Solomon v. Khoury et al

Filing 41

Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - The Court ALLOWS Defendants' motions to dismiss, D. 13 and D. 21, with prejudice pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6). Given this ruling, the other bases of the Defendants' motions to dismiss or strike are DENIED as moot.(Hourihan, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
__________________________________________
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DENNIS SOLOMON,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Civil Action No. 16-10176
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PHILIP KHOURY, DOUGLAS WOLF
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DAVID GESNER, VINCENT LECLERC,
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LEIGH-ELLEN LOUIE, PEPSICO., INC.,
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ESKI, INC., AND DAVID PARENT,
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Defendants.
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__________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CASPER, J.
I.

February 13, 2017

Introduction
Plaintiff Dennis Solomon (“Solomon”), proceeding pro se, has filed this lawsuit against

Defendants Philip Khoury, Douglas Wolf, David Gesner, Vincent LeClerc, Leigh-Ellen Louie,
PepsiCo, Inc., Eski, Inc., and David Parent (the “Defendants”). Solomon filed his complaint on
February 5, 2016, alleging causes of action relating to an alleged conspiracy by the Defendants to
steal, among other things, trade secrets from him. D. 1. Specifically, Solomon asserts that various
Defendants have engaged in inequitable conduct in their filing of a patent application that
purportedly infringed on Plaintiff’s patent (Counts I and II), commercially disparaged him (Count
III), violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act through false advertising (Counts IV and V),
intentionally interfered with his various business relations (Counts VI, VII, and VIII), and schemed

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to obtain his trade secrets (Count IX).1 D. 1 at 8-17. Defendants Gesner and Wolf have moved to
dismiss Counts I, II, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. D. 13. Defendants Eski, LeClerc, and Parent moved
to join Gesner and Wolf’s motion to dismiss (D. 20), which the Court allowed, D. 30, and also
moved to dismiss Counts III, IV and V. For the reasons stated below, the Court ALLOWS the
motions and DISMISSES the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 12(b)(6).
II.

Standard of Review
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that “[a] pleading

that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement must “give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Phelps
v. Local 0222, No. 09-cv-11218, 2010 WL 3342031, at *5 (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 2010) (quoting
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quotations and citations omitted)). If a
plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with the “short and plain statement” requirement, a district
court may dismiss it. Kuehl v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 905, 908 (1st Cir. 1993). “Dismissal
[for noncompliance with Rule 8] is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so
confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well
disguised.” Miranda v. United States, 105 F. App’x 280, 281 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Salahuddin
v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court will dismiss a pleading that fails to include
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

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Solomon has listed Count 8 two times in his complaint. For the sake of convenience, the
Court will refer to the second “Count 8” as Count 9.
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550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)
(alteration in original). ). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court conducts a twostep, context-specific inquiry. See García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir.
2013). First, the Court must perform a close reading of the complaint “as a whole” to distinguish
the factual allegations from the conclusory legal allegations contained therein. Id. The Court must
accept the factual allegations as true. Id. Conclusory legal assertions may be disregarded. Id.
Second, the Court must determine whether the factual allegations present a “reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged.” Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III.

Factual Background
As can best be gleaned from the factual allegations in the complaint, which the Court must

accept as true for the purposes of deciding the motions to dismiss, Solomon’s claims revolve
around a patent prosecuted by Solomon which concerned audience effects technology. D. 1 ¶ 38.
In 2000, Solomon consulted with Defendant Wolf, an attorney, regarding the audience effects
technology at issue. See id. ¶¶ 37-39. Solomon’s complaint does not mention any significant
event occurring between this consultation in 2000 and 2006, the year that Solomon eventually filed
his patent application with the U.S. Patent Office. Id. ¶ 40. Specifically, there is no allegation that
Solomon and Wolf maintained an attorney-client relationship at any point after the initial
consultation in 2000 and there is no indication Wolf assisted Solomon in the eventual filing of the

