Diaz v. Department of Correction et al

Filing 81

Magistrate Judge M. Page Kelley: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: "For all the reasons stated, Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement (# 66 ) is ALLOWED. Diaz shall, within 60 days of this Order, file an amended complaint (s tyled as the "First Amended Complaint") in which all defendants, facts, alleged wrongdoing, grounds for relief, and specific relief sought are to be identified in a way that comports with this Order and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "(Moore, Kellyann)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

LUIS DIAZ,
Plaintiff,

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-11579-NMG

JEREMY DREW, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT (#66).

KELLEY, U.S.M.J.
I. Introduction.
On August 3, 2016, pro se plaintiff Luis Diaz, a pretrial detainee housed at the
Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction, filed this action against several
correctional officers, Department of Corrections staff members, and various other individuals1
alleging violations of state and federal statutes and Diaz’s constitutional rights2 stemming from

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It is unclear against whom specifically several of plaintiff’s allegations are levied given that he fails to
identify the person(s) responsible for many of the harms set forth. In addition, Diaz continues to attempt
to add defendants to the case. See, e.g., #33 (Notice for Supplemental Inclusion of Additional
Defendants).

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Diaz’s initial submission (#1), which, for the sake of this motion, will be treated as the operative
complaint, states that the action is brought under “42 U.S.[C.] §§ 1985 and 1983.” (#1 at 1.) Plaintiff,
however, continues to submit supplements to his complaint that contain additional facts and allegations
premised on statutes and constitutional amendments not addressed in his original filing. See, e.g., #19 at 4
(seeking relief under the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution); #58 at

an ongoing “campaign of obstruction and intimidation[]” undertaken in an effort to retaliate
against plaintiff for filing grievances and this action. (#1 at 1-2.) Over the course of the litigation,
Diaz has filed a number of supplements to his complaint as well several motions in which
additional facts are proffered and supposedly incorporated into the complaint. See ##1, 4, 8, 10,
33, 43, 44, 56, 58, 61. From all that appears, it is plaintiff’s intention that these documents be
construed together as his complaint. See, e.g., #58 at 9 (“all statement[s] of fact[] in all
supplemental and original complaints and any statement of fact supplement in any and all filed
documents . . . must be considered as a whole.”).
Presently before the court is a motion by defendants Jeremy Drew, Elena Clodius,
Harrold Wilkes, Mathew Sawash, William Byrnes, and Michael Kasprzak seeking a more
definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. (#66.) As explained below, the court
finds Diaz’s pleadings deficient to the extent that a repleader is necessary.
II. Standard of Review.
A party may move for a more definite statement when the pleading “is so vague or
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The “rule
‘is designed to remedy unintelligible pleadings, not merely to correct for lack of detail.’” Jones v.
Revenue Assistance Program, No. CV 15-14017-NMG, 2016 WL 3919843, at *8 (D. Mass. July
14, 2016), appeal dismissed (Nov. 16, 2016) (quoting Ivymedia Corp. v. iLIKEBUS, Inc., 2015
WL 4254387, at *6 (D. Mass. July 13, 2015)). “Rule 12(e) relief is the most suitable remedy
where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and the parties are unable to engage in
discovery until they are capable of identifying the specific claims against the specific

1 (asserting that “this action is also an action for Americans with Disabilities Act . . . and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act . . . .”).

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individuals.” Carter v. Newland, 441 F. Supp. 2d 208, 214 (D. Mass. 2006) (citing Hilska v.
Jones, 217 F.R.D. 16, 25 (D.D.C. 2003)).
III. Discussion.
“While the court is mindful that it must construe pro se complaints liberally, even pro se
litigants are bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Janosky v. Massachusetts P’ship
for Corr. Healthcare, No. 15-CV-12929-IT, 2017 WL 1164490, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2017)
(citing Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2014) and F.D.I.C. v.
Anchor Properties, 13 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1994)). Here, the litany of filings that make up
Diaz’s complaint fall far short of the threshold requirements established by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
A. Rule 8 General Rules of Pleading.
Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., mandates that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words,
the complaint must include “‘enough detail to provide a defendant with fair notice of what the . .
. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Silverstrand Investments. v. AMAG
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 707 F.3d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Ocasio-Hernandez v. FortunoBurset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation and further internal
quotation marks omitted)); Barbosa v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, No. CV 14-13439ADB, 2016 WL 3976555, at *2 (D. Mass. July 22, 2016). This means that the statement of the
claim must “‘at least set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when, where, and
why.’” Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 430 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Educadores
Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004)). Although the
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) are minimal, “‘minimal requirements are not tantamount to

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nonexistent requirements.’” Id. (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.
1988)).
The plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his claims “requires more than labels
and conclusions.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A court is not
“‘bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Id. (quoting
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Further, “only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief” states a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). “Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint does not show that “‘the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) in second quotation).
Just as Rule 8 establishes the threshold requirements of what must be set forth in a
complaint, so too does it provide a bookend as to the extent of what information a litigant is
entitled to include therein. “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(d)(1). The documents that make up Diaz’s complaint are verbose, disjointed, and fail to
comport with the requirements of Rule 8.
As an initial matter, plaintiff continues to file documents in which he seeks to add
additional facts, claims, defendants, and forms of relief sought. When read together, these
documents fail to articulate any coherent claim beyond a general displeasure with the way in
which he has been, and continues to be, treated while in custody. Even though Diaz is
proceeding pro se, that does not give him license to bombard defendants with new allegations
throughout these proceedings. The court is aware that the alleged misconduct against plaintiff is
ongoing, however, he need only allege as much in the complaint; he need not supplement his
pleadings with each new instance of alleged wrongdoing.

