Peixoto v. Russo et al

Filing 24

Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - The Court ALLOWS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion to dismiss, D. 14, as follows: a. ALLOWS the motion as to the § 1983 claim against Silva and dismisses this claim without prejudice; b. DENIES the motion as to the § 1983 claim against Russo and Smith in their individual and official capacities; c. DENIES the motion as to the MCRA claim against Russo and Smith in their individual and official capacities; and d. ALLOWS the motion as to any Mass. Gen. L. c. 265, §37 claim.(Hourihan, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_________________________________________
)
)
BRIAN PEIXOTO,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
) Civil Action No. 16-cv-10428-DJC
v.
)
)
LOIS A. RUSSO, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
_________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CASPER, J.
I.

December 22, 2016

Introduction
Plaintiff Brian Peixoto (“Peixoto”) brings this lawsuit against Lois A. Russo (“Russo”), the

superintendent of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Concord, Massachusetts (“MCIConcord”);1 Mark Smith (“Smith”), the inner parameter security sergeant at MCI-Concord; and
Marcelo Silva (“Silva”), the institutional grievance coordinator at MCI-Concord (collectively, the
“Defendants”). D. 1 ¶¶ 2-5. Peixoto brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), the
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. L. c. 12, § 11I (“MCRA”) and Mass. Gen. L. c. 265,
§ 37 by the Defendants in their individual and official capacities. D. 1 ¶¶ 1, 72-80.2 Pursuant to

1

Russo has since retired but at all times relevant to this action was the superintendent of MCIConcord. D. 1 ¶ 3; D. 15 at 1 n.1.
2

To the extent that Peixoto’s complaint raises an MCRA claim against Silva, D. 1 ¶ 80, his
subsequent filings, D. 19 at 1; D. 20 at 12, 15 n.4, as well as his counsel’s statements at the motion
hearing, D. 23, clarify that he is not pursuing such a claim against Silva.
1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims. D. 14. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court ALLOWS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Defendants’ motion.
II.

Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts to “state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In
determining whether a plaintiff has met this burden, the Court must first “isolate and ignore
statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash causeof-action elements.” Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.
2012).

Then the Court must “take the complaint’s well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-

speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor, and see if they
plausibly narrate a claim for relief.” Id. at 55 (emphasis omitted). Ultimately, in determining
whether the complaint “crosses the plausibility threshold,” the Court must draw on its “judicial
experience and common sense.” García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir.
2013) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted). Because this is a context-specific inquiry,
the allegations within the complaint need not have “a high degree of factual specificity.” Id.
(quoting Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 2012)).
Furthermore, in deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider documents that are
“attached to or fairly incorporated into the complaint,” Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), as well as “documents central to [the] plaintiff[‘s] claim[s],” “the
authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties,” Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc.,
575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted).

2

III.

Factual Background
The following is based upon the allegations set forth in Peixoto’s complaint, D. 1, which

