Amadi v. Department of Children and Families et al

Filing 26

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ENDORSED ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDERIn accordance with the foregoing, plaintiffs motions for injunctive relief, for injunctive relief ex parte, for an order to show cause and to strike (Docket Nos. 2, 9, 18 and 20) are DENIED and defendants motion to dismiss (Docket No. 11) is DENIED as moot. Defendants are directed to submit a memorandum on or before April 18, 2017 as to whether the case should be stayed pending the resolution of plaintiffs appeal in First Circuit Court of Appeals, Case No. 16-1960, and plaintiff shall respond on or before May 9, 2017. So ordered.(Caruso, Stephanie)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts

BENNETH O. AMADI,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No.
16-11901-NMG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This case arises from a child custody dispute.

Plaintiff

Benneth Amadi (“Amadi” or “plaintiff”) alleges that defendants,
employees of the Massachusetts Department of Children and
Families (“DCF”) and the Massachusetts Juvenile Court (“the
Juvenile Court”), are, inter alia, conspiring to violate his
constitutional rights, preventing him from seeing his children
and obstructing his access to court.
Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief, an order to show
cause and to strike are currently before the Court.
reasons that follow, those motions will be denied.

For the
Defendants’

motion to dismiss the case is also before the Court but before
deciding it, the Court will accept briefing as to whether the
case should be stayed pending a decision of the First Circuit
Court of Appeals (“First Circuit”) in plaintiff’s prior action.
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I.

Factual Background
Pro se plaintiff Amadi is a licensed attorney in

Massachusetts.

Defendants are the DCF, DCF Commissioner Linda

Spears, DCF Attorney Sean Bernard (“Attorney Bernard”), DCF
Manager Roger Randall, DCF Social Workers Sean Ferrick and
Ronald Strand and a Massachusetts Juvenile Court Judge, Garrett
McManus (“Judge McManus”).

This case is related to a lengthy

dispute over the custody of plaintiff’s four minor children.

In

July, 2013, the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court, which
has jurisdiction over divorces and child custody, granted
plaintiff temporary custody of his children.
In January, 2014, DCF filed a care and protection case
concerning the children in Juvenile Court.

Contemporaneously,

the children were removed from plaintiff’s custody and
temporarily placed in foster care.

According to defendants, the

removal occurred after two reports from mandated reporters
alleged that plaintiff was neglecting or abusing the children
and his refusal to cooperate with the investigation of the
reports.

Plaintiff contends that DCF “fraudulently and

illegally” removed the children because its employees had “the
dubious intention of transferring the custody to [the mother]”.
In defendants’ recounting of the facts, after the children
were placed in foster care, the DCF developed “service plans”
for the parents to complete in order to regain custody.
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Defendants assert that the mother completed her plan and
cooperated with DCF whereas plaintiff did neither.

In May,

2014, DCF returned physical custody of the children to their
mother because of her cooperation but it retained legal custody.
Plaintiff contends that the mother regained custody as a
result of gender discrimination and a conspiracy between Judge
McManus and DCF.

In support of those allegations, plaintiff

claims that in May, 2014, Sara Garofalo, a DCF supervisor, told
him that he lost custody because he is a man.

Plaintiff also

contends that at the June, 2015 Juvenile Court proceeding,
Attorney Bernard admitted in open court that DCF had no case
against him and that the dispute is between the parents and
belongs in Probate Court.
Defendants strenuously deny plaintiff’s version of the
facts.

Ms. Garofalo has submitted an affidavit stating that she

“told Mr. Amadi exactly the opposite of what he alleges [she]
said”.

She states that she

[s]pecifically told Mr. Amadi that [DCF] does not take
custody of children because of the gender of the parent[.]
Attorney Bernard submitted an affidavit stating that plaintiff
“misconstrues” his statements in the Juvenile Court.

He

explains that when he said “this is really the mother’s case
against the father” he meant that DCF had determined that the

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mother was a fit parent and would therefore support her in a
custody dispute.
The care and protection case in Juvenile Court is ongoing
and Judge McManus apparently plans to set a trial date after
this Court decides plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief.
II.

