Sheffield v. City of Boston et al

Filing 41

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDERFor the forgoing reasons, defendants motion to strike (Docket No. 32) is: 1) with respect to paragraphs 28 through 33 of plaintiffs amended complaint (Docket No. 26), DEN IED; 2) with respect to the Northeastern study in paragraph 34 of plaintiffs amended complaint (Docket No. 26), DENIED, but, with respect to the citation to the National Bureau of Economic Research study in paragraph 34, ALLOWED< /b>; 3) with respect to paragraph 35 of plaintiffs amended complaint (Docket No. 26), ALLOWED; 4) with respect to paragraphs 36 through 52 of plaintiffs amended complaint (Docket No. 26), DENIED; 5) with respect to paragraphs 53 through 60 of plaintiffs amended complaint (Docket No. 26), ALLOWED;Defendants shall file any supplemental responsive pleadings deemed necessary on or before Monday, November 14, 2016. So ordered.(Caruso, Stephanie)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Carla Sheffield,
Plaintiff,
v.
City of Boston et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No.
15-14174-NMG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
Plaintiff Carla Sheffield (“plaintiff”) brought this action
after an officer-involved shooting of her son Burrell RamseyWhite (“decedent”), against defendants City of Boston, Matthew
Pieroway, Joel Resil (collectively, “defendants”) and Michael
Moes 1-10 and Mary Moes 1-10, unknown defendants in the Boston
Police Department (“BPD”).

Plaintiff is the decedent’s mother

and the personal representative of his estate.
Defendants filed a motion to strike paragraphs 28 through
60 in plaintiff’s amended complaint.

For the following reasons,

defendants’ motion to strike will be allowed, in part, and
denied, in part.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background
On August 21, 2012, Burrell Ramsey-White was killed in an

officer-involved shooting.

Officers Pieroway and Resil pursued

-1-

Ramsey-White after he fled from them during a traffic stop.

The

pursuit concluded when Ramsey-White attempted to enter a locked
building but could not get inside.

At some point after Ramsey-

White attempted to enter the building, Officer Pieroway
discharged his firearm which resulted in Ramsey-White’s death.
Plaintiff originally brought this action in Massachusetts
state court and in December, 2015, defendants removed the case
to federal court.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in

April, 2016, after defendants filed motions to dismiss.

Now

pending before this Court is defendants’ joint motion to strike
paragraphs 28 through 60 of plaintiff’s amended complaint.
In the subject paragraphs, plaintiff describes 1) various
court opinions and statutes, 2) studies conducted by the BPD,
the American Civil Liberties Union and other organizations and
3) newspaper articles.

Plaintiff maintains that those

paragraphs support her claims against defendants.
II.

Defendants’ Motion to Strike
Under Rule 12(f) Defendants move to strike paragraphs 28

through 60 in plaintiff’s amended complaint on the grounds that
the paragraphs contain factual allegations and evidence that are
inadmissible, immaterial and extremely prejudicial to
defendants.
In her opposition to defendants’ motion to strike,
plaintiff attempts to convert the motion into a Rule 12(b)(6)

-2-

motion to dismiss.

Although defendants mention the potential

legal insufficiency of plaintiff’s complaint, the crux of their
objection is to the immateriality of the allegations in
paragraphs 28 through 60.

Accordingly, the Court will construe

defendants’ pleading as a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). See
Guzman v. Concavage Marine Constr. Inc., Docket No. 14-cv-8587,
2016 WL 1273285, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (construing
defendant’s motion as a motion to strike although defendant
maintained that the subject portion of plaintiff’s complaint was
legally insufficient).
A.

Legal Standard for a Motion to Strike

The Court has broad discretion to strike comments which are
not “substantive elements of the cause of action.” Alvarado–
Morales v. Digital Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 618 (1st Cir.
1988).

Such motions are, however, “narrow in scope, disfavored

in practice, and not calculated readily to invoke the court’s
discretion.” Boreri v. Fiat, S.p.A., 763 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir.
1985).