the Court must accept as true for the purpose of considering Defendants’ motion to dismiss, D. 14.
Peixoto is a prisoner under the care and custody of the Massachusetts Department of
Correction (“DOC”) and is currently incarcerated at MCI-Concord. D. 1 ¶ 2. On May 8, 2014,
after undergoing an extensive screening process, id. ¶¶ 9-12, Peixoto was accepted into the
National Education for Assistance Dogs Services Prison PUP Program (“NEADS Program”), id.
¶¶ 6, 13, a rehabilitative program in which fifteen DOC inmates are entrusted with raising, caring
for and training service dogs to be placed with disabled individuals, id. ¶¶ 6 n.2, 7. Inmates who
participate in the program are given certain privileges not available through other DOC programs:
(1) housing in a “smaller, quieter, less restrictive program unit”; (2) residence in “the only single
cells in the facility”; (3) the ability to remain outside of their prison cells for up to five additional
hours a day; (4) ten days a month of “good-time” (for inmates with eligible sentences); and (5) ten
dollars a week in compensation. Id. ¶ 8. Through the NEADS Program, Peixoto successful trained
three dogs who were placed with disabled individuals and, due to his performance in the program,
was promoted to the position of “Primary Dog Handler.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 43, 48-49.
On August 25, 2015, Peixoto was contacted by Gus Garcia-Roberts (“Garcia-Roberts”), a
reporter who was interested in writing a feature story for Boston Magazine about Peixoto’s alleged
wrongful criminal conviction. Id. ¶ 15. Peixoto agreed to be interviewed by Garcia-Roberts for
the feature story. Id. On November 3, 2015, the DOC Central Office granted Garcia-Roberts’s
request for permission to enter MCI-Concord on November 16, 2015 to interview Peixoto. Id. ¶
20. On November 6, 2015, in anticipation of the upcoming interview, Garcia-Roberts began
conducting preliminary phone interviews with Peixoto. Id. ¶ 21. These conversations were
recorded by the MCI-Concord phone system. Id.
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On November 10, 2015, after normal business hours, Smith called Peixoto into the inner
parameter security office and then led him to an isolated room where he proceeded to question
Peixoto regarding his upcoming media interview. Id. ¶¶ 22-24. Uncomfortable with Smith’s line
of questioning, Peixoto informed Smith that he was determined to participate in the interview and
that any further questions regarding the interview should be addressed to his attorney. Id. ¶ 25.
Angered by Peixoto’s response, Smith warned him that participating in the interview would put
his position in the NEADS Program “at risk.” Id. ¶ 26.
On November 12, 2015, Russo revoked Garcia-Roberts’s permission to conduct the
interview with Peixoto on November 16, 2015. Id. ¶ 30. In response, Garcia-Roberts immediately
contacted the DOC Central Office to report Russo’s cancellation of the interview and, the next
day, the DOC Central Office overruled the cancellation. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. The same day as the MDOC
Central Office’s ruling, Russo revoked Peixoto’s permission—which he had been given long
before—to keep and play his guitar in his cell to practice for religious service performances. Id.
¶¶ 33-34. Pursuant to Russo’s orders, the property sergeant confiscated Peixoto’s guitar. Id. ¶ 35.
On November 16, 2015, Garcia-Roberts, accompanied by a photographer for Boston
Magazine, interviewed and photographed Peixoto. Id. ¶¶ 38-40. On February 8, 2016, Boston
Magazine published a feature article about Peixoto’s alleged wrongful criminal conviction, his
romantic relationship with a former DOC employee—who was caught bringing a cellphone into
prison—and the alleged abuses he suffered while under the care and custody of the DOC. Id. ¶
41; D. 15-1.
On February 10, 2016, Peixoto completed training the dog he had been raising for the past
fifteen months and the dog was placed with a disabled child. D. 1 ¶ 42. As such, on February 22,
2016, the NEADS Program liaison informed Peixoto that in two days he would be entrusted with

4

a new puppy to train over the next eighteen to twenty-four months. Id. ¶ 45. A day later, however,
the NEADS Program liaison informed Peixoto that, pursuant to orders from the DOC’s
administration, Peixoto had been removed from the NEADS Program, effective immediately. Id.
¶ 46. Peixoto was thus removed from his single cell in the NEADS Program unit and placed in a
two-man cell in a larger unit. Id. ¶ 47.
On March 4, 2016, Peixoto submitted a written appeal of his removal from the NEADS
Program to Russo. Id. ¶ 57; D. 1-1 at 12-13. Russo never responded to this appeal. D. 1 ¶ 58. On
March 18, 2016, Peixoto submitted DOC Inmate Grievance 87563 to Silva, claiming that Russo’s
decision to remove Peixoto from the NEADS Program two weeks after the publication of the
Boston Magazine article was “arbitrary, retaliatory, and punitive punishment.” Id. ¶ 61; see D. 11 at 14-16. On April 5, 2016, Silva denied Peixoto’s grievance, finding that his claim had “no
basis in fact” and that his removal was permissible under a work assignment policy.
D. 1 ¶ 62; see D. 1-1 at 17. On April 18, 2016, Peixoto appealed Silva’s denial of his grievance to
Russo. Id. ¶ 64. On April 20, 2016, Russo denied the appeal. Id. ¶ 65; D 1-1 at 18.
IV.

Procedural History
Peixoto brought this action against Defendants on July 25, 2016. D. 1. Defendants moved

to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief on October 5, 2016. D. 14. The Court heard the
parties on the pending motion on December 1, 2016 and took the matter under advisement. D. 23.
V.

