Martin v. Colvin

Filing 25

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 15 MOTION for Order Reversing Decision of Commissioner; ALLOWING 23 MOTION for Order Affirming Decision of Commissioner. See Attached Order .(DaSilva, Carolina)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

MAUREEN THERESA MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.

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Civil No. 15-10313-LTS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR
ORDER REVERSING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER (DOC. NO. 15)
AND MOTION FOR ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER (DOC. NO. 23)
June 7, 2016
SOROKIN, J.
Plaintiff Maureen Theresa Martin (“Martin”) brings this action against Carolyn W.
Colvin, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“The Commissioner”),
asking this Court to either reverse the final decision of the Commissioner and award benefits or,
alternatively, remand for further proceedings. Doc. No. 15. The Commissioner moves to affirm
her final decision. Doc. No. 23. After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and arguments,
Martin’s motion is DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion is ALLOWED.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Facts

Martin, a fifty-five-year-old woman born October 25, 1960, has never married, has no
children, and lives alone in a studio apartment. Administrative Record (“R.”) at 38, 39. 1
Although Martin has a driver’s license, she does not own a car; rather, she walks, takes public
transportation, and relies on family members. Id. at 40-41, 291. After graduating high school,
she completed one year of secretarial training, but did not finish the program. Id. at 39, 40, 45,
446. Following high school, she worked part-time at a library for five years. Id. at 39, 40, 45.
Martin last worked in August 2009, when she was laid-off as a temporary employee at
Dural Juvenile Group. Id. at 23. For 2.5 years, she assessed the quality of children’s products
pre-shipment and processed returns. Id. at 45, 56-59. For three to four years prior to 2005,
Martin had, sporadically, similar employment with First Year. Id. She also worked for a book
bindery. Id. at 59.
Martin has actively sought employment by going to the local career center and library. Id.
at 45-46. She testified that her previous jobs ended due to difficulties working with co-workers.
Id. at 60-61. Her qualifications and lack of transportation have limited her job search. Id.
Martin has been diagnosed with Asperger syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorder
(“OCD”), adjustment disorder with depressed mood, and anxiety. Id. at 104, 460-68. Martin
also hoards, and has done so since at least 1999. Id. at 50, 454. Hoarding has caused issues with
landlords, resulting in evictions in 2003 and 2013. Id. at 61, 62, 454. Martin received treatment
at South Bay Mental Health Center (“SBMHC”) from April to November 2007, where clinician
Kevin Hershey recorded Martin’s OCD and episodic hoarding. Id. at 306, 308.

1

The Administrative Record is found at ECF Doc. No. 14. The Court uses the pagination found
in the original Administrative Record.
2

On August 8, 2011, Martin’s primary care physician, Tinah Canda, M.D., completed a
psychiatric disorder questionnaire, noting “none reported/known.” Id. at 263-64. On August 15,
2011, Martin returned to SBMHC, where she sought weekly, hour-long, therapy sessions with
Randall Richard (“Richard”), M.A. Id. at 279-92, 302-21, 324-31 372-89. Richard conducted an
initial intake evaluation. Id. at 302-15. He noted that Martin is a “pack rat” and hoarder, with
misdirected anger that impairs her functioning. Id. He further noted that she wears a full set of
dentures due to years of neglect. Id. at 309. Martin’s trauma history noted that she is disheveled,
over-talkative, irritable, anxious, and obsessional; and that she has a short attention span, loose
thought processes, and impaired concentration; demonstrates inappropriate facial expressions
and changeable moods; and has no social circle of friends. Id. at 310-11. While seeking
treatment, Martin filed applications for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits
and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) payments with the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) on September 19, 2011. Id. at 173-81, 182-85. Both applications alleged a disability
onset date of September 1, 2009. Id. at 173, 182.
On October 12, 2011, Richard prepared a Psychiatric Disorder Questionnaire. See id. at
290. Martin continued to experience severe symptoms resulting in deficiencies in work behavior
and difficulties in activities of daily living. See id. at 290-91. Her symptoms included poor
judgment and inflexibility. Id. Martin was able to remember work-like tasks and instructions.
Id. On certain days, Martin was not able to get out of bed. Id. at 291. She was fired from jobs
for being overly talkative. Id. She self-isolated and fought with neighbors. Id. at 291-92.
Per the request of the Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission, Dr. Edward Powers
(“Powers”), Ph.D., conducted a ninety minute psychodiagnostic interview with Martin on
December 12, 2011. Id. at 295-98. Martin described her average day as extending from 8:00

