Watkins v. Medeiros

Filing 20

Judge Allison D. Burroughs: ORDER entered denying 14 Petitioner's Second Motion to Stay. (Montes, Mariliz)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
KYLE WATKINS,
Petitioner,
v.
SEAN MEDEIROS,
Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 16-cv-10891-ADB

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Petitioner Kyle Watkins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 on May 16, 2016. [ECF No. 1]. He was convicted of first-degree murder and unlawful
possession of a firearm by the Bedford Superior Court in 2005. He filed a motion for a new trial
in that court in 2011, which was denied in 2013. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
Judicial Court on November 24, 2015. His petition to this Court sets forth seven grounds for
relief, including failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, conflicts of
interest, fraud on the court, errors by defense counsel, and insufficient evidence. In July 2016,
Petitioner filed a motion to stay this case [ECF No. 11] in order to address an unexhausted issue
in state court. The Court denied that motion with leave to renew [ECF No. 13] because the
motion did not address the legal requirements necessary to obtain a stay. Now before the Court is
Petitioner’s second motion to stay. [ECF No. 14]. Respondent opposes the motion. [ECF No.
18]. For the reasons given below, the motion is denied.
When a habeas corpus petition contains some claims that have been exhausted before the
state court, but other claims that have not, it is known as a “mixed” petition. Josselyn v.

Dennehy, 475 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2007). 1 Ordinarily, a federal court cannot adjudicate a mixed
petition, so the solution is to dismiss the petition without prejudice, allowing the petitioner to
return to state court to exhaust the remainder of his claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274
(2005). Such a dismissal could prevent some petitioners from ever bringing their claims to
federal court, however, so district courts are empowered to issue a stay in certain cases. Id. at
274–76. This power must be used sparingly because it has the potential to undermine the
purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Id. at 277. Thus, “to
obtain a stay of a mixed petition, the petitioner must show that there was ‘good cause’ for failing
to exhaust the state remedies, the claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication
that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory tactics.” Josselyn, 475 F.3d at 4 (citing
Rhines at 278).
In this case, Petitioner has failed to prove that his claims are potentially meritorious. The
unexhausted claims advanced by Petitioner hinge on the Supreme Judicial Court’s recent
decision in Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015). That decision determined
that certain principles concerning eyewitness identification are so “generally accepted” within
the scientific community that they will be included in a revised model jury instruction on the
issue. Id. at 909–11. Petitioner argues that the testimony of an eyewitness identification expert
would have made a difference in his case, and he intends to move for a new trial in state court on
this basis. As the Commonwealth points out, however, the court in Gomes explicitly declined to

1

Technically, the petition here is not “mixed,” because Petitioner did not include the
unexhausted claims in his petition. Both of his motions to stay have invoked the stay procedure
for mixed petitions, however, and his second motion discusses relation back under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15, which indicates that he may intend to amend the petition to add the
claims.

give the new instruction retroactive effect, and in fact, even the defendant in that case did not
receive the benefit of the new instruction. Id. at 904–905, 917.
Petitioner points to a subsequent decision by the Worcester Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Cosenza, which allowed a motion for a new trial on the basis of “newly
available evidence” concerning the science of eyewitness identification that became judicially
accepted, as reflected in Gomes, after the defendant’s 2002 trial. [ECF No. 14-1]. The defendant
in Cosenza, however, had attempted to introduce expert testimony on the science of eyewitness
identification at trial, which the judge did not permit. Id. at 6. The same principles about which
the defendant’s expert intended to testify were later discussed in the report by the Supreme
Judicial Court’s study group on eyewitness identification, id. at 8, which was cited extensively in
Gomes, 22 N.E.3d at 905, 909–16. Unlike the defendant in Cosenza, Petitioner has not alleged
that he made any effort to introduce testimony concerning the science of eyewitness
identification at his trial. Nor has Petitioner pointed to anything else in his case that would justify
departing from the statement in Gomes that the decision is not retroactive. Thus, the Court
cannot conclude that he is likely to prevail on this basis. 2
Accordingly, Petitioner’s second motion to stay [ECF No. 14] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
December 16, 2016

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/s/ Allison D. Burroughs
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

In addition, as the Commonwealth correctly points out, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) tolls the statute
of limitations “during [the time] which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” Petitioner had
until February 22, 2017 (one year plus 90 days after judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court) to
file his habeas petition, but because he recently filed a new trial motion in the state court, as he
informed this Court on December 8 [ECF No. 19], this will toll the statute of limitations. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (petition for writ of certiorari must be filed within
90 days of entry of judgment). Thus, he does not currently require a stay of the litigation in this
Court.