Arkansas Teacher Retirement System v. Insulet Corporation et al

Filing 36

Judge Mark L. Wolf: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (Bartlett, Timothy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT

SYSTEM,

Plaintiff

C.A. No. 15-12345-MLW

v.
INSULET CORP. et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WOLF, D.J.

March 31, 2016

This class action securities suit arises under the Securities
Exchange Act

of

1934,

15

U.S.C.

§78a

et

Pri vate Securities Litigation Reform Act

seq.

Pursuant

of 1995

to

(" PSLRA"),

the
15

U.S.C. §78u-4, two putative class members and one group of three
putative class members have filed motions for appointment as lead
plaintiff. For the reasons explained below, the court is appointing
the Institutional Investor Group as lead plaintiff in this action,
and

approving

its

selection

of

Bernstein

Litowitz

Berger

&

Grossmann LLP and Scott + Scott LLP as co-lead counsel.
I.

BACKGROUND
On June

("Arkansas

16,

2015,

Teacher")

the

filed

Arkansas
this

Teacher

class

Retirement

action

against

System
Insulet

Corporation ("Insulet") and four of its officers. At the time, it
was one of three class actions in this district

seeking relief

from

The

Insulet

under

the

Securities

Exchange Act.

other

two

actions,

15-cv-1178

("Murphy")

and

15-cv-11855

("Burns")

were

voluntarily dismissed on July 2, 2015.
All three complaints alleged that the defendants made false
or

misleading

Insulet's

statements

OmniPod

Insulin

about

the

Management

sales

and

System

performance
("OmniPod").

of
The

plaintiffs, investors in Insulet, allege that they suffered losses
when the defendants'

misrepresentations were revealed.

The only

significant difference between the complaints, for the purposes of
the

current

analysis,

was

the

class

periods.

Murphy and Burns

alleged a class period beginning on February 27, 2013, the day on
which Insulet issued its 2012 financial results. The complaint in
this action alleges a class period starting on May 7,

2013,

"the

first trading day after Insulet's former CEO Duane DeSisto touted
the Company's launch of its new OmniPod system." Complaint

~3.

The

three complaints agreed that the class period ended on April 30,
2015,

the day Insulet disclosed its first quarter 2015 revenues.

See id. at

~53.

The putative class members described below subsequently filed
motions for appointment as lead plaintiffs under the PSLRA. See 15
U.S.C. §78u-4(a) (2). Each movant has filed a memorandum in support
of its motion and made the certification necessary to establish
that it is eligible to be appointed lead plaintiff.

Each movant

has also responded to the filings of the other moving parties. It

2

is now the court's obligation to appoint a lead plaintiff. See id.
§78u-4 (a) (3) (B) .
II.

APPLICANTS FOR LEAD PLAINTIFF
A. The Institutional Investor Group
Arkansas Teacher, the party that filed this action, has moved

for

appointment

of

the

Institutional

Investor Group

("IIG")

as

lead plaintiffs. The IIG consists of Arkansas Teacher, the City of
Bristol Pension Fund ("Bristol"), and the City of Omaha Police and
Fire

Retirement

System

("Omaha

Police

&

Fire").

They

seek

appointment of Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP and Scott
+ Scott LLP as lead counsel.

With the exception of the complaint,

the members of the IIG

have filed all of their motions in coordination with each other.
They have also submitted a joint affidavit signed by officers of
each member institution. In the affidavit, the member institutions
state

that

they

have

litigation,

and

have

consulted

regarding

established

a

their

plan

to

duties

during

communicate

by

conference call, email, and meetings. They also note that Bristol
and Omaha Police & Fire served as joint lead plaintiffs in a PSLRA
action in the Northern District of California.
The IIG alleges that, as a group, it purchased approximately
154, 000 total shares and,
shares

in

Insulet

during

taking sales into account,
the

class

expenditures of more than $2,500, 000.
3

period.
Finally,

It

79,000 net
alleges

net

it alleges total

losses

of

First-Out

approximately
("FIFO")

$834,000

as

calculated on

a

First-In­

basis or $330,000 as calculated on a Last-In­

First-Out ("LIFO") basis.