Discussion
Section 1983 Claims
1.

As Against Russo and Smith

Peixoto claims that Russo and Smith retaliated against him for participating in the interview
for Boston magazine. D. 1 ¶¶ 41, 72-75. Specifically, Peixoto claims that, as a result of his

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agreeing to be interviewed, Russo ordered Smith to intimidate Peixoto and to threaten him with
removal from the NEADS Program if he participated in the interview, id. ¶ 73, that Smith did
intimidate and threaten him, id. ¶ 74, and, when such tactics proved ineffective, Russo cancelled
the pre-approved interview, id. ¶ 75. Peixoto further claims that, as a result of his participation in
the interview, Russo ordered the confiscation of his guitar, his removal from the NEADS Program
and the loss of all privileges associated with the program. Id. ¶¶ 77-78.
To succeed on a retaliation claim under § 1983, an inmate must prove: (1) “he engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct”; (2) “prison officials took adverse action against him”; (3)
“with the intent to retaliate against him for engaging in the constitutionally protected conduct”;
and (4) “he would not have suffered the adverse action ‘but for’ the prison officials’ retaliatory
motive.” Schofield v. Clarke, 769 F. Supp. 2d 42, 46-47 (D. Mass. 2011) (citing Partelow v.
Massachusetts, 442 F. Supp. 2d 41, 51 (D. Mass. 2006)); see McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18
(1st Cir. 1979). In assessing such a claim, courts must use “particular care because virtually any
adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official . . . can be characterized as a
constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.” Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The First Circuit has specifically cautioned that
“[b]ecause prisoner retaliation claims are easily fabricated and pose a substantial risk of
unwarranted judicial intrusion into matters of general prison administration, courts must insist that
such claims are bound up in facts, not in the gossamer strands of speculation and surmise.” Hannon
v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even
then, “a motion to dismiss is not the place to resolve factual disagreements and make credibility
determinations.” Goldman v. Masucci, No. CA 10-064 S, 2011 WL 884717, at *2 (D.R.I. Mar.
11, 2011).

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As to the first element, Peixoto has alleged sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury
could infer that “he [was] engaged in constitutionally protected conduct” by communicating with
reporter Garcia-Roberts. It is well established that an inmate retains his “First Amendment right
to communicate with the media.” McMann v. Cent. Falls Det. Facility Corp., No. 13-cv-570 ML,
2013 WL 5565507, at *5 (D.R.I. Oct. 8, 2013); McMillan v. Carlson, 369 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 (D.
Mass. 1973) (acknowledging that “a prisoner’s claimed right of communication with the press . .
. is firmly established”), aff’d, 493 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1974). Peixoto alleges that he was engaged
in repeated communications with Garcia-Roberts regarding his personal views on the penal justice
system as applied to his particular case. D. 1 ¶ 15, 21, 29, 38-41. These communications, as
alleged, sufficiently implicate Peixoto’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech.3
In arguing for dismissal, Defendants rely upon cases which have upheld “reasonable
regulation with respect to media interviews” of inmates. D. 15 at 7-8; see, e.g., Hatch v. Lappin,
660 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) (denying habeas petition challenging revocation of
home confinement for violation of certain prison regulations regarding communications with the
media); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upholding a regulation which prohibited
inmates from engaging in face-to-face interviews with media personnel); Shaw v. Murphy, 532
U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court has “generally . . . deferred to the judgments
of prison officials in upholding [such] regulations against constitutional challenge”). Such cases
are inapposite here where Peixoto is not challenging any DOC or MCI-Concord regulations
regarding inmate communications with the media but rather contends that, despite complying with

