Claudomir v. Massachusetts Environmental Police et al

Filing 99

Judge Indira Talwani: ORDER entered. For the reasons set forth in the attached ORDER, the Joint Motion for Entry of Stipulated Protective Order 98 is ALLOWED in part. (MacDonald, Gail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
RALPH CLAUDOMIR,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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COMMONWEALTH OF
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MASSACHUSETTS,
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MASSACHUSETTS ENVIRONMENTAL *
POLICE, AARON GROSS, and
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ROBERT WONG,
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Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 15-cv-12867-IT

ORDER
TALWANI, D.J.
This court hereby orders that the Parties’ Joint Motion for Entry of Stipulated
Protective Order [#98] is ALLOWED in part. To the extent that the proposed protective order
governs the exchange of documents and information between the Parties, the motion is
ALLOWED.
Insofar as the proposed protective order seeks to govern the use of confidential
information in any court proceeding or court filing, however, nothing in the protective order shall
limit this court’s power to make orders concerning the disclosure or impoundment of documents
produced in discovery or at trial. To that end, a party seeking to file such documents under seal
shall make a particularized showing for the need for impoundment.
This court is guided in this regard by First Circuit precedent and Local Rule 7.2. Because
the public has a “presumptive” right of access to judicial documents, United States v. Kravetz,
706 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir.
1998)), “‘only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records that

come within the scope of the common-law right of access.’” Id. (quoting In re Providence
Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002)). The burden is thus on the impoundment-seeking
party to show that impoundment will not violate the public’s presumptive right of access. See
Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A party asserting
good cause bears the burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of showing that
specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” (citing Phillips v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002))); Miller v. City of Bos., 549 F. Supp. 2d
140, 141 (D. Mass. 2008) (“The proponent of a Protective Order bears the burden of establishing
‘good cause’ for its continuation.” (internal citation omitted)). For that reason, when seeking to
file under seal any confidential information, a party must show this court good cause for the
impoundment. See Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 60. Specifically, the party seeking impoundment must
make “‘a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not . . . conclusory statements,’” id.
(quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 412 (1st Cir. 1987)),
as to why a document should be sealed. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
1986) (“A finding of good cause must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential
harm, not on conclusory statements.” (citations omitted)). This court “will not enter blanket
orders” for impoundment. L.R. 7.2(e).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 12, 2018

/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge

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