Calandro v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.

Filing 169

Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: ORDER entered. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Sedgwick did not violate Chapters 176D and 93A. Judgment for Defendant. (Geraldino-Karasek, Clarilde)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT
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SERVICES,
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Defendant.
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___________________________________)
GARRICK CALANDRO, AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
GENEVIEVE CALANDRO,

Civil Action
No. 15-10533

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
November 21, 2017
Saris, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Garrick Calandro, as administrator of the estate
of Genevieve Calandro, alleges that Sedgwick Claims Management
Systems, Inc. (“Sedgwick”) violated Massachusetts General Laws
Chapter 176D (“Chapter 176D”) and Massachusetts General Laws
Chapter 93A (“Chapter 93A”) by failing to make any reasonable
attempt -- both pre-verdict and post-verdict -- to settle the
negligence and wrongful death claims involving his mother who
died at a nursing home in Danvers, Massachusetts.
After a four-day bench trial, the Court finds that Sedgwick
did not violate Chapters 176D and 93A. The evidence presented at
1

trial showed that, although both sides engaged in tough
litigation tactics, the element of causation on Calandro’s
wrongful death claim was never reasonably clear. Even though
causation was reasonably clear on Calandro’s conscious pain and
suffering claim, Sedgwick made two reasonable settlement offers
when causation on that claim was reasonably clear. Sedgwick also
attempted to engage in negotiations one month before trial, but
was rebuffed by Calandro’s attorney. Calandro also alleges
statutory violations stemming from post-verdict or post-judgment
settlement offers. For the reasons set forth below, Sedgwick’s
conduct at those times did not violate Chapters 176D and 93A.
Therefore, the Court finds that Sedgwick did not violate
Chapters 93A and 176D. Judgment shall enter for Defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT1
I.

Background
A.

The Parties

The plaintiff, Garrick Calandro (“Calandro”), is the
administrator of his mother Genevieve Calandro’s estate.
Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (“Sedgwick”) is a
third-party administrator (“TPA”) of insurance claims. Hartford
Insurance Company, through its subsidiary, Pacific Insurance

1

The Court states its findings of facts and conclusions
of law separately, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a)(1).
2

Company (“Hartford”), issued a liability insurance Policy No.
2Y0004802 naming four out of five of the “Radius Entities” as
insureds excluding Roush & Associates, Inc. The policy was an
occurrence policy in the amount of $1 million, covering the
period June 1, 2008 to June 1, 2009.
There were five “Radius Entities”:

Radium Management

Services, Inc., Radius Management Services II, Inc., Roush &
Associates, Inc., Radius Danvers Operating, LLC, and Radius BD.
For convenience, the Court refers to the entities collectively
as “Radius”. In connection with its healthcare line of business,
Hartford engaged Sedgwick as a TPA pursuant to written
contract(s). Under the terms of those written contracts,
Sedgwick must undertake certain actions in adjusting claims, and
has contractual reporting requirements vis-à-vis a claim
involving a fatality. The operative contract at the time of
Calandro’s claim set forth a list of standards for handling and
adjusting that claim and others similar to it.
Dr. David Wahl was Ms. Calandro’s personal physician at all
times relevant to Calandro’s underlying negligence claims.
B.

Genevieve Calandro’s Death

Genevieve Calandro died on August 16, 2008 at age 91, five
weeks after she last resided at Radius Danvers, a long-term

3

skilled nursing facility where Ms. Calandro had lived for a sixmonth period between late December 2007 and July 10, 2008.
On July 10, 2008, at the Radius Danvers facility, Ms.
Calandro fell from her wheelchair, hit her head, and was taken
by ambulance to Beverly Hospital. Upon her admission to Beverly
Hospital, Ms. Calandro was dehydrated, had undiagnosed acute
appendicitis, renal failure, uncontrolled diabetes, a severe bed
sore, a urinary tract infection (“UTI”), and a high white blood
cell count. She also had dementia. She was discharged from
Beverly Hospital on July 22, 2008 and admitted to a different
nursing home. Ms. Calandro died on August 16, 2008. Her death
certificate lists congestive heart failure and acute renal
failure as the causes of death, along with various other
conditions that contributed to her death.
II.

Timeline of Sedgwick’s Pre- and Post-Judgment Conduct
A.

