Boston Taxi Owners Association, Inc. et al v. City of Boston et al

Filing 107

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ENDORSED ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER.For the forgoing reasons,1) the motion by plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction (Docket No. 97) is DENIED and2) the motion by defendants to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 99) is ALLOWED.So ordered.(Caruso, Stephanie)

Case 1:15-cv-10100-NMG Document 107 Filed 12/21/16 Page 1 of 9

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
)
Boston Taxi Owners Association, )
Inc., Steven Goldberg and Joseph )
)
Pierre
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
City of Boston and Boston Police )
)
Commissioner William Evans
)
)
Defendants.
)

Civil Action No.
15-10100-NMG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
Boston Taxi Owners Association, Inc. and taxi medallion
holders, Steven Goldberg and Joseph Pierre (collectively,
“plaintiffs”), allege that the City of Boston and Boston Police
Commissioner William Evans (“defendants”) violated their equal
protection rights by not applying the same regulatory framework
to taxicabs and so-called transportation network companies
(“TNCs”).
Defendants have filed a motion 1) to dismiss plaintiffs’
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and 2) for judgment
on the pleadings with respect to the equal protection and
monetary relief claims.

For the following reasons, defendants’

motion will be allowed.

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Case 1:15-cv-10100-NMG Document 107 Filed 12/21/16 Page 2 of 9

I.

Background
Eight months have elapsed since this Court denied

plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction.

Since

then, the General Court has enacted and the Governor of
Massachusetts has signed into law a comprehensive statute,
M.G.L. ch. 159A½ (“the Act”), regulating TNCs at the state
level.
The Act defines a TNC as
a corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship or
other entity that uses a digital network to connect
riders to drivers to pre-arrange and provide
transportation.
Id. § 1.

The Act also delegates regulation of TNCs to a new

state “division” within the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities. Id. § 2.

That division implements insurance

requirements, monitors fare estimates, ensures the safety and
annual inspection of TNC vehicles and monitors the accommodation
of riders with special needs. Id.

The division also issues

permits, which are annually renewed, to TNCs and it has the
power to conduct hearings and impose penalties on TNCs which are
noncompliant with the Act. Id. §§ 3, 6.
Moreover, the Act ostensibly removes TNCs from local
regulation.

Section 10 provides, in part:

[N]o municipality or other local or state entity,
except the Massachusetts Port Authority . . . may
subject a [TNC] to the municipality’s or other local
or state entity’s rate or other requirements . . . .

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Case 1:15-cv-10100-NMG Document 107 Filed 12/21/16 Page 3 of 9

M.G.L. ch. 159A½, § 10.

The Act does not, however, prevent

municipalities from regulating “traffic flow and traffic
patterns to ensure public safety and convenience.” Id.
In July, 2016, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint,
in which they allege one substantive claim for “due
process/equal protection” violations (Count IV).

So-called

Counts I (declaratory judgment), II (injunctive relief) and III
(damages) simply describe plaintiffs’ requested relief.
Pursuant to an order of this Court (Docket No. 66),
defendants filed a status report in September, 2016, explaining
that they are now precluded from regulating TNCs.

Shortly

thereafter, plaintiffs filed their own status report and, for a
third time, moved for a preliminary injunction.

Defendants

responded by filing a motion 1) to dismiss and 2) for judgment
on the pleadings.
The facts underlying this case were summarized extensively
in prior orders of this Court and will not be repeated here.
Instead, the Court will assume familiarity with that record and
will incorporate and/or supplement additional facts where
necessary.

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II.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss as moot plaintiffs’ claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief (Counts I and II,
respectively).
A.

Legal Standard

Mootness is a constitutional issue that a court should
ordinarily resolve before reaching the merits. ACLU of Mass. v.
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir.
2013).

The mootness doctrine ensures that claims will be

justiciable throughout litigation not only when a claim is
initially filed. Id.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has

identified the following instances of cases becoming moot:
1) when the issues presented are no longer live or the
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome;
2) when the court cannot give any effectual relief to
the potentially prevailing party; and
3) if events have transpired to render a court opinion
merely advisory.
KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 969 F. Supp. 2d 52, 56 (D.
Mass. 2013) (citing Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d at 52-53).
B.

Application

Defendants assert that the Act preempts municipal
regulation of TNCs and thus moots plaintiffs’ claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs respond that the

Act provides an exception under which defendants can still
regulate TNCs.

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1.