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application in 2006. In 2012, the U.S. Patent Office approved Solomon’s patent application, and
the patent issued as U.S. Patent 8,194,188 (the “‘188 patent”). Id.
As alleged, at some point between 2000 and 2013, Wolf was retained by LeClerc, the Chief
Technology Officer of Eski, Inc., to assist in the filing of a separate and distinct patent application
from the one filed by Solomon. See id. ¶ 41. In 2013, on behalf of his client, Wolf filed LeClerc’s
patent application with the U.S. Patent Office. Id. This patent application covered a data and
image projector. Id. ¶ 42. According to Solomon’s allegations, the patent application filed on
behalf of LeClerc disclosed an invention identical to the invention covered by his patent, the ‘188
Patent. Id. In March 2014, Solomon sent Parent, the President of Eski, Inc., a letter informing
him that LeClerc’s patent application covered similar technology to the ‘118 patent. Id. ¶ 45. In
response, Gesner—a different attorney at Wolf’s firm—filed a Request for Continued Examination
(“RCE”) and an Information Disclosure Statement (“IDS”) with the U.S. Patent Office, which
listed many of Solomon’s U.S. patents. Id. ¶¶ 45-46. This gave notice to the patent examiner that
the ‘118 patent would need to be considered before the issuance of LeClerc’s patent. On April 29,
2014, the patent examiner indicated that he had considered the ‘118 patent in his evaluation of
LeClerc’s patent application, but that the ‘118 Patent failed to set forth what was claimed by the
LeClerc patent application. D. 15-4 at 2. As such, in May 2014, the U.S. Patent Office allowed
the claims present in LeClerc’s patent application. D. 1-6. On June 3, 2014, LeClerc’s patent
issued as U.S. Patent 8,740,391. D. 1 ¶ 47.
IV.

Procedural History
Solomon first filed suit against Defendants in September 2015, but the case was dismissed

without prejudice after Solomon failed to pay the required administrative filing fees or,
alternatively, file a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Solomon v. Wolf, 15-CV-

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13393-DJC, D. 8. On February 5, 2016, Solomon instituted this action. D. 1. Defendants Gesner
and Wolf have now moved to dismiss Counts I, II, VI, VII, VIII, and IX. D. 13. Defendants Eski,
Inc., LeClerc, and Parent moved to join co-defendants motion to dismiss (D. 20) and filed their
own motion to dismiss Counts III, IV, and V. D. 21. The Court heard the parties on the pending
motions and took these matters under advisement. D. 30.
V.

Discussion
A.

The Complaint Fails to Satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

As the Defendants point out in their motions to dismiss, many of the allegations in the
complaint appear to have nothing to do with Solomon’s causes of action. See, e.g., D. 1 ¶ 89
(alleging that the former Chief Justice of the United States, William Rehnquist, participated in
“anti-Semitic Lutheran liturgy”); D. 1 ¶ 91 (alleging an organization called the “Atlantis Cartel”
used an Israeli man named Al Schwimmer as a scapegoat in the Iran/Contra Scandal); D. 1 ¶ 34
(alleging the mother of a guitarist from the band PHISH, Marge Minkin, was consulted by some
of the defendants in furtherance of an unidentified “scheme” against Solomon); and D. 1 ¶ 87
(alleging that assistants to President Ronald Regan provided high quality cocaine to patrons of
Studio 54, businessmen on Wall Street, visitors to the Hamptons, and members at various New
England yacht clubs). Indeed, the allegations presented by Solomon are so disjointed and
disorganized that the complaint, “falls into the category of ‘[c]omplaints which ramble, which
needlessly speculate, accuse and condemn, and which contain circuitous diatribes far removed
from the heart of the claim.’” Phelps v. Local 0222, No. 09-cv-11218-JLT, 2010 WL 3342031, at
*5 (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 2010) (Report and Recommendation) (quoting Prezzi v. Berzak, 57 F.R.D.
149, 151-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)), adopted by, 2010 WL 3342023 (D. Mass. Aug. 25, 2010).

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As a result, the complaint does not give notice to each of the defendants of the cause of
action(s) asserted against them separately. See Brown v. Forensic Health Servs, Inc., 13-CV13078-RGS, 2013 WL 6814852, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2013). For many of the counts asserted
by Solomon, it is unclear to the Court which causes of actions apply to which Defendants. The
Court, for one example, is unable to glean facts that link Defendant Gesner to any cause of action,
or to decipher which facts link the remaining Defendants to the various allegations. Solomon
argues that under Rule 8 “a party may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless
of consistency,” D. 18 at 4, but that does not excuse Solomon from “afford[ing] the defendants a
‘meaningful opportunity to mount a defense.’” Benyamin v. Commonwealth Med. UMass Med.
Ctr., Inc., No. 11-CV-40126-FDS, 2011 WL 2681195, at *2, (D. Mass. July 6, 2011) (quoting
Díaz-Rivera v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 377 F.3d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal punctuation and
additional citations omitted)). It would be unfair to require each of the Defendants to peruse the
complaint as pled and cull out Solomon's claims for which liability would attach. See United
States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1992). Additionally, Solomon attempts to introduce new
causes of action is his opposition to motion to dismiss, while eliminating causes of action plead in
his original complaint. D. 18 at 6-7. For example, Solomon for the first time in his opposition
appears to allege unlawful civil conspiracy and unlawful attempt to monopolize, but eliminates his
previous claims for inequitable conduct. D. 18 at 6-8. Notwithstanding that modifying causes of
action in an opposition to motion to dismiss is improper, see Portfolioscope, Inc. v. I-Flex
Solutions Ltd., 473 F. Supp. 2d 252, 256 (D. Mass. 2007), such proposed changes do little to
unentangle the confusion regarding which present claims are asserted against which defendants.
While the “First Circuit holds a pro se litigant to a standard of pleading less stringent than
that for lawyers . . . this cannot be taken to mean that pro se complaints are held to no standard at