Rule 12(f) motions are not typically granted without a

showing of prejudice to the moving party. See 5C Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382
at 421–22 (3d ed. 2016).

-3-

B.

Application
1.

The Assertion of Defendants that Paragraphs 28
through 60 Are Inadmissible and Are Legal
Conclusions

Defendants first contend that paragraphs 28 through 60
should be stricken because they contain “legal conclusions and
inadmissible reports.”

That argument is unavailing, however,

because inadmissibility is insufficient to support a Rule 12(f)
motion. See Gallagher v. Funeral Source One Supply & Equip. Co.,
Docket No. 14-cv-115, 2015 WL 773737, at *3 n.2 (D.N.H. Feb. 24,
2015) (noting that a majority of district courts will not strike
allegations solely on the basis of inadmissibility).
Furthermore, the fact that the allegations could be construed as
legal conclusions is not grounds for striking the pleadings
under Rule 12(f). See Quatela v. Stryker Corp., 820 F. Supp. 2d
1045, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
2.

Paragraphs 28 through 33:
Statutes

Court Opinions and

Plaintiff avers that the court opinions and statutes quoted
and described in paragraphs 28 through 33 1) allege the state of
the law before and at the time of the decedent’s death and 2)
are relevant to defendant’s alleged deliberate indifference and
to potential qualified immunity defenses.
The Court agrees.

The legal opinions and statutes are

sufficiently related to plaintiff’s claims and therefore will

-4-

survive a motion to strike. See Berke v. Presstek, Inc.,
188 F.R.D. 179, 180-81 (D.N.H. 1998) (finding SEC consent
decrees sufficiently related to plaintiff’s complaint to survive
a motion to strike).

Also, defendants have not shown they would

be prejudiced by the citations to court opinions and statutes.
See James v. Agnew, Docket No. 15-cv-409, 2016 WL 5662073, at *3
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2016) (declining to strike plaintiff’s case
citations and legal arguments in a complaint for excessive
force).

Because a motion to strike is disfavored, the Court

will deny defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 28 through 33.
3.

Paragraphs 34 through 35:
NBER Studies

The Northeastern and

Paragraphs 34 and 35 describe two studies, one conducted by
Northeastern University and the other by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (“NBER”).

Plaintiff cites the studies for the

alleged proposition that the BPD has engaged in racial
profiling.

Although defendants do not specifically address

those paragraphs in their motion to strike, they seek their
deletion (as well as the other subject paragraphs), on grounds
that the subject allegations are not related to this case.
The Northeastern study was conducted pursuant to the
Massachusetts statute described in paragraphs 32 and 33.
Because the Court will not strike those paragraphs, it will not
strike paragraph 34 in its entirety.

-5-

The Court will strike the

appended citation to the NBER study in paragraph 34, however,
and will strike paragraph 35 which describes the NBER study.
Even without a showing of prejudice, courts have stricken
“repetitious and unnecessary pleadings” to remove “clutter” from
the case. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Regulator Co., 796 F.
Supp. 2d 240, 246 (D. Mass. 2011) (first quoting In re Feeley,
393 B.R. 43, 51 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) and then quoting Heller
Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th
Cir. 1989)).
The references to the NBER are redundant and cited for the
same alleged proposition of racial profiling.
therefore “repetitious and unnecessary.”

They are

Thus, the Court will

strike the citation to the NBER study in paragraph 34 and
paragraph 35 in its entirety.
4.

Paragraphs 36 through 52:

The BPD Report

In paragraphs 36 through 52, plaintiff provides data and
conclusions from a report published by the BPD on its own
policing practices.

Defendants seek to strike those paragraphs

on grounds that 1) the allegations do not support any of
plaintiff’s claims and 2) the report was a result of a proactive
attempt by the BPD to analyze and reform its policies and
practices.

Plaintiff responds that the allegations are relevant

to its Monell claims.

-6-

Although that portion of the complaint concerns conduct of
individuals other than the defendant, the paragraphs describe
the BPD’s policing practices. See Heldt v. Tata Consultancy
Servs., Ltd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1193 N.D. Cal. 2015)
(“[S]tatistical data may be relevant to describe, at a minimum,
the defendant’s practices.”).