B. Alaska Electrical Pension Fund
The Alaska Electrical Pension Fund ("Alaska Electrical") has
moved for appointment as the sole lead plaintiff in this case. It
seeks

appointment

of Robbins

Geller Rudman

Dowd LLP as

&

lead

counsel. Alaska Electrical alleges that it purchased approximately
25,400 total shares in Insulet during the class period.
all

of

these

shares

during

the

class

period

and,

It sold

therefore,

purchased no net shares. It alleges net expenditures of $295,000,
and total losses of the same amount,

regardless of calculation

method.

c.

Jefferey Smith

Jefferey

Smith

is

the

only

individual

plaintiff

seeking

appointment in this action. Although he initially filed a motion
for appointment as the sole lead plaintiff, he has since filed a
memorandum requesting appointment as co-lead plaintiff with the
IIG.
lead

He seeks appointment of Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP as co­
counsel.

Smith

alleges

that

he

purchased

approximately

168,200 total shares, and 32,200 net shares, in Insulet during the
class

period.

He

alleges

net

expenditures

$650,000 and total losses of $110,660.

4

of

approximately

III. APPOINTMENT UNDER THE PSLRA

Section 101(b)

of the PLSRA,

codified at 15 U.S.C.

governs the appointment of lead plaintiffs

§74u-4,

in securities class

actions. As Judge Patti Saris succinctly explained:
The purpose of [§101(b)] is to establish new procedures
for the appointment of the lead plaintiff and lead
counsel in securities class actions. H. R. Conf. Rep.
No.
104-369,
at
32
(1995)
(reprinted
in
1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731). The legislation responds to
congressional concern that "the selection of the lead
plaintiff
and
lead
counsel
should
rest
on
considerations other than how quickly a plaintiff has
filed its complaint," as well as its desire "to increase
the likelihood that institutional investors will serve
as lead plaintiffs by requiring courts to presume that
the member of the purported class with the largest
financial stake in the relief sought is the most
adequate plaintiff." Id. at 33-34. This is predicated
upon the conclusion that "[i]nstitutional investors and
other class members with large amounts at stake will
represent the interests of the plaintiff class more
effectively than class members with small amounts at
stake." Id. at 34. Expressing a jaundiced view of
"unsupervised" plaintiffs' attorneys, the Conference
Commi ttee was most hopeful that "the plaintiff will
choose counsel rather than, as is true today, counsel
choosing the plaintiff." Id. at 35. One key aim was "to
empower investors so that they-not their lawyers­
exercise primary control over private
securities
litigation." S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4, reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig.,

138 F.

Supp.

2d 39,

43

(D.

Ma s s. 2001).
The PSLRA provides for appointment of a lead plaintiff who is
"the most capable of adequately representing the interests of the
class

members,"

also

called

the

5

"most

adequate

plaintiff."

15

U.S.C.

§78u-4 (a) (3) (B) (i).

The court must presume that the most

adequate plaintiff is "the person or group of persons that-­
(aa) has either filed the complaint or made a motion
[for appointment as lead plaintiff];
(bb) in the determination of the court, has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class;
and
(cc) otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id.

§78u-4 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (I).

That presumption is rebuttable only

on proof "that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff-­
(aa)
will not fairly and
interests of the class; or

adequately

protect

the

(bb) is subject to unique defenses that render such
plaintiff incapa ble of adequately repr esenting the
class."
Id.

78u-4 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (II). After the court determines the most

adequate plaintiff, that plaintiff "shall, subject to the approval
of the court,

select and retain counsel to represent the class."

Id. §78u-4 (a) (3) (v) .
IV.

DISCUSSION
The court has considered the submissions of each movant. For

the

reasons

stated below,

presumptively most

the

court

finds

that

adequate plaintiff in this

the

case.

IIG is
It

the

further

finds that no other class member has proven that the IIG cannot
adequately

represent

the

class.

Accordingly,

the

court

is

appointing IIG as lead plaintiff and approving its choice of lead
counsel.
6

A. Presumptively Most Adequate Plaintiff
Each person or group seeking appointment as lead plaintiff
has filed a timely motion in response to notice under 15 U.S.C.
§78u-4 (3) (A) (i). Therefore, each movant satisfies the first PLSRA
factor.