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AM to 11:00 PM, and as primarily home-based. Id. at 297. Each day, she attempts to clear her
apartment, and would watch television as a leisure interest. Id. Martin arrived to the interview
adequately groomed, but appeared to be in emotional distress, speaking rapidly. Id. Powers
noted episodic anxiety with OCD features, and some depression given both her current
circumstances and continued bereavement over her father’s death. Id. Attention and
concentration proved unimpaired, and judgment and social reasoning appeared within normal
limits. Id.
On December 27, 2011, James Carpenter (“Carpenter”), Ph.D., the state agency
psychological consultant on initial consideration, diagnosed Martin with individually “nonsevere” affective disorder and anxiety-related disorder, and determined that the combination of
impairments was severe. Id. at 69-87. Carpenter reviewed Richard’s Psychiatric Disorder
Questionnaire from October 10, 2011 and Power’s psychodiagnostic interview from December
12, 2011. Id. at 72. Under the Paragraph B criteria of the listings of Appendix 1, Carpenter
found the following: moderate restriction of activities of daily living; moderate difficulties in
maintaining social functioning; moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or
pace; and no episodes of decompensation. Id. at 73. Thereafter, Martin’s initial request of SSI /
SSDI benefits was denied on December 27, 2011. Id. at 123-25. On March 13, 2012, Robert
Lasky, Ph.D., a state agency psychological consultant on reconsideration, affirmed the
assessment of Carpenter. Id. at 88-109. Request for reconsideration of SSI / SSDI benefits was
denied on April 4, 2012. Id. at 126-28. Subsequently, on April 13, 2012, Martin filed a request
for hearing. See id. at 129.
Richard referred Martin to licensed psychologist Cary P. Gearhart (“Gearhart”), Ed.D.,
who saw her for a one-hour evaluation on April 23, 2012. Id. at 335-40. Gearhart noted that

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Martin was suggestive of emotional confusion, poor social development, and a dearth of
internalized psychological structures. Id. at 339. He noted that Martin thinks about her
experiences in a highly inflexible manner, and evidence suggested difficultly in modifying her
perspective about herself or events in her life. Id. Gearhart diagnosed Martin with OCD and
Asperger’s. Id.
From May 23, 2012 through February 26, 2013, Martin continued receiving treatment at
SBMHC, now with Kimberly Sawusch (“Sawusch”), L.C.S.W., and Mallory Centonze
(“Centonze”), M.S. Id. at 394-408, 417-40. While Sawusch’s primary focus included
motivational interviewing (to encourage cleaning and job hunting) and psychoeducation
(concerning social skills, Asperger’s, and sensory issues), Centonze conducted psychotherapy
with Martin. Id.
On October 29, 2012, Martin was assaulted in her apartment. Id. at 409. She suffered
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) from this incident. Id. On March 3, 2013, Martin’s
family took her to the Morton Hospital Emergency Department due to concerns about her not
taking care of herself. Id. at 460-68. Martin was experiencing heightened stress levels due to her
impending eviction and the purging of the majority of her “things.” Id. at 52. Emergency
records noted the following about Martin: suicidal and homicidal ideation; flight risk; pressured
speech consistent with a manic episode; cooperative; and extremely dirty. Id. at 460-68. The
emergency physician recommended Martin be admitted to a psychiatric facility. Id.
Subsequently, from March 4, 2013 through March 8, 2013, Martin was hospitalized at
Lowell Youth Treatment Center, a satellite of Westwood Lodge Hospital. Id. at 12. Martin
agreed to start medication, and found group therapy sessions helpful. Id. at 414, 450. She also
participated in family meetings and was provided a lot of family support. Id. Martin