The Underlying Lawsuit

On August 16, 2011, Calandro filed suit against Radius
alleging negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death. The
complaint included a prayer for punitive damages. Calandro
served the summons and complaint on Radius in October 2011. In

4

July 2012, the plaintiff amended the complaint to add Dr. Wahl
as a defendant. Calandro’s lead trial counsel was David Hoey.2
B.

Sedgwick Claims Management Services

The terms under which Sedgwick acted as a TPA for Hartford
are set out in a Third Party Administrator Agreement and the
Service Requirements in that Agreement. After Radius received
service of the summons and complaint in October 2011, Sedgwick
assigned Mary Blair (“Blair”), an experienced claims adjuster at
Sedgwick who had previously worked at Hartford, to adjust the
claim. Blair engaged Bistany Adjustment Service (“Bistany”) to
investigate the claim. Hartford, via Blair, hired attorney
Lawrence Kenney (“Kenney”) to serve as counsel for the insureds
in the litigation.
Bistany filed two investigative reports. At the time of its
investigation, Radius, including the Danvers facility, was
winding up operations or in the process of sale. This fact made
the investigation difficult, both in terms of securing documents
and identifying witnesses. Indeed, no incident report of Ms.
Calandro’s fall from her wheelchair was ever found.
Bistany conducted interviews with two nurses who worked at
the Danvers facility at the time of Ms. Calandro’s fall, one of

2

Hoey also served as lead Plaintiff’s counsel in this
matter. He did not testify in the trial before this Court.
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whom told him that she remembered the fall and stated that a
contemporaneous incident report was prepared. Bistany found the
names of the two nurses in Ms. Calandro’s clinical chart, which
Calandro’s attorney already had in his possession.
Although Bistany conducted interviews with the two nurses,
Radius -- via Blair and Kenney -- did not disclose their names
in response to Calandro’s very-late filed interrogatories in the
underlying case. Instead, Kenney objected to the interrogatories
as untimely (they were), separately writing a letter to Hoey
advising him of the difficulty of obtaining responsive
information in light of the winding up of Radius entities.
Calandro filed a motion to compel, but that motion was never
granted. The discovery period was, however, extended.
The nurses’ identities and contact information were never
disclosed to Calandro before or during the underlying trial. The
nurses were not called as witnesses. Defendant (Blair and
Kenney) made a strategic decision to not disclose the
information about the nurses.
C.

Calandro’s Demands and Insureds’ Offers of Settlement

In October 2011, when the summons and complaint were
received, the plaintiff demanded $500,000 to settle the case
against Radius. No settlement activity happened for two years.

6

In November 2013, at the deposition of Dr. Wahl, Hoey
demanded $500,000 total to settle with all defendants. There
were just two notable intervening events between when Radius was
served and this demand. First, Dr. Wahl was added as a codefendant in July 2012. Second, the plaintiff’s put forward an
offer of proof at the medical malpractice tribunal in May 2013.
See Trial Ex. 64 (state court docket sheet); Trial Tr. at 2–39
(Blair testimony on outcome of medical malpractice tribunal).
The offer of proof may have included an outline of Calandro’s
medical-expert opinion, but Sedgwick did not receive the full
medical-expert opinion from Dr. Paul Genecin of Yale Health
until late April or early May of 2014. See Trial Ex. 32 at 2
(“Plaintiff served his expert disclosures on April 27th
. . . which we were waiting for.”); Trial Tr. at 2:199 (Kenney
testimony). Dr. Genecin opined that Radius breached its duty of
care and that its breach caused Ms. Calandro’s death, as well as
conscious pain and suffering due to an undiagnosed UTI, and a
stage IV bedsore, among other ailments.
On February 6, 2014, the defendants (Radius and Wahl) made
a joint settlement offer of $275,000, with $150,000 attributed
to Wahl and the remainder to Radius. Joe Pacheco (“Pacheco”), a
claims adjuster for Coverys, Dr. Wahl's malpractice insurer
conveyed the offer to Hoey. At that point, Blair had settlement
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authority of $125,000. Plaintiff’s counsel rejected the offer on
February 17, 2014, indicating that the $500,000 demand was nonnegotiable.
On February 7, 2014, Kenney sent Blair a pre-trial report
which attached a verdict value to the case of between $300,000
and $500,000. This value was attributable pro rata to Radius and
Dr. Wahl. Kenney described the case as involving the “usual
wrongful death damages.” Trial Ex. 51 at 4. At that time, Kenney
was preparing to admit to breach of the standard of care (which
he and Blair generally referred to as “liability”) and to try
the case on proximate cause and damages, although no formal
stipulation or admission had yet been filed. Going forward from
mid-February 2014, Radius, via Kenney, Sedgwick, and Hartford,
never changed its valuation of the case.3 As late as July 10,
2014, Blair told Becky Shingleton, who was supervising the claim
for Hartford, that, “[w]e are fairly confident that we have a
strong argument for causation and injuries.” Trial Ex. 31 at 2.
On February 18, 2014, Pacheco again contacted Hoey
indicating that the $275,000 was an initial offer and that the