Accordingly,

the

remaining

two

factors

are

the

most

significant.
The First Circuit has yet to articulate a test for determining
which plaintiff has the largest financial interest. Many courts,
incl uding

this

one,

have

considered

purchased during the class period;

"( 1)

(2)

the

number

of

shares

the number of net shares

purchased during the class period; (3) the total net funds expended
during the class period; and
during the class period."

(4)

the approximate losses suffered

In re Olsten Corp.

Sec.

Li tig.,

3 F.

Supp. 2d 286, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); State Universities Ret. Sys. of
Illinois v.

Sonus Networks,

3827441, at *2

Inc.,

C.A. No.

06-10040-MLW,

2006 WL

(D. Mass. Dec. 27, 2006). Courts using this method

often consider approximate loss to be the most important factor.
See, e.g., In re Diamond Foods, Inc., Sec. Litig., 281 F.R.D. 405,
408

(N. D. Cal. 2012).
Other

courts

have

held

that

"the

number

of

purchased during the class period is determinative"
equates directly with potential
Inc.

Sec.

Litig.,

156 F.

Supp.

recovery.
2d 1102,

net

shares

because it

In re Critical Path,
1108

(N.D.

Cal.

2001).

However, even under the net shares approach, the amount recoverable
7

may

be

adj usted

for

"in/out

losses,

1. e.,

los ses

suffered

by

selling shares during the class period." Id.
Under

either

approach,

the

I IG

has

the

largest

financial

interest in this case. It purchased the most net shares, expended
the most net funds,
FIFO and a

and suffered the greatest losses under both a

LIFO calculation.

Smith purchased more gross shares

than the IIG. However, he also sold more shares, at less of a loss,
during the class period. Therefore, he would recover less in this
action

if

it

is

successful.

Alas ka

Electrical

has

less

of

a

financial interest than the IIG under any measurement. Therefore,
the court finds that the IIG satisfies the second PSLRA factor.
The court also finds that the IIG satisfies the requirements
of Rule 23. At this stage,

the IIG need only make a prima facie

showing of typicality and adequacy. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig.,
264 F.3d 201, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2001); Sonus, 2006 WL 3827441, at *2.
The

IIG

is

a

typical

class member.

It

"has

suffered the

same

injuries as absent class members, as a result of the same conduct
by the defendants." Diamond Foods, 281 F.R.D. at 408 (citing Hanon
v.

Dataproducts Corp.,

976 F.2d 497,

508

(9th Cir. 1992)). It is

also adequate to represent the class. As a group that has sustained
large losses,

"it has the ability and incentive to represent the

claims of the class vigorously," and it has retained experienced
counsel to do so.

In re Cendant Corp., 264 F.3d at 265

(internal

quotations omitted). Its claims do not conflict with those asserted
8

on behalf of the class. Id. Moreover, its members are the type of
insti tutional

investors

the

PSLRA encourages

be

appointed lead

plaintiff. See In re Lernout, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
The

court

satisfies

the

finds

that,

requirements

of the

three movants,

of

PLSRA.

the

the

Therefore,

I IG best
it

is

the

presumptively most adequate plaintiff.
B. Arguments in Rebuttal
Having identified the IIG as the presumptively most adequate
plaintiff,

it is necessary for the court to consider the other

movants' arguments in rebuttal. See In re Cendant Corp., 264 F.3d
at 264.

"[T]he question is not whether another movant might do a

better job of protecting the interests of the class than the [IIG];
instead, the question is whether anyone can prove that the [IIG]
will not do a fair[ ] and adequate [ ]'

job." Id. at 268

(emphasis

in original) .
Alaska Electrical asserts that the IIG should not be appointed
as lead plaintiff for three reasons.

1

First,

it argues that the

losses of the IIG members should not aggregated to determine the
financial interests of the movants.

See Alaska Opp.

(Docket No.

1 Smith does not contest that the Institutional Investor Group is
the most adequate plaintiff in this action. See Smith Opp. (Docket
No. 26) at 2-3. His request for appointment as co-lead plaintiff
is addressed below in §IV.C.

