Boston Taxi Owners Association, Inc. et al v. City of Boston et al

Filing 82

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ENDORSED MEMORANDUM & ORDER entered denying 70 Motion to Stay District Court Proceedings Pending Appeal (Caruso, Stephanie)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
)
BOSTON TAXI OWNERS ASSOCIATION, )
INC.,
)
SHARON OPHIR and
)
JOSEPH PIERRE,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF BOSTON and
)
BOSTON POLICE COMMISSIONER
)
WILLIAM EVANS,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

Civil Action No.
15-10100-NMG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This action was brought by the Boston Taxi Owners
Association, Inc. and two individual Boston taxicab license
owners, Sharon Ophir (as the personal representative of deceased
plaintiff Raphael Ophir) and Joseph Pierre (collectively,
“plaintiffs”) against the City of Boston (“the City”) and Boston
Police Commissioner William Evans.

Plaintiffs challenge the

City’s regulations with respect to the registration and
operation of vehicles providing transportation-for-hire services
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.

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After the Court allowed, in part, and denied, in part,
Commissioner Evans’s motion to dismiss, defendant appealed the
Court’s ruling denying him qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ one
remaining claim.

Currently before the Court is defendant’s

motion to stay the proceedings in the District Court pending
resolution of his appeal by the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a denial of
qualified immunity, either at the motion to dismiss stage or at
the summary judgment stage, is immediately appealable. Behrens
v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 839-40 (1996).

Both the Supreme

Court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals have noted the
importance of a government officer’s right, through qualified
immunity,
not merely to avoid “standing trial,” but also to
avoid the burdens of “such pretrial matters as
discovery ..., as ‘[i]nquiries of this kind can be
peculiarly disruptive of effective government.’”
Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
Commissioner Evans argues that a stay is necessary to
effectuate such protection, citing Hegarty v. Somerset County,
25 F.3d 17 (1994).

In Hegarty, the First Circuit found a stay

of discovery to be mandatory for the duration of the appellate
court’s consideration of the appeal of a denial of qualified
immunity. Id. at 18.
in two respects.

The court, however, qualified its holding

It cautioned that a stay is required only “so

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long as the appeal is non-frivolous,” id., and noted that it may
not be necessary where the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as
to which a defense of qualified immunity is immaterial, id. at
18 n.2.

In support, the court cited Lugo v. Alvarado, 819 F.2d

5 (1st Cir. 1987).
In Lugo, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of a motion to stay discovery while the district court
considered a motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. Id. at 5.

It concluded that “equitable claims stand

on a different footing than damage claims” because qualified
immunity applies only to claims for money damages against
government officials in their personal capacities. Id. at 7.
Because the plaintiffs in that case had requested both money
damages and injunctive relief, discovery on the substantive
claims would occur regardless of the Court’s ruling on
defendant’s qualified immunity claim.

Accordingly, the stay

would not shield the defendant from unnecessary litigation.
Plaintiffs here assert that a stay would be similarly
futile because they have requested injunctive relief as well as
damages.

They note that Commissioner Evans has appealed the

Court’s decision only with respect to qualified immunity.
Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief against Commissioner
Evans is not, therefore, on appeal.

Consequently, even if the

First Circuit were to reverse the Court’s qualified immunity
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decision, the suit would go forward and Commissioner Evans would
be subject to discovery on plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.
A stay is not warranted as a matter of right. Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (citing Virginian Ry. Co. v.
United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)).

An analysis of the

suitability of a stay is, therefore, required in this case.

The

Supreme Court has outlined a framework for assessing a motion to
stay which balances four factors:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured
absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in
the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
lies.
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (quoting Hilton v.
Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).
weigh most heavily. Id. at 434.

The first two factors

The party requesting the stay

bears the burden of establishing that the balance of those
factors warrants the requested relief. Id. at 433-34.
As to the likelihood of success, the party requesting a
stay must show “more than a mere possibility of relief” on
appeal. Id. at 434.

Defendant “need not persuade the court that

is it likely to be reversed on appeal,” but the appeal must
“raise serious and difficult questions of law in an area where
the law is somewhat unclear.” Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v.
Sullivan, 999 F. Supp. 144, 150 (D. Mass. 1998).
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While the

Commissioner has not convinced the Court that he is likely to
succeed in his appeal with respect to qualified immunity, the
constitutional issue in this case is neither elementary nor
well-established.
Defendant cannot, however, demonstrate that he will be
irreparably harmed absent a stay of the proceedings.

As

discussed above, because this case involves claims against
Commissioner Evans for both money damages and equitable relief,
the case will proceed regardless of the First Circuit’s decision
on the qualified immunity issue.

Defendant will suffer no

substantial harm from proceeding directly with the case rather
than waiting for the qualified immunity issue to be resolved on
appeal.
Furthermore, the third and fourth factors dissuade this
Court from a stay as well.

In its analysis of plaintiffs’

second motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court noted that
plaintiffs face a growing potential for irreparable harm due to
ongoing developments in the transportation-for-hire industry.
Staying this case would result in a delay of the resolution of
the show cause order entered by the Court in relation to that
motion, which could cause further injury to plaintiffs. Boston
Taxi Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Boston, No. 15-cv-10100, 2016
WL 1274531, at *16 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2016).

Moreover, given

that the case will proceed irrespective of the outcome of
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defendant’s appeal, staying the proceedings will not promote the
broader goal of the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence, which is to help shield government officers from
unnecessary litigation.

Accordingly, the public interest would

not be served by a stay.
Because Commissioner Evans cannot show irreparable harm and
the balance of the other factors weighs against staying the
proceedings, defendant’s motion for a stay will be denied.
ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing, defendant Evans’s motion
to stay the District Court proceedings (Docket No. 70) is
DENIED.

So ordered.

/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton _ __
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated May 20, 2016

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