Arango et al v. TD Bank, N.A.
Filing
47
Judge George A. OToole, Jr: OPINION AND ORDER entered granting 26 Motion for Summary Judgment (Lyness, Paul)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-10078-GAO
LUZ ARANGO and HEIBER HOYOS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TD BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
March 30, 2018
O’TOOLE, D.J.
This case arises out of the failure of the defendant, TD Bank, N.A., to approve the
residential mortgage loan application of the plaintiffs, Luz Arango and Heiber Hoyos. The
plaintiffs, who identify as Hispanic, claim that their mortgage loan application was denied because
of their race, ethnicity, and national origin in violation of state law prohibiting discrimination in
the making or purchasing of mortgage loans. The defendant has moved for summary judgment,
which the plaintiffs oppose.
The purpose of summary judgment is “to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay
the parties’ proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Rojas-Ithier v. Sociedad
Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de P.R., 394 F.3d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of fact exists where the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Taylor v. Am. Chemistry
Council, 576 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotation omitted).
The court considers “the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and gives that
party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Clifford v. Barnhard, 449 F.3d 276, 280
(1st Cir. 2006).
The plaintiffs’ sole claim is a violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B. In
relevant part, the anti-discrimination law provides:
It shall be an unlawful practice . . . [f]or any person whose business includes
granting mortgage loans or engaging in residential real estate-related transactions
to discriminate against any person in the granting of any mortgage loan or in
making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a loan or
transaction, because of race[] . . . [or] national origin.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(3B).
A plaintiff can prove discrimination through either direct or indirect evidence. Direct
evidence is evidence that, “if believed, results in an inescapable, or at least highly probable,
inference that a forbidden bias was present in the workplace.” See Chief Justice for Admin. &
Mgmt. of Trial Court v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 791 N.E.2d 316, 320 n.11 (Mass.
2003) (citations omitted). Here, in response to the defendant’s motion, the plaintiffs have failed to
show a trial-worthy issue with respect to any direct evidence of discriminatory animus.
The legal framework for analyzing indirect discriminatory animus under Massachusetts
law mirrors the three-stage burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). Id. at 320; accord Wheelock Coll. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 355
N.E.2d 309, 314 (Mass. 1976). The parties appear to agree that at the first stage the plaintiffs bear
the initial burden to establish a prima facie case under the framework by showing that (1) they are
members of a protected class, (2) that they applied for and were qualified for a loan, (3) that the
loan was rejected despite their qualifications, and (4) the bank continued to approve loans for nonHispanic applicants with similar qualifications. See Boykin v. Bank of Am. Corp., 162 F. App’x
837, 838–39 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); Noland v. Commerce Mortg. Corp., 122 F.3d
2
551, 553 (8th Cir. 1997); Lustgarten v. Bank of Am. Loan Servicing, LP, Civil Action No. 1010839, 2011 WL 1233232, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2011) (citing Hickson v. Home Fed. of Atl.,
805 F. Supp. 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1992)). If the plaintiffs establish the inference, the burden shifts
to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. If the defendant
is able to offer a non-discriminatory reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the defendant’s justification is mere pretext to conceal discriminatory animus.
Even assuming that there are triable issues with respect to whether the plaintiffs were
members of a protected class, qualified for the loan, and rejected despite their qualifications, the
plaintiffs fail to show that other similarly situated non-Hispanic applicants were treated differently
or continued to have loans approved by the bank. See Boykin, 162 F. App’x at 840. The record
suggests that the plaintiffs’ loan application process was marked by misunderstanding and
miscommunication. They may feel they were not dealt with in a sufficiently respectful way by
bank personnel. What the record lacks is any information about how other loan applicants were
treated differently from the plaintiffs, particularly in a way that would support a plausible inference
of racial, ethnic, or national origin discrimination.
Consequently, the plaintiffs fail to adduce evidence sufficient to establish an element
necessary to their prima facie case, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), and no
reasonable trier of fact could assume that the defendant’s decision to deny them a loan was
motivated by discriminatory animus. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant is warranted.
The defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 26) is GRANTED. Judgment
shall enter for the defendant.
It is SO ORDERED.
/s/ George A. O’Toole, Jr.
United States District Judge
3
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?