9

29)

at 6-9.

the

class

Second,

period to

it argues that Arkansas Teacher manipulated
exaggerate

its

financial

interest,

at

the

expense of excluding potential class claims. Id. at 9-12. Finally,
it

argues

defenses.

that
Id.

at

two

of

12 -15.

the

I IG

members

are

For the reasons

subj ect

to

explained below,

unique
these

arguments are insufficient to rebut the presumption that the IIG
is the most adequate lead plaintiff.
1. The IIG's Adequacy as a Group
Alaska

Electrical

asserts

that

the

IIG

is

an

improper

plaintiff group because it "offers no indication that all of its
members shared a pre-existing relationship" and "fails to describe
how

its

members

would

Class." Alas ka Opp.

at

function
7.

cohesively

However,

"[ i] t

in

representing

is not necessary that

proposed lead plaintiffs have a pre-litigation relationship,
rather that

they be able to operate

the

in concert

but

and manage the

litigation and the lawyers." Howard Gunty Profit Sharing Plan v.
CareMatrix Corp., 354 F. Supp. 2d 18, 24

(D. Mass. 2000); see also

In re Cendant Corp., 264 F.3d at 266. In making this determination,
the

court

should consider any relevant

existing relationships,

factors,

including pre­

and also "how its members would function

collectively; [and] the mechanism that its members and the proposed
lead counsel have established to communicate with one another about
the litigation. '" In re Lernout, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (quoting In

10

re MicroStrategy Inc.

Sec.

Litig.,

110 F.

Supp.

2d 427,

434-35

(E.D. Va. 2000)).
Alaska Electrical's assertion that the IIG has not described
how it would function is incorrect. The IIG members have filed a
sworn

declaration

explaining

how

and

why

they

intend

to

work

together. See IIG Decl., Ex. C (Docket No. 18-3). They state that
they,

rather than their counsel,

appointment as a

made the decision to move for

lead plaintiff group.

Id.

at

CJ['3I5-7.

They also

report that they have discussed how duties will be shared among
the three organizations and how they will communicate with each
other and with lead counsel.

See id.

'3I'3I8-9. They also recognize

their duty to direct litigation and monitor lead counsel's actions.
Id. '3II0-ll. These statements contribute to the conclusion that the
IIG is an adequate lead plaintiff.

See Goldstein v.

Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 348, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
member group based on sworn declarations);
Supp. 2d at 45

Puda Coal,

(appointing three-

In re Lernout,

138 F.

(same).2

2 The court also notes that Arkansas Teacher purchased the most
net shares, had the highest net expenditures, and suffered the
greatest FIFO losses of any individual movant during the class
period. It also had the second highest LIFO losses. Therefore, the
court would likely find Arkansas Teacher to have the largest
financial interest in this action even without the other members
of the IIG. This diminishes the concern that the IIG was formed
solely to meet the largest financial interest requirement. See
Hodges v. Akeena Solar, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 528, 533 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
11

2. Arkansas Teacher's Proposed Class Period
Alaska Electrical also asserts that Arkansas Teacher filed
this action with a shorter class period than that in the Murphy
and

Burns

actions

to

exaggerate

its

losses

compared

to

other

potential lead plaintiffs. See Alaska Opp. at 9-10. It notes that
Smith

filed

a

certification

§78u-4 (a) (2) (A),

required

by

the

PSLRA,

that

information

u. S. C.

using the shorter class period on July 1, 2015,

the day before the Murphy complaint was dismissed.
asserts

15

Arkansas
for

the

Electrical argues

Teacher

longer

that

the

declined

class

to

period.

Id.

release
Id.

"suspicious nature"

at

It also
financial

11.

Alaska

of these events

warrants discovery before appointing the IIG as lead plaintiff.
Id. at 11-12.
In support of this argument, Alaska Electrical cites Karam v.
Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 2011 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 157041 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 30, 2011). Arkansas Teacher had the largest financial interest
in the Karam action.

See

id.

at

*2.

Wyoming Retirement

System

("Wyoming") had the largest financial interest in an earlier action
against the same defendant, which was subsequently dismissed. See
id.

In Karam,

the

court

held

that

it

could

consider both the

pending and the dismissed action to determine which movant was the
most adequate lead plaintiff. See id. at 3. The court noted that
the complaint in Karam inexplicably omitted losses based on a prior
partial

disclosure

by

the

defendants.
12

See

id.

