Brown v. Chelsea Police Department

Filing 9

Judge Richard G. Stearns: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: All of plaintiff's claims against Officer Walczak are DISMISSED with prejudice; All claims against the Chelsea Police Department are DISMISSED with prejudice; Within 35 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order, plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint against the City of Chelsea setting forth plausible claims in accordance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, failing which, this action shall be dismissed.(PSSA, 1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-11422-RGS
JASON T. BROWN,
v.
CHELSEA POLICE DEPARTMENT
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
September 1, 2016
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jason T. Brown (Brown) filed the instant action against the
Chelsea Police Department (CPD) alleging that at his criminal trial, Officer
Walczak (Walczak) testified and made several perjured statements against
him.
On July 19, 2016, Magistrate Judge Dein issued a Memorandum and
Order (Dkt. # 4) directing Brown to demonstrate good cause why this action
should not be dismissed in its entirety because Brown failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted based on violations of federal criminal
statutes, and failed to state cognizable civil rights claims because the CPD
was not a suable entity and because there was no respondeat superior
liability of the CPD under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged wrongful actions of its

employees. Further, the Memorandum and Order noted that Walczak was
entitled to absolute immunity for statements made in the course of Brown’s
criminal trial.
On August 23, 2016, Brown filed a Show Cause Response (Dkt. # 7).
Brown contends that the CPD should be held liable under § 1983 because it
is responsible for its municipal employees, and because municipalities may
be held responsible for a single decision made by a policymaker or enforcer,
citing, inter alia, Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services , 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978). He further claims that the CPD established a special
relationship with him by virtue of its charging and booking, its failure to
release camera footage of his booking, and its awareness of the potential
harm to him by being found guilty of a crime he did not commit. Moreover,
Brown argues that the CPD, as a policymaker, is responsible for the actions
of Walczak because he wears a CPD uniform and represents the CPD. Brown
maintains that the CPD can be sued, but requests that if the court determines
the CPD is not a suable entity, then he seeks leave to amend the Complaint
and substitute the City of Chelsea instead.
Next, with respect to claims against Walczak, Brown contends that
absolute immunity for his statements at trial does not apply because

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immunity only applies to officers action in the scope of his or her duties,
citing to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
On August 31 , 2016, this action was reassigned to this court for further
proceedings.
DISCUSSION
This Court does not find Brown’s Show Cause Response to have
demonstrated sufficiently a basis for claims against the CPD or Walczak.
First, with respect to Walczak, Brown’s reliance on Bivens is misplaced. As
discussed in detail in the prior Memorandum and Order, Walczak is entitled
to absolute immunity for his testimony in Brown’s criminal trial. It is beyond
peradventure that a police officer’s testimony in connection with criminal
charges is within the scope of employment. Moreover, as noted, Supreme
Court case law makes clear that this immunity applies even where the police
officer is alleged to have committed perjury. Accordingly, all claims against
Walczak are DISMISSED with prejudice.
Second, with respect to the claims against the CPD, Brown’s allegations
that respondeat superior liability applies to § 1983 claims belies established
law. Moreover, Brown has not demonstrated that the CPD is a suable entity.
Therefore, all of Brown’s claims against the CPD are DISMISSED with
prejudice.
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Finally, even assuming this court permitted Brown to amend his
Complaint to substitute the City of Chelsea for the CPD, his assertion of
municipal liability does not, in this form, state a plausible claim upon which
relief may be granted. Brown has not set forth any underlying factual basis
that the City of Chelsea’s “policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy”
inflicted an injury for which the City is liable under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694. This “official policy” requirement “was intended to distinguish acts
of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby
make clear that municipal liability is limited to actions for which the
municipality is actually responsible.” Id. (italics in original).
In order to state a claim for municipal liability of the City of Chelsea,
Brown must set forth facts that describe the government policy and show
that the execution of the governmental policy caused the constitutional
injury. This can be done by showing that there was an” explicit setting of a
policy by the government” or by an “action of a policymaker within the
government,” or by “the adoption by a knowing failure to act by a
policymaker of actions by his subordinates that are so consistent that they
have become ‘custom,’” or by “the failure of the government to respond to a
need (for example, the training of employees) in such a manner as to show
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‘deliberate indifference’ to the risk that not addressing the need will result in
constitutional violations.” Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302,
1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 25-26
(1st Cir. 2005). With respect to a governmental practice that constitutes
custom or usage, “a plaintiff must show that the duration and frequency of
the custom or practice is so well-settled and widespread so that the
policymakers of the municipality can be considered to have had actual or
constructive knowledge of the practice. Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d
1151, 1156 (1st Cir. 1989). A custom cannot be proven by a single incident
alone. See City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 US 808, 823-24 (1985).
Here, since Brown has alleged only generalized and conclusory
allegations against the City of Chelsea, he will be afforded an opportunity to
set forth his claims in an Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED unless Brown files an
Amended Complaint, within 35 days of the date of this Memorandum and
Order, setting forth plausible claim(s) upon which relief may be granted
against the City of Chelsea. Such claim(s) shall comply with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and set forth underlying facts to support any
claims for municipal liability.

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Failure to comply with these directives will result in a dismissal of this
action.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby Ordered that:
1.

All of plaintiff’s claims against Officer Walczak are DISMISSED with

prejudice;
2.

All claims against the Chelsea Police Department are DISMISSED with

prejudice;
3.

Within 35 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order, plaintiff

shall file an Amended Complaint against the City of Chelsea setting forth
plausible claims in accordance with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, failing which, this action shall be dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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