Rockstar Consortium US LP et al v. Google, Inc.

Filing 57

Judge F. Dennis Saylor, IV: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND RESPONDENT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS. (Pezzarossi, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_____________________________________
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ROCKSTAR CONSORTIUM US LP and )
NETSTAR TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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GOOGLE INC.,
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Defendant,
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v.
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EMC CORPORATION,
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Respondent.
)
_____________________________________)

Misc. Civil Action No.
14-91322-FDS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
AND RESPONDENT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS
SAYLOR, J.
This matter concerns third-party subpoenas that Google Inc. served on EMC Corporation
in connection with two patent-infringement cases, one in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas and one in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California.1 In this Court, Google filed a motion to compel production of documents responsive
to the two subpoenas. EMC objected to the subpoenas, and later filed an opposition to Google’s
motion to compel.
Google has moved to dismiss the proceeding because the two patent-infringement cases

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Those cases were Rockstar Consortium US LP, et al. v. Google Inc., No. 13-00893 (E.D. Tex.) and Google Inc. v.
Rockstar Consortium US LP, et al., No. 13-5933 (N.D. Cal.).

have settled. EMC has filed a cross-motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 for attorneys’ fees and
costs incurred in responding to the motion to compel. For the following reasons, EMC’s crossmotion for fees and costs will be granted.
I.

Background
A.

Procedural Background

On November 4, 2014, Google moved in this Court for an order compelling EMC to
produce all responsive documents to two subpoenas that Google served on EMC in July 2014.
On November 19, 2014, EMC filed an opposition to Google’s motion to compel and an affidavit
from its Deputy General Counsel, Krishnendu Gupta. Two days later, Google moved to stay its
motion to compel discovery from EMC. On March 5, 2015, Google moved to dismiss the
proceeding because both of the related patent-infringement cases had settled.
On March 19, 2015, EMC moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 for an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs that it incurred in responding to Google’s motion to compel. EMC also
filed a declaration from its outside counsel, Martin Murphy of the Foley Hoag law firm. EMC’s
motion contends that Google “refus[ed] to comply with the protections granted to third parties by
Rule 45.” (Resp’t Mot. Fees 1). Google filed its opposition to EMC’s motion on April 3, 2015,
along with a declaration from its counsel, Michelle Ernst.
The Court held a hearing on both motions. At the hearing, the Court heard argument on
the motion for fees and then directed EMC to file evidence as to the amount of attorneys’ fees
incurred. EMC then moved to file under seal a supplemental declaration in support of its motion
for fees. After that motion was granted, EMC’s counsel filed under seal a declaration that
included billing records for the work performed by EMC’s outside counsel in responding to
Google’s motion to compel.

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B.

Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
1.

The Patent-Infringement Suits between Rockstar Consortium
and Google

The subpoenas that Google served on EMC arise out of two patent-infringement cases
between Google and an entity called Rockstar Consortium US LP. Rockstar is a group of
telecommunications and Internet companies that includes Microsoft, Apple, Sony, and Ericsson.
(Resp’t Mem. 2). EMC is not a member of Rockstar Consortium. (Gupta Aff. ¶ 2).
Rockstar Consortium filed suit against Google in the Eastern District of Texas to enforce
fourteen patents involving the Android mobile operating system and Google’s search and
advertising technology. (Def.’s Mot. Compel Exs. 3, 4). Google then filed a declaratory
judgment action in the Northern District of California seeking a declaration of non-infringement
of seven of Rockstar Consortium’s patents. (Def.’s Mot. Compel Ex. 5). The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ordered the Texas case against Google stayed pending the outcome of
Google’s declaratory judgment action in California. (Def.’s Mot. Compel Ex. 8).
2.

