns about interfering with ongoing state
court proceedings necessarily are implicated. See In re Justices
of Superior Court, 218 F.3d at 17.
Many years ago, another session of this Court faced a
similar scenario involving a pending proceeding in state court
and opted to abstain under Younger and dissolve an alreadyissued federal injunction. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc.
v. Town of Norwood, 579 F. Supp. 108, 112-14 (D. Mass. 1984).
In Gannett, a police officer filed an application for a criminal
complaint in state district court against plaintiff, a newspaper
publisher, for distributing papers in the Town of Winchester in
violation of town by-laws.

A court hearing had been scheduled

but was continued at the request of plaintiff.

Before the state

hearing could be held, plaintiff filed suit in federal court and
argued that the town’s licensing law unconstitutionally
infringed on its First Amendment rights.2

2

The hearing eventually took place prior to the court’s ruling
in Gannett, however, the court’s analysis of Younger focused on
the fact that the federal case had been filed prior to the state
court hearing. See id.; see also Brooks, 80 F.3d at 638 (noting
that first factor in Younger inquiry is whether ongoing state
proceeding was initiated prior to federal suit).
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The plaintiff in Gannett argued that abstaining under
Younger would be inappropriate because, when it filed its
federal suit, the Town had merely sought an application for a
criminal complaint.

The complaint itself had not yet been

issued. Id. at 113.

Plaintiff relied on Mass. R. Crim. P. 3(a)

which stated that “a criminal proceeding shall be commenced in
the District Court by a complaint.”

Plaintiff argued that no

criminal proceeding sufficient to precipitate Younger abstention
had been filed when its federal suit was initiated. Id.
The Gannett court, in rejecting plaintiff’s argument, noted
that “application of the Younger doctrine does not depend on so
wooden an approach to the date when a state criminal action
begins.” Id.

Instead, by the time plaintiff had filed its

federal suit, all of the appropriate, necessary steps had been
taken to begin a formal criminal action in state court.

That

is, the application for a criminal complaint had already been
filed with the state court and a hearing had been scheduled.
The Gannett decision held that
the same concerns the Supreme Court cited in requiring
abstention in Younger--notions of comity, federalism,
and equitable restraint--militate against interfering
with the criminal process in this case which has
already begun.
Id.

Moreover, the Gannett decision reasoned that a

determination on the merits of the First Amendment issue would
“likely result in some disruption of the State criminal justice
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system, and could be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon
the state court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles.”
Id. (quoting Steffel, 401 U.S. at 462) (internal quotations
omitted).

The court thus concluded that a state criminal action

was pending for purposes of Younger abstention.
The Court agrees with the reasoning of the court in Gannett
that Younger abstention is warranted in this context.
Plaintiffs have asked this Court to enjoin the Clerk Magistrate
for the Falmouth District Court from conducting an alreadyscheduled probable cause hearing on Mannal’s application for a
criminal complaint against Lucas.
almost two months ago.

Mannal filed his application

Since then the Barnstable District Court

scheduled a hearing and transferred the pending case to the
Falmouth District Court.

The Falmouth District Court has

rescheduled the hearing once, postponing it from November 20 to
December 18, 2014.

All of those events occurred prior to

plaintiffs’ filing of the instant federal suit.
Thus, there already has been significant interaction with
the state court that has resulted in a pending state court
proceeding.

Taken as a whole, these interactions are sufficient

to warrant Younger abstention as to Lucas even though a
“criminal proceeding” is technically not commenced until the
Clerk Magistrate issues a complaint. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 3(a).
Nevertheless, “all necessary and proper steps to begin a formal
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criminal action” in state court are underway and have been for
some time. See Gannett, 579 F. Supp. at 113.
Moreover, plaintiffs have filed a motion to dismiss in the
pending state case, arguing essentially, as they do here, that
the state statute is unconstitutional and infringes on
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.

Plaintiffs’ filing in state

court demonstrates that Lucas has an “adequate opportunity in
the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” See
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432.
At the hearing before the Clerk Magistrate, Lucas can
present her First Amendment argument as grounds for quashing the
criminal complaint.

Moreover, in the event that a complaint

issues, she will be able to raise federal constitutional
defenses and again seek to have the case dismissed. See Rushia
v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1983).

If

that fails, she will have the opportunity to seek state
appellate review of any adverse ruling. See Maymo-Melendez, 364
F.3d at 34-35.
This Court is confident that the courts of the Commonwealth
will properly preserve federal constitutional guarantees.

Were

it instead to step in at this stage and enjoin the Clerk
Magistrate from holding a probable cause hearing on an
application for a criminal complaint that has been pending for
over a month, it would certainly “disrupt[] ... the State
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criminal justice system” and would very likely be interpreted
(erroneously) as casting doubt upon the state court’s “ability
to enforce constitutional principles.” Cf. Steffel, 401 U.S. at
462.

Thus, it is inappropriate for this Court to interfere with

the pending state court proceeding at this juncture or to
prevent the state criminal justice system from conducting the
scheduled hearing.
The fact that this case involves First Amendment rights
does not alter the abstention analysis.