Procedural Background
Plaintiff has filed two lawsuits in this Court concerning

the ongoing custody proceedings.
in May, 2016.

He filed the first complaint

This Court dismissed that case based on the

Younger doctrine in July, 2016. Amadi v. McManus, et al., No.
16-cv-10861-NMG, 2016 WL 3814597, at *5 (D. Mass. July 11,
2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-1960 (1st Cir. Jul. 27, 2016)
[hereinafter “the prior action”].

Plaintiff’s appeal of that

decision is now pending before the First Circuit. Id.
In September, 2016, plaintiff filed his complaint in this
case and moved for a preliminary injunction. Amadi v. Dep’t
Child. & Fam., et al., 16-cv-11901-NMG (D. Mass. filed Sept. 19,
2016).

Shortly thereafter, he moved for injunctive relief ex

parte and defendants filed a motion to dismiss and their
opposition to injunctive relief.

Plaintiff then filed an

amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) and defendants
again moved to dismiss.
In November, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion for an order
to show cause why Attorney Bernard should not be held in
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contempt and a motion to strike defendants’ affidavits.

The

motions for injunctive relief, to show cause, to strike and to
dismiss are the subject of this memorandum and order.
III.

Motion to Strike
Plaintiff moves to strike the affidavits that Attorney

Bernard and Ms. Garofalo submitted to oppose his request for a
preliminary injunction.

According to plaintiff, the affidavits

do not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4), are inadmissible
hearsay, conclusory, speculative and contain falsehoods.
Defendants respond that plaintiff’s contentions are erroneous.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, an affidavit must be competently
made, based on personal knowledge and include admissible
evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

In the preliminary

injunction context, however, a court has “broad discretion” with
respect to the evidence that it may consider. Rice v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 2 F. Supp. 3d 25, 31 (D. Mass. 2014).

It may

rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence, including hearsay.
Asseo v. Pan American Grain Co., Inc., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.
1986).

The crucial question is whether, based on the totality

of the circumstances, the “evidence [is] appropriate given the
character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding.” Id.
The Court will not strike the affidavits.

They are based

on personal knowledge from individuals directly involved in the
events at issue.

Moreover, this Court considers the evidence
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“appropriate given the character and objectives” of injunctive
relief. Id.
IV.

Consequently, the motion to strike will be denied.

Motion for Order to Show Cause
Plaintiff moves for the Court to order Attorney Bernard to

show cause why he should not be held in contempt for purportedly
swearing to a false affidavit.

The crux of plaintiff’s

contention seems to be that, because Attorney Bernard submitted
an affidavit clarifying the meaning of his statements in
Juvenile Court, he lied under oath.

After examining the

statements side by side, this Court finds no indication that
Attorney Bernard did any such thing.

Therefore, it declines to

exercise its “wide latitude” to sanction him, AngioDynamics,
Inc. v. Biolitec AG, 780 F.3d 420, 426 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 535 (2015).
V.

Motions for Injunctive Relief
A. Legal Standard
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must

establish 1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits,
2) the potential for irreparable harm if the injunction is
withheld, 3) a favorable balance of hardships and 4) the effect
on the public interest. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24,
26-27 (1st Cir. 2007).

The same four factors are considered for

ex parte injunctive relief. See, e.g., Largess v. Supreme
Judicial Ct., 317 F. Supp. 2d 77, 81 (D. Mass. 2004).
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Out of

these factors, the likelihood of success on the merits “normally
weighs heaviest in the decisional scales.” Coquico, Inc. v.
Rodriguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 2009).
The Court may accept as true “well-pleaded allegations [in
the complaint] and uncontroverted affidavits.” Rohm & Haas Elec.
Materials, LLC v. Elec. Circuits, 759 F. Supp. 2d 110, 114, n.2
(D. Mass. 2010) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350, n.1
(1976)).

Ultimately, preliminary injunctive relief is “an

extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never awarded as of
right.” Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d
1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v.
MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011)).
B. Application
Plaintiff submitted two similar motions for injunctive
relief.