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demonstrated rapid, monotone speech, circumstantial rambling, and odd and poor eye contact.
Id. Her Discharge Diagnosis included PTSD, OCD (as a hoarder), and Asperger’s. Id. at 415.
On March 15 and 22, 2013, Martin met with Kelly Kugel (“Kugel”), M.A., at North East
Health Services for a Comprehensive Assessment. Id. at 444-55. Kugel noted that Martin was
not eating or sleeping, and that she had “threatened to hurt her sister.” Id. at 449. While
hospitalized, Martin was prescribed fluvoxamine for her depression and anxiety. Id. at 450. She
was characterized as having “significant impairment in social relationships [and] few friends,”
and never having a relationship with a partner lasting longer than six weeks. Id. at 451. Kugel
also described Martin as hyper-alert, unable to concentrate, and lacking in judgment and insights.
Id. at 454.
On March 20, 2013, Dr. Charu K. Patel (“Patel”), M.D., a specialist in psychosomatic
medicine, saw Martin for medication management. Id. at 457. Patel diagnosed Martin as having
OCD and PTSD. Id. Patel saw Martin again on April 10, 2013, and noted that while Martin had
been doing “very well,” and had “not engaged in any OCD behaviors,” she continued having a
“hard time getting rid of things.” Id. at 458. The move and medication seemed to have benefited
Martin. Id.
At the SSA’s request, Patel executed a Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) form on
April 12, 2013. Id. at 441-43. Patel noted the following about Martin: no issues understanding,
remembering, and carrying out simple instructions; mild restriction making judgments on simple
work-related decisions; moderate restriction understanding and remembering complex
instructions; marked restrictions carrying out and making judgments on complex work-related
decisions; moderate impairment interacting appropriately with supervisors; marked impairments
interacting appropriately with the public and co-workers; and marked restrictions responding

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appropriately to unusual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. Id. at 441-42.
Patel also noted that Martin’s Asperger’s “significantly impairs [Martin’s] social functioning,”
that her OCD has “previously impaired [her] ability to report to work on time and consistently,”
and that she had “previous difficultly going to work and leaving her home.” Id. at 442. Lastly,
Patel noted that Martin cannot manage benefits in her own best interest. Id. at 443. Martin
continued medication management, and met again with Patel on May 8, 2013. Id. at 459. Martin
stated that she was sleeping better, felt more relaxed, and was used to her new apartment. Id.
On May 22, 2013, Martin, represented by non-attorney Michelle Pequita, appeared and
testified before the ALJ. Id. at 137. She testified that she is unable to return to work full-time
due to her sensitivity towards noise, which easily distracts her. Id. at 43.
B.

Procedural Posture

On June 17, 2013, the ALJ found that although Martin asserted OCD–hoarding, PTSD,
Asperger’s, anxiety, depression, and thumb pain, she was not disabled under Sections 216(i),
223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. See id. at 18-30. Martin then filed a
request for review of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council, which was denied on August
14, 2014. Id. at 5-7. Martin then filed this action on February 10, 2015. Doc. No. 1. 2
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
The Commissioner’s decision must stand if grounded in substantial evidence. See 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). “More than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)), substantial evidence
must adequately support a given conclusion in a reasonable mind. See Rodriguez v. Sec'y of

2

On January 9, 2015, SSA sent Martin a letter giving her thirty days after she received that letter
to file a civil action. R. at 1-2. This extension makes Martin’s suit timely.
7

Health & Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981). Since “substantial evidence” means
something less than a preponderance, see Bath Iron Works Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 336
F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2003), a court will affirm the Commissioner’s decision “even if the record
can arguably justify a different conclusion.” Rodriguez Pagan v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987). The task of resolving evidentiary conflicts and weighing
credibility belongs to the Commissioner and her designee, the ALJ. See Rodriguez, 647 F.2d at
222. Legal errors made while evaluating a particular claim preclude this Court from affirming a
denial of benefits. See Manso–Pizarro v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st
Cir. 1996).
III.

