Toldness v. Ryan

Filing 30

Judge Douglas P. Woodlock: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered granting 15 Motion to Dismiss; denying 26 Motion to Strike; the Clerk is directed to enter a judgment dismissing the petition. (Woodlock, Douglas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

MICHAEL TOLDNESS,
Petitioner,
v.
KELLY RYAN,
Respondent.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
16-11779-DPW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
May 8, 2017
Petitioner Michael Toldness, who was convicted of various
felony domestic abuse crimes in state court, filed this petition
for habeas corpus relief from this court under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254.
His custodian, Respondent Kelly Ryan, has moved to dismiss the
petition.

I will grant Respondent’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND

In 2012, Petitioner was indicted on fourteen counts
stemming from his alleged attack on his wife on December 25,
2011.

Commonwealth v. Toldness, 28 N.E.3d 14 (Table), 2015 WL

1650066, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015).
The first indictment charged Petitioner with aggravated
rape in count one, armed burglary in count two, aggravated
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon on a person
with a protective order in count three, aggravated assault and
battery on a person with a protective order in count four,

violation of an abuse prevention order in count five, larceny
over $250 in count six, aggravated assault and battery on a
person with a protective order in count seven, violation of an
abuse prevention order in counts eight and nine, threatening to
commit a crime in count ten, assault by means of a dangerous
weapon in count eleven, and threatening to commit a crime in
count twelve.

Id. at *1 n.2.

In a second indictment,

Petitioner was charged with intimidating a witness and violating
an abuse prevention order.

Id.

On January 22, 2013, a jury in Norfolk Superior Court found
Petitioner guilty on counts two, three, four, five, seven,
eight, nine, and ten of the first indictment and both counts of
the second indictment.

Id.1

As to counts one and six of the

first indictment, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the lesser
included offenses of indecent assault and battery and larceny
under $250.
Id.

Id.

The Appeals Court affirmed his conviction.

The Supreme Judicial Court denied further review.

Commonwealth v. Toldness, 32 N.E.3d 316 (Mass. 2015).
II. ANALYSIS
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
provides that “a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted
unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim on the merits

1

Counts eleven and twelve of the first indictment were
dismissed.
2

‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or
‘resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.’”

Jenkins v. Bergeron, 824 F.3d

148, 152 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d)(1)-(2))
(citations omitted).
“A state court decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly
established federal law if it ‘contradicts the governing law set
forth in the Supreme Court’s cases or confronts a set of facts
that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the
Supreme Court’ but reaches a different result.”

Gaskins v.

Duval, 640 F.3d 443, 451-52 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting John v.
Russo, 561 F.3d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 2009)).

A state court

“unreasonably applies” clearly established law “if it applies
Supreme Court precedent to the facts of the case in an
objectively unreasonable manner, such as reaching a result that
is ‘devoid of record support’ for its conclusion.”

Id. at 452

(quoting McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 37 (1st Cir. 2002))
(citations omitted).

3

Toldness pursues two grounds for relief in this court.2
First, he argues that the trial judge’s refusal to provide the
jury instruction he requested regarding the unlawful entry
component of the armed burglary charge deprived him of a fair
trial.

Second, he argues that the Commonwealth’s expert

regarding domestic abuse provided improper testimony that in
turn deprived him of a fair trial.
A.

Denial of Petitioner’s Requested Unlawful Entry Instruction
Massachusetts General Laws c. 266, ' 14 sets forth the

offense of armed burglary in Massachusetts:
Whoever breaks and enters a dwelling house in the night
time, with intent to commit a felony, or whoever, after
having entered with such intent, breaks such dwelling house
in the night time, any person being then lawfully therein,
and the offender being armed with a dangerous weapon at the
time of such breaking or entry, or so arming himself in
such house, or making an actual assault on a person
lawfully therein, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for life or for any term of not less than ten
years.
Massachusetts law is settled that “‘[t]he term ‘enters’ within
the statute is given no special definition.

Nonetheless, the

word is to be construed as an unlawful entry, consistent with
its use in a criminal context.’”