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Another flaw in Diaz’s filings is that he fails to detail against whom specifically he is
asserting the various causes of action that are strewn throughout the papers. In its current form,
the complaint does not permit defendants to identify the specific wrongdoing alleged against the
specific actor(s). The complaint must connect each defendant identified in the title of the
complaint to the harm Diaz accuses them of inflicting upon him.
Diaz must identify with specificity the causes of action on which his claims are based.
For example, alleging that a defendant’s actions are “an offense to the Constitution” is an
insufficient basis on which to ground a claim. See #43 at 4. Defendants are entitled to know the
nature of their alleged actions and how these actions are wrongful.
B. Rule 10 Form of Pleadings.
Rule 10, Fed. R. Civ. P., establishes the appropriate form in which a pleading is to be
submitted. Diaz’s complaint and supplemental filings fail to comply with Rule 10 in several
respects.
1. Title.
Section (a) of Rule 10 mandates that “[e]very pleading must have a caption with the
court’s name, a title, a file number, and a Rule 7(a) designation.3 The title of the complaint must

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Rule 7(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., states that
[o]nly these pleadings are allowed:
(1) a complaint;
(2) an answer to a complaint;
(3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim;
(4) an answer to a crossclaim;
(5) a third-party complaint;

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name all the parties . . . .” Review of plaintiff’s filings evidences facts and allegations against
individuals who are not named in the title of the complaint. See, e.g., #4-1 at 1-6 (addressing
allegedly false statements made by a Dr. Toomey). The court is aware that Diaz may not be in
possession of the information necessary to identify all of the alleged wrongdoers, however, to the
extent he is aware (including information that has been provided by defendants), plaintiff must
identify these individuals and entities in the title of his complaint.4
2. Paragraph Structure.
Section (b) of Rule 10 provides in part that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in
numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Review
of Diaz’s filings shows that some of his paragraphs are numbered. However, these paragraphs
are in no way limited to a single set of circumstances. Many of the paragraphs span multiple
pages, contain multiple allegations, and address a variety of subject matter. In addition, plaintiff
fails to parse out his specific causes of action and the relief requested. To the best of his abilities
Diaz is to produce a complaint that contains numbered paragraphs that are limited to specific
allegations or as close as reasonably practicable.

(6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and
(7) if the court orders one, a reply to an answer.
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As explained by the district court judge to whom this case is assigned:
Although the use of fictitious names to identify defendants is not favored, situations may
arise where the identity of an alleged defendant cannot be known prior to the filing of a
complaint. See Martínez-Rivera v. Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). If, through
discovery, the plaintiff discovers the true names of these unnamed defendants, he should
act promptly to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to identify the correct parties and their alleged misconduct and to dismiss any
baseless claims. See id. at 8 n. 5

(#14 at 1-2.) Given that Diaz has exhausted his one-time right to amend, see infra Section C., any attempt
to add additional defendants must comport with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(a)(1)(B) and
this Order.

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C. Rule 15 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings.
In his initial submission, Diaz states that he “preserve[s] [his] right to amend this
complaint at any time due to the obstructions herein claimed.” (#1 at 2.) Plaintiff has submitted a
number of filings that contain additional facts and claims that were not addressed in his initial
complaint. Diaz puts defendants in the untenable position of trying to identify exactly against
whom this action has been brought and of what they are accused based on a constantly evolving
factual basis. Plaintiff’s current practice fails to comply with Rule 15(a)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P.,
which states that
[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after
service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule
12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
After this one-time right has been exhausted, Diaz may make further amendments “only with the
opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Such a request
for leave should be granted freely by the court when justice so requires. Id. Here, plaintiff has
exhausted his right to amend. Prior to the filing of any additional documents proffered in an
attempt to support or supplement the complaint, Diaz must obtain the written consent of the
opposing parties or shall file a motion seeking leave from the court to do so along with a concise
argument as to why such leave is required.5 No further supplements or amendments will be
considered without compliance with the procedure set forth in Rule 15, Fed. R. Civ. P.

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It bears mention that
[a]t a certain point, this amendment-friendly regime may cease to govern. Rule 16 directs
a district court to issue a scheduling order charting the anticipated course of the litigation.
See [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 16(b)(1). One customary element of such an order is a deadline for
amending the pleadings. See id. 16(b)(3)(A). Such a deadline, like other deadlines

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IV. Conclusion.
For all the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement (#66) is
ALLOWED. Diaz shall, within 60 days of this Order, file an amended complaint (styled as the
“First Amended Complaint”) in which all defendants, facts, alleged wrongdoing, grounds for
relief, and specific relief sought are to be identified in a way that comports with this Order and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6

/s / M. Page Kelley
M. Page Kelley
United States Magistrate Judge

August 4, 2017

contained in a scheduling order, may be modified only upon a showing of ‘good cause.’
Id. 16(b)(4). Thus, when a litigant seeks leave to amend after the expiration of a deadline
set in a scheduling order, Rule 16(b)’s more stringent good cause standard supplants Rule
15(a)’s leave freely given standard. See, e.g., Cruz v. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., P.R.,
Inc., 699 F.3d 563, 569 (1st Cir. 2012); Trans–Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc.,
524 F.3d 315, 327 (1st Cir. 2008).
U.S. ex rel. D’Agostino v. EV3, Inc., 802 F.3d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 2015).
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Any reference to the previously filed complaint or supplements submitted in support contained in
plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint shall not be considered. Diaz is to produce a single operative
pleading.

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