3

There is no evidence that Blair independently valued
the case. Kenney is an experienced insurance defense litigator
in Massachusetts and defended numerous claims against nursing
homes including Radius entities. Calandro’s own expert on
insurance practices, Arthur Kiriakos, admitted that a claims
adjuster can rely on seasoned defense counsel’s expertise, so
long as the adjuster does not abrogate her duties.
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defendants had room to move but would not bid against
themselves. On March 27, 2014, the plaintiff withdrew the
$500,000 demand.
On April 8, 2014, the plaintiff demanded $2 million total
in settlement of the entire case collectively against the Radius
Entities and Dr. Wahl. Radius and Dr. Wahl each carried $1
million insurance policies. Thus, this demand constituted a
“policy demand” on each defendant.
In May 2014, Radius and Wahl extended a joint offer of
$300,000 -- a $25,000 increase over their prior joint offer.
Hoey rejected this offer in a letter to Pacheco dated June 4,
2014. Hoey expressed frustration with the tenor of settlement
negotiations and suggested that the adjusters (Pacheco and
Blair) may be engaging in conduct that violated Chapter 176D.4
On May 27, 2014, Radius disclosed its medical expert
opinion. Dr. Terrence O’Malley of Massachusetts General Hospital
and Harvard Medical School wrote an expert opinion that Radius’
conduct did not cause Ms. Calandro’s death. Kenney testified
that Radius did not seriously dispute that its conduct caused

4

In the letter, Hoey acknowledged that his
disappointment and frustration stemmed, at least in part, from
the Thomas case, which appears to have also involved a Coverys
insured defendant. See Trial Ex. 50 at 1. Hoey also references
disappointment in Pacheco’s handling of the Thomas case in a
February 17, 2014 email rejecting the defendants’ joint $275,000
settlement offer. See Trial Ex. 21 at 2.
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Genevieve Calandro conscious pain and suffering before her
death. See Trial Tr. at 2:182.
In mid-June 2014, while attending a mediation on another
matter, Blair told Kenney that she wanted to settle the Calandro
suit. Kenney gave Hoey’s office phone number to Blair. Kenney
observed Blair make the phone call, and heard her end of the
conversation in which she told Hoey that she wanted to settle
the Calandro case. Hoey refused to hear the amount of her
settlement offer until he spoke with his client.5 Hoey never got
back in touch with Blair to hear her settlement offer before
trial began.
Emails between Pacheco and Blair in early June suggest that
both defendants’ adjusters remained hopeful for a joint
settlement. However, in early July 2014, unbeknownst to
Sedgwick, Dr. Wahl separately settled with Calandro for
$250,000. On July 3, 2014, Hoey’s associate sent Kenney an email
renewing a $1 million demand on Radius. The associate said that
unless an offer in excess of $500,000 was made by July 9 all
settlement discussions would cease. Kenney was out of the office
from July 3 through July 7 taking family vacation. He did not

5

This hearsay evidence was admitted without objection
at trial. See Trial Tr. 2:175–76.
10

see the email until the morning of July 8, when he forwarded the
message to Blair.
That day, Blair contacted Shingleton. At that time, Blair
requested settlement authority of $300,000 and recommended a
reserve of $350,000. Shingleton assented to the request.6
However, on July 10, when Blair followed up to confirm the
amount of her settlement authority, Shingleton responded in an
email that Blair only had $250,000 in settlement authority and
could make an offer if the opportunity arose. There is no
evidence that the parties conversed directly in the brief period
during which Blair believed she had $300,000 in settlement
authority.
On July 14, Kenney made an oral offer of settlement of
$250,000 to Hoey. Kenney also relayed that, although he did not
have higher settlement authority at that time, he thought that
Blair could get more -- perhaps up to $350,000 -- if needed.

