Snell v. The Department of Corrections

Filing 146

Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - The Court ALLOWS the DOC Defendants motion for summary judgment, D. 113, and ALLOWS Ruze's motion for summary judgment, D. 119. (Hourihan, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
__________________________________________
)
EMORY G. SNELL, JR.,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Civil Action No.: 16-cv-11643-DJC
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CAROL MICI, STEPHANIE COLLINS,
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JEFFREY QUICK, MONSERRATE
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QUINONES, DOUGLAS DEMOURA,
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LOIS RUSSO, DALE BISSONNETTE,
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PATRICIA RUZE, GENE CHAISSION,
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JOANN LYNDS, THOMAS NEVILLE,
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THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT
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OF CORRECTIONS,
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Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CASPER, J.
I.

September 11, 2019

Introduction
Plaintiff Emory G. Snell, Jr. (“Snell”) has filed this lawsuit against Defendants Carol Mici

(“Mici”), Stephanie Collins (“Collins”), Jeffrey Quick (“Quick”), Monserrate Quinones
(“Quinones”), Douglas DeMoura (“DeMoura”), Lois Russo (“Russo”), Dale Bissonnette
(“Bissonnette”), Gene Chaission (“Chaission”), Joann Lynds (“Lynds”), Thomas Neville
(“Neville”), all in their individual and official capacities, and the Massachusetts Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) (collectively, the “DOC Defendants”) and Dr. Patricia Ruze (“Ruze”)
(collectively, “Defendants”). D. 26. Snell is an inmate who was previously housed at the
Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord (“MCI-Concord”).

Snell alleges that

Defendants violated his constitutional rights and various statutes by denying him an
1

accommodation allowing him to access a first floor library at MCI-Concord given various physical
ailments that make it difficult for him to climb stairs.
Specifically, Snell alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights (Claim
1), his Fourteenth Amendment rights (Claim 2), his Fifth Amendment rights (Claim 3), his rights
under Article of Amendment 114 to the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights pursuant to Mass.
Gen. L. c. 151B, §1 and Mass. Gen. L. c. 93, § 103 (Claim 4) and that they retaliated against him
in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Claim 6). He further alleges that the
DOC engaged in disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA (Claim 5) and violated his
rights under the Rehabilitation Act (Claim 7). D. 26 at ¶¶ 93-144. The DOC Defendants and Ruze
have separately moved for summary judgment. D. 113; D. 119. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court ALLOWS Ruze’s motion for summary judgment and ALLOWS the DOC Defendants’
motion for summary judgment.
II.

Standard of Review
The Court grants summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the undisputed facts demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the
outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp.,
217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Sánchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996)).
The movant “bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). If the movant meets its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations
or denials in her pleadings, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986), but “must,
with respect to each issue on which she would bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that a
trier of fact could reasonably resolve that issue in her favor,” Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano–
2

Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). “As a general rule, that requires the production of evidence
that is ‘significant[ly] probative.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
“Neither party may rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated denials, but must identify
specific facts derived from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and
affidavits to demonstrate either the existence or absence of an issue of fact.” Magee v. United
States, 121 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997). In conducting this inquiry, the Court “view[s] the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable inferences in his favor.” Noonan
v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009).
III.

Factual Background
The following facts are drawn primarily from the DOC Defendants’ statement of

undisputed material facts, D. 114, Ruze’s statement of material facts, D. 121, Snell’s responses to
same, D. 131 and D. 130, and other supporting documents and are undisputed unless otherwise
noted.
Snell is currently incarcerated at MCI-Shirley. D. 130, ¶ 1; D. 131, ¶ 48. Snell was
transferred to MCI-Shirley from MCI-Concord on November 8, 2018. D. 130, ¶ 2; D. 131, ¶ 48.
A.