Despite plaintiffs’

argument that allowing the state hearing to take place would
chill the exercise of their First Amendment rights,
the existence of a chilling effect, even in the area
of First Amendment rights, has never been considered a
sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting
state action.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 51 (internal quotations omitted).3
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that would
sufficiently implicate one of the very limited exceptions to
Younger abstention. See Gannett, 579 F. Supp. at 113.
Accordingly, the Court will abstain from enjoining the
state hearing scheduled against Lucas for December 18, 2014.
Because the Court will exercise its duty to abstain under
3

The Court notes that Mannal’s filing of the application on
October 21, 2014, did not impede plaintiffs’ ability to speak
out on issues during the remainder of the campaign and now that
the election has occurred, it is unclear how the Clerk
Magistrate’s scheduled hearing will have any effect, much less a
chilling effect, on plaintiffs’ speech.
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Younger, it need not reach the merits of the motion for
injunctive relief or consider Lucas’s substantive First
Amendment arguments at this time. Greening v. Moran, 953 F.2d
301, 304 (7th Cir. 1992) (“To say that abstention is in order
then is to say that [the court] should not address the merits,
period.”).
2. Jobs First
Mannal filed his application for a criminal complaint only
against Lucas and, as such, Jobs First is not a party to the
state court proceeding.

The Court notes, however, that despite

that fact, Jobs First and Lucas jointly filed the motion to
dismiss the state court application just as though they had both
been named.

Nevertheless, no pending state proceeding

sufficient to warrant Younger abstention exists against Jobs
First.

Therefore, the Court proceeds to consider the merits of

Jobs First’s request for injunctive relief.
A party seeking injunctive relief “bears the burden of
establishing that the four [pertinent] factors weigh in its
favor” and that it is therefore entitled to this extraordinary
remedy. Esso Std. Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st
Cir. 2006).

For the sake of brevity, the Court skips to the

second factor, the likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence
of injunctive relief.

As the First Circuit has remarked,

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We need not discuss three of these elements. In most
cases--and this case is no exception--irreparable harm
is
a
necessary
threshold
showing
for
awarding
preliminary injunctive relief.
Inasmuch as the
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a realistic
prospect of irreparable harm, she has not crossed that
threshold.
Matos ex rel. Matos v. Clinton School Dist., 367 F.3d 68, 73
(1st Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Braintree
Laboratories, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 622 F.3d
36, 43 (1st Cir. 2010) (“at least some positive showing of
irreparable harm must [] be made”); 11A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.
§ 2948.1 (3d ed.) (“Perhaps the single most important
prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a
demonstration that if it is not granted the applicant is likely
to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can
be rendered.”).

Accordingly, the Court considers the likelihood

of irreparable harm to Jobs First if the Clerk Magistrate is
allowed to conduct a probable cause hearing on December 18,
2014.
Jobs First argues that it faces an imminent threat of
irreparable harm if the state hearing proceeds because it has
already had its free speech rights curtailed as a result of
Mannal’s application and the hearing will only lead to a
“continued chilling effect” on such rights.
That argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, as
Jobs First itself has pointed out repeatedly, it is not a named
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defendant in the state court proceedings.

Thus, it does not

face the imminent prospect of a criminal complaint issuing
against it.

Moreover, even if it were named as a defendant in

the state court proceeding, the November, 2014 election is
history and, in fact, Jobs First had every opportunity to speak
out on campaign issues.

Finally, even if a complaint were filed

against Jobs First, it would not be prevented from speaking out
on political issues while the case is pending.

In sum, Jobs

First’s free speech rights have not been chilled by the pending
state proceeding against Lucas.
This analysis is further supported by the First Circuit’s
ruling in Rushia. See 701 F.2d at 9-10.

In Rushia, a store

owner appealed a district court’s denial of a preliminary
injunction after he claimed that he faced the imminent threat of
prosecution and thus infringement of his free speech rights.
Jobs First also claims such a threat.

In affirming the denial

of injunctive relief, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
(Breyer, J.) noted that
[T]he fact that [plaintiff] is asserting
First
Amendment rights does not automatically require a
finding of irreparable injury ... [W]hile a state
prosecution may sound like serious injury to the
ordinary ear, it does not normally in and of itself
constitute “irreparable injury” as a matter of law.
The harm to the threatened defendant tends to be
counterbalanced by the fact that the prosecution
offers him a forum in which to make his legal
arguments, by the fact that a state forum may be the
more appropriate one, and by [] comity considerations.
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Id. at 10.

Thus, even if Jobs First were actually facing the

threat of imminent prosecution, which it apparently is not, its
alleged claim of irreparable harm is tenuous.
The Court need not venture further in its analysis.

Jobs

First’s federal case may proceed but there is no justification
for this Court to issue an “extraordinary and drastic remedy”,
i.e. a preliminary injunction, where none is warranted. See
Voice of the Arab World, 645 F.3d at 32 (quoting Munaf, 553 U.S.
at 689-90).
III. Defendant Mannal’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Mannal has filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’
complaint on the grounds that Younger abstention applies and
thus the Court lacks jurisdiction over the entire suit.
As discussed above, however, the Court will abstain from
enjoining the state hearing scheduled for December 18, 2014 only
as to Lucas and will not entertain her requests for relief so
long as a parallel state court proceeding is pending.

Jobs

First, on the other hand, may continue to pursue its claims in
this Court and plaintiffs claim against Mannal for abuse of
process will not be stayed.

Accordingly, Mannal’s motion to

dismiss the entire complaint on Younger grounds will be denied,
without prejudice.

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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (Docket
No. 2) is DENIED and defendant Mannal’s motion to dismiss
(Docket No. 11) is DENIED.
So ordered.
_/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton____
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated December 17, 2014

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