3

Defendants argue that an inmate does not have a constitutional right to participate in a particular
rehabilitative program such that Peixoto’s retaliation claims fail as to the first element. See D. 15
at 4-6. Peixoto’s retaliation claim, however, is based upon his First Amendment rights, D. 20 at
7-9.
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the applicable prison regulations, he was retaliated against for communicating with reporter
Garcia-Roberts. D. 20 at 7-9. Likewise, Defendants rely upon several cases suggesting that media
personnel do not have a constitutional right to communicate with inmates. D. 15 at 7-8; e.g., Pell,
417 U.S. at 834; Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). Such cases, however, do not cut
against the well-established principle that inmates themselves have a constitutional right to
communicate with the media. McMann, 2013 WL 5565507, at *5; McMillan, 369 F. Supp. at
1186.
As to the second element, Peixoto has sufficiently alleged at this stage that “prison officials
took adverse action against him” by, among others, removing him from the NEADS Program.
Although a de minimis adverse action is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983, an adverse
action “is not de minimis if it would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First
Amendment activities.” Pope v. Bernard, No. 10-1443, 2011 WL 478055, at *2 (1st Cir. Feb. 10,
2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where a
plaintiff alleges multiple adverse actions, courts consider the cumulative effect of such actions in
determining whether they are more than de minimis. See Ayotte v. Barnhart, 973 F. Supp. 2d 70,
94 (D. Me. 2013). A reasonable jury could find that the cumulative effect of the adverse actions
Peixoto alleges, including confiscation of personal property and removal from the NEADS
Program which he was involved in for a substantial period of time, D. 1 ¶¶ 14, 22-27, 33-35, 43,
46-49, would deter an inmate of “ordinary firmness” from engaging in communications with the
media.
As to the third and fourth elements, a reasonable jury could infer from the sequence and
temporal proximity of the events alleged—for instance, Peixoto’s removal from the NEADS
Program two weeks after the Boston magazine article was published—that Russo and Smith had

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the intent to retaliate against Peixoto for exercising his constitutional right to communicate with
the media and that “but for” this intent, Peixoto would not have suffered an adverse action. See
Hudson v. MacEachern, 94 F. Supp. 3d 59, 68 (D. Mass. 2015) (explaining that “[a]t the motion
to dismiss stage, intent . . . can be inferred from a ‘chronology of events which may support an
inference of retaliation’” (quoting Schofield, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 47)); accord Ferranti v. Moran,
618 F.2d 888, 892 (1st Cir. 1980).
As such, Peixoto has stated a plausible § 1983 retaliation claim against Russo and Smith.
2.

As Against Silva

Peixoto also asserts a § 1983 claim against Silva for failing to provide Peixoto with a
remedy through the institutional grievance process for Russo’s and Smith’s allegedly retaliatory
actions. D. 1 ¶¶ 61-63, 80. To bring such a § 1983 claim, Peixoto must allege that Silva, acting
under color of state law, deprived him of his “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
constitution.” See Mattei v. Dunbar, No. 13-cv-12195-FDS, 2015 WL 926044, at *6 (D. Mass.
Mar. 4, 2015) (quoting § 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). The denial of Peixoto’s
grievance due to the inadequacy of Silva’s investigation, D. 1 ¶ 63 (alleging that contrary to
established policy, Silva failed to interview both Peixoto and the NEADS Program liaisons
regarding the conduct alleged in the grievance), or otherwise, cannot serve as the basis for his
§ 1983 claim where “the Constitution does not create a liberty interest in, or other right to, access
to a prison grievance procedure,” see Mattei, 2015 WL 926044, at *6 (citations omitted); see also
Moseley v. Spencer, No. 15-cv-13661-LTS, 2016 WL 347305, at *5 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2016)
(recognizing that “[w]hen the claim underlying the administrative grievance involves a
constitutional right, the prisoner's right to petition the government for redress is the right of access
to the courts, which is not compromised by the prison’s refusal to entertain his grievance”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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To the extent that Peixoto raises a § 1983 retaliation claim based upon Silva’s denial of his
grievance, Peixoto does not allege sufficient facts to raise a plausible inference that Silva had a
retaliatory motive or that such motive was a “but for” cause of his denial of the grievance. See
Schofield, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47. The temporal proximity between Peixoto’s assertion of his
First Amendment right to communicate with the media in November 2015 and Silva’s denial of
Peixoto’s grievance in April 2016 is less than the proximity alleged as to the other defendants and
he has not alleged sufficient facts from which a jury could infer that Silva was somehow acting in
concert with Russo and Smith such that their alleged retaliatory intent implies a retaliatory intent
by him. Indeed, there are no allegations to suggest that Silva had any knowledge of Russo’s and
Smith’s actions prior to Peixoto’s filing of his grievance or that Silva in any way communicated
with Russo or Smith regarding their conduct subsequent to receiving the grievance. See Murphy
v. Corizon, No. 12-cv-00101-JAW, 2012 WL 3637902, at *8 (D. Me. July 6, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 12-cv-00101-JAW, 2012 WL 3637897 (D. Me. Aug. 22, 2012).
For all of these reasons, Peixoto has failed to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983
against Silva.
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act Claims
1.