DISCUSSION
Before proceeding seriatim through Martin’s claims of error, the Court begins with an

overview of the guiding legal framework, including the relevant statutory and regulatory
provisions. Martin bears the burden of proving her disability within the meaning of the Social
Security Act (“The Act”). See Deblois v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 686 F.2d 76,
79 (1st Cir. 1982). Under the Act, a claimant seeking benefits must prove an inability “to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Only
claimants afflicted with disabilities “of such severity” as to render the claimant “not only unable
to do h[er] previous work but [also], considering h[er] age, education, and work experience,
[unable to] engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy,” may receive benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

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To determine disability, the SSA has promulgated a five-step sequential analysis. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. The hearing officer (here, the ALJ) must determine: 1) whether the claimant
is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; 2) whether the claimant suffers from a severe
impairment; 3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or medically equals a listed
impairment; 4) whether the claimant’s impairment precludes her performance of any past
relevant work; and 5) whether the claimant’s impairment prevents her performance of other jobs
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See id. The findings discussed in the
above summary of the ALJ’s decision correspond to the five steps of this analysis. Having
provided the background legal framework, the Court now turns to Martin’s four asserted claims
of error.
A.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s “Meets or Medically Equals” Findings

Martin argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the record in determining whether the
severity of her mental impairments “meet or medically equal” the Paragraph B criteria of
Listings 12.04 and 12.06 in Appendix 1. To meet these criteria, Martin’s mental impairments
must result in at least two of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

marked restriction of activities of daily living; or
marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or
marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or
repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration.

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listings 12.04, 12.06 (emphasis added). The ALJ’s decision
is holistic, assessing “severity according to the functional limitations” the impairment imposes.
See id. § 12.00(c).
1.

Activities of Daily Living

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In evaluating activities of daily living, Martin argues that the ALJ incorrectly found that
she is able to live alone and care for herself. Doc. No. 16 at 7. The ALJ noted Martin lives
alone, and cares for herself, even though she may not always bathe and change her clothes. R. at
21. He also noted that, although Martin has a hoarding disorder, she is able to maintain her
home, perform basic chores, and prepare meals. Id. As daily activities include, inter alia,
cleaning, shopping, cooking, taking public transportation, paying bills, maintaining a home, and
grooming, 20 C.F.R. § 12.00(C)(2), App. 1, the ALJ discussed and acknowledged the relevant
evidence—including evidence of Martin’s impairments—and determined that Martin was
moderately impaired, based on consideration of all the evidence and explained in his reasoning.
Substantial evidence in the record supported this determination, even if the evidence potentially
could support other conclusions.
2.

Social Functioning

Martin also asserts social functioning deficits. She argues that the evidence did not
support the finding that her social functioning is moderately impaired—either at work or at
home, nor did it support the finding that her symptoms are “only moderate” in severity. Doc.
No. 16 at 7-8. Martin points out that Patel stated in the RFC form that a “[d]iagnosis of
Asperger’s Disorder significantly impairs social functioning and interaction with others,” and
classified Martin as “markedly restricted” when interacting with the public, co-workers, and
responding appropriately to work situations and changes in routine work settings. See Doc. No.
16 at 8.
Social functioning includes the ability to get along with others. 20 C.F.R. § 12.00(C)(2),
App. 1. A claimant may demonstrate impaired functioning through a history of evictions,