6

In her email, Blair stated that Kenney had filed a
stipulation to try the case only on damages. Trial Ex. 32 at 2.
Blair misstated the stipulation in her email. Kenney attempted
to stipulate to a breach of the standard of care, but instead
was forced to admit breach at trial. However, Radius contested
wrongful death causation and damages throughout. Blair’s
misstatement appears to have been incorporated into an internal
Hartford post-verdict synopsis, see Trial Ex. 34 at 1,
compounding the confusion. However, later in that email, the
report makes clear that causation was contested at trial. Id. at
2 (“Our expert testified well with respect to causation and
injuries leaving us with the expectation that a defense verdict
was possible.”).
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There is no evidence that Hoey replied at all, and he never made
a counteroffer on July 14 or any date thereafter.
Jury selection began on July 16 and the trial commenced on
July 17. Blair told Shingleton that she would not attend
empanelment because she did want to be present with settlement
authority before trial began, given how well she knew Hoey. In a
July 16 email, Blair asked Shingleton if she still had $250,000
in settlement authority going in to the first day of trial.
Shingleton confirmed that she did. However, no further
settlement negotiations took place after Kenney’s July $250,000
offer to Hoey on July 14.
Over the course of negotiations among these repeat players,
tempers flared on both sides, whether it be from tactics deemed
hardball, lack of progress in other cases, or other grudges.
Regardless, Radius, via Sedgwick, made reasonable offers at key
points leading up to trial, all of which Calandro rejected.
Throughout, causation and damages were hotly contested,
especially as to Calandro’s wrongful death claim.
D.

The Underlying Trial

The compensatory portion of the trial took place on July
17, 18, and 21. The jury received a verdict form that required a
finding on causation (not differentiated between wrongful death
and conscious pain and suffering) and damages. Radius admitted
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to a breach of the duty of care on a number of facts.7 See Trial
Ex. 81. On July 21, 2014, the jury returned a verdict for
Calandro, finding Radius was grossly negligent, and awarding
compensatory damages of $1,452,000. The punitive phase of the
trial took place on July 22, 2014. The jury awarded Calandro
$12,514,605 in punitive damages. Blair and Kenney were shocked.
E.

Post-Verdict Conduct and Post-Judgment Demands

After the verdict, Hartford took control of the claim away
from Blair. Shingleton reached out to Blair with a series of
questions, including asking whether she thought Calandro would
accept a policy limit ($1 million) settlement offer to release
all claims despite the verdict. Blair responded that she thought
Calandro would, noting that it would be time consuming and
expensive to collect on the judgment. Whatever Blair may have
counseled, the Court finds that Sedgwick no longer controlled
the claim on a day-to-day basis. Instead, Hartford handled the
claim from that point forward. See Trial Ex. 57 (Shingleton

7

At times in the documentary evidence and in testimony,
various witnesses, including Blair and Kenney, used the term
“liability” to refer to a breach of a duty of care, excluding
causation. This loose legal talk created some confusion. However
two facts make clear that Radius always contested causation on
the wrongful death claim. First, the transcript excerpt from the
underlying trial shows that the only admissions made at trial
related to breach of the duty of care, and not causation. See
Trial Ex. 81. Second, the Court took notice of the state court’s
verdict form, which put the question of causation to the jury.
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email to Blair gathering information for Hartford to manage next
steps). On July 31, 2014, Kenney, with Hartford’s direct
authorization and without Blair or Sedgwick as an intermediary,
offered Calandro $1 million in exchange for a release of Radius.
See Trial Tr. at 2:133–34 (Hartford directly authorized Kenney
to make the $1 million). Calandro rejected the offer.
On September 30, 2014, Calandro sent a demand letter under
Chapter 93A, §9 to Hartford, Pacific Insurance Company, and
Sedgwick alleging violations of Chapter 176D and demanding $40
million. Sedgwick received the demand on October 2, 2014 and
responded on October 30, 2014. In its response, Sedgwick made a
settlement offer of $1,990,197, reflecting the compensatory
damage award, as well as costs and pre- and post-judgment
interest. Calandro rejected the settlement offer and filed this
lawsuit. At the time of the offer, Kenney advised Radius to
appeal on a number of issues including the gross negligence
finding against Radius and the punitive damages award, see Trial
Tr. at 2:203–04; 3:70–71; Trial Ex. 57 at 1–2 (listing four
issues for appeal). Hartford did not settle with Calandro until
December 5, 2014. Trial Ex. 66 at 8.
In November 2014, Hartford and Calandro mediated the case.
At the mediation, Hartford settled by paying the full amount of
the judgment plus an additional amount, totaling $16 million.
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Hartford obtained releases of the Radius Entities and itself. It
did not obtain a release for Sedgwick.
The Court does not credit Plaintiff’s expert testimony that
Sedgwick’s conduct was below insurance industry standards. In
fact, Kiriakos’s opinion and credibility were undermined by his
failure to include, despite his admitted knowledge, Blair’s
attempt to make an offer to Hoey in June 2014, and Kenney’s
offer to Hoey three days before the underlying trial. Trial Tr.
4:44–45; 4:84–85. Therefore, the Court does not adopt Kiriakos’s
opinion that Sedgwick’s actions deviated from acceptable
insurance adjustment practices.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.

