Credeur v. O'Neill

Filing 15

Judge Richard G. Stearns: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER dismissing action without prejudice to plaintiff pursuing his arguments for relief in state court. (PSSA, 3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-13186-RGS
CASEY R. CREDEUR, a/k/a TIMOTHY R. RICHARDS
v.
W. JAMES O’NEILL, et al.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
January 13, 2016
STEARNS, D.J.
For the reasons stated below, the Court dismisses this action without
prejudice.
I.

Factual Background
Casey R. Credeur, formerly known as Timothy R. Richards, brings

this action in which he asks for a declaration that the delay by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in bringing him to trial on criminal
charges violates his rights under federal and state law and mandates the
dismissal of the charges.
According to the amended complaint,1 the Commonwealth brought a
criminal complaint against him (under the name Timothy Richards)
In his original complaint, Credeur named the Honorable W. James O’Neill, First
Justice of the Barnstable District Court, as the sole defendant. Upon a representation of

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charging him on thirteen counts of statutory rape. The plaintiff represents
that he did not receive notice of the complaint or summons to appear
because they were sent to the wrong address. After he did not appear at the
April 2005 arraignment, he was defaulted and a warrant issued for his
arrest.
Credeur represents that he not learn of the action until September
2014, at which point he contacted the Barnstable District Court to request
information about the case. The court treated Credeur’s correspondence as
a motion to dismiss or quash the warrant and denied the same.

The

plaintiff filed two motions to dismiss the criminal complaint on speedy trial
grounds. The first motion was never received by and/or placed on the
docket of the Barnstable District Court. The second motion was filed on
May 18, 2015 and is pending. The Commonwealth has not responded to the
motion.
The plaintiff alleges that the Commonwealth’s decade-plus delay in
bringing him to trial on the 2005 criminal complaint violates his federal
and state rights to a speedy trial and to due process.

the Commonwealth’s Attorney General that Judge O’Neill was deceased, Credeur filed
an amended complaint naming Michael O’Keefe as the sole defendant, acting in his
official capacity as District Attorney for the Cape & Islands. Other than the identity of
the defendants, the original and amended complaints are substantially the same.
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II.

Discussion
Because Credeur paid the filing fee, the federal in forma pauperis

does not provide a statutory basis for screening this action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2).

Nonetheless, because he is a prisoner, 2 his amended

complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This statute
requires the Court to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or employee and dismiss the action if it
is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The statute does not contain an explicit
exception for a prisoner who has paid the filing fee, and the federal courts
of appeals that have addressed the issue have ruled that no such exception
exists.3 Further, the Court has an obligation to inquire its own subject
matter jurisdiction, see McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004),
and it may raise issues of abstention sua sponte, see Ford Motor Co. v.
Meredith Motor Co., Inc., 257 F.3d 67, 71 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001).
The plaintiff states in the amended complaint that he is currently serving a federal
sentence following his conviction for child pornography distribution. See United States
v. Richards, Crim. No. 05-00185 (M.D. Tenn.).

2

See O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008); Judd v. Federal Election
Com’n, 304 Fed. Appx. 874, 875-76 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Thompson v. Hicks,
213 Fed. Appx. 939, 942 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Miller v. Edminsten, 161 Fed.
Appx. 787, 789 (10th Cir. 2006); Stringer v. Bureau of Prisons, Fed. Agency, 145 Fed.
Appx. 751, 752 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Lee v. Hennigan, 98 Fed. Appx. 286, 287
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Here, the Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this
action because it is a matter for the state courts to address.
“Abstention is a device designed to facilitate the side-by-side
operation of federal and state courts, balancing their respective interests in
the spirit of comity.” Coggeshall v. Mass. Bd. of Reg. of Psychologists, 604
F.3d 658, 664 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1971)). “[F]ederal courts have long recognized ‘the fundamental policy
against federal interference with state criminal proceedings.’”

In re

Justices of Superior Ct. Dep’t of Mass. Trial Ct., 218 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.
2000) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)). Under the Younger
abstention doctrine, federal courts "abstain from interfering with state
court proceedings even where defendants claim violations of important
federal rights," In re Justices, 218 F.3d at 17, as long as the "federal claims"
can be "raised and resolved somewhere in the state process," MaymóMeléndez v. Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis
added).
Here, the Court has no reason believe that Credeur cannot pursue
relief in the state courts. The Barnstable District Court has docketed his

(5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773, 775
(7th Cir. 2002); Lews v. Estes, 242 F.3d 375 (table), 2000 WL 1673382 (8th Cir. Nov. 8,
2000) (per curiam); Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
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motion to dismiss and has jurisdiction to rule on it. To the extent that
Credeur believes that the state trial court has not been adequately
responsive to his initial inquiry and motion, he has not alleged facts from
which the Court can reasonably infer that the matter cannot be resolved
somewhere in the state court process.

For example, Credeur has not

suggested that he is precluded from filing a petition under M.G.L. ch. 211,
§ 3.

See M.G.L. ch. 211, § 3 (giving the Supreme Judicial Court

superintendence of inferior courts); Burton v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass.
1008, 1008 & n.1 (2000) (noting that petition under M.G.L. ch. 211, § 3 was
appropriate vehicle to bring claim that delay in criminal prosecution
violated defendant's right to a speedy trial).
ORDER
Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED. The dismissal is without
prejudice to the plaintiff pursuing his arguments for relief in state court.
SO ORDERED.

_/s/ Richard G. Stearns_______
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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