Accommodations Process at MCI-Concord

Medical providers at MCI-Concord evaluate inmates and can recommend that an inmate
be granted a medical “restriction” 1 or an accommodation based on a legitimate medical need. D.
130, ¶ 15. The DOC will consider the recommendations of medical personnel, along with other
factors, in deciding whether to grant an inmate an accommodation. Id. During the time that Ruze

1

“Restriction” is a term of art used by the DOC to denote a recommendation by medical
personnel based on an inmate’s medical needs, such as medical equipment (i.e., a back brace or a
cane), modifications to transportation (i.e., waist chain restraints instead of handcuffs), or modified
work or living requirements (i.e., light work status, a bottom bunk, no stair climbing). See D. 131,
¶ 4.
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treated Snell at MCI-Concord, it was the practice that medical restrictions would expire after one
year, at which time they would be reviewed by a medical provider. D. 130, ¶ 14. Snell disputes
that this was the practice, however, because in 1998 he was granted what he characterizes as an
“indefinite” bottom-tier housing restriction based on “problems with climbing stairs.” Id. at ¶¶
12-14.
Pursuant to DOC policy, an inmate may request a reasonable accommodation through
either a verbal or written request to a staff member or completion of a Request for Reasonable
Accommodation form. D. 131, ¶ 6. The Deputy Superintendent for Entry serves as the ADA
Coordinator for MCI-Concord, receives accommodation requests from inmates, communicates
with medical providers and reviews restrictions to evaluate whether an accommodation is
medically necessary. D. 130, ¶ 11.
B.

Snell’s History of Medical Issues and Treatment During Incarceration

Snell was transferred to MCI-Concord on July 13, 2010. D. 130, ¶ 37. Ruze was then
Snell’s primary care physician at MCI-Concord for seven years. D. 130, ¶ 7; D. 131, ¶ 16. While
incarcerated at MCI-Concord, Snell suffered from hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, degenerative joint disease, and intermittent pedal edema. D. 130,
¶ 9; D. 131, ¶ 17. Snell also experienced some injuries, including a rolled ankle, while at MCIConcord. D. 130, ¶ 38. On May 31, 2011, when Snell rolled his ankle, Ruze examined an x-ray
and determined that Snell had a “very tiny” fracture and issued him an air cast. D. 130, ¶ 38. Snell
denied Ruze’s offer of a cane at that time. Id. In January 2012, Ruze recommended that Snell be
permitted to use an air cast for six months. D. 130, ¶ 39. In November 2012, a nurse practitioner
at MCI-Concord evaluated Snell and recommended one-year restrictions for an air cast, knee
sleeves, an elbow sleeve, and a low-back binder. Id. In October 2013, Snell met with another
nurse practitioner at MCI-Concord who recommended that he exercise more and recommended
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restrictions for an air cast, knee sleeves, an elbow sleeve and back brace be renewed for one year.
D. 130, ¶ 42.
On two occasions in December 2013, Snell complained of pain in his knees and back due
to stair climbing. D. 130, ¶ 44. Ruze ordered x-rays of Snell’s knees and spine and recommended
one-year extensions of Snell’s restrictions for knee sleeves. Id. In December 2013, Snell
complained of increased leg swelling and stated that he was limping more than usual. D. 130, ¶
45. Ruze ordered a cane for Snell, ordered a change in medication and referred him to a specialist.
Id. In July 2014, Ruze recommended one-year extensions of Snell’s restriction for a cane and
bottom bunk. D. 130, ¶ 49. In November 2014, Ruze recommended a one-year extension for a
back brace. D. 130, ¶ 54. Snell met with another medical provider at MCI-Concord in March
2015 who recommended restrictions for a bottom bunk, back brace, cane, knee sleeves, antiembolism stockings, light work status, and waist chains. D. 130, ¶ 58. The following year, on
June 23, 2016, Ruze renewed all of the restrictions that were issued the prior year. D. 130, ¶ 18.
Although Snell disputes her conclusion, at this time, Ruze also noted that Snell “ambulates well
with a cane” and “can negotiate stairs.” D. 130, ¶ 18; D 131, ¶ 39. In July 2017, a medical provider
at MCI-Concord renewed his restrictions with the exception of the light work restriction. D. 130,
¶ 19.
C.