Preemption

Under Massachusetts law, a local regulation is preempted if
1) the statute explicitly provides for preemption or 2) the
purpose of the state law would be “frustrated” by local
regulation such that there is an inference that the legislature
intended to preempt “the field”. St. George Greek Orthodox
Cathedral of W. Mass., Inc. v. Fire Dep’t of Springfield, 967
N.E.2d 127, 132 (Mass. 2012) (quoting Town of Wendell v. Att’y
Gen., 476 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Mass. 1985)).
Here, the Act expressly prohibits defendants from
regulating TNCs:
[N]o municipality or other local or state entity,
except the Massachusetts Port Authority . . . may
subject a [TNC] to the municipality’s or other local
or state entity’s rate or other requirements . . . .
M.G.L. ch. 159A½, § 10.
Moreover, the comprehensiveness of the Act also creates a
strong inference that defendants are barred from regulating
TNCs.

For example, the Act creates a new state division to

regulate TNCs and contains numerous operational requirements.
M.G.L. ch. 159A½, §§ 2, 3. See St. George, 967 N.E.2d at 133-34.
Plaintiffs maintain that the Act contains an exception for
municipalities to regulate “traffic flow and traffic patterns.”
Id. § 10.

Thus, according to plaintiffs, defendants can still

regulate TNCs, by, for instance, applying certain taxi medallion

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and driver requirements to TNCs.

Plaintiffs’ expansive reading

of the exception would, however, render the entire regulatory
scheme of the Act nugatory and would “frustrate” the purpose of
the statute.

The Court therefore concludes that the Act

preempts local regulation of TNCs.
2.

Mootness

Because local regulation of TNCs is preempted by the new
state law, plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief are moot.
First, plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that TNCs must
comply with local taxi ordinances.

After the passage of the

Act, however, defendants cannot regulate TNCs and thus any
declaration from this Court would be merely advisory. See New
Eng. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 18 (1st
Cir. 2002) (remarking that it would be “pointless” to declare
the constitutionality of a policy that had been revised during
litigation).
Plaintiffs also ask the Court to direct defendants to
regulate TNCs under the current taxi regulations.

That, too, is

moot because such an injunction would require defendants to
violate state law.

Because defendants cannot regulate TNCs,

there is “no ongoing conduct to enjoin”. See Town of Portsmouth
v. Lewis, 813 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2016).

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Accordingly, the Court will allow defendants’ motion to
dismiss Counts I and II.
III. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
In addition to declaratory and injunctive relief,
plaintiffs also seek monetary damages (Count III) for the
alleged equal protection violations (Count IV).

Because a claim

for monetary damages can save a claim from mootness even when
declaratory or injunctive relief cannot, Cty. Motors, Inc. v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 40, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2002), the Court
will address defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
A.

Legal Standard

Judgment on the pleadings follows the familiar demurrer
standard. Aponte–Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 54 (1st
Cir.2006).

The “modest difference” between the two is that a

“Rule 12(c) motion, unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, implicates
the pleadings as a whole.” Id. at 54–55.

The Court views the

facts contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in
their favor. Id.
B.

Application

Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ equal protection claim
fails because they have not alleged an actionable municipal
policy.

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To bring an equal protection claim against defendants,
plaintiffs must identify a policy or custom of the City of
Boston that violates their rights. Los Angeles County v.
Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 (2010).
Plaintiffs rely on their argument that defendants can still
regulate TNCs under the Act’s exception for “traffic flow and
traffic patterns”.

As explained above, however, defendants are

preempted from regulating TNCs.

It is thus state policy, not

municipal policy that now prevents defendants from regulating
TNCs.

Because municipalities are liable only for their own

illegal acts, Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011),
defendants cannot be held liable for the conduct alleged in the
complaint. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 257 (1st
Cir. 1997) (Stahl, J., concurring) (citing Surplus Store &
Exch., Inc. v. City of Delphi, 928 F.2d 788, 791-92 (7th Cir.
1991)).
Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that that defendants
could modify the taxicab regulations to conform to state
regulation of TNCs.

Notwithstanding the irrelevance of that

argument to the claim for damages, it is unavailing because
plaintiffs’ requested relief in their second amended complaint
relates to the regulation of TNCs as taxicabs not the converse.
Therefore, the Court will allow defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings on Count IV.

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Because Count III is

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merely a request for damages, and the Court will allow
defendant’s motion with respect to plaintiffs’ equal protection
claim, the Court will also dismiss Count III.
IV.

Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiffs’ third motion for a preliminary injunction will

be denied as moot because the Court will allow defendants’
motion with respect to all of plaintiffs’ claims.

ORDER
For the forgoing reasons,
1)

the motion by plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction
(Docket No. 97) is DENIED and

2)

the motion by defendants to dismiss and for judgment
on the pleadings (Docket No. 99) is ALLOWED.

So ordered.

/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton_____
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated December 21, 2016

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