Darden v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

Filing 10

Judge George A. OToole, Jr: OPINION AND ORDER entered denying 8 Motion to Remand (Danieli, Chris)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-10154-GAO
FRANCES DARDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
April 10, 2015
O’TOOLE, D.J.
Plaintiff Frances Darden alleges that defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”)
sought foreclosure of her home even though her mortgage was discharged through a settlement
agreement and the plaintiff is current on payments due on another mortgage for that same
property. She brings claims of quiet title, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), breach of contract, and intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Darden originally filed her Complaint in Massachusetts Land Court. Ocwen subsequently
removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and federal-question
jurisdiction. The parties do not dispute that subject-matter jurisdiction is proper here, nor does
Darden argue that the Land Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this claim. Rather, Darden
contends that the Court should remand this action in light of the abstention doctrines in Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
I.

Younger Abstention
Under Younger v. Harris, abstention is appropriate where the “relief would interfere (1)

with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) that implicates an important state interest; and (3)

that provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to advance his federal
constitutional challenge.’” Massachusetts Delivery Ass’n v. Coakley, 671 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir.
2012) (quoting Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2007)). Whereas Younger
originally applied to state criminal proceedings, it “has been extended to some quasi-criminal (or
at least ‘coercive’) state civil proceedings [and] . . . those situations uniquely in furtherance of
the fundamental workings of a state’s judicial system.” Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Rullan,
397 F.3d 56, 69 (1st Cir. 2005). For purposes of Younger, “the state judicial proceeding must be
‘ongoing.’” Massachusetts Delivery Ass’n, 671 F.3d at 41.
Darden alleges that her mortgage was discharged pursuant to a prior superior court
judgment and corresponding settlement agreement, and, as a result, this action will interfere with
the state’s continued enforcement of that agreement. While the Supreme Court in Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), spoke to “the importance to the States of enforcing the orders
and judgments of their courts,” the Supreme Court also clarified that parties may seek relief in
federal court when “the [State] courts render a final decision on any federal issue presented by
[the] litigation.” Id. at 13, 18. Darden attempts to characterize the state’s enforcement of her
settlement agreement as “ongoing,” but the state court action has long since settled and there is
currently no active enforcement action with respect to the agreement. As Darden cannot identify
a pending state proceeding, the Court declines to remand this action under the Younger
abstention doctrine.
II.

Burford Abstention
Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., a federal court may abstain from hearing a case where
it presents “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial
public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar” or if its
adjudication in a federal form “would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.”
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Quakenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 726-27 (1996) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. Counsel of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)). Burford only applies in
“‘unusual circumstances, where federal review risks having the district court become the
regulatory decision-making center.’” Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. Sol Puerto Rico Ltd., 633 F.3d
20, 30 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 473 (1st
Cir. 2009)).
Darden asserts that this Court should refrain from interfering with the Massachusetts
Land Court’s jurisdiction over registration of title to real property and that Pomponio v. Fauquier
County Bd. of Supervisors, 21 F.3d 1319 (4th Cir. 1994), supports her proposition that federal
courts typically abstain from actions involving state property law. However, Pomponio involved
the “construction of state or local land use or zoning law,” not a quiet title claim. Id. at 1328.
Indeed, both the First Circuit and the District of Massachusetts have recently heard cases
involving try title claims, and neither court has demonstrated any difficulty in analyzing these
issues. See Lemelson v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 721 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2013) (interpreting the
Massachusetts try title statute); Larace v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151-52
(D. Mass. 2013) (rejecting argument that Massachusetts Land Court has exclusive jurisdiction
over petitions to try title and interpreting Massachusetts try title statute); see also Barbosa v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-12236-DJC, 2013 WL 4056180, at *5-8 (D. Mass. Aug. 13,
2013) (finding that Younger and Burford abstention doctrines do not warrant remand in
Massachusetts quiet title action). Moreover, this action involves federal claims under the FDCPA
that are properly in this Court’s jurisdiction.
Darden also fails to identify what “policy problem[] of substantial public import” is
implicated in this Court’s adjudication of a quiet title action. Burford itself involved an order

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issued by the Texas Railroad Commission granting permits to drill oil wells in East Texas. 319
U.S. at 317. The Commission had exclusive authority in that area and was charged with
weighing a complicated set of factors, from conservation of gas and oil and geological issues to
the economic impact on the industry and the state. Id. at 320. In sum, the interests at stake in a
straightforward quiet title action do not reach the same level of complexity and import as the
complicated regulatory scheme at play in Burford. See Barbosa, 2013 WL 4056180, at *7
(distinguishing Burford where the plaintiffs sought remand in try title action).
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (dkt. no. 8) is DENIED.
It is SO ORDERED.
/s/ George A. O’Toole, Jr.
United States District Judge

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