Snell’s Use of the First Floor Library

From October 2011 through October 2012, Snell worked as a clerk in the law library on
the second floor of MCI-Concord. D. 130, ¶ 23. Snell was fired from his job in this second floor
law library. D. 130, ¶ 24. Snell began to use the first floor law library in July 2013. D. 131, ¶ 31.
At the time, Snell did not have a medical restriction or accommodation that permitted him to use
the first floor library instead of the general law library on the second floor. D. 131, ¶ 31. In

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October 2015, it came to the attention of Defendants Gaffney and Lynds that Snell was using the
first floor library. D. 131, ¶ 32. DOC personnel informed Snell that he was no longer permitted
to use the first floor library because he did not have a medical restriction or accommodation. D.
130, ¶ 26; D. 131, ¶ 32.
Snell wrote to Defendant Gaffney claiming that he was being arbitrarily deprived of his
constitutional right to court access and stated that the “indefinite” restriction he received in 1998
regarding use of the stairs warranted his access to the first floor library. D. 131, ¶ 35. Defendant
Gaffney responded that she was unaware of an accommodation that had been granted to Snell that
would permit access to the first floor library, but would review his situation if he provided
necessary documentation. D. 131, ¶ 36. In June 2016, Snell submitted a request for reasonable
accommodation seeking access to the first floor library to Defendant Neville. D. 131, ¶ 40.
Defendant Neville denied the request, informing Snell that he had consulted the medical providers
at MCI-Concord and that the request was not supported by this medical review. Id.
D.

Transfer to MCI-Shirley

Following

Ruze’s

departure

from

MCI-Concord,

Dr.

Lawrence

Churchville

(“Churchville”) became Snell’s physician there. D. 131, ¶ 43. Churchville evaluated Snell in
October 2018 and noted that his knees were “visibly deformed,” that Snell had a slow gait, and
that he used a cane to walk. Id. Churchville recommended exercise, medications, and diet. Id.
At a subsequent evaluation four days later, Churchville noted that Snell suffered from crepitus
(grinding) of the knee. D. 131, ¶ 44. On November 7, 2018, Snell complained of worsening knee
pain and requested a renewal of his restrictions. D. 131, ¶ 45. This request was brought to
Churchville, who reviewed Snell’s medical record and considered his own examinations of Snell
and determined that Snell now had severe osteoarthritis in both of his knees. D. 131, ¶ 46. In

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November 2018, Churchville renewed Snell’s existing restrictions and added restrictions for no
stair climbing, first floor housing, knee sleeves, orthopedic shoes, and an elbow sleeve. Id.
The Deputy Superintendent of MCI-Concord notified the DOC Director of Classification
that medical staff at MCI-Concord had determined that Snell required a handicap-accessible
facility. D. 131, ¶ 47. Based upon this need, Snell was transferred to MCI-Shirley, a handicapaccessible facility, on November 8, 2018, D. 131, ¶ 48, where it appears that he remains.
IV.

Procedural History
Snell instituted this action on August 9, 2016. D. 1. Snell subsequently filed an amended

complaint. D. 26. On August 23, 2017, while he was still at MCI-Concord, Snell sought a
preliminary injunction seeking to require MCI-Concord to permit him access to the first floor
library, to return all medical appliances he required for his disabilities and to reinstate his first floor
housing and bottom bunk assignment. D. 41. The Court denied the motion, concluding that Snell
had failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits or a risk of irreparable harm.
D. 85. The DOC Defendants and Ruze have now each filed separately for summary judgment. D.
113; D. 119. The Court heard the parties on the pending motions on July 17, 2019 and took these
matters under advisement. D. 139.
V.

Discussion
A.

Eighth Amendment Claim Pursuant to § 1983 (Claim 1)

The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects
prisoners from medical mistreatment that is “so inadequate as to shock the conscience.” Perry v.
Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 235 (1st Cir.
1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Undue suffering, unrelated to any legitimate

penological purpose, is considered a form of punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
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(1976)). “[T]o state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
“[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,
while no cause for commendation, cannot under [Supreme Court case law] be condemned as the
infliction of punishment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994).
A plaintiff alleging an Eighth Amendment violation must prove that prison personnel
showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs by satisfying a two-part inquiry: an
objective test establishing that the plaintiff’s need is “sufficiently serious,” Burrell v. Hampshire
Cty., 307 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002), and a subjective test showing that officers acted with intent or
wanton disregard when providing inadequate care. See Perry, 782 F.3d at 78; Leavitt v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 645 F.3d 484, 502 (1st Cir. 2011). To establish that his medical need is or was
“sufficiently serious,” under the objective prong, a plaintiff must show that his illness or injury
was either diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious that a layperson would
recognize the need for medical assistance. See Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208
(1st Cir. 1990).
Snell alleges that his orthopedic conditions are “sufficiently serious” because he has been
“diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” and, further, that his condition was “so obvious
that even a lay person could easily recognize the necessity” for treatment based on his need to use
a cane when walking. D. 132 at 22; Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 82. Snell also alleges that he satisfies
the subjective prong because Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Snell’s medical needs
when terminating his access to the first floor library, thereby requiring him to climb stairs to access
the second floor library. D. 132 at 24.

