Sanchez et al v. Foley et al

Filing 102

Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. The Court DENIES Defendants' motion for JMOL or new trial, D. 92, 93, 94. (McKillop, Matthew)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_________________________________________
)
LUIS B. SANCHEZ,
)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
) Civil No. 15-10120-DJC
v.
)
)
JAMES J. FOLEY, MICHAEL A. SWEET and )
DANIEL T. PURTELL,
)
)
)
Defendants.
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CASPER, J.
I.

September 13, 2018

Introduction
After a four-day trial of claims brought by Plaintiff Luis B. Sanchez (“Sanchez”) against

Defendants James J. Foley, Michael A. Sweet and Daniel T. Purtell (collectively, “Defendants”),
each defendant renews his motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50
and for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. D. 92, 93, 94. For the reasons stated below, the Court
DENIES Defendants’ motions, D. 92, 93, 94.
II.

Relevant Background
This case proceeded to trial on Sanchez’s six claims against the Defendants. Five of those

claims were against all Defendants (Foley, Sweet and Purtell): Section 1983 claim for use of
excessive force (First Claim); violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”) (Second
Claim): assault and battery (Third Claim); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Fourth
Claim); and civil conspiracy (Fifth Claim). D. 84. Sanchez’s last claim was asserted only against
Foley: malicious prosecution (Sixth Claim). D. 84. At trial, the jury found Foley liable on all six
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claims and found Sweet and Purtell liable only on the Fifth Claim, civil conspiracy. Id. At the
close of Sanchez’s case at trial (and again after the close of all evidence), Defendants moved for
judgment as a matter of law as to certain counts, including the civil conspiracy claim, D. 77-77,
which the Court denied, reserving on any such motions being renewed after verdict. D. 83. The
Defendants now renew their motions as to all of counts, respectively, for which they were found
liable.
III.

Discussion
The Evidence at Trial Supports the Verdict Regarding Civil Conspiracy
As Defendants acknowledge, the standard for prevailing on a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.

50 is demanding. In considering such motion, the “evidence and inferences reasonably to be drawn
therefrom are considered in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Andrade v. Jamestown
Housing Auth., 82 F.3d 1179, 1186 (1st Cir. 1996). “A verdict may be directed only if the evidence,
viewed from this perspective, ‘would not permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of the plaintiff
on any permissible claim or theory.’” Id. (quoting Murray v. Ross-Dove Co., 5 F.3d 573, 576 (1st
Cir. 1993)). Having considered the evidence in this light and Defendants’ motions, the Court
concludes that this standard has not been met as to the verdict against Defendants for civil
conspiracy.
The bulk of evidence presented at trial by Sanchez concerned the allegations of excessive
use of force by the troopers in the aftermath of his arrest. Although the jury found Sweet and
Purtell not liable on the substantive Section 1983 claim for excessive use of force, it found Foley
liable for this claim. There was sufficient evidence for them to do so. The jury heard evidence,
that they could have reasonably credited, that during the booking process, Sanchez (who was
having the process translated by an interpreter on the phone) indicated that he did not understand

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his rights and soon thereafter, Trooper Foley took hold of him (testimony of Mr. De Leon and Mr.
Waugh); that en route to the holding cell, while being escorted by Foley and the other troopers,
Sanchez’s head was jammed into the door jamb (testimony of Mr. De Leon and Dr. Chirkov); and
that he sustained injury while in the holding cell (Sanchez is heard on the audiotape saying “he
killed me, he killed me” and begging for help), and that, under the circumstances, Foley, acting in
his capacity as a law enforcement officer, acted intentionally or with reckless disregard of
Sanchez’s right to be free from the use of excessive force in his use of unreasonable force against
Sanchez that day.
Similarly, there was evidence to support the jury’s finding that all three defendants were
liable for civil conspiracy and such verdict is not inconsistent with the jury instructions that the
Court gave the jury. For the conspiracy claim, the Court properly instructed the jury that the
elements for this claim included a common agreement between the Defendants to violate
Sanchez’s civil rights on January 31, 2012; an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and that
Plaintiff was actually deprived of his civil rights. As discussed above, a reasonable jury could
have found such overt act (for one example, the excessive use of force by Foley). Defendants
contest that there was sufficient showing of the requisite agreement between them to violate
Sanchez’s civil rights. As the jury was instructed, such agreement need not be an express one and
can be shown by circumstantial evidence. Such showing was made here. Although there was no
explicit agreement alleged or shown between the Defendants, the jury heard circumstantial
evidence of the Defendants acting in concert in subduing Sanchez during the booking process
(testimony of Sanchez, De Leon and Waugh), taking him toward the cell and heard evidence that
contradicted the three Defendants’ testimony that only Foley entered the cell with Sanchez
(testimony of Deleon, Waugh and Sgt. Bernstein) which jury could have relied upon to disbelieve

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Defendants’ testimony that only Foley entered the cell, that only Foley was present when he fell
and Foley’s testimony that Sanchez’s injury to his head was accident when he fell into the toilet in
the cell. See, e.g., Jury Charge (instructing that “[i]f a witness is shown to have given inconsistent
statements concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust that witness=s testimony in
other respects. You may reject all of the testimony of that witness or give it such credibility as
you may think it deserves). Based upon the totality of evidence presented at trial and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict, the Court concludes that there is no basis to
reverse that verdict or allow a new trial as to the conspiracy claim against the Defendants.
Jury’s Verdict as to the Other Claims Against Foley Also Shall Stand
The Court comes to the same conclusion as to all of the other claims for which the jury
found Foley singularly liable. As discussed above, there was a reasonable basis in evidence for
the jury to have found Foley liable for the Section 1983 claim for use of excessive force (First
Claim). Similarly, the jury could have reasonably found that the same conduct violated the MCRA
(Second Claim) where it was by threats, intimidation or coercion. See D. 96 at 13-15. The jury
could have reasonably believed that Sanchez’s injury was caused by Foley’s conduct, namely that
he intended to cause Sanchez harmful or offensive contact and did make such contact in a harmful
or offensive manner or put Sanchez in imminent apprehension or fear of bodily harm and that a
reasonable person in Sanchez’s position would have been placed in such imminent apprehension
or fear (Third Claim); and that with Foley’s intentional conduct, he knew or should have known
that it would cause Sanchez emotional distress, that such conduct was extreme and outrageous
under all of the circumstances presented and it did cause Sanchez extreme emotional distress (as
evidenced by the audiotape and Sanchez’s own testimony and medical records) (Fourth Claim).
Finally, the jury reasonably found Foley liable for malicious prosecution for charging Sanchez

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with resisting arrest. There was evidence (namely, observations by De Leon and Sanchez’s own
testimony and the audiotape) about Foley’s reaction to (an intoxicated) Sanchez’s indication of a
lack of understanding of his rights during the booking process to suggest that this criminal charge
was motivated by an improper motive, was not supported by probable cause and that the charge
terminated in Sanchez’s favor (since it was dismissed). Accordingly, the Court finds no basis to
reverse the verdict or allow a new trial as to the other claims for which Foley was found liable.
IV.

Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for JMOL or new

trial, D. 92, 93, 94.
So Ordered.
/s/ Denise J. Casper
United States District Judge

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