Applicable Law
Chapter 176D was “designed to remedy a host of possible

violations in the insurance industry and to subject insurers
committing violations to the remedies available to an injured
party under G.L. c. 93A.” Hopkins v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 750
N.E.2d 943, 948 (Mass. 2001). Among other acts, an insurance
company commits an unfair claim settlement practice if it
“[f]ail[s] to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements
of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.” Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 176D, § 3(9)(f). The word “liability” as used in
the statute “encompasses both fault and damages.” Clegg v.
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Butler, 676 N.E.2d 1134, 1140 (Mass. 1997); see also Bobick v.
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 790 N.E.2d 653, 659 (Mass. 2003)
(finding insurer not statutorily required to make fair and
reasonable offer until liability and damages were apparent).
Liability is not reasonably clear if the elements of the
claim are “still the subject of good faith disagreement.” Clegg,
676 N.E.2d at 1138. Although Chapter 176D places a duty to
settle upon insurers, that duty does not arise until “liability
has become reasonably clear” because “[i]nsurers must be given
the time to investigate claims thoroughly to determine their
liability.” Id. at 1140. In short, Chapter 176D “in no way
penalize[s] insurers who delay in good faith when liability is
not clear and requires further investigation.” Id.
“[A]ny person whose rights are affected by another person
violating the provisions of [Chapter 176D, § 3(9)(f)]” is
entitled to bring an action to recover for the violation under
Chapter 93A section 9. Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 961
N.E.2d 1067, 1075 (Mass. 2012) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D,
§ 3(9)(f)). Chapter 93A section 9(3), in turn, was amended in
1989 in response to state caselaw which “limited those damages
subject to multiplication under c. 93A to loss of use damages,
measured by the interest lost on the amount the insurer
wrongfully failed to provide the claimant. This amendment
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greatly increased the potential liability of an insurer who
wilfully, knowingly or in bad faith engages in unfair business
practices.” Clegg, 676 N.E.2d at 1142 (citations omitted).
II.

Analysis
A.

Pre-Verdict Conduct

Based on the Court’s findings of fact during the trial and
recounted above, there was no Chapter 176D violation.8 Liability
on the wrongful death claim was not reasonably clear at any
point in the litigation because causation was fairly disputed.
Furthermore, to the extent that causation was reasonably clear
on Calandro’s conscious pain and suffering claim, Sedgwick made
reasonable settlement offers at key stages of the litigation,
including in early February 2014 ($275,000 joint offer with Dr.
Wahl) and on July 14, 2014 ($250,000 offer extended from Kenney
to Hoey). Additionally, Blair attempted to engage in settlement
negotiations one month before trial, but Hoey rebuffed her.
To the extent Calandro alleges a Chapter 176D violation
based on failure to investigate, it has not shown that
Sedgwick’s actions constitute an unfair practice. Sedgwick