EMC, Rockstar Bidco, and the Nortel Auction

During its 2011 bankruptcy proceedings, Nortel sold the fourteen patents at issue in an
auction of its entire patent portfolio. (Def.’s Mot. Compel Ex. 1 at 50-56). Those fourteen
patents were among thousands of patents in Nortel’s portfolio sold at the auction, which attracted
several technology-company buyers, including Google. (Id. at 67). An entity called Rockstar
Bidco LP––a group of companies that included Apple, Microsoft, Sony, Ericsson, Blackberry,
and EMC––also bid at the auction. (Id.). To obtain a license to Nortel’s patents, EMC became a
limited partner in Rockstar Bidco. (Gupta Aff. ¶ 9). Ultimately, Rockstar Bidco prevailed over
Google by placing the winning bid to acquire Nortel’s entire patent portfolio.
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After placing the winning bid, Rockstar Bidco transferred and licensed the Nortel patents
to other entities, including newly-formed Rockstar Consortium, and other former Rockstar Bidco
members, such as EMC. (Def.’s Mot. Compel Ex. 1 at ¶ 14). Specifically, EMC entered into a
non-exclusive license permitting it to use the Nortel patents. (Gupta Aff. ¶ 7). The nonexclusive nature of the license prevented EMC from enforcing the patents. (Id. at ¶ 9).
Google contends (without citation to the record) that Nortel provided interested buyers,
including EMC, access to confidential diligence materials that allowed bidders to evaluate the
validity, enforceability, and value of its patents. (Def.’s Mem. 2). EMC contends that it joined
Rockstar Bidco for the sole purpose of obtaining a non-exclusive license to the Nortel portfolio,
and that it did not “conduct any substantive validity, enforceability, infringement, or valuation
analyses.” (Gupta Aff. ¶ 8-9).
3.

The Subpoenas and the Parties’ Meetings to Confer

On July 23, 2014, Google served a subpoena on EMC in the Texas litigation. (Murphy
Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. A). The Texas subpoena is 26 pages long and contains 64 requests. (Id.). Nine
days later, Google served a second subpoena on EMC in the California litigation. (Id. at ¶ 3; Ex.
B). The California subpoena is 28 pages long and contains 65 requests. (Id.). In both cases,
EMC was a non-party and had no financial interest in the outcome. (Gupta Aff. ¶¶ 2-3). The
two subpoenas overlap significantly, and have no date limitations. (Id. at ¶ 3-4; Exs. A, B). Of
the 129 requests in the two subpoenas, 127 of them call for EMC to produce “[a]ll
[d]ocuments . . .” about a variety of parties and topics, including the patents’ prior art, claim
construction, prosecution, and monetization. (Id.). 2

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For example, three of the requests seek:

“All DOCUMENTS and THINGS, including COMMUNICATIONS, REGARDING the patentability,
novelty, non-obviousness, scope, validity, invalidity, enforceability or unenforceability of any claim of the

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After objecting to the subpoenas, EMC began a search for responsive documents. (Gupta
Aff. ¶ 10). During its search, EMC found a small number of documents relating to EMC’s and
other companies’ participation in Rockstar Bidco. Specifically, EMC located “(1) EMC’s and
other companies’ limited partnership agreement in Rockstar Bidco; (2) EMC’s and other
companies’ bid commitment letters, in which these companies committed to fund Rockstar
Bidco’s . . . bid for pre-specified amounts; and (3) EMC’s [patent] license agreement.” (Id. at
¶ 11). EMC offered to produce these documents if Google would agree that their production
would satisfy EMC’s obligations under the subpoenas, but the parties failed to reach an
agreement. (Id. at ¶ 20).
Beginning in July 2014, the parties met and conferred at least eight times to negotiate the
terms of discovery. EMC objected to Google’s subpoenas on three grounds. First, EMC notified
Google that its internal documents were not relevant because it had conducted no substantive
validity, infringement, or valuation analysis on any of Rockstar Consortium’s patents. (Id. at
¶ 20). Second, EMC contended that all of its communications with Rockstar Bidco or its
shareholders would be available through party discovery with Rockstar Consortium. (Id. at

