Castagna et al v. Jean et al

Filing 343

Judge Indira Talwani: ORDER ENTERED. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Plaintiffs Christopher and Gavin Castagna’s Motion for Relief from Judgment as to Section 1983 Wrongful Entry Claim 339 is DENIED. Please see attached.(IT, law2)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CHRISTOPHER CASTAGNA and
GAVIN CASTAGNA,

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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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DARAN EDWARDS, ANTHONY TROY, *
JAY TULLY, KAMAU PRITCHARD,
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MICHAEL BIZZOZERO, KEITH
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KAPLAN, and HARRY JEAN,
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Individually,
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Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 15-cv-14208-IT

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
June 17, 2021
TALWANI, D.J.
Before the court is Plaintiffs Christopher Castagna and Gavin Castagna’s Motion for
Relief from Judgment as to § 1983 Wrongful Entry Claim [#339]. Plaintiffs seek to vacate the
Second Amended Judgment [#335] entered in Defendants’ favor and to restore the vacated
Amended Judgment [#325] which awarded Plaintiffs nominal damages on their Unlawful Entry
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs contend relief is warranted in light of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 1596 (2021). Defendants
oppose the Motion [#339], stating that “the appropriate court to entertain Plaintiffs’ motion” is
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and that Plaintiffs’ motion must be
denied because this court “lacks jurisdiction in this matter.” Opposition 3 [#341]. Defendants
argue further that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
The court recounts the procedural history in Section I below. The court DENIES
Plaintiffs’ Motion [#339] for the reasons set forth in Section II below. The court sets forth in

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Section III an indicative ruling in the event that the First Circuit recalls its mandate, vacates its
opinion, and remands for further proceedings in this court in light of Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S.
___, 141 S.Ct. 1596 (2021).
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs brought this action against numerous Boston Police Officers who entered

Plaintiffs’ home and Plaintiff Christopher Castagna’s bedroom, broke up Plaintiffs’ Saint
Patrick’s Day party, and arrested Plaintiffs. Prior to trial, the court dismissed most of the
Defendants and narrowed the claims as to the remaining three Defendants, Officers Daran
Edwards, Harry Jean, and Keith Kaplan. At trial, Plaintiffs pursued these remaining claims,
including an unlawful entry claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Over Defendants’ objection, the court
declined to instruct the jury on a community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.
Defendants timely filed motions for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Plaintiffs’ case
and at the close of all evidence, in which they argued that their entry into both the apartment and
the bedroom was justified by a community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, and
protected by qualified immunity. Defendants’ Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law [#275],
[#278]. The jury decided in favor of the Defendants on all counts, including the Unlawful Entry
count, see Jury Verdict [#284], and the court denied Defendants’ Motions for Judgment as a
Matter of Law [#275], [#278] as moot. Elec. Order [#289].
Plaintiffs subsequently moved for a new trial on multiple grounds, Motion for a New
Trial [#292], and the court granted the motion. Mem. & Order at 11 [#305]. Viewing the parties’
dispute as to the community caretaking exception to be a dispute of law, the court discussed with
counsel how they could tee up the legal issue for appellate review without the expense and delay
of another trial. Counsel suggested cross-motions for summary judgment based on the trial
record, see Status Report [#308], while the court invited Rule 52 motions. See Elec. Order
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[#310]. In accordance with the court’s suggestion, Plaintiffs sought judgment as a matter of law
as to liability, and Defendant moved for a ruling that Plaintiff failed to prove damages beyond
nominal damages. Elec. Clerk’s Notes [#311]. The court granted both motions, Elec. Orders
[#312], [#324], and entered the Amended Judgment [#325], with judgment for Defendants on all
counts except the § 1983 unlawful entry claim, judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs as to the
§ 1983 unlawful entry claim, and an award to Plaintiffs of one dollar in nominal damages from
each of the three officers.
Defendants appealed, and the First Circuit reversed. Opinion of the Court of Appeals
[#333]. The Court of Appeals explained that
[t]his year, after the district court in this case issued its decision, [the Court of
Appeals] held that the community caretaking exception could be used to justify
police officers’ entry into homes as well [as cars] . . . . Police are entitled to enter
homes without a warrant if they are performing a community caretaking function
and their actions are “within the realm of reason.”
Id. at 19 (quoting Caniglia v. Strom, 953 F.3d 112, 123-24 (1st Cir. 2020) (internal citations
omitted)). The Court of Appeals proceeded to find that Defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity for the unlawful entry claim because Defendants were performing a community
caretaking function of making sure underage guests were safe, and remanded the matter for this
court to enter judgment for the Defendants. Id. at 20-21; Judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit [#334]. Accordingly, on May 1, 2020, the court entered the Second
Amended Judgment [#335].
II.