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As to the objective prong, both Snell and Ruze submitted expert reports by physicians who
each reviewed Snell’s medical records (but did not examine Snell) and opined on the nature of
Snell’s condition and recommended treatment options. D. 122-10; D. 122-11. Ruze’s expert, Dr.
Ira K. Evans, summarized the diagnoses and treatment that Snell received while at MCI-Concord
while treated by Dr. Ruze and concluded that Snell has “stage 1 arthritis of the knee, which is
considered to be very mild,” that none of Snell’s medical conditions should preclude him from
climbing stairs, that the care Snell received at MCI-Concord was consistent with accepted medical
practice “and the decision by Dr. Ruze, and other providers, that he was capable of climbing stairs
several times per week was in no way outside of the standard of care, nor did it aggravate any
underlying degenerative changes.” D. 122-10 at 8-9, 10. Snell’s expert, Dr. Michael G. Kennedy,
noted that Snell has degenerative joint disease in his knees, but did not provide an opinion as to
the severity of the condition. D.122-11 at 4-5, 6-7. Dr. Kennedy suggested that Snell should have
avoided climbing up and down stairs in or about late October 2015, since such action could
“aggravate any underlying degenerative changes,” but did not make any conclusions as to the
quality of care that Snell received at MCI-Concord. Id.
Even assuming arguendo that Snell could meet the objective prong or has raised a genuine
issue of material fact regarding same, Snell fails to meet the subjective prong, as there is ample
undisputed evidence demonstrating that Defendants were not “deliberately indifferent” to Snell’s
medical needs. First, as noted above, even while agreeing with Dr. Ruze’s assessment that Snell
has medical needs, even Dr. Kennedy, Snell’s expert, does not suggest that her treatment of Snell
was inadequate. Snell met with Ruze and other medical staff numerous times and received ongoing
care and treatment for his knee and related conditions. On this record, the Court does not conclude
that Snell was denied medical evaluation or treatment while at MCI-Concord. “[I]t is not the place

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of [the] court to ‘second guess medical judgments,’” Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 85, and “[s]ubstandard
or negligent medical treatment, ‘even to the point of malpractice,’ is insufficient to state a claim
under the Eighth Amendment.” Sepulveda v. UMass Corr. Health Care, 160 F. Supp. 3d 371, 385
(D. Mass. 2016) (quoting Feeney, 464 F.3d 158 at 162 (1st Cir. 2006)). Moreover, the Court notes
that there is no opinion—not from Dr. Kennedy, Dr. Evans or Dr. Churchill—that Snell received
substandard or negligent care from Dr. Ruze or the other medical providers at MCI-Concord. That
Dr. Kennedy had a different opinion about the recommendation for treatment for Snell’s knees
back in October 2015 or that Dr. Churchill had a different recommendation in late 2018 does not
aid Snell’s claim because “a mere professional difference of opinion among an inmate’s doctors
generally cannot give rise to liability under section 1983, both because the prisoner has no right to
his preferred treatment and because a good-faith dispute among doctors over the appropriate course
of treatment tends to show that neither doctor was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s needs.”
Hennessy v. Dennehy, No. 08CV11724-NG, 2010 WL 3464234, at *8 (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2010).
Such is the case here.
Ruze treated Snell for approximately seven years. She evaluated Snell regularly, ordered
x-rays and other diagnostic tests, recommended appropriate medical restrictions when she deemed
them necessary, and provided Snell with medical devices to reduce pain and swelling. See, e.g.,
D. 130 at ¶¶ 37-78. That Ruze, in the course of treating Snell and based on her professional
judgment, did not specifically recommend a “no stairs” restriction does not demonstrate that Snell
received medical care below professional standards and does not “shock the conscious” sufficient
to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim. Nunes v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., 766 F.3d 136, 142 (1st
Cir. 2014).