Accordingly,

it

included the prior partial disclosure in calculating the movants
losses, and appointed Wyoming as the lead plaintiff. See id.
The PSLRA requires that each party moving for appointment as
lead plaintiff provide a sworn certification that "sets forth all
of the transactions of the plaintiff in the security that is the
subject of the complaint during the class period specified in the
complaint."

15

U.S.C.

§78u-4 (a) (2) (A) (iv)

(emphasis

added).

Nevertheless,

some

circumstances,

the most inclusive class period should be used to

courts

have

held

that,

in

appropriate

determine the movants' financial interests in a case. In re Gentiva
Sec. Litig., 281 F.R.D. 108, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
However,
action.

In

these

Karam

cases

and

are

distinguishable

similar

cases,

the

(citing cases).
from the

shorter

instant

class

period

excluded, without justification, disclosures by the defendant that
were relevant to the theory of liability in the complaint.

See

Karam,

2011 u.S.

281

F.R.D.

at 114;

Dist.

LEXIS 157041,

see also Nicolow v.

05980 CRB, 2013 WL 792642, at *4

at *2;

In re Gentiva,

Hewlett Packard Co.,

No.

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2013)

12­

(noting

that in Karam and Gentiva, "the longest class period alleged facts
relevant to the theories advanced by the movants in the actions
still pending before the court").
Here, Arkansas has provided a reason for the starting date
for

its

putative

class--it

was

the

first

trading

day

Insulet's first allegedly deceptive statements. See Complaint
13

after
~22.

Moreover, Alaska Electrical has not explained,

let alone proven,

how

Murphy

the

earlier

statements

alleged

in

the

and

Burns

complaints caused additional losses to any class members. See Dura
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005)

(in fraud-on-the­

market

will

cases,

constitute

or

"an

inflated

proximately

purchase

cause

the

price
relevant

not

economic

itself
loss").

Therefore, it has not met its burden of proving that IIG is not an
adequate class representative.
3. Arkansas Teacher and Omaha Police & Fire's Defenses
Finally, Alaska Electrical argues that two members of the IIG
are

inadequate

defenses.

plaintiffs

See 15 U.S.C.

because

they

most adequate plaintiff .
such plaintiff

class").

Specifically,

subj ect

§78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (II)

adequacy may be rebutted "upon proof .

render

are

to

unique

(presumption of

. that the presumptively

. is subject to unique defenses that

incapable

of

adequately

representing

Arkansas Teacher and Omaha Police

&

the
Fire

purchased shares after partial disclosures by Insulet on January
7, 2015 and January 14, 2015. See Alaska Opp. at 12-13. Therefore,
Alaska Electrical argues, the IIG may be unable to prove reliance
on Insulet's alleged fraud.

Id. at 13-14.

The fact that an investor has purchased shares after a partial
corrective disclosure does not necessarily make that investor an
atypical or inadequate class representative.
Data Sys.

Corp.,

429 F.3d 125,

138
14

(5th Cir.

See Feder v.
2005).

Elec.

Rather,

an

investor

is

atypical

or

inadequate

only

if

it

"possessed

information that had not been disclosed to the investing public or
made
purchases

a

'disproportionately

post-disclosure."

Litig., 249 F.R.D.

Id.

196, 204

(E.D.

large

percentage'

(quoting

In

Pa. 2008)

re

DVI

of

[its]

Inc.

Sec.

aff'd sub nom.

In re

DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623 (3d Cir. 2011)).
Alaska
possessed

Electrical

information

does,

however,

assert

large

percentage

of

does

unavailable
that

allege
to

that

the

shares

in

the

IIG

investing

they purchased a

their

corrective disclosures.
two-thirds of its

not

members

public.

It

disproportionately

Insulet

after

the

initial

Arkansas Teacher purchased approximately

shares in Insulet after January 7,

roughly half of its shares after January 14,

2015.