PATENTS-IN -SUIT or RELATED PATENTS/APPLICATIONS, including any analyses or searches conducted by
NORTEL, ANY ROCKSTAR ENTITY, ANY ROCKSTAR SHAREHOLDER, including YOU, any THIRD
PARTY, or by any PERSON on behalf of NORTEL, ANY ROCKSTAR ENTITY, ANY ROCKSTAR
SHAREHOLDER, any THIRD PARTY, or YOU.” (Murphy Decl. Exs. A, B at Req. 2).
“All DOCUMENTS and THINGS, including COMMUNICATIONS, REGARDING the value of any of
the PATENTS-IN-SUIT, RELATED PATENTS/ APPLICATIONS, or the SUBJECT MATTER IN SUIT,
including any valuation performed by YOU, ANY ROCKSTAR SHAREHOLDER, NORTEL, NORTEL'S
ADVISORS, ANY ROCKSTAR ENTITY, or any THIRD PARTY, or by any PERSON on behalf of YOU, ANY
ROCKSTAR SHAREHOLDER, NORTEL, ANY ROCKSTAR ENTITY, or any THIRD PARTY.” (Id. at Req.
11).
“All DOCUMENTS and THINGS, including COMMUNICATIONS, REGARDING the filing and
prosecution of the PATENTS-IN-SUIT or RELATED PATENTS/APPLICATIONS, including all draft and final
versions of such applications, office actions, draft and final versions of responses to office actions, and all
COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING the filing and prosecution of such patent applications.” (Id. at Req. 49).

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¶ 17). Third, EMC contended that any internal documents, even if relevant and not available to
Google through party discovery, were privileged. (Id. at ¶ 18; Ex. 21).
Google insisted that its requests were relevant to both the infringement and damages
elements of Rockstar Consortium’s patent-infringement claims. (Def.’s Mem. Exs. 20, 23).
Google also offered to narrow the date range and negotiate a list of search terms that EMC could
use in producing e-mails and other internal documents. For example, Google assented to a sixyear search, and a list of seventeen search terms, including “Apple,” “Google,” “Microsoft,” and
“Global IP.” (Gupta Aff. ¶¶ 20-21). Notably, at the time the parties were negotiating, Google
had already obtained documents in party discovery that it was also requesting from EMC,
including documents showing how much EMC paid Rockstar Consortium for its non-exclusive
license. (Id. at ¶ 23).
4.

Google’s Motion to Compel and EMC’s Opposition

With the parties at a standstill three months into negotiations, Google filed a motion to
compel in this Court on November 4, 2014. EMC retained outside counsel on November 5 to
prepare its response to the motion. (Murphy Suppl. Decl. ¶ 2). Meanwhile, Rockstar
Consortium and Google entered settlement negotiations in the Texas case. The parties disagree
about Google’s knowledge of those negotiations. EMC contends that Google entered into a
binding term sheet in the Texas litigation on November 12, 2014. (Resp’t Mem. Supp. Mot.
Fees 4). Google contends that it had limited knowledge of those settlement negotiations because
RPX, a third-party patent clearinghouse, was negotiating with Rockstar Consortium. (Def.’s
Mem. 7-8).
The parties do agree that EMC’s counsel, suspecting that the two infringement cases were
approaching a settlement, called Google’s counsel on Friday, November 14, to ask whether

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Google would stay or withdraw its subpoenas. (Murphy Decl. ¶ 4; Ernst Decl. ¶¶ 26-27).
Google informed EMC that neither the Texas nor California litigation had settled and that
discovery was proceeding, but that it would not oppose an extension for EMC to respond to the
motion to compel. (Murphy Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Ernst Decl. ¶¶ 26-27). On November 18, Google
informed EMC that the parties in the Texas litigation had announced a pending settlement and
sought a stay. (Murphy Decl. ¶¶ 6-7). Again, instead of staying the proceeding in this Court or
withdrawing its motion to compel, Google informed EMC that it would not oppose an extension
for its response. (Id. at ¶ 8).
EMC moved to file its opposition to Google’s motion to compel under seal on November
18, and the next day it filed its opposition. Two days later, Google filed an unopposed motion to
stay its motion to compel. On February 24, 2015, Google informed EMC that both the Texas
and California cases had reached final settlements. On March 5, Google moved to dismiss the
proceeding in this Court. On March 19, 2015, EMC filed a cross-motion for fees and costs.
5.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