THE PENDING MOTION
Because the mandate issued from the First Circuit and this court issued the final judgment

that Plaintiffs now seek to have vacated, Plaintiffs properly initiated their request for relief in this
court.

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Plaintiffs seek relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). “A motion under
Rule 60(b)(6) must be made within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The court finds
the Motion [#339] is timely. Plaintiffs filed this Motion [#339] on June 1, 2021, thirteen months
after entry of judgment and within two weeks of the Supreme Court’s decision in Caniglia.
Defendants have argued no prejudice caused by the timing of the Motion [#339].
Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other
reason that justifies relief.” This subsection “provides federal district courts with a residual
reservoir of equitable power to grant discretionary relief from a final judgment . . . where such
relief is appropriate to accomplish justice, but the reasons for that relief are not encompassed by
the other provisions of the rule.” Paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Zang, 248 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Such relief, however, is
“‘extraordinary relief’ reserved for ‘exceptional circumstances,’ given the countervailing interest
in the finality of such orders.” Id. (quoting United States v. One Urban Lot, 882 F.2d 582, 585
(1st Cir. 1989)). “Ordinarily, a change in decisional law is not considered an ‘extraordinary
circumstance’ justifying relief from judgment.” O'Callaghan v. Shirazi, 204 F. App'x 35, 36 (1st
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 397
F.3d 334, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2005) (Supreme Court decision clarifying law and resolving circuit
split was not an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)); Blue Diamond
Coal Co. v. Trustees of UMWA Combined Benefit Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524–25 (6th Cir. 2001)
(notwithstanding change in decisional law, equity favored denial of Rule 60(b)(6) motion, given
the amount of time that had passed since final judgment; reliance of parties upon that judgment;
and public policy favoring finality of judgments)).
Here, however, the appellate decision vacated by the Supreme Court, Caniglia v. Strom,
953 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. Mar. 13, 2020), was issued by the First Circuit nine months after this court
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entered its Amended Judgment [#325]. The First Circuit’s Opinion [#333] then explicitly
“appl[ied] the analysis in Caniglia and [held] that the officers’ entry was justified under the
community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.” Castagna, 955 F.3d at 221. In
these extraordinary circumstances, relief may be considered under Rule 60(b)(6).
Whether relief is in fact warranted requires consideration of the merits previously
addressed by the First Circuit. However, because “the mandate of an appellate court forecloses
the lower court from reconsidering matters determined in the appellate court,” Diaz v. Jiten Hotel
Mgmt., Inc., 741 F.3d 170, 175 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 111 F.3d
205, 209 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)), this court may not reconsider the
First Circuit’s decision. For this reason, the Motion [#339] is DENIED.
III.

INDICATIVE RULINGS
The pending Motion [#339] does not fall directly within Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 12.1(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1, as no appeal is currently pending. In
light of Plaintiffs’ Notice [#342] that they have also filed a Motion to Recall Mandate, to Stay
Ruling on Within Motion Pending Ruling on Rule 60(b) Motion, and to Set Deadline to File
Petition for Rehearing with the First Circuit, and anticipating the likelihood Plaintiffs will appeal
this court’s denial of their Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the court sets forth the following indicative
ruling should the matter be remanded.
If the matter is remanded for further proceedings in light of Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S.
___, 141 S.Ct. 1596 (2021), the court anticipates vacating the Second Amended Judgment [#335]
but not reinstating its Amended Judgment [#325]. Instead, the court would proceed as follows.
A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a New Trial [#292]
Following the jury verdict, Plaintiffs sought a new trial. On such a motion, the movants
are not seeking a judgment contrary to the jury’s verdict. Instead, they are seeking an opportunity
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to retry the case. Accordingly, the court may not only “weigh the evidence” but must also
consider whether “action is required in order to prevent injustice.” Jennings v. Jones, 587 F.3d
430, 436 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation omitted). The court therefore “may order
a new trial ‘even where the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.’” Id. at 439 (quoting
Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1994)). Indeed, “the district court ‘has the power and
duty to order a new trial whenever, in its judgment, the action is required in order to prevent
injustice.’” Kearns v. Keystone Shipping Co., 863 F.2d 177, 181 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting 11 C.
Wright & A. Miller, § 2805). And, when the court so orders, the non-movant is not deprived of a
jury’s determination of the facts, but only of this particular jury’s determination. The remedy of a
new trial thus affords relief to prevent injustice to one party “without abrogating his opponent’s
right to a jury trial.” Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Musa, 785 F.2d 370, 375 (1st Cir. 1986).
Here, the court rejected Defendants’ request to give an instruction on a community
caretaking exception; the Supreme Court’s ruling in Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct.
1596 (2021), that police officers’ “caretaking duties” do not create “a standalone doctrine that
justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home,” is in accord with the court’s rejection of
the community caretaking exception instruction. Despite being properly instructed, the jury
found no constitutional violation. That finding was against the weight of the evidence and
resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice. In this court’s view, the jury’s failure to follow the
court’s proper instruction on the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution warranted a new trial.
Defendants opposed Plaintiffs’ Motion for a New Trial [#292] on qualified immunity
grounds. But the qualified immunity doctrine does not allow the court to ignore a jury’s
miscarriage of justice. Instead, the court should have considered qualified immunity separately
on Defendants’ motion. Accordingly, on remand, the court would again grant Plaintiffs’ Motion