Commonwealth v. Mahar, 722

2

Toldness initially raised three grounds for relief in his
petition, but later moved to amend to remove the third ground,
acknowledging that the third ground was not included in his
application for further appellate review to the Supreme Judicial
Court and therefore remained unexhausted.
Accordingly, I
dismissed the third ground of the petition and it is no longer a
part of this case.
4

N.E.2d 461, 465 (Mass. 2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Dunn, 680
N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997)).
Petitioner claims that the evidence presented at trial
supported the view that he entered the home with the victim’s
consent.

As the Appeals Court recounted, Petitioner “requested

the following instruction: ‘An entry, or going in, by an (armed)
person into a dwelling in response to an invitation from a
person living there obviously is not a violation of the
statute.’”

Toldness, 2015 WL 1650066, at *1.

Petitioner

contends that the trial judge’s refusal to provide such an
instruction denied him the ability to present his theory of
defense.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Sixth
Amendment, either in combination or independently, “guarantee[]
criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense.’”

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)

(quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
Moreover, an incorrect jury instruction may violate the Due
Process Clause’s basic guarantee of “fundamental fairness” if
“‘the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial
that the resulting conviction violates due process.’”

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Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten,
414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)).3
The Appeals Court found no error in the trial judge’s
refusal to give the requested jury instruction.

The Appeals

Court observed that “[n]o instruction on permissive entry was
required . . . because the G.L. c. 209A abuse prevention order,
the violation of which is a criminal offense, rendered all entry
by him as unlawful regardless of his wife’s consent.”

Toldness,

2015 WL 1650066, at *1 (citations omitted).
I will not disturb the Appeals Court’s determination that,
under Massachusetts state law, the victim’s purported consent in
this case was irrelevant to whether Petitioner’s entry into the
dwelling was unlawful.

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (“[I]t is not

the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court
determinations on state-law questions.”).

The Appeals Court

3

Petitioner cites Mathews v. United States for the proposition
that “a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any
recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient
for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” 485 U.S. 58, 63
(1988). Mathews, however, dealt with an appeal from a federal
conviction “and was not based on the Constitution or federal
habeas corpus principles.” Jackson v. Mullin, 46 F. App’x 605,
609 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Mathews, 485 U.S. at 69
(White, J., dissenting) (“The Court properly recognizes that its
result is not compelled by the Constitution.”). As discussed
below, even if I were to find that Mathews created a right under
the Constitution to request an instruction as to a recognized
defense for which there is evidence in the record, no such right
would be violated here because the requested instruction did not
amount to a recognized defense to armed burglary under
Massachusetts law.
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decision was fully consistent with decisions of the Supreme
Judicial Court, which have held that violations of orders to
vacate, to refrain from abusing, or to have no contact under
G.L. c. 209A are criminal violations.

Commonwealth v. Finase,

757 N.E.2d 721, 723-24 (Mass. 2001).

In Commonwealth v. Mahar,

the Supreme Judicial Court made clear that “[a] consensual entry
. . . does not always correlate with a lawful entry.”
N.E.2d at 468-69.

722

I defer to the Appeals Court’s conclusion

that Petitioner’s requested instruction was an incorrect
statement of Massachusetts law; even if the petitioner had
received an invitation from the person living in the dwelling,
under these circumstances he still would have committed an
unlawful entry under Massachusetts law.4
Any purported federal right to jury instructions in line
with Petitioner’s theory of defense would not have been violated

4

The Appeals Court’s alternative grounds also demonstrates that
the petitioner’s proposed jury instruction was not a correct
statement of Massachusetts law. Relying on Commonwealth v.
Putnam, which in turn relied on Mahar, the Appeals Court
observed that the victim’s purported consent for the petitioner
to enter the dwelling would not be legally significant under
these circumstances because he entered the dwelling armed with a
wooden stick and ready to attack the victim once he was let
inside. Toldness, 2015 WL 1650066, at *1 n.4 (citing
Commonwealth v. Putnam, 914 N.E.2d 969, 973 (Mass. App. Ct.
2009))(“‘[P]urported consent [to entry] cannot be considered
legally significant unless the occupant has been made aware that
the person at the door is armed with a dangerous weapon and is
about to commit an assault once inside.’”) (quoting Mahar, 722
N.E.2d at 469) (alterations in original).
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by the trial court’s refusal to adopt an instruction that the
Appeals Court determined to be an incorrect statement of state
law.

