Malick v. Quincy Police Department

Filing 17

Judge George A. O'Toole, Jr: OPINION and ORDER entered granting 15 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Halley, Taylor)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-10008-GAO
YVETTE MALICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
QUINCY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
August 8, 2016
O’TOOLE, D.J.
On January 4, 2016, Yvette Malick filed a pro se complaint against the Quincy Police
Department1 alleging that she was mistreated by Quincy police officers in 2008. The Department
has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, arguing primarily that Malick’s case is time-barred under the applicable statute of
limitations.
According to Malick’s complaint, police and a mental health worker visited her apartment
on October 3, 2008. She claims that the police entered the apartment against her wishes, and that,
once inside, they witnessed a civil rights violation which they failed to document. She alleges that

A “police department” is normally not a suable entity. See Henschel v. Worcester Police Dep’t,
Worcester, Mass., 445 F.2d 624, 624 (1st Cir. 1971). Typically, a suit against a municipal agency
or department is construed as a suit against the municipality. See id. (“If a Police Department may
be successfully sued, it is the city which will pay; the result is the same as suing the city.”) No
individual police officers are identified by name in the complaint. Whoever the intended
defendant(s), the issue need not be addressed because it is so clear that any claim arising from
events in 2008 is time-barred.
1

the police handcuffed her, dragged her out of the apartment, and placed her face down into an
ambulance. She further alleges that the police harassed her with the use of their sirens.2
When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court “must accept all of the
nonmovant's well-pleaded factual averments as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in [her]
favor.” Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The
Court may not enter a judgment on the pleadings “unless it appears beyond a doubt that the
nonmoving party can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief.”
Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 788 (1st Cir. 1998).
Although Malick does not argue that the defendant violated a specific statute, the
allegations in her complaint resemble a claim that could arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (requiring courts to construe complaints filed by pro se
litigants liberally). Section 1983 imposes liability on police officers who act to deprive persons of
their constitutional rights. Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016).
In order to be entitled to relief, a plaintiff who sues under § 1983 must initiate the action
before the statute of limitations expires. Because § 1983 does not contain its own statute of
limitations, federal courts “must lift a limitation period from state law.” McIntosh v. Antonino, 71
F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 1995). In this District, such claims are subject to the Massachusetts three-year
statute of limitations applicable to tort actions. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A; see also Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (holding that the limitation period for a § 1983 claim is

2

Malick also advances several allegations against parties other than the police. For example, she
asserts in her complaint that the ambulance “dumped” her off at a local hospital, where doctors
made disparaging remarks about her race and defamed her character by calling her a drug addict.
At a scheduling conference on May 16, 2016, Malick added that the doctors imprisoned her against
her will and left an object in her body. These allegations are not at issue here, however, because
the Quincy Police Department is the only named defendant in this case.
2

borrowed from the state’s law for tort actions). If an action is not initiated within three years of the
alleged injury, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.
Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, the statute of limitations had already
expired by the time Malick initiated her action. According to Malick, the events that gave rise to
her complaint occurred in October 2008. She has not alleged any additional offenses that have
occurred since that day.3 Given the three-year statute of limitations, Malick had until October 2011
to commence her action.4 Malick did not file the present complaint until January 2016, many years
after the statute of limitations had expired. Thus, even taking all factual allegations as true and
drawing all inferences in Malick’s favor, see Rivera-Gomez, 843 F.2d at 635, there is no possibility
that she could be entitled to relief.
For the foregoing reasons, the Quincy Police Department’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (dkt. no. 15) is GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED.
It is SO ORDERED.
/s/ George A. O’Toole, Jr.
United States District Judge

3

At the scheduling conference held on May 16, Malick referenced a 2006 incident as well. The
existence of a separate incident two years earlier than the one centrally described in the complaint
does not alter the analysis regarding timeliness.
4
Although she filed a complaint in Norfolk Superior Court in September 2010, the Norfolk action
is separate from the action before this Court and irrelevant to the timeliness of this action.
3