After hearing oral argument on Google’s motion to dismiss and EMC’s cross-motion for
fees and costs, the Court directed EMC’s counsel to file a supplemental declaration detailing the
hours, fees, and costs EMC incurred. EMC is pursuing only the fees and costs that it incurred in
hiring outside counsel to respond to Google’s motion to compel. EMC incurred $35,696 in legal
fees for 77.3 billable hours and $209.48 in costs between November 5, 2014 (when it retained
Foley Hoag on the matter) and November 20, 2014 (when it filed its redacted public opposition
to the motion to compel). (Murphy Suppl. Decl. ¶ 2). The matter was handled by one partner
(billed at a rate of $680 per hour), one associate (billed at a rate of $408 per hour), and one
paralegal (billed at a rate of $228 per hour). (Id. at Ex. A).

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II.

Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit “discovery regarding any non-privileged

matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense” or discovery of any information that
“appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). Because “discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues,” the limits
set forth in Rule 26 must be “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that
reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
It is well-established that “[t]he non-party witness is subject to the same scope of
discovery under [Rule 45] as that person would be as a party to whom a request is addressed
pursuant to Rule 34.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Advisory Committee’s Note (1991 Amendment).
However, Rule 45 provides special protections for non-parties that receive subpoenas. “A party
or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid
imposing undue burden or expense on a [non-party] subject to the subpoena.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
45(d)(1) (emphasis added); see also Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir.
1998) (“[C]oncern for the unwanted burden thrust upon non-parties is a factor entitled to special
weight in evaluating the balance of competing [discovery] needs.”). The ultimate determination
of undue burden and reasonableness is subject to the discretion of the court. See United States v.
Concemi, 957 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1992).
In determining whether a subpoena imposes an “undue burden” on a non-party, courts
consider “(1) the relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the [non]-party for the
documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request;
(5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; (6) the burden

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imposed; and (7) the expense and inconvenience to the non-party.” LSI Corp. v. Vizio, Inc., 2012
WL 1926924, at *3 (D. Mass. May 24, 2012); see also In re New Eng. Compounding Pharm.,
Inc., 2013 WL 6058483, at *6 (D. Mass. Nov. 13, 2013). No single factor in the undue-burden
test is dispositive. See, e.g., Legal Voice v. Stormans, Inc., 738 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“The district court need not impose sanctions every time it finds a subpoena overbroad; such
overbreadth may sometimes result from normal advocacy . . . .”).
The non-party resisting discovery “bears the burden of showing that the subpoena
imposes an undue burden, and it cannot rely on a mere assertion that compliance would be
burdensome and onerous without showing the manner and extent of the burden and the injurious
consequences of insisting upon compliance.” In re New Eng. Compounding Pharm., Inc., 2013
WL 6058483, at *6. But if the non-party does meet its burden of showing a subpoena imposes
an undue burden, “[t]he court for the district where compliance is required must . . . impose an
appropriate sanction––which may include lost earnings and reasonable attorney’s fees––on a
party or attorney who fails to comply.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1) (emphasis added).
III.

Analysis
EMC contends that this Court should award it attorneys’ fees under Rule 45 for three

reasons. First, EMC contends that the subpoenas seek information that is irrelevant to the patent
litigation between Rockstar Consortium and Google. Specifically, EMC contends that because it
did not conduct any substantive validity, infringement, or valuation analyses of the Nortel
portfolio, its internal communications about a non-exclusive license are irrelevant to the key
issue in the underlying litigation: whether Google infringed the fourteen patents owned by
Rockstar Consortium. Second, EMC contends that even if the Google subpoenas sought relevant
information, it did not need to burden EMC, a non-party, with subpoenas to obtain the desired