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firings, avoidance of interpersonal relationships, or social isolation. Id. Cooperative behavior,
functioning in work situations, and interactions with the public are also germane. Id.
The ALJ found that although Martin has a diagnosis of Asperger’s, she shops for
groceries, attends church weekly, and goes to the library or career center daily to use the
computers to socialize on Facebook or search for employment. R. at 21. The ALJ consequently
indicated in the RFC that Martin was limited to jobs that required no more than occasional
interaction with the public, supervisors, or coworkers. Id. at 21-22. Martin merely reasserts
notes from Gearhart’s report that her “affective malaise [ ] interferes with her being able to
function effectively,” and notes from SBMHC records that she had “misdirected anger” and
“snapp[ed]” at people. See Doc. No. 16 at 7-8. This does not sustain her burden of establishing
that substantial evidence does not support a finding of moderate social impairment in the area of
social functioning.
3.

Concentration, Persistence, or Pace

Regarding Concentration, Persistence, or Pace (“CCP”), the ALJ found that Martin has
moderate difficulties. R. at 22. He noted that Martin is able to handle her own finances and
spends up to two hours at a time on the computer. Id. The ALJ also observed that although
Martin recently had issues of racing thoughts, loose associations, and flight of ideas, Powers’
report indicates that Martin was oriented in all spheres and had no memory impairments. Id.
Martin argues that the record is filled with reference to her flight of ideas, pressured speech,
tangential speech, difficulty concentrating, and racing thoughts. Doc. No. 16 at 8. She cites the
following: Powers’ report; Northwest Health Service’s records indicating Martin perseverates on
obsessive thoughts and had severe flight of ideas; Gearhart’s report that she was “terminated
from [jobs] or fails the interviews because of unceasing questions and extreme talkativeness”;

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and Gearhart’s recommendation for using relaxation techniques to manage intrusive thoughts
and reduce interference from compulsions. Id. at 8-11.
Limitations in CCP are best observed in work settings, and refer to the ability to sustain
focused attention and concentration sufficiently long to permit the timely and appropriate
completion of tasks commonly found in work settings. 20 C.F.R. § 12.00(C)(3), App. 1. An
individual may be able to sustain attention and persist at simple tasks but may still have difficulty
with complicated tasks. Id. Deficiencies that are apparent only in performing complex
procedures or tasks would not satisfy the intent of this Paragraph B criterion. Id. Although
Martin cites Powers’ report to argue that a finding of “moderate” impairment is not supported by
the record, the report notes otherwise. Powers’ report, dated December 12, 2011, states that
Martin’s “[t]hought appeared normal in process and content,” and that she lacked “disturbances
in perception.” R. at 297. Furthermore, Powers’ notes that her “attention and concentration
proved unimpaired.” Id. This evidence underscores how the ALJ provided an adequate “meets
or medically equals” analysis at step three of the evaluation process, and suffices to support the
conclusion that Martin’s mental impairments do not cause at least two “marked” limitations or
one “marked” limitation and “repeated” episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration.
See id. at 22.
B.

Reliance on State Agency Psychologists

Martin next argues that the ALJ’s reliance on the non-examining state agency
psychologists, given that these psychologists did not consider a full record, is not based on
substantial evidence. Doc. No. 16 at 12. Specifically, Martin argues that because neither
Carpenter nor Lasky considered the objective test results of Gearhart and Patel in making their
DDS determinations, the ALJ should not have relied on them. Id. at 11-12.

