O'Connell v. Town of Tewksbury et al

Filing 55

Judge Indira Talwani: ORDER entered. The Assented to Motion to Enter Stipulated Protective Order 54 is ALLOWED to the extent that the proposed protective order governs the exchange of documents and information between the Parties. Insofar as the pr oposed protective order seeks to govern the use of information in any court proceeding or court filing, however, nothing in the protective order limits this courts authority to make orders concerning the disclosure or impoundment of documents produced in discovery. SEE attached Order. (MacDonald, Gail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
ALICE E. O’CONNELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF TEWKSBURY, et al.,
Defendants,

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Civil Action No. 15-cv-14027-IT

ORDER
January 23, 2017
TALWANI, D.J.
The parties’ Assented to Motion to Enter Stipulated Protective Order [#54] is
ALLOWED to the extent that the proposed protective order governs the exchange of documents
and information between the Parties. Insofar as the proposed protective order seeks to govern the
use of information in any court proceeding or court filing, however, nothing in the protective
order limits this court’s authority to make orders concerning the disclosure or impoundment of
documents produced in discovery.
This court is guided in this regard by First Circuit precedent and Local Rule 7.2. Because
the public has a “presumptive” right of access to judicial documents,1 “‘only the most
compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records that come within the scope of
the common-law right of access.’”2 The burden is thus on the impoundment-seeking party to

1

United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 10 (1st
Cir. 1998)).
2

Id. (quoting In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002)).

show that impoundment will not violate the public’s presumptive right of access.3 For that
reason, when seeking to file under seal any confidential information, a party must show this
court good cause for the impoundment.4 Specifically, the party seeking impoundment must make
“‘a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not . . . conclusory statements’”5 as to why
a document should be sealed.6 This court “will not enter blanket orders” for impoundment.7
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 23, 2017

/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge

See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A party asserting good cause
bears the burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of showing that specific prejudice or harm will
result if no protective order is granted.” (citing Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002)));
Miller v. City of Bos., 549 F. Supp. 2d 140, 141 (D. Mass. 2008) (“The proponent of a Protective Order bears the
burden of establishing ‘good cause’ for its continuation.” (internal citation omitted)).
3

4

See Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 60.

5

Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 412 (1st Cir. 1987)).

See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (“A finding of good cause must be based on a
particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory statements.” (citations omitted)).
6

7

L.R. 7.2(e).

2