As Against Smith

Peixoto brings MCRA claims against Smith where he allegedly questioned Peixoto in an
isolated room after normal business hours and out of the presence of other corrections personnel
regarding his upcoming interview with Garcia-Roberts and that during such questioning Smith
strongly indicated that Peixoto should not go forward with the interview. D.1 ¶ 14, 22-26, 43, 4849, 74. Peixoto further alleges that Smith threatened him with removal from the NEADS Program
should he do so. Id.

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To succeed on a MCRA claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) “his exercise or enjoyment
of rights secured by the constitution or laws of either the United States or the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, . . . (3) by threats,
intimidation or coercion.” Farrah ex rel. Estate of Santana v. Gondella, 725 F. Supp. 2d 238, 247
(D. Mass. 2010); see Johnson v. Ryan, 2016 WL 2585676, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. May 5, 2016)
(unpublished). For MCRA purposes, a “threat” is “intentional exertion of pressure to make another
fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm”; “intimidation” is “putting [a person] in fear for the
purpose of compelling or deterring [his] conduct”; and “coercion” is “application to another of
such force, either physical or moral, as to constrain him to do against his will something he would
not otherwise have done.” Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467,
474 (1994). “Massachusetts courts apply an objective reasonable person standard to determine
whether conduct constitute[s] threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Spencer v. Roche, 755 F. Supp.
2d 250, 265 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 659 F.3d 142 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Critically, a plaintiff cannot rely on the same conduct “as both the constitutional
violation and the evidence of threats, intimidation, or coercion” to establish a violation of the
MCRA. Santiago v. Keyes, 890 F. Supp. 2d 149, 159 (D. Mass. 2012).
As previously discussed, Peixoto has sufficiently pled that Smith acted with the intent to
deter Peixoto from exercising his constitutional right to communicate with the media.
Furthermore, Peixoto has alleged facts which, at the very least, raise a triable inference that Smith’s
questioning regarding the media interview amounted to intimidation within the meaning of the
MCRA. In light of the unusual circumstances in which Peixoto alleges such questioning occurred,
D. 1 ¶¶ 22-27, as well as Peixoto’s sudden termination of the questioning, id. ¶ 25, a reasonable
jury could infer that Peixoto experienced substantial discomfort during such questioning which

11

amounted to fear. Even if Peixoto himself did not experience fear in these circumstances, his
allegations at this stage are such that an “objective reasonable person” may have experienced fear.
Spencer, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 265. Despite Defendants’ suggestions, D. 15 at 10, that Peixoto
ultimately participated in the media interview does not doom his MCRA claim because it is
sufficient for MCRA purposes to allege that Defendants “attempted to . . . interfere[] with”
Peixoto’s First Amendment rights, Farrah, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 247.
As such, Peixoto has stated a plausible claim for relief under the MCRA against Smith.
2.

As Against Russo

Peixoto claims that, to deter him from participating in the interview with Garcia-Roberts,
Russo ordered Smith to engage in the above-mentioned conduct in violation of the MCRA. D. 73.
To establish supervisory liability for a violation of the MCRA, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant was a “supervisor”; (2) the behavior of one of the defendant’s subordinates
resulted in a civil rights violation; and (3) the defendant’s action or inaction was “affirmative[ly]
link[ed] to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement,
condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference.” Pineda v.
Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) (alterations in original) (internal quotation mark and
citation omitted) (discussing supervisory liability under § 1983); see Xian Ming Wu v. City of
New Bedford, No. 12-cv-11648-RWZ, 2013 WL 4858473, at *2 n.1 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2013)
(explaining that “[t]he standard for supervisory liability under the MCRA is . . . the same as under
§ 1983”).
Here, Peixoto has pled facts from which a reasonable jury could infer that, at all relevant
times, Russo was acting as Smith’s supervisor. See D. 1 ¶¶ 3-5 (noting that Russo was the
“Superintendent” and “Chief Executive Officer” of the facility while Smith was one of several