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Martin relies on Chelte v. Apfel, which held that the weight given to a report by a nontreating physician varies on the circumstances. See 76 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 1999)
(citing Berrios Lopez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 951 F.2d 427, 431 (1st Cir. 1991)).
One important factor when weighing these reports is “the availability of most of the medical
evidence to the non-examining physician.” Id. (citing Divirgilio v. Apfel, 21 F. Supp. 2d 76, 8081 (D. Mass 1998)). In Chelte, none of the evidence of the claimant’s symptoms associated with
herpes zoster was included in the records DDS reviewers used in making their determinations.
Id. The non-examining physicians only reviewed a partial record, never seeing vital information
contained in the unreviewed portion, and Chelte held that while the report was noteworthy, this
absence precluded it from serving as the sole factor in determining disability. Id.
Here, while Carpenter and Lasky did review a partial record—never seeing the test
results of Gearhart on April 23, 2012, the RFC report of Patel on April 12, 2013, and other
evidence following the agency decisions on December 27, 2011 and March 13, 2012—the ALJ
did not solely rely on their reports in determining Martin’s disability status. While the ALJ gave
great weight to the non-treating physicians’ opinions, he also considered and relied upon the
opinions of other medical sources, including Richard, Patel, Gearhart, and Powers. See R. at 2229. Because the ALJ did not reject the opinions of the alleged “treating” physicians, but rather
chose to give them little weight (justifiably, as discussed below), his reliance on the opinions of
Lasky and Carpenter was not in error.
C.

The ALJ’s Treatment of Martin’s “Treating” Medical Sources

Martin next contends that the ALJ should have given deferential weight to the treating
physicians’ opinions. Doc. No. 16 at 12. She asserts that these records— Richard’s treating
notes from SBMHC, psychological testing done by Gearhart, and the RFC form by Patel,

13

including hospitalization records from March 2013—collectively illustrate her severe and
chronic mental impairment. Id. at 11. Before addressing this argument for each doctor, the
Court provides some background legal principles. According to the “treating source” rule, only
acceptable medical sources can be considered treating sources whose medical opinions may be
entitled to controlling weight. SSR 06-03p, at *45594. Under SSA regulations, “acceptable
medical sources” include licensed physicians and licensed or certified psychologists. Id.; accord
20 C.F.R. § 416.913. The treating source rule accords controlling weight to medical opinions of
treating sources if their views are well-supported by medical evidence and do not conflict with
substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(c), 416.927(d)(2). The Court now
addresses each doctor.
1.

Randall Richard

The ALJ correctly gave Richard little weight. SSA regulations establish that only M.D.
degree holders and licensed psychologists can qualify as “acceptable medical source[s].” See 20
C.F.R. § 404.151(a). Because Richard is neither, the ALJ correctly declined to afford his
testimony that degree of weight.
Additionally, even if Richard were considered an acceptable medical source, the ALJ was
not required to give deferential weight to his questionnaire. See Barrientos v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 820 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that an opinion “is not entitled to greater
weight merely because” it was provided by a “treating physician.”) (internal citations omitted).
The ALJ may afford less weight to a treating physician’s opinion regarding an impediment’s
nature and severity when “it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other evidence in the
record including treatment notes and evaluations by examining and nonexamining physicians.”
Tetreault v. Astrue, 865 F. Supp. 2d 116, 124 (D. Mass. 2012). The ALJ is free to use his

14

discretion in considering medical and expert opinion as long as he provides “good cause” for his
decision. SSR 06-03p, at *6. ALJs not according controlling weight to the treating source
opinion must give good cause in the written decision for failing to do so. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1257(c)(2)-(6); SSR 06-03p, at *6; see also Amaral v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 797 F.
Supp. 2d 154 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding that opinions of non-examining sources may be given
more or less weight than treating sources based on circumstances and may constitute substantial
evidence).
Here, the ALJ explained that he gave little weight to Richard’s opinions, expressed in his
Psychiatric Disorder questionnaire, because they were “inconsistent with the medical evidence as
a whole.” R. at 28. While Richard opined that Martin had severe symptoms resulting in
deficiencies in work behaviors (exemplified by an inability to get to work), and that she had
these symptoms since 2007, the ALJ observed that the medical evidence does not support this
conclusion: Martin was able to work in 2007; continued working until she was laid off in 2009;
attributed her lack of employment, at least in part, to transportation problems; and, contrary to
Richard’s opinion that Martin has considerable difficulty completing simple tasks, Martin
testified that she goes to the library or career center on a daily basis and spends two hours
looking for work. See id. These discrepancies support the ALJ’s decision to lend Richard’s
evaluation little weight.
2.