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The DOC Defendants’ denial of access to the first floor library based on Snell not having
a “no stairs” restriction similarly does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to Snell’s
medical needs.

“Since most prison officials are not doctors, they cannot be said to have

consciously disregarded an inmate's serious medical needs when they have relied in good faith on
the expertise of the inmate's attending physicians.” Hennessy, 2010 WL 3464234, at *8; see Costa
v. Massachusetts P'ship for Corr. Healthcare, LLC, No. CV 17-12201-RGS, 2018 WL 3769823,
at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2018) (stating that prison officials are permitted to rely on the opinions of
treating physicians and denying an Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials where
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that they ignored the medical judgments of medical personnel). The
record indicates that the DOC Defendants relied upon the medical judgment and recommendations
of Ruze and other medical personnel in granting and denying certain restrictions and
accommodations to Snell based on his medical needs. To the extent that Snell disagreed with
Ruze’s recommendations and course of treatment, there is no requirement that “prison
administrators . . . provide care that is ideal, or of the prisoner’s choosing.” Kosilek,774 F.3d at
82. Accordingly, the Court grants the DOC Defendants’ and Ruze’s motions for summary
judgment with respect to Snell’s Eighth Amendment claim.
B.

Fourteenth Amendment Claim (Claim 2)

Snell includes a Fourteenth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as his second
claim in the amended complaint against all Defendants. D. 26. The allegations in the amended
complaint supporting the Fourteenth Amendment claim are similar to those alleged in support of
the Eighth Amendment claim. D. 26, ¶¶ 103-108 (alleging that “Defendants have subjected and
are subjecting Snell to a substantial risk of harm and injury from the denial of reasonable
accommodations and deliberate indifference to Snell’s documented disability and physical
impairments”). In his opposition to summary judgment, however, Snell frames his Fourteenth
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Amendment claim based on a theory of denial of access to legal resources because his access to
the first floor library was terminated. D. 132 at 32-33. Courts have found that the protections
under the Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment pursuant to section 1983 are
“essentially coextensive.” Hernandez v. Ashe, 745 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullan, 485 F.3d 150, 155 (1st Cir.
2007)). To the extent Snell’s Fourteenth Amendment claim relies on the same facts as he relies
upon for his Eighth Amendment claim, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants
for the same reasons as applicable to that claim discussed above.
To the extent that Snell’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is based upon a separate allegation
that he was denied access to the courts, this claim fails because Snell has failed to show that he
was harmed or will imminently suffer harm based upon this alleged denial. Snell argues that,
during the time when he was denied access to the first floor library, he was not represented by
counsel and relied upon access to the law library to challenge his criminal conviction. D. 132 at
32. In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the Supreme Court emphasized that inmates bringing
claims based on denial of access to courts must allege a resulting injury. Id. at 350-51. The Court
stated that inmates do not have a “freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance” and an
inmate must “demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program
hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id. at 351. By way of example, the Court noted that
an inmate “might show . . . that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some
technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he
could not have known . . . [or] that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to
bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable
even to file a complaint.” Id. Snell has failed to allege any specific harm resulting from the DOC’s

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termination of his access to the first floor law library. As a result, summary judgment is granted
in favor of all Defendants on Snell’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.
C.

Fifth Amendment (Claim 3)

Defendants argue that Snell’s Fifth Amendment claim must be dismissed because Fifth
Amendment claims relate only to actions by federal actors. D. 115 at 33; D. 120 at 13-14. Snell
failed to address these arguments in his opposition to the motions for summary judgment. D. 132.
At oral argument, Snell’s counsel confirmed that Snell is no longer pursuing the Fifth Amendment
claim. For all of these reasons, the Court ALLOWS summary judgment in favor of Defendants as
to Snell’s Fifth Amendment claim.
D.

The ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims (Claims 5-7)
1.

ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims (Claims 5 & 7)

Snell has alleged that Defendant DOC violated Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act because it failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation to access the first floor
library to conduct legal work. D. 132 at 25-27. “The same standards . . . apply to claims under
the ADA and under the Rehabilitation Act.” Calero-Cerezo v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 355
F.3d 6, 11 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004). The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Rehabilitation Act similarly provides that “no otherwise
qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “Where, as here,
a plaintiff raises essentially identical claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and those

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claims do not turn on any of the various differences between the two statutory schemes, courts are
free to address the claims ‘simultaneously.’” McCauley v. Groblewski, No. 14-CV-12732, 2018
WL 4119641, at *8 (D. Mass. Aug. 29, 2018) (quoting Partelow v. Massachusetts, 442 F. Supp.
2d 41, 47 (D. Mass. 2006)). The ADA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
Public entities are required to “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). An ADA claim requires that the plaintiff prove: “(1) that
he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in,
or denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs or activities or was otherwise
discriminated against; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by
reason of the plaintiff’s disability.” Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 283 (1st Cir.
2006) (quoting Parker v. Universidad de P.R., 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Although Ruze determined that Snell’s condition did not require a “no stairs” restriction,
she did diagnose Snell with “chronic orthopedic issues,” including “arthritis . . . of the knees,
ankles, and back” and ordered him a cane and various braces to assist with ambulation. D. 121, ¶
64. Following Ruze’s departure from MCI-Concord, Churchville evaluated Snell and diagnosed
him with “severe osteoarthritis in both knees.” D. 121, ¶ 77. In Shedlock v. Dep't of Corr., the
Supreme Judicial Court analyzed whether an inmate who needed a cane to walk was disabled for
the purposes of a disability claim. Shedlock v. Dep’t of Corr., 442 Mass. 844, 851-855. The court
noted that “in cases where a plaintiff uses some device to assist with walking and climbing (e.g.,

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a cane, brace, or crutches), most courts have found a substantial limitation on the activity of
walking.” Id. at 851 (citing EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 2000);
Belk v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1999); Saunders v. Horn, 959 F.
Supp. 689, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Shedlock further stated that “from the very fact that [Plaintiff]
needs a cane in order to walk, one could infer that his ability to walk without a cane is extremely
limited” and that, in the context of a prison, an inference can be made that an inmate had to
demonstrate a genuine need for a cane before one would be issued given the security concerns
inherent in providing a cane to an inmate. Id. at 853-54. Given that Snell was issued various
medical devices to assist with walking, including a cane, he at least arguably qualifies as an
individual with a disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
Although Snell likely qualifies as an individual with a disability under the ADA, he has
failed to show that any alleged exclusion from the first floor law library was because of his
disability. To make out a successful claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, “a plaintiff's
showing of medical unreasonableness . . . must be framed within some larger theory of disability
discrimination.” Kiman, 451 F.3d at 285 (quoting Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 2001)).
“When the decision being challenged is simply a reasoned medical judgment with which the
patient disagreed, it is more appropriate for the patient to turn to state medical malpractice law,
not [the ADA].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). That is, similar to
Snell’s constitutional claims, prison officials may rely upon medical personnel’s determination of
whether a medical accommodation is warranted. See Bane v. Virginia Dept. of Corr., No. Civ. A.
705-cv-00024, 2005 WL 1388924, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 9, 2005) (noting that, among other things,
“[p]rison officials may reasonably require the inmate to obtain medical confirmation of the alleged
need for accommodation”). Rather, the DOC Defendants relied upon the recommendations of

15

medical personnel who determined that Snell did not require a “no stairs” restriction, in deciding
to terminate Snell’s access to the first floor library. Additionally, there are no facts indicating that
the medical treatment that Snell received, or the recommendations made by Ruze and other
medical personnel, were based on any discriminatory animus. As there has been no showing of
discrimination based on Snell’s disability, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants.
Sepulveda, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 392 (dismissing ADA claim based on inmate’s allegations of
inadequate medical treatment where inmate failed to show “discriminatory animus” or that the
medical providers’ “treatment decisions rested on stereotypes about [inmate’s] conditions”).
2.

