Littlefield et al v. United States Department of the Interior

Filing 113

Judge William G. Young: ORDER entered granting 89 Motion to Intervene "Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Mashpees motion to intervene as a Defendant, ECF No. 89, with the proviso that their role shall be limited to participating in any challenges to the judgment as to the Plaintiffs first cause of action and appealing that judgment. SO ORDERED." (Sonnenberg, Elizabeth)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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DAVID LITTLEFIELD, MICHELLE
LITTLEFIELD, TRACY ACORD, DEBORAH
CANARY, FRANCIS CANARY, JR.,
VERONICA CASEY, PATRICIA COLBERT,
VIVIAN COURCY, WILL COURCY, DONNA
DEFARIA, ANTONIO DEFARIA, KIM
DORSEY, KELLY DORSEY, FRANCIS
LAGACE, JILL LAGACE, DAVID LEWRY,
KATHLEEN LEWRY, MICHELE LEWRY,
RICHARD LEWRY, ROBERT LINCOLN,
CHRISTINA McMAHON, CAROL MURPHY,
DOROTHY PEIRCE, DAVID PURDY, and
LOUISE SILVIA,

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v.
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
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THE INTERIOR; SALLY JEWELL,
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in her official capacity; BUREAU
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OF INDIAN AFFAIRS; LAWRENCE
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ROBERTS, in his official capacity, )
and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Defendants.
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Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 16-10184-WGY

ORDER
YOUNG, D.J.

September 23, 2016

This action concerns the taking of certain land into trust
by the United States Department of the Interior (the
“Department”) for the benefit of the Mashpee Wampanoag Indian
Tribe (the “Mashpees”) pursuant to the Indian Reorganization
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 479.

On July 28, 2016, the Court ruled that

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the government’s acquisition of the land at issue was improper,
at least on the ground proffered by the Secretary of the
Department in his Record of Decision and by the government in
its briefing of this issue.

Mem. and Order, ECF No. 87.

In

conjunction with its memorandum and order, the Court entered a
declaratory judgment for the Plaintiffs on the first cause of
action in their complaint.

Judgment, ECF No. 88.

The case was

then administratively closed.1
On August 15, 2016, the Mashpees filed a motion to
intervene as a Defendant in this action for the purpose of “1)
participat[ing] in any motion practice remaining in the District
Court; and 2) appeal[ing] the Court’s July 28, 2016 Memorandum
and Order[.]”

The Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe’s Mot.

Intervene, ECF No. 89; Mem. Law Supp. Mashpee Wampanoag Indian
Tribe’s Mot. Intervene (“Mashpees’ Mem.”), ECF No. 90.
Plaintiffs oppose this motion.

The

Pls.’ Opp’n Mashpee Wampanoag

Indian Tribe’s Mot. Intervene (“Pls.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 101.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), the Court must
grant a timely motion to intervene, as matter of right, where
the intervenor “claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so

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The parties had earlier stipulated that all other counts
included in the Plaintiffs’ complaint be administratively closed
pending the resolution of the first count. Elec. Clerk’s Notes,
ECF No. 49.
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situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest,
unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”
Factors relevant to this determination include
(1) the length of time the applicants knew, or
reasonably should have known, of their interest before
they petitioned to intervene; (2) the prejudice to
existing parties due to applicants’ failure to
petition for intervention promptly; (3) the prejudice
that applicants would suffer if they were not allowed
to intervene; and (4) any unusual circumstances
militating either for or against intervention.
Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825, 834 (1st Cir. 1987)
(internal citations omitted).
The Plaintiffs are correct that the Mashpees knew of their
interest in this lawsuit well before they moved to intervene.
See Pls.’ Opp’n 6; Mashpees’ Mem. 18 (effectively acknowledging
that they “could have but did not bring [the motion to
intervene] sooner”).

Ultimately, however, the balance of

prejudices here favors the Mashpees.

The prejudice to the

Plaintiffs should the Mashpees be permitted to intervene is not
especially concerning.2

On the other hand, given the Mashpees’

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The Court is not convinced by the Plaintiffs’ argument
that they would be meaningfully prejudiced by the so-called
“pil[ing] on” of an additional Defendant, Pls.’ Opp’n 3, and
“re-plow[ing]” previously litigated issues, id. at 7. See
Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 193 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (concluding that existing parties were not prejudiced
where intervenor sought “to intervene only to participate at the
appellate stage and in any further trial proceedings”). Indeed,
there is no concern here that allowing the Mashpees’ motion
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undeniable and compelling interest in the outcome of this
litigation, their risk of prejudice is substantial.

Moreover,

to the extent the Plaintiffs argue that timing of the Mashpees’
motion reflects some sort of ploy designed to impede the
Plaintiffs’ recovery, see Pl.’s Opp’n 1, 6, the Court rejects
the notion that the Mashpees’ decision not to waive their
sovereign immunity earlier in this lawsuit necessarily
disqualifies them from intervention.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Mashpees’ motion to
intervene as a Defendant, ECF No. 89, with the proviso that
their role shall be limited to participating in any challenges
to the judgment as to the Plaintiffs’ first cause of action and
appealing that judgment.3

SO ORDERED.

would, for example, delay trial. See Caterino v. Barry, 922
F.2d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming district court’s
conclusion that existing parties would be prejudiced by allowing
motion to intervene where intervention would delay trial). Nor
would it disturb thoughtfully negotiated and relied upon
settlement terms. See Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v.
Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1232 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding postjudgment intervention prejudicial to existing parties where the
judgment was a carefully negotiated settlement).
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In other words, the Mashpees’ inclusion as a Defendant
does not entitle them to reopen those counts that were
administratively closed pursuant to the existing parties’
stipulation, see Elec. Clerk’s Notes, ECF No. 49.
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_________________
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE

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