Cruz v. Maloney, 152 Fed. App’x 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The

trial court’s instruction boiled down to an issue of
Massachusetts state law and [Petitioner’s] attempt to recast the
issue in a constitutional light is unavailing.”).

The jury

instructions the trial court ultimately provided do not fall
within the rare category of state rules that run afoul of either
the Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment.

The trial

judge’s instruction on armed burglary recited the elements of
the offense and described “entry” as simply “the unlawful making
of one’s way into a dwelling.”

That instruction falls within

the state’s power to define its own criminal laws and does not
violate any guarantees of the United States Constitution.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).
B.

Commonwealth’s Expert Testimony
In his second grounds for relief, Petitioner argues that

the Commonwealth’s expert on domestic violence, Dr. Margret
Bell, improperly vouched for the veracity of the victim.

He

claims that Dr. Bell tailored her testimony to fit the evidence
presented in the case and thereby gave the Commonwealth’s theory
of the case support in a manner offensive to the United States
Constitution.

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The Due Process Clause places some limits on evidence that
may be introduced at trial.

Coningford v. Rhode Island, 640

F.3d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 2011) (“To be sure, a misbegotten
evidentiary ruling that results in a fundamentally unfair trial
may violate due process and, thus, ground federal habeas
relief.”) (citing Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)).
To entitle the petitioner to habeas relief, however, the state
court’s application of state evidentiary rules “must be ‘so
arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due
process . . . violation.’”

Id. (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497

U.S. 764, 780 (1990)).
The Appeals Court held that Dr. Bell’s testimony “was not
improper because it included general concepts only” regarding
domestic violence.

Toldness, 2015 WL 1650066, at *1.

The

Appeals Court observed that under Massachusetts law “[e]xpert
testimony on domestic violence is generally admissible because
the subject is not within the common experience of ordinary
jurors,” but cautioned that “[s]uch testimony must be limited to
general characteristics shared by typical victims.”

Id. (citing

Commonwealth v. Morris, 974 N.E.2d 1152, 1159 (Mass. App. Ct.
2012)).

The Appeals Court concluded the jurors who convicted

Petitioner were “properly instructed as to how they were to
evaluate the testimony of an expert witness” and “the jurors are
presumed to follow the judge’s instructions.”
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Id.

The Appeals

Court also noted “that the expert neither met nor treated the
victim,” a circumstance which necessarily underscored that Dr.
Bell’s testimony was regarding domestic abuse generally and did
not involve her specific observations about the facts of the
alleged incident.

Id. at *1 n. 5.

I find that neither the trial court’s nor the Appeals
Court’s application of Massachusetts evidentiary rules on expert
testimony violated Petitioner’s due process rights.

Review of

the trial transcript shows that Dr. Bell testified only to
general characteristics and behavior patterns of domestic
violence victims.

Even when she discussed more specific

behavior patterns that the jury may have found similar to the
victim’s behavior-such as the potential for domestic violence
victims to continue to have sexual relations with their abusersDr. Bell focused only on general trends and did not discuss the
victim’s individual circumstances.

Moreover, before Dr. Bell

began the substance of her expert testimony, the trial judge
gave an instruction on the role of expert testimony, telling the
jury “the witness is not going to talk about this particular
case, but [will] give you some – seek to give you some insight
into what may or may not be going on in the mind of someone in a
relationship that some people would say is not a healthy
relationship.”

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As the Appeals Court correctly found, the general nature of
Dr. Bell’s testimony and the limiting instructions provided by
the trial judge ensured that her testimony was not improper
under Massachusetts state law, let alone under the federal Due
Process clause.

Toldness, 2015 WL 1650066, at *1.
III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth more fully above, I direct the
clerk to enter a judgment dismissing this petition for habeas
corpus.

/s/ Douglas P. Woodlock______
DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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