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documents. Rather, EMC contends that Google’s requests could have been more efficiently
resolved in party discovery with Rockstar Consortium. EMC cites to cases in this district to
support the proposition that Rule 45 requires a party to obtain documents, when reasonably
available, from an adverse party rather than a non-party. See, e.g., Accusoft Corp. v. Quest
Diagnostics, Inc., 2012 WL 1358662, at *10 (D. Mass. April 18, 2012) (holding that “the
discovery at issue must be limited because it is cumulative and because it can be obtained from
another source that is more convenient––namely, the defendants themselves”). Third, EMC
contends that Google’s subpoenas were “extraordinarily broad.” (Resp’t Mot. Fees 1). EMC
points to not only the total length of the subpoenas, but also to the sweeping nature of each
request. Specifically, EMC contends that Google failed to tailor its requests to EMC’s limited
involvement in the Nortel patent auction.
In its opposition, Google first contends that it sought information from EMC that was
relevant to the development of its invalidity, infringement, and valuation defenses in the
underlying litigations against Rockstar Consortium. Second, Google contends that EMC’s partydiscovery argument “fails to take into consideration the actual circumstances in the underlying
cases.” (Def.’s Mem. 12). Specifically, Google contends that the discovery in the underlying
cases was “far from straightforward,” and that it “had no way of knowing which [Rockstar
Bidco] third-party entities had what discovery, and whether any entities had overlapping
information.” (Id.). Third, Google contends that its subpoenas were not overbroad.
Specifically, it asserts that the 129 requests were “more than reasonable given the complexity of
the issues and the high stakes involved in the underlying cases.” (Id. at 14). Finally, Google
contends that even if its subpoenas imposed an undue burden on EMC, it later took reasonable
steps to alleviate that burden by negotiating with EMC on date ranges, search terms, and

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privilege procedures.
The first factor of the Rule 45 undue-burden test weighs in favor of awarding attorneys’
fees to EMC, because Google’s subpoenas appear to have sought largely irrelevant information.
The underlying lawsuits between Rockstar Consortium and Google involved allegations of
infringement of fourteen patents that Rockstar Consortium acquired at the Nortel auction.
Presumably, the three key issues in those cases were (1) the validity of the patents; (2) whether
Google infringed the patents; and (3) the amount, if any, of damages. But EMC notified Google
early in the discovery process that it had not conducted any substantive validity, infringement, or
valuation analyses of the patents at issue before the Nortel auction. Furthermore, that assertion
makes sense, because EMC was only a limited partner in Rockstar Bidco. Unlike the many
shareholders that had equity interests in Rockstar, EMC sought a non-exclusive license to the
Nortel patent portfolio solely for design-freedom purposes. In essence, EMC had no economic
interest in enforcing the patents. Therefore, it would have been a waste of resources for EMC to
conduct validity and valuation analyses on thousands of Nortel patents, only to drop out of
Rockstar Consortium and license the patents on a non-exclusive basis.
But even if EMC did analyze the validity of the thousands of patents in Nortel’s portfolio,
Google has failed to demonstrate why that third-party information would be relevant to their
defenses in the Rockstar Consortium cases. Google contends that EMC had information that was
relevant to proving that the fourteen Rockstar Consortium patents were “invalid, unenforceable,
and not infringed.” (Def.’s Mem. 12). But that argument strains the concept of relevance for at
least three reasons.
First, the validity of the Nortel patents involve questions of law that would be determined
by the Texas and California district courts. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112. EMC’s internal

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patent-validity assessments, if they even existed, would not affect the courts’ determinations, nor
would a court likely even consider them. Second, the infringement issue would be focused on
the elements of the Rockstar Consortium patents and Google’s allegedly infringing products. A
non-party’s internal documents were not likely to be relevant to that factual question. Third,
EMC’s internal documents about its paid-up, non-exclusive license to Nortel’s portfolio are
tenuously relevant, at least, to the damages inquiry in the underlying cases. The Federal Circuit
has rejected damages determinations that rely on licenses that are not comparable to the damages
at issue. See, e.g., Trell v. Marlee Elecs. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
that the trial court’s “apparent failure to consider the fact that the . . . license was exclusive and
that it encompassed the right to other inventions compels reversal”). And even if the value of
EMC’s license was somehow relevant to Google’s damages defense, Google had already
obtained from another source EMC’s commitment letter to Rockstar Bidco showing how much it
paid for the non-exclusive license. In short, EMC’s internal documents were not likely to be
relevant to the patent validity, infringement, or damages issues that were in dispute between
Google and Rockstar Consortium.
The second factor of the Rule 45 undue-burden test also weighs in favor of awarding
attorneys’ fees to EMC. Google’s document requests could have been satisfied, to a
considerable extent, through requests to Rockstar Consortium. For example, Google’s requests
for communications between EMC and Rockstar, as well as other information about Rockstar
entities would have been available in party discovery. 3 Google contends that it was forced to