2015,

and

Omaha Fire &

Police purchased less than 5 percent of its shares after January
7, 2015.
by

the

In total,
IIG

just under 60 percent of the shares purchased

members

were

purchased

after

one

or

more

partial

disclosure was made.
While
purchased

60
by

percent
the

disproportionate

IIG,

in the

is

a
it

significant
is

less

portion

than

that

of

the

shares

found

to

case on which Alaska Electrical

be

relies

primarily. See Faris v. Longtop Financial Technologies Ltd., 2011
u.S. Dist. LEXIS 112970, at *27-28 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011)

(group's

purchase of 87 percent of shares after disclosures was atypical).
Furthermore, Insulet's initial disclosures were not "so forceful"
15

that is was "unreasonable for [the IIG members] to continue to be
misled by the defendants'

alleged misrepresentation."

In re DVI

Inc., 249 F.R.D. at 204 n.13 (internal citations omitted). Rather,
the complaint alleges significant, cumulative disclosures through
April 30, 2015. The IIG members, and other absent class members,
may reasonably have relied on the market to correct itself after
Insulet's

initial

disclosures.

See

Feder,

429

F.3d

at

138.

Accordingly, the court finds that IIG's post-disclosure purchases
do not undermine its adequacy and typicality as lead plaintiff.
C. Appointment of Lead Plaintiff
Smith, while apparently not opposing the IIG's appointment,
requests appointment as co-lead plaintiff with the IIG. See Smith
Opp.

at 4-6.

Many courts have recognized the benefits of having

both private and institutional lead plaintiffs in securities class
actions. See Johnson v. Pozen Inc., No. 1:07CV599, 2008 WL 474334,
at *2

(M.D.N.C.

Feb.

15,

2008)

(collecting cases).

court must also consider the effect appointing,
matter,
the

four parties,

prospects

CareMatrix,
appoint

for

354 F.

four

Supp.

movants,

efficient
2d at 24

litigation
(D.

represented

Mass.
by

of

would have on
this

2000)

two

the

as a practical

represented by three firms,

the

However,

case.

See

(declining to

firms,

as

lead

plaintiffs) .
The court finds that, in this case, appointment of Smith and
the IIG as co-lead plaintiffs would undermine the purposes of the
16

PSLRA.

The IIG members are already a varied group in terms of the

size and timing of their investments. Adding a fourth party would
have only marginal benefits,

while potentially complicating the

coordination of this litigation. Moreover, the IIG has not assented
to Smith's request.
Smith

would

"be

3

The court is not persuaded that the IIG and

able

to

operate

in

litigation and the lawyers." CareMatrix,

concert
354

F.

and
Supp.

manage

the

2d at 24.

Nor has Smith shown that any marginal value he would add would
justify the cost and risks of his participation. Accordingly, the
court is appointing the

IIG as the sole lead plaintiff in this

case.
D. Lead Counsel
The PSLRA provides that the lead plaintiff shall select class
counsel

subject

to

§78u-4 (a) (3) (B) (v)

the

court's

138

F.

See

15

u.S.C.

"While the Court should not be a rubber stamp,

it should give the lead plaintiff['s]
Lernout,

approval.

Supp.

2d at

46-47.

choice some weight." In re
Both Bernstein Litowitz and

Scott + Scott have significant experience representing plaintiffs

3 Smith did not certify that he attempted to resolve this issue
with the IIG prior to filing his motion, as required by Rule
7.1(a) (2) of the Local Rules for the District of Massachusetts.
The IIG has not responded to Smith's request that he be appointed
as an additional lead plaintiff.

17

in securities class actions. Accordingly,

the court is approving

the IIG's selection of these firms as lead counsel.
V.

ORDER
In view of the foregoing,
1.

The

Appointment

Group's
of its

Motion

for

Selection of

(Docket No. 13) is ALLOWED.

Jefferey Smith's Motion for Appointment as Lead Counsel

and Approval of Counsel
3.

Investor

as Lead Plaintiff and Approval

Lead Counsel
2.

Institutional

it is hereby ORDERED that:

The

Alaska

(Docket No. 10) is DENIED.
Electrical

Pension

Fund's

Mot ion

for

Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Selection of Lead
and Liaison Counsel
4.

(Docket No. 15) is DENIED.

The parties shall confer and, by April 22, 2016, file a

proposed schedule for further proceedings in this case, jointly if
possible but separately if necessary.

18