Dyette v. Shugrue et al
Filing
72
Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ENDORSED ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDERFor the foregoing reasons, defendants motion for summary judgment (Docket No.56) is, with respect to Count III, ALLOWED, but is otherwise DENIED.So ordered.(Caruso, Stephanie)
United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
Shaka U. Dyette,
Plaintiff,
v.
Scott Black, Kurt S. DeMoura,
William Shugrue
Defendants.
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Civil Action No.
16-10202-NMG
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This case involves the alleged mistreatment of Shaka Dyette
(“plaintiff” or “Dyette”) by three employees (collectively
“defendants”) of the Massachusetts Department of Correction
while Dyette was incarcerated at MCI-Cedar Junction.
Dyette brings his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that 1) Lieutenant William J. Shugrue (“Shugrue”)
violated his Eighth Amendment rights when Shugrue accosted him,
2) Scott W. Black (“Black”) violated his incorporated First
Amendment rights when Black retaliated against Dyette for filing
a grievance against Shugrue and 3) Kurt Demoura (“Demoura”)
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by
obstructing Dyette’s attempt to obtain evidence of the alleged
battery.
In addition, Dyette alleges that Shugrue, Black and
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Demoura engaged in a civil conspiracy to commit the underlying
acts.
Pending before this Court is defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. For the following reasons, that motion will be allowed
with respect to plaintiff’s procedural due process claim but
will otherwise be denied.
I.
Background
At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was housed
by the Massachusetts Department of Correction at MCI-Cedar
Junction in Walpole, Massachusetts.
On June 1, 2014, plaintiff
was order by Corrections Office Hope Hill to comply with a “pat
search” while he was leaving the dining area.
During that
process, Shugrue approached the plaintiff and the two exchanged
words.
Shugrue ordered plaintiff to enter a nearby room to be
strip searched.
Plaintiff contends that, as he was complying
with that order, he was grabbed by Shugrue and other Corrections
Officers and then punched by Shugrue in the face (“the
incident”).
As a result of that incident, plaintiff was placed in
solitary confinement for 30 days and classified for placement in
a maximum security prison.
Plaintiff filed a grievance
concerning the incident and the subsequent placement and
classification.
That grievance was assigned to Black, a
Department of Correction investigator.
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Plaintiff claims that Black attempted to coerce plaintiff
to drop the grievance in return for a guarantee that he would
not be classified for a maximum security prison.
declined that offer.
Dyette
Black filed a disciplinary report against
plaintiff that alleged that the initial grievance constituted
providing false information against a staff member.
As a part of his investigation for the grievance, plaintiff
requested a copy of the video tape of the incident.
Plaintiff
asserts that DeMoura refused to provide that video in bad faith
and took actions to prevent plaintiff from obtaining the video.
II. Analysis
The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings
and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a
genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d
816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991).
The burden is on the moving party to
show, through the pleadings, discovery and affidavits, “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).
A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A genuine issue of material
fact exists where the evidence with respect to the material fact
in dispute “is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
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If the moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine, triable issue. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
The Court must view the
entire record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and indulge all reasonable inferences in that party's
favor. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993).
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the record in
the non-moving party's favor, the Court determines that no
genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A. Count I - Excessive Force Claim
Plaintiff contends that Shugrue violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Defendants respond that Shugrue’s use of force was reasonable,
and thus not in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in part
that “nor [shall] cruel and unusual punishments [be] inflicted.”
U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
This prohibition includes the use of
excessive and unjustified physical force by prison officials
against inmates. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327
(1986).
In that context, the “unnecessary and wanton infliction
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of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by
the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 319 (internal quotations omitted).
An excessive force claim will lie where the force was
applied “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm.” See Skinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483, 488 (1st
Cir. 2005) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21).
In contrast,
force applied “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline” does not constitute a violation. See id. (quoting
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
Defendants assert that
no reasonable inference could be drawn, based upon a review
of [the] videotape, that defendants’ use of force was
unlawful.
The Court disagrees.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, this Court believes that a reasonable jury could find
that Shugrue did not act in a good-faith effort to maintain
discipline but rather maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
Conversely, a reasonable
jury could also find that Shugrue acted to restore and maintain
good order and discipline.