Such policing practices described

in the subject paragraphs are relevant to plaintiff’s Monell
claims against defendants. Ramirez v. City of Worcester, 80 F.
Supp. 3d 287, 287 (D. Mass. 2015).

Although paragraphs 36

through 52 are perhaps circuitous, plaintiff’s decision to
include them is not a “gross violation” of the pleading
requirements in Rule 8. Hayes v. McGee, Docket No. 10-cv-40095,
2011 WL 39341, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2011) (quoting Newman v.
Massachusetts, 115 F.R.D. 341, 343-44 (D. Mass. 1987)).
Accordingly, defendants’ motion to strike with respect to
paragraphs 36-52 will be denied.
5.

Paragraphs 53 through 59:
the Boston Globe Article

The ACLU Report and

Paragraphs 53 through 58 are comprised of quotes from a
report published by the American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts (“ACLU”) with respect to the BPD’s policing
practices.

Defendants contend that those paragraphs are

irrelevant to plaintiff’s case and should be stricken.

-7-

Plaintiff responds that the report is relevant to establishing
its Monell claims by showing a custom of racial discrimination.
The Court will allow defendants’ motion to strike with
respect to paragraphs 53 through 58 because they are redundant.
As plaintiff explains in paragraph 53, the ACLU arrived at its
conclusions by analyzing “the same data” that was relied upon by
the BPD in its report.

As a result, the allegations with

respect to the ACLU report are irrelevant.
Moreover, the ACLU’s conclusions in paragraphs 53 through
58 amount to “superfluous descriptions” of defendants.1 See
Alvarado-Morales, 843 F.2d at 618.
The Court will also strike paragraph 59 because it involves
allegations beyond the scope of plaintiff’s claim.

In paragraph

59, plaintiff describes an article from the Boston Globe
referencing BPD data on interrogations, observations, frisks and
searches of civilians between 2011 and 2015.

Although the

conduct at issue in this case took place during that time frame,
the Globe article attempts to explain BPD conduct, much of which
is unrelated to plaintiff’s claims.

Paragraph 59 thus

“clutters” plaintiff’s complaint and defendants’ motion to
strike with respect to paragraph 59 will be allowed.

1

For example, in paragraph 56, plaintiff quotes the ALCU’s
opinion that the BPD’s practices “were arguably even more
racially skewed” than those practices of the New York City
Police Department.
-8-

6.

Paragraph 60: Allegations of Discrimination Against
BPD Officers and Recruits

In paragraph 60, plaintiff cites two court cases
purportedly finding that the BPD discriminated against its own
officers and recruits in promotions and disciplinary actions.
Those allegations are not related to the causes of action in
this case, however, which involve alleged violations of a
private citizen’s rights.

Consequently, the Court will allow

defendant’s motion to strike with respect to paragraph 60. See
Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 F.2d 6, 14 (10th Cir.
1952) (affirming district court’s decision to strike a portion
of plaintiff’s amended complaint which was unrelated to
plaintiff’s cause of action).

-9-

ORDER
For the forgoing reasons, defendants’ motion to strike
(Docket No. 32) is:

1)

with respect to paragraphs 28 through 33 of
plaintiff’s amended complaint (Docket No. 26), DENIED;

2)

with respect to the Northeastern study in paragraph 34
of plaintiff’s amended complaint (Docket No. 26),
DENIED, but, with respect to the citation to the
National Bureau of Economic Research study in
paragraph 34, ALLOWED;

3)

with respect to paragraph 35 of plaintiff’s amended
complaint (Docket No. 26), ALLOWED;

4)

with respect to paragraphs 36 through 52 of
plaintiff’s amended complaint (Docket No. 26), DENIED;

5)

with respect to paragraphs 53 through 60 of
plaintiff’s amended complaint (Docket No. 26),
ALLOWED;

Defendants shall file any supplemental responsive pleadings
deemed necessary on or before Monday, November 14, 2016.

So ordered.

/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton_____
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated October 28, 2016

-10-