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all.” Green v. Massachusetts, 108 F.R.D. 217, 218 (D. Mass. 1985). Indeed, “the requirements of
Rule 8(a)(2) are minimal–but ‘minimal requirements are not tantamount to nonexistent
requirements.’” Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir.
2004) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Accordingly, the Court cannot say that Solomon’s 117-paragraph complaint is a “short and
plain statement” that shows that Solomon is entitled to relief or which puts each defendant on
notice of the claims against him as required by Rule 8.
B.

Dismissal is Also Warranted Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Although the failure to satisfy Rule 8 is reason alone to dismiss the complaint, the Court
now turns to the Defendants’ arguments that Solomon’s claims must each be dismissed for failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court addresses each count in turn.
Counts I and II of the complaint allege inequitable conduct on the part of Defendants Wolf
and LeClerc in their filing of a patent application with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (“USPTO”). D. 1 at 8. Specifically, Solomon claims that Wolf and LeClerc had an
affirmative duty to disclose and bring to the Examiner’s attention relevant information including
prior art and patents, including a patent owned by Solomon (the ‘118 patent). Id. at 9. In light of
the fact that this patent was incorporated by reference in the complaint and that the Court may
otherwise take judicial notice of a patent filing, the Court’s examination of the patent reveals that
these defendants disclosed Solomon’s ‘118 patent in its application. D. 15-5 at 3. Beyond the fact
that the record demonstrates Defendants disclosed the ‘118 patent, see D. 1-8 at 5; D. 15-5 at 3,
inequitable conduct is not an affirmative allegation that can be brought forth in a complaint.
Rather, t “[i]nequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if proved, bars
enforcement of a patent.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285

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(Fed. Cir. 2011). As such, Solomon’s assertion that Defendants engaged in inequitable conduct is
an improper cause of action. Even if it were a proper cause of action, since a claim of inequitable
conduct is similar to a claim of fraud, such claims must be pled with particularity under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b). Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Since
Solomon fails to meet such heightened pleading standard here as to this claim, even if inequitable
conduct were a proper cause of action, it would fail for this independent reason.
As to Count III, Solomon has not pled the requisite elements for commercial
disparagement. Under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff claiming commercial disparagement must
allege that the “defendant (1) published a false statement to a person other than the plaintiff; (2)
‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff's products or services; (3) with knowledge of the statement's
falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (4) where pecuniary harm to the plaintiff's
interests was intended or foreseeable; and (5) such publication resulted in special damages in the
form of pecuniary loss.” HipSaver, Inc. v. Kiel, 464 Mass. 517, 523 (2013). First, Solomon has
not adequately pled that the statement at issue is false. Solomon takes issue with the fact that
LeClerc made statements to the “Live Design Master Class in 2014” that he was “‘the inventor’ of
the performance audience display system.” D. 1 ¶ 59. But LeClerc is listed as the inventor of the
‘391 Patent, again, a document of which the Court can take judicial notice, and the ‘391 Patent
covers “a projection system, a projector, and a projection method for providing a distributed
manifestation in an environment.” D. 15-5 at 1, 13. Given that LeClerc is, indeed, the inventor of
a performance audience display system, as evidenced by the ‘391 Patent, and given that Solomon
has not pointed the Court to any other allegedly false statement, Solomon has not plausibly pled
the first element of this cause of action.