12

sergeants); id. ¶ 24 (alleging that Smith explicitly told Peixoto that his actions were “by order of .
. . Russo”). As previously discussed, there is at least a question of fact as to whether Smith’s
conduct resulted in a violation of Peixoto’s civil rights as established by § 1983. Smith’s statement
to Peixoto that Russo ordered his conduct, if taken as true, raises a triable inference of “supervisory
encouragement” of such conduct.
Thus, Peixoto has stated a plausible claim for relief under the MCRA against Russo.
Mass. Gen. L. c. 265, § 37
While not explicitly raised in the complaint, to the extent that Peixoto is attempting to bring
a claim under Mass. Gen. L. c. 265, § 37 by reference to such statute in the “jurisdiction” section
of his complaint, D. 1 ¶ 1, that statute is a criminal statute4 and provides no private right of action,
Moffat v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 14-cv-10082-RWZ, 2015 WL 4270161, at *5 (D. Mass. July 13,
2015); O’Neil v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 538 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322 (D. Mass. 2008). As such, this
Court lacks jurisdiction over such a claim and it must be dismissed.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert that the affirmative defense of qualified immunity bars all of Peixoto’s
claims. D 15 at 13. Qualified immunity shields “government officials performing discretionary
functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Such immunity is “immunity from suit” not

4

Section 37 provides for punishment by fine or imprisonment for any person who “by force or
threat of force, willfully injure[s], intimidate[s] or interfere[s] with, or attempt[s] to injure,
intimidate or interfere with, or oppress[es] or threaten[s] any other person in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth
or by the constitution or laws of the United States.”
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merely immunity from liability for monetary damages. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009).
In determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court
considers: (1) “whether the claimant has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional [or
statutory] right”; (2) “whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged action or
inaction”; and (3) “whether an objectively reasonable official would have believed that the action
taken violated that clearly established constitutional right.” Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 253 F.3d
137, 141 (1st Cir. 2001); see Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2004) (establishing the
First Circuit’s practice of addressing the three factors sequentially). Notably, the first factor
encompasses denial of a federal statutory right, Mason v. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 774 F. Supp.
2d 349, 372 (D. Mass. 2011), or a state statutory right, Bally v. Ne. Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 717
(1989). Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of
proving that the doctrine applies. DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 35-36 (1st Cir.
2001).
As previously discussed, the Court concludes that Peixoto has sufficiently alleged
violations of both § 1983 and the MCRA and the alleged constitutional right was clearly
established at the time of Defendants’ alleged misconduct. See Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 191
(2011). Where there is a question of fact as to whether the Defendants deprived or attempted to
deprive him of his First Amendment right, there is, relatedly, also a question of fact as to whether
an objectively reasonable person in the Defendants’ position would have believed that their actions
or inactions violated such rights. See Morales v. Ramirez, 906 F.2d 784, 787 (1st Cir. 1990)
(reasoning that “[e]ven assuming for the sake of discussion that the right . . . was ‘clearly
established’ in the operative time frame . . . , our consideration here of whether ‘a reasonable

14

official would [have] underst[oo]d that what he is doing violates’ that right, . . . unavoidably calls
into question whether any violation of the right occurred” (citation omitted) (alterations in
original)). Thus, whether the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity depends upon genuine
disputes of material facts that cannot be resolved at this juncture. See Rodríguez-Marín v. RiveraGonzález, 438 F.3d 72, 83 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that “factual questions, to the extent they are
antecedent to [the qualified immunity] determination, must be determined by a jury”). Defendants
thus fail to show, at this stage, that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
VI.

Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, D. 14, as follows:
a. ALLOWS the motion as to the § 1983 claim against Silva and dismisses this claim
without prejudice;
b. DENIES the motion as to the § 1983 claim against Russo and Smith in their individual
and official capacities;
c. DENIES the motion as to the MCRA claim against Russo and Smith in their individual
and official capacities; and
d. ALLOWS the motion as to any Mass. Gen. L. c. 265, §37 claim.
So Ordered.
/s/ Denise J. Casper
United States District Judge

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