8

For purposes of this analysis, the Court assumes
without deciding that Sedgwick is in the business of insurance
as the term is used in Chapter 176D. See Calandro v. Sedgwick
Claims Mgmt. Svcs., No. 15-10533, 2017 WL 1496915, at *6 (D.
Mass. Apr. 25, 2017) (denying defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on ground that it was not engaged in the business of
insurance).
17

retained an investigator promptly, and investigated the claim to
the extent possible given the sale and dissolution of the
various Radius entities. The failure to disclose the two nurses
Bistany interviewed did not display a cooperative approach to
pretrial discovery, but Kenney’s timeliness objection was in
good faith, and Calandro’s motion to compel was not allowed.
With the two major prongs of Calandro’s claim foreclosed
by the facts found above, his closing argument focused on one
newly raised toehold to a Chapter 176D violation: Radius’
failure to respond with an offer of settlement after receipt of
plaintiff’s offer of proof to the medical malpractice tribunal
in May 2013.9 Calandro argues that at the point his expert
opinion was generally outlined Sedgwick had an affirmative duty
under Chapter 176D to make a settlement offer. During closing
arguments, Calandro’s counsel cited Gore v. Arbella Mut. Ins.
Co., 932 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010), and Clegg for this

9

In closing argument, Plaintiff’s counsel referred to
this as the plaintiff’s medical expert opinion disclosure. That
is not the case. Plaintiff’s medical expert opinion is dated May
18, 2012, see Trial Ex. 79, but Kenney testified that Sedgwick
did not receive the opinion until May 2014. See Trial Tr. 2:199.
Blair’s report to Hartford stated that Kenney received the
opinion on April 27, 2014. Trial Ex. 32 at 2. The Court finds
Kenney’s testimony credible, uncontested as to the timing of the
expert disclosure, and supported by documentary evidence. Thus,
the Court adopts that timeline. It was only in closing argument
that Calandro’s counsel asserted that Sedgwick received Dr.
Genecin’s expert disclosure in May 2013, around the time of the
medical malpractice tribunal. See Trial Tr. at 4:111.
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proposition. In his post-trial briefing, Calandro did not cite
Gore, but cited numerous other cases for related propositions.
See Docket No. 168 at 25–26.
But Calandro’s Hail Mary falls short. First, Gore and Clegg
do not place an affirmative duty on insurance companies to make
an offer of settlement before liability is reasonably clear nor
when the insured is continuing to conduct an investigation.
Clegg, 676 N.E.2d at 1140. To be sure, an insurer must act
reasonably, and must respond to demands in good faith and
without delay. See Gore, 932 N.E.2d at 846 (describing insurers
obligation to respond and inform claimant of the status of the
claim). Clegg and Gore both highlight the duty to act in good
faith, and the duty to make a fair settlement offer when
liability is reasonably clear.
Plaintiff’s offer of proof to the medical malpractice
tribunal in May 2013 did not make liability, as the term is
defined in Chapter 176D, reasonably clear. Sedgwick’s
investigation was ongoing, and after Calandro’s expert
disclosure in late April 2014, Sedgwick obtained its own expert
opinion in May 2014, which kept causation in dispute for
wrongful death.
Beyond the lack of an affirmative duty to make a settlement
offer before liability is reasonably clear, Calandro’s own
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behavior shows his offer of proof to the medical malpractice
tribunal was not the game changer his attorney would have the
Court believe. Five months after the offer of proof to the
medical malpractice tribunal, in November 2013, Hoey made a
joint settlement demand of $500,000 -- exactly the same demand
he made at the time the suit was filed in October 2011.10 As the
facts show, the plaintiff’s offer of proof to the medical
malpractice tribunal did not change his own attorney’s valuation
of the case. It cannot be said, then, that the offer of proof
established wrongful death liability to a reasonable certainty
for Sedgwick.
B.

Post-Verdict Conduct

Calandro has not presented evidence of a Chapter 176D
violation after the verdict. The evidence at trial was that
Hartford directed and authorized the $1 million post-verdict
settlement offer complained of. Therefore, even if that offer
constituted a Chapter 176D violation, Sedgwick is not liable.
Furthermore, Sedgwick’s separate post-judgment settlement offer
of $1,990,197 was reasonable considering the likelihood of an
appeal on the basis for and amount of the punitive damage award.

10

Arguably, the November 2013 demand was less than the
initial demand, as the former was to Radius only, whereas the
latter was a joint demand upon Radius and Dr. Wahl.
20

ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Sedgwick
did not violate Chapters 176D and 93A. Judgment for Defendant.

/s/ PATTI B. SARIS
Patti B. Saris
Chief United States District Judge

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