Retaliation Claim (Claim 6)

To establish a retaliation claim under the ADA a plaintiff must show that “(1) he engaged
in protected conduct, (2) he was subjected to an adverse action by the defendant, and (3) there was
a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action.” Knox v. Mass. Dep't
of Corr., No. 1:14-cv-12457-LTS, 2017 WL 3401443, at *12 (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2017) (citing D.B.
ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted)); see
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). “Once a plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant
to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for the adverse action.” Knox, 2017 WL
3401443 at *12. “If the defendant articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to show that the proffered legitimate explanation is pretextual, meaning that the defendant was
motivated by a retaliatory animus.” Id. (citing D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B., 675 F.3d at 41) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Snell argues that the termination of his access to the first floor library was retaliation for
his “long history of initiating grievances and litigation concerning his disabilities.” D. 132 at 30.
The record does not support Snell’s contention that the termination of Snell’s access to the first

16

floor library was connected to any of his previously filed grievances or litigation or to the
frequency of his prior complaints. The undisputed record reveals, however, that Defendants
Gaffney and Lynds became aware that Snell was using the first floor library because he sent a
letter to Defendant Gaffney requesting additional time to use the first floor library. Defendants
Gaffney and Lynds then reviewed Snell’s restrictions record and determined that Snell was not
permitted to use the first floor library because he did not have a medical “no stairs” restriction in
his file and, therefore, was required to use the law library located on the second floor. D. 114, ¶
32.
Snell argues that this reasoning is simply pretextual because, once he was given a “no
stairs” medical restriction by Churchville, he was immediately transferred to MCI-Shirley. This
argument is unavailing. “Within the prison system, officials may legitimately desire to screen . . .
requests and verify that an accommodation is genuinely needed before a prisoner is accorded what
other prisoners would likely view as special treatment.” Shedlock, 442 Mass. at 857. It is
“reasonable for prison officials to rely on the contents of medical orders . . . and to insist that those
medical orders be updated or modified before extending . . . additional accommodations.” Id. at
858. Here, Snell did not have a medical “no stairs” restriction and it was reasonable for the DOC
Defendants to terminate Snell’s access to the first floor library once they were made aware of his
use of it on the basis that he did not have the required medical restriction stating that he was unable
to climb stairs to the other law library. That his access was terminated after previous grievances
and requests for additional time in the library is insufficient to show retaliation on summary
judgment. Partelow, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 52 (discussing plaintiff’s argument that a transfer occurred
shortly after plaintiff engaged in a protected action and stating “[t]he mere chronology . . . while
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, cannot get plaintiff to the jury once defendants have

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produced evidence of a legitimate reason”). Even assuming that Snell had satisfied his prima facie
case as to this claim, he has not shown that the non-retaliatory reasons offered by DOC Defendants
for terminating his access to the first floor library was pretextual, motivated by retaliatory animus.
As to Ruze, Snell argues that she “participated in retaliation against Mr. Snell.” D. 132 at
31. This allegation is based on a note that Ruze added to Snell’s medical record indicating that he
did not require a “no stairs” restriction. Id. In June 2016, Prisoners’ Legal Services contacted the
DOC on behalf of Snell, discussing his position that he should be granted access to the first floor
library based on his disability. D. 132 at 8, 31. DOC personnel then discussed the issue with Ruze
and, shortly thereafter, she entered a note in Snell’s electronic medical record stating that he was
“well known to [her],” that he “currently ambulates well [with a] cane,” and that, in her opinion,
he could “negotiate stairs.” D. 132 at 10, 31. As discussed above, the DOC Defendants have
provided an unrebutted, non-retaliatory explanation for terminating Snell’s access to the first floor
library. The record indicates that the DOC, upon receiving the letter from Prisoner’s Legal
Services, reached out to the medical personnel at MCI-Concord to confirm whether Snell was able
to access the second floor library. D. 132 at 9. Ruze confirmed that Snell was able to access the
second floor library and did not need a “no stairs” restriction, adding a notation to his record
documenting this opinion. D. 132 at 10. Further, Snell has acknowledged that medical personnel
at MCI-Concord, including Ruze, do not have the authority to determine whether an inmate has
access to the first floor library. D. 132 at 19. Snell has failed to show that Ruze took any adverse
action against him or that any actions Ruze took against him were related to his participation in
protected activity.

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E.