3

For example, request number 3 seeks:

“All DOCUMENTS and THINGS, including COMMUNICATIONS, between YOU and . . . ANY
ROCKSTAR ENTITY, ANY ROCKSTAR SHAREHOLDER . . . REGARDING the PATENTSIN-SUIT
or SUBJECT MATTER IN SUIT.” (Murphy Decl. Exs. A, B at Req. 3).
Request number 17 seeks:

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serve broad subpoenas on EMC because discovery with Rockstar Consortium was “far from
straightforward” and proceeding slowly. But Rule 45 does not excuse imposing an undue burden
on EMC, a non-party, because of discovery difficulties with Rockstar Consortium.
The third, fourth, and fifth factors of the undue-burden test, all of which relate to the
breadth of the subpoenas, also weigh in favor of EMC. Each individual request that begins with
“[a]ll [d]ocuments and things . . .” appears to have been overly broad and unduly burdensome.
Google’s subpoenas contained 129 requests, and the 54 pages of definitions and requests covered
everything from EMC’s business relationship with each Rockstar Consortium shareholder to its
knowledge of the prior art for Nortel’s entire patent portfolio. Furthermore, the Google
subpoenas do not specify a date limitation, nor do they identify with particularity what specific
documents they are seeking. Google contends that it took reasonable steps to avoid imposing a
burden on EMC after serving its subpoenas by proposing search terms and a date range. But
Google’s proposals included searching for generic terms like “Google,” “Microsoft,” “Apple,”
and “Global IP” in six years of e-mails and internal documents. And even if Google’s proposals
lessened the burden on EMC, the discovery rules do not permit a party to begin with broad,
burdensome subpoenas and only then proceed to target specific, relevant information, especially
when non-parties are involved. Such discovery practices would nullify the protections that Rule
45 affords non-parties.
Finally, the Court finds that Google’s subpoenas and motion to compel actually burdened
EMC, and that the fee award EMC seeks is reasonable. Google served EMC with the first

“All DOCUMENTS and THINGS, including COMMUNICATIONS, REGARDING ANY
ROCKSTAR ENTITY's structure, including organizational charts REGARDING ANY ROCKSTAR
ENTITY.” (Id. at Req. 17).

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subpoena on July 23, 2014, and EMC’s in-house attorneys spent significant time and resources in
responding to Google over the next three months. EMC is not seeking compensation for these
internal costs. But when Google filed its motion to compel on November 4, 2014, EMC resorted
to hiring outside counsel to assist with the matter. EMC’s outside counsel dedicated 77.3 hours
over the course of 15 days to the matter, culminating in the filing of EMC’s opposition to the
motion to compel on November 20, 2014. EMC incurred and paid a total of $35,696 in fees and
$209.48 in costs during that two-week period. After a detailed review of the submissions, the
Court concludes that the billing rates and hours dedicated to the matter are reasonable.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Google’s subpoenas were overbroad,

unnecessary, and largely irrelevant, and imposed an undue burden on a non-party under Rule 45.
The cross-motion of respondent EMC Corporation for attorneys’ fees and costs is therefore
GRANTED. EMC is hereby awarded its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of
$35,905.48. The motion of defendant Google Inc. to dismiss is GRANTED in part, as the matter
has been resolved. The Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with
its order.
So Ordered.
/s/ F. Dennis Saylor
F. Dennis Saylor IV
United States District Judge

Dated: October 14, 2015

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