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for a New Trial [#292] for the reasons set forth in the court’s Memorandum and Order [#303]
except as it addresses qualified immunity.
B. Defendants’ Motions for Judgment [#275], [#278]
Defendants raised qualified immunity in their Motions for Judgment [#275], [#278]. The
court denied those motions as moot after the jury entered a defense verdict. Elec. Order [#289].
Once the court vacated the jury verdict, however, the court should have reconsidered those
motions and resolved the question of qualified immunity based on the evidence presented at trial.
In that context, the court would view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the
nonmoving party. Casco, Inc. v. John Deere Construction & Forestry Company, 990 F.3d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 2021). The evidence would be viewed as follows:
Although Detective Jean testified that he saw someone vomiting twice
outside of the apartment, he also admitted that he did not look for or inquire inside
about the person who vomited. No other officer testified that they observed any
vomiting inside or outside of the apartment. Prior to entering the apartment, none
of the officers observed anything remarkable about the scene in the apartment;
Officer Kaplan testified that he observed people dancing and Detective Edwards
testified that he observed people chatting and drinking from cups.
During the trial, none of the officers articulated any concern as to an
emergency need to enter. Nor did the officers articulate a specific safety concern
other than the possibility that the party goers may have been underage, and as to
that concern, none of the officers testified to asking any party goers their age or
for identification. Officer Kaplan testified that upon entering the home, the guests
were cooperative. None of the officers testified that [ ] anyone tried to run or hide
from the officers to avoid detection. . . .
Furthermore, all three men testified that they were responding to a noise
complaint and that their primary objective in entering the home was to find the
owner and ask him to turn down the music.
Mem. & Order 5-6 [#305].
When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, they do
not support qualified immunity. To paraphrase the First Circuit’s decision in Matalon v. Hynnes,

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the contours of both the [Plaintiffs’] right to enjoy the sanctity of [their] home and
the heartland of the community caretaking exception were sufficiently clear to
alert [the officers] that [their] plan of action—a warrantless entry—would infringe
the [Plaintiffs’] constitutional rights. Put another way, an objectively reasonable
officer should have known that a warrantless entry into the [Plaintiffs’] home [to
have music turned down] could not be effected on the basis of the community
caretaking exception.
806 F.3d 627, 635 (1st Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, the court would deny the Defendants’ Motions for Judgment as a Matter of
Law [#275], [#278].
C. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment as to Liability
After granting the motion for a new trial, the court viewed the dispute between the parties
as primarily a dispute of law (whether the community caretaking exception applied to the home
or only to cars) rather than a dispute of fact. The court encouraged Plaintiffs to move for
judgment as to liability in order to allow for review of that legal issue. Elec. Order [#310]. But in
granting Plaintiffs’ oral motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 and entering judgment,
see Elec. Orders [#312], [#324]; Amended Judgment [#325], the court deprived Defendants of a
jury to determine what Defendants were doing when they entered the Plaintiffs’ home. Quite
simply, there was a factual dispute that should have gone to the jury as to whether the
Defendants entered the home to have the music turned down or whether they entered the home to
protect against underage drinking as their lawyers claim.
Accordingly, the court would deny Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment as to liability so the
jury could resolve this factual dispute.
D. Defendants’ Motion to Limit Damages to Nominal Damages
The court would, however, leave in place its order limiting damages on the Unlawful
Entry claim to nominal damages. Plaintiffs presented no evidence to support a claim of damages
based on the officers’ entry into Plaintiffs’ home or Plaintiff Christopher Castagna’s bedroom.
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Instead, the evidence of damage offered at trial all related to subsequent events, including the
intervening actions of Plaintiffs and their guests.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief from

Judgment as to § 1983 Wrongful Entry Claim [#339] and sets forth its indicative rulings in the
event that the First Circuit grants Plaintiffs relief and remands the matter to this court for further
proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: June 17, 2021

/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge

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