State Law Claims (Claim 4)

Article 114 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides that “[n]o otherwise
qualified handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or
activity within the commonwealth.” Shedlock, 442 Mass. at 852; Carleton v. Commonwealth, 447
Mass. 791, 811 (2006). Actions to enforce rights under Article 114 are brought pursuant to Mass.
Gen. L. c. 93, § 103. Shedlock, 442 Mass. at 852 n.6. The term “qualified handicapped individual”
is not defined, but Mass. Gen. L. c. 93, § 103 cross-references the definition of “handicap” in Mass.
Gen. L. c. 151, § 103 and the term has been accorded the same meaning as “disability” in the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 852 (citing Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar
Junction, 406 Mass. 156, 159 (1989)).
Given the parallels between the Article 114 claim and the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims, see Marlon v. W. New England Coll., 124 F. App'x 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2005), the state law
claim pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. c. 93, § 03 fails for the same reasons, discussed above, that the
ADA and Rehabilitation claims fail.
The Title II ADA claim and the Rehabilitation Act claim were not brought against Ruze
and, therefore, it is necessary to discuss her alleged liability under Article 114. Ruze argues that
she is not liable because Snell is not handicapped and, even if he were, she did not discriminate
against him by excluding him from a program or activity. D. 120 at 14-15. Snell argues that Ruze
discriminated against him when she discussed Snell’s medical status and request for a “no stairs”
restriction with DOC personnel, who then denied Snell access to the first floor library. D. 132 at
28-29. Snell has conceded, however, that Ruze has no authority to determine whether an inmate
is granted an accommodation and, thus, whether he has access to a program. As Snell concedes,

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the role of medical professionals is only to enter restrictions on an inmate’s record, whereas DOC
personnel assess these restrictions to approve or deny a specific accommodation to an inmate.
D. 131, ¶ 11; D. 132 at 18. As a result, Ruze was not responsible for allowing or denying Snell
access to the first floor library. Ruze determined that Snell did not require a “no stairs” restriction,
but it was up to DOC personnel to evaluate Snell’s record to determine whether to grant him an
accommodation allowing him to access the first floor library.2 Therefore, summary judgment is
granted in favor of Ruze as to Claim IV.3
F.

Mootness as to the Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Sought

Defendants also argue that Snell’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot
because, as of November 8, 2018, Snell was transferred from MCI-Concord to MCI-Shirley, a
handicap-accessible facility. D. 131, ¶ 1. Snell argues that the claim for injunctive relief is not
moot because the injuries are “capable of repetition yet evading review.” D 132 at 36. Snell argues
that the restrictions issued by Churchville is set to expire on November 8, 2019 and, thus, the
restriction that warranted Snell’s transfer to MCI-Shirley would no longer be valid and he could
be transferred to another facility that is not handicap-accessible. Id. The one-year restriction limit
is meant to allow medical personnel to evaluate and accommodate changes in inmates’ medical
conditions. The record indicates that inmates’ restrictions are reviewed during regular medical
evaluations and once the restrictions are set to expire. D. 131, ¶ 9. That Snell’s restrictions, still
in effect, could be revoked upon review and that he would then be transferred to a facility where
2

Ruze also argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because Snell failed to exhaust
all administrative remedies with respect to the claims brought against her. D. 120 at 4-6. As the
Court has found that she is entitled to summary judgment on such claim on other grounds, it is
unnecessary to address this argument.
3

The individual DOC Defendants and Ruze also argue that they are entitled to qualified
immunity. D. 115 at 40-41; D. 120 at 19. Since the Court has now allowed summary judgment
as to the claims against them on substantive grounds, the Court does not reach this issue.
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he could be denied access to programs on the basis of his disability is too speculative to determine
that Snell’s injuries are “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Shaheed-Muhammad v.
Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, 106 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that “[t]he possibility of future harm
based only on prior injury and the organization of the Massachusetts prison system is too remote
to overcome the mootness doctrine.”). Snell’s claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,
therefore, are also denied as moot based on his transfer to MCI-Shirley, a handicap-accessible
facility.
VI.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS the DOC Defendants motion for summary

judgment, D. 113, and ALLOWS Ruze’s motion for summary judgment, D. 119.
So Ordered.
/s/ Denise J. Casper
United States District Judge

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