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Additionally, special damages are an “essential element of a cause of action for commercial
disparagement,” and Solomon has alleged no damages at all. HipSaver, 464 Mass. at 536. “To
establish special damages, a plaintiff ordinarily must demonstrate that publication of the false
statement resulted in ‘a specific loss of sales to identified customers.’” BBJ, Inc. v. MillerCoors,
LLC, No. 12-cv-11305-IT, 2015 WL 4465410, at *4 (D. Mass. July 21, 2015) (internal citation
omitted). Solomon has pled no such facts. While there is an exception to this general rule where
the false statement has been “widely disseminated” such that “it would be impossible to identify
particular customers who chose not to purchase a plaintiff's goods or services,” HipSaver, 464
Mass. at 537, Solomon has not alleged such dissemination. Accordingly, for failing to assert the
essential elements of this claim, Count III is also dismissed.
Counts IV and V, false advertising claims under the Lanham Act against Eski, Inc.,
LeClerc, and Parent must be dismissed. To assert a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act,
“a plaintiff must plead (and ultimately prove) an injury to a commercial interest in sales or business
reputation proximately caused by the defendant's misrepresentations.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1395 (2014). As with Count III, Solomon has not
sufficiently alleged any misrepresentations in Count IV where such claim also relies upon
LeClerc’s representations as the inventor of the performance audience display system. To
establish proximate causation, Solomon is not required to show that he was in direct commercial
competition with the Defendant(s), but he nevertheless must allege that he suffered “economic or
reputational injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant's advertising;
and that that occurs when deception of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the
plaintiff.” Id. at 1391. Here, Solomon’s complaint, as to both Counts IV and V, fails to allege
what commercial interest is being harmed by the allegedly false statements uttered by the

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Defendants. Significantly, the product at issue here is not clearly specified, nor does Solomon
allege that the sales of this unspecified product have been harmed. Cf. Bern Unlimited, Inc. v.
Burton Corp., 25 F. Supp. 3d 170, 184 (D. Mass. 2014) (recognizing that the claim was “thin, at
best,” the Court still found that the Lanham “counterclaims allege that plaintiff's false advertising
deceived customers, which resulted in increased sales for plaintiff and decreased sales for
defendants. Assuming those allegations are true, defendants suffered harm directly caused by
plaintiff's false advertising”). Here, Solomon has not alleged decreased sales of anything. As
such, Solomon fails to plead these claims sufficiently since his claims are “too remote” from the
defendants’ alleged unlawful conduct. See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1390-91.
Counts VI, VII, and VIII also fail. In each count, Solomon asserts a claim for intentional
interference with business relations. Under Massachusetts law, to assert this claim, a plaintiff must
allege “(1) the plaintiff has a business relationship for economic benefit with a third party, (2) the
defendants knew of that relationship, (3) the defendants interfered with that relationship through
improper motive or means, and (4) the plaintiff's loss of business advantage resulted directly from
the defendants' conduct.” Tomaselli v. Beaulieu, 967 F. Supp. 2d 423, 455-56 (D. Mass. 2013)
(quoting Brewster Wallcovering Co. v. Blue Mountain Wallcoverings, Inc., 68 Mass. App. Ct.
582, 608 (2013)). Solomon, however, has not alleged the requisite elements as to this cause of
action. For example, Count VI alleges that all defendants intentionally interfered with business
relations Solomon maintained with Pepsi Co.. D. 1 at 11. The complaint, however, provides no
facts purporting to show a relationship between Solomon and Pepsi Co. other than the fact that
Solomon “sent the president of Pepsico a proposal for a performance audience display system,”
and that “they were considering the idea.” Id. This level of conjecture cannot meet the threshold
for the first element of this cause of action. Indeed, this district court has noted that, “[t]he mere

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possibility that [a plaintiff’s] proposal would be accepted by the permitting authority is not
sufficient” to satisfy this critical element. Sherman v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 889 F. Supp.
2d 168, 177 (D. Mass. 2012). Without a valid business relationship, there can be no intentional
interference with a business relationship. The same deficiencies in Count VI are similarly absent
as to Counts VII and VIII and, therefore, they are also dismissed.
Count IX alleges Defendants engaged in schemes to steal his trade secrets. “To establish
trade secret misappropriation under Massachusetts law, [Solomon] must show (1) that the
information in question is a trade secret, (2) that [Solomon] took reasonable steps to preserve the
secrecy of that information, and (3) that defendants used improper means, in breach of a
confidential relationship, to acquire and use the trade secret.” Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom
Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., No. 02-CV-12102-RWZ, 2006 WL 1766434, at *8 (D. Mass.
June 28, 2006) (quoting DB Riley, Inc. v. AB Eng'g Corp., 977 F. Supp. 84, 89 (D. Mass. 1997)).
Solomon has not sufficiently alleged what his trade secret is or how it has been misappropriated.
Defendants cannot be required to guess the trade secret Solomon is referencing. Furthermore, to
the extent Solomon’s trade secret claim rests upon the information claimed in the ‘118 Patent, that
information cannot be properly protected as a trade secret. The Supreme Court has made clear
that “[i]nformation that is public knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a
trade secret.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984). Solomon’s complaint,
however, concedes that “from 2006 and thereafter, Plaintiff Solomon’s Performance Audience
Display system was well known at the MIT Media Lab.” D. 1 ¶ 112. Additionally, by definition
a patent or published patent cannot be a trade secret. Indeed, when an individual “publicly
discloses the secret, his property right is extinguished.” Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002. A patentee

