Cichocki et al v. Massachusetts Bay Community College et al

Filing 58

Magistrate Judge Judith G. Dein: ORDER entered denying Plaintiffs' 54 Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter Order Dismissing Case and 56 Motion to Amend Rule 59(e) Motion. (Dambrosio, Jolyne)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

TIMOTHY E. CICHOCKI and
Y. DOLLY HWANG,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS BAY
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 15-10663-JGD

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ RULE 59(e)
MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
September 7, 2016
DEIN, U.S.M.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 2016, this court issued a Memorandum of Decision and Order allowing the
defendants’ motion to dismiss all Counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint, and an Order dismissing
the case in its entirety. The plaintiffs have since filed a “Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter the Order of
August 8, 2016” (Docket No. 54), by which they are challenging this court’s rulings in connection
with the motion to dismiss, and are seeking to reinstate a number of their claims, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). They have also filed a “Motion for Leave to Amend” (Docket No. 56), by
which they are requesting leave to amend their Rule 59(e) Motion in order to seek alternative
relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. After consideration of the parties’ written submissions, and for
the reasons described below, both of the plaintiffs’ motions are DENIED.

II. ANALYSIS
The plaintiffs have moved to alter the court’s judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
Relief under Rule 59(e) “is granted sparingly,” and is only available in a limited number of
situations. Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014). Specifically, as the
First Circuit has explained:
Rule 59(e) allows a party to direct the district court’s attention to newly
discovered material evidence or a manifest error of law or fact and
enables the court to correct its own errors and thus avoid unnecessary
appellate procedures. The rule does not provide a vehicle for a party to
undo its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party
to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should
have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment.
Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997).
The plaintiffs’ challenge to this court’s August 8, 2016 decision does not warrant relief
under Rule 59(e). As an initial matter, the plaintiffs’ submission of evidence, which is attached
as exhibits to their Memorandum in support of their motion under Rule 59(e) and were
available to the plaintiffs long before judgment in this case, is not appropriate and is not
entitled to consideration. Furthermore, to the extent the plaintiffs challenge this court’s
reading of their complaint, their arguments are unpersuasive. The Statement of Facts set forth
in this court’s Memorandum of Decision and Order on the motion to dismiss reflects a thorough
review of the plaintiffs’ complaint, including all of the factual allegations contained therein, and
an effort to describe those allegations as accurately as possible. Even if it could be argued that
this court misinterpreted one or more of the plaintiffs’ allegations, any such error would not
have made a difference in the outcome of the motion, and does not constitute a manifest error
of fact. Finally, the plaintiffs have not presented any legal arguments in support of their
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present motion that could not have been raised earlier in connection with the motion to
dismiss. Therefore, they have failed to present a basis for altering this court’s judgment, and
their motion to reinstate claims pursuant to Rule 59(e) is denied.
The plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend must be denied as well. By their motion, the
plaintiffs are seeking permission to treat their Rule 59(e) motion, in the alternative, “as an
appeal to the district court judge to correct clear errors in facts and laws” pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72. However, Rule 72 provides for appeals to the district judge in cases where the
parties have not consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction and the dispositive motion at
issue has been referred to the magistrate judge for a recommendation to the district judge.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Where, as here, the parties have consented to the magistrate judge’s
jurisdiction for all purposes, any appeal should be made “to the court of appeals as would any
other appeal from a district-court judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. Because Rule 72 is inapplicable
to this case, the plaintiffs’ effort to rely on it as a means of seeking relief from this court’s
decision is futile and must be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, both the plaintiffs’ “Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter the
Order of August 8, 2016” (Docket No. 54) and their “Motion for Leave to Amend” (Docket No.
56) are DENIED.

/ s / Judith Gail Dein
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Judith Gail Dein
United States Magistrate Judge

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