Accordingly, a genuine issue of
material fact exists and summary judgment is inappropriate for
this claim.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will, with respect
to Count I, be denied.
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B. Count II - Retaliation Claim
Dyette submits that Black retaliated against Dyette’s
exercise of his First Amendment rights by 1) suggesting that he
could avoid a maximum security classification by withdrawing his
grievance and 2) issuing a disciplinary ticket to Dyette for
“lying” about the Lt. Shugrue incident.
Defendants rejoin that
Sgt. Black acted in good faith while reviewing the disciplinary
record and that Dyette would have been classified to a maximumsecurity facility regardless of Sgt. Black’s actions.
Prisoners have a First Amendment right to petition the
prison for the redress of grievances and prison officials may
not retaliate against prisoners for exercising that right. Brown
v. Corsini, 657 F.Supp.2d 296, 305 (D. Mass. 2009).
To
establish a retaliation claim, the prisoner must demonstrate
that: 1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, 2)
prison officials took adverse action against him, 3) with the
intent to retaliate against him for engaging in the
constitutionally protected conduct and 4) he would not have
suffered the adverse action “but for” the prison officials'
retaliatory motive. Partelow v. Massachusetts, 442 F.Supp.2d 41,
51 (D. Mass. 2006).
Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot establish the “but
for” prong because plaintiff was classified for maximum security
before meeting with Black.
Although defendants’ are correct
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with respect to the attempted “deal” Black offered, they are
incorrect with respect to the disciplinary ticket that Black
issued.
Plaintiff alleges Black promised him a medium security
classification if he would withdraw the grievance, that
plaintiff declined that “offer” and that, frustrated with that
result, Black issued a trumped-up disciplinary ticket.
Because
a reasonable jury could find that the ticket would not have been
issued “but for” Black’s retaliatory motive, defendants’ motion
for summary judgment will, with respect to Count II, be denied.
C. Count III - Due Process Claim
Dyette asserts that DeMoura violated his right to due
process by intentionally obstructing him from obtaining video of
the incident.
Defendants contend that plaintiff’s claim fails
as a matter of law because he was not deprived of a protected
liberty interest.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
To determine whether due process has been violated, the
Court considers whether: 1) the plaintiff has been deprived of a
protected interest and 2) if so, whether that deprivation was
accomplished without due process of law. Perez–Acevedo v.
Rivero–Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2008).
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A protected
liberty interest may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or
from state law. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
460 (1989).
A liberty interest is defined as a change that
creates an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Plaintiff proffers two purported liberty interests: his
right to be free from incarceration in solitary confinement and
his right to be free from incarceration in a maximum security
prison.
Those interests do not, however, constitute liberty
interests as a matter of law. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (30
days in solitary confinement does not constitute a liberty
interest); Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1160–61 (1st Cir.
1996) (transfer to more secure prison does not constitute
liberty interest).
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment will,
with respect to Count III, be allowed.
D. Count IV - Civil Conspiracy
Plaintiff contends that defendants agreed to, and then did,
act in unison to commit the acts underlying counts I, II and
III.
To succeed on a claim of conspiracy under Section 1983, a
plaintiff must prove both a conspiratorial agreement and an
actual deprivation of rights. Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46,
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53 (1st Cir.2001).
Accordingly, no conspiracy claim arising out
of Count III will lie.
As to Counts I and II, however, offers evidence, albeit
disputed, that DeMoura delivered the disciplinary ticket to
plaintiff while he was in solitary confinement and Black
attempted to coerce Dyette into withdrawing the grievance
against Shugrue from which a reasonable jury could infer that an
agreement existed between the defendants.
Accordingly, a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether defendants
DeMoura, Black and Shugrue entered a conspiratorial agreement to
deprive plaintiff of his Eighth and First Amendment rights.
While plaintiff’s chances of proof of such a conspiracy may
be tenuous, he has done enough to avoid summary judgment against
him.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will, with respect
to Count IV, be denied.
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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Docket No. 56) is, with respect to Count III, ALLOWED,
but is otherwise DENIED.
So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton___
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated January 23, 2018
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