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necessarily discloses his secret to the public at large. Thus, trade secret law is inapplicable to the
situation Solomon presents.
Under some circumstances, a Court might grant a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint
without prejudice, and provide the pro se complainant leave to amend to cure identified
deficiencies. Granting Solomon leave to amend would, however, prove to be futile. Review of
the allegations in Solomon’s complaint and the various exhibits attached to that complaint
establishes that there are no factual bases upon which he might “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In his
opposition and at oral argument, Solomon referred to some additional claims he would bring
against Defendants, including but not limited to seeking a declaratory judgment, D. 31 at 27-28, a
civil conspiracy claim and an unfair competition claim against all Defendants. D. 18 at 6-8 if given
the chance to amend his complaint. The Court has considered Solomon’s proposed amendments
and nonetheless determines that any such amendment would still fail to bring plausible claims
against the Defendants. See id. at 33; Chaing v. Skeirik, 582 F.3d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 2009) (district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to file amended complaint, when amendment
would have been futile). In granting the motions to dismiss, the Court further recognizes that
another judge within this district has been compelled to enjoin Solomon from filing additional
complaints without leave of court. See Solomon v. Texas Instruments, Inc., No. 06-CV-11307RGS, 2007 WL 107744, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 2007) (noting that “because this is the third time
that Texas Instruments has been forced to defend itself in this court against the same meritless
claims, Dennis Solomon is hereby ENJOINED from filing any further Complaints regarding the
same or related subject matter without prior leave of court”). The same warnings have been issued
by at least one Massachusetts state court. See Solomon v. Malloy, 94-CV-3617 (Middlesex Sup.

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Ct. 1994), aff’d No. 03-P-1553 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 19, 2005) (dismissing case in favor of
defendants and enjoining Solomon “from filing future pro se complaints against the named
defendants, arising out of the same set of facts unless [Solomon] first obtains leave of court to
proceed pro se”). Thus, while the filings of pro se litigants should be liberally construed, see
Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997), the leniency afforded to a pro se party is
diminished when he has significant experienced litigating like Solomon.2 See Faust v. Cabral, No.
12-CV-11020-DJC, 2015 WL 3953185, at *3 n.4 (D. Mass. May 15, 2015).
VI.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS Defendants’ motions to dismiss, D. 13 and

D. 21, with prejudice pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6). Given this ruling, the other bases of the
Defendants’ motions to dismiss or strike are DENIED as moot.

So Ordered.
/s/ Denise J. Casper
United States District Judge

2

See Solomon v. Univ. of S. California, 360 F. App’x 165, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Solomon
v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 06-cv-11307, 2007 WL 107744, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 2007);
Solomon v. Vest, 04-cv-12499 (D. Mass. 2004); Solomon v. Puritan Clothing, Inc., 00-CV-12560
(D. Mass. 2000); Solomon v. Lawless, 00-cv-12268 (D. Mass. 2000); Solomon v. Altman Stage
Lighting Co., Inc., 00-CV-01732 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Solomon v. Microvision, 98-CV-00258 (D.
Mass. 1998); Solomon v. Cheney, 96-cv-11377-PBS (D. Mass. 1996); Solomon v. Altman Stage
Lighting Co., 90-cv-11251 (D. Mass. 1990); Solomon v. Atlantis Dev., Inc., 516 A.2d 132 (Vt.
1986); Solomon v. Lawless, 01-cv-00721 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003); Solomon v. Raytheon,
Inc., 9772-CV-00452 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1997); Solomon v. Malloy, 94-CV-3617 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 5, 1994); Solomon v. Atlantis Dev., Inc. 88-CV-00224 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 7, 1989).
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