Cary Gearhart

Similarly, the ALJ correctly accorded Gearhart’s opinion little weight, as it fell outside
the scope of the treating source rule. 20 C.F.R. § 416.902 defines a “treating source” as a
claimant’s “own physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source . . . who has, or has
had, an ongoing relationship with” the claimant. Occasionally, an acceptable medical source

15

who has treated or evaluated a claimant only a few times or only after long intervals may be
considered a treating source if the nature and frequency of the treatment or evaluation is typical
of the condition. Id. However, if the foundation of the relationship is based on the need for a
report in support of a disability claim, that source will not be considered a treating source. Id.
Prior to the Psychological Testing Report (“PTR”), Gearhart had never treated nor evaluated
Martin. He thus never had the requisite ongoing relationship with Martin to warrant
consideration as a treating source. 3
3.

Charu Patel

The ALJ likewise correctly gave limited weight to Patel’s opinion. Patel lacked the
ability to offer a longitudinal picture of Martin’s impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2).
Patel had met with Martin during an extremely stressful and traumatic time—Martin had moved
to a new apartment, and many of her belongings had been thrown away—potentially distorting
Patel’s opinion given the impact of those events. Even if Patel were considered a treating source,
she would not necessarily be entitled to deferential weight. As explained earlier, an ALJ is
entitled to resolve conflicts in the record, and may reject the treating physician’s opinion so long
as he provides an explanation. SSR 06-03p, at *6. In this case, the ALJ provided the required
explanation, finding Patel’s opinion inconsistent with the longitudinal history. R. at 28-29; c.f.
Tetreault, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (“In this case, the ALJ provided the required explanation,
stating that [the treating physician’s] opinion was ‘inconsistent with the longitudinal history
noted above’ and appeared to be based upon ‘the claimant’s subjective allegations rather than

3

Additionally, even if Gearhart were a treating source, the PTR comports with the rest of the
record. The PTR primarily clarifies Martin’s diagnosis and recommended a treatment plan—it
did not assess work-related functional limitations. See R. at 335-40. Further, the PTR’s
recognition of Martin’s social functioning deficits and impairments in daily functioning supports
the ALJ’s finding that Martin has moderate social impairments and daily functioning disabilities.
16

objective findings.’”). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in giving Patel’s opinion limited weight
in determining Martin’s RFC.
D.

The RFC Determination

Martin lastly argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion as to
Martin’s RFC. See Doc. No. 16 at 13. ALJs must consider all relevant medical and other
evidence, including opinions of treating physicians, the claimant’s activities, and the claimant’s
descriptions and observations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945. This Court’s review of the record finds
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusions.
Here, the ALJ relied on Martin’s testimony that although several mental impairments
affected her ability to function in a work environment, she stopped working when she was laid
off, not because of her mental impairments. R. at 28. He also observed that Martin has been
looking for work since her alleged onset date, that a lack of transportation—not an inability to
perform the work she has done in the past—has been her biggest stumbling block, and that she
was able to perform certain daily activities around her apartment. Id. He furthermore noted
Martin’s ability to work for many years in spite of her impairments, as her hoarding behavior has
been evident since 1999, and her Asperger’s did not develop as an adult. Id. And finally, while
finding that Martin’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause
the alleged symptoms, he found Martin’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of these symptoms not entirely credible. Id. at 24. Because Martin’s claimed
inability to perform work-related activities or function independently is inconsistent with the
record, see SSR 16-3p, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Martin’s Motion for Order Reversing the Commissioner’s

Decision, Doc. No. 15, is DENIED, and the Commissioner’s Motion for Order Affirming the
Decision of the Commissioner, Doc. No. 23, is ALLOWED.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ Leo T. Sorokin
Leo T. Sorokin
United States District Judge

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