Both motions state that

since May 2016 defendants have vindictively been harassing,
intimidating and retaliating against [plaintiff] by
preventing him from visiting with his children or seeing
his children because he petitioned to the Federal District
Court . . . .
In both motions, plaintiff specifically asks the Court to enjoin
defendants from “any further unlawful interferences with
plaintiff’s relationship with his children . . . .”
1. Likelihood of Success
Plaintiff contends that he is likely to succeed on the
merits because defendants have violated his constitutional
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rights, harassed him and retaliated against him.

Defendants

respond that plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits on
grounds of: 1) claim preclusion, 2) Younger abstention, 3) the
domestic relations exception, 4) immunity and because plaintiff
has stated no plausible or actionable claims.
At first glance, plaintiff’s claims based on events that
occurred before July, 2016 appear to be barred by the doctrine
of res judicata because this Court already dismissed those
claims in the prior action.

Res judicata is inapplicable here,

however, because this Court applied Younger abstention rather
than resolving the claims on the merits. See Eldakroury v.
Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, 601 F. App'x 156, 158 (3d Cir.
2015) (“[W]here Younger abstention is appropriate, federal
courts ‘have no occasion to address the merits’ . . . .”);
Foster v. City of El Paso, 308 F. App'x 811, 812 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“The district court's express purpose in applying Younger
abstention was to avoid reaching the merits, which would likely
interfere with pending state judicial proceedings.”).

Although

plaintiff’s claims are not precluded, this Court again
determines that the Younger doctrine applies.
As fully described in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), the Younger doctrine “counsels federal-court abstention
when there is a pending state proceeding.” Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415, 423 (1979).

The doctrine derives from “principles of
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equity, comity, and federalism.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 460 (1974).

It recognizes that state and federal courts

bear an equal responsibility “to guard, enforce, and protect
every right granted or secured by the constitution of the United
States.” Id. at 460-61 (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624,
637 (1884)).
The First Circuit has identified a three-step analysis to
determine whether Younger applies. Sirva Relocation, LLC v.
Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 192–93 (1st Cir. 2015).

First, the state

proceeding must be a criminal prosecution, civil enforcement
proceeding or a civil proceeding “uniquely in the furtherance of
the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)[hereinafter “NOPSI”]; see also Sprint,
134 S. Ct. at 593-94.

Second, the case must meet the three

Middlesex factors: 1) the state proceeding is ongoing, 2) it
involves significant state interests and 3) it permits the
plaintiff to raise his federal claims. Brooks v. New Hampshire
Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 638 (1st Cir. 1996).

Finally,

courts consider whether exceptions to Younger apply. Sirva, 794
F.3d at 193.

For instance, if the state proceeding is brought

“in bad faith” to harass, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
490 (1965), or there is “concrete evidence” of bias, Brooks, 80
F.3d at 640, abstention is not warranted.
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If a case meets all three prongs of the Younger analysis,
federal courts must abstain from exercising jurisdiction even if
the plaintiff asserts that important federal rights are at
issue. See In re Justices of Superior Court Dep’t of Mass. Trial
Court, 218 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2000) (collecting cases).
As this Court has previously concluded, it is appropriate
to abstain from adjudicating plaintiff’s claims that this Court
dismissed in July, 2016 under the Younger doctrine. Amadi, 2016
WL 3814597, at *5.

As for the claims raised for the first time

in this action, i.e. that after the dismissal of his prior
action defendants retaliated against him and harassed him by
preventing him from seeing his children, plaintiff remains
unlikely to succeed on those claims by virtue of the Younger
doctrine.
Under the first step of the Younger analysis, state child
custody proceedings involve a “traditional area of state
concern” and warrant abstention. Moore, 442 U.S. at 434–35
(determining that Younger abstention is appropriate when there
is an ongoing child welfare proceeding); see also Brooks, 80
F.3d at 638–39 (applying Younger abstention when a plaintiff
requested that a federal court enjoin, inter alia, a state
paternity proceeding).

Plaintiff’s disagreement with this

Court’s conclusion that he is asking the Court to interfere with
the child custody proceeding rings hollow in light of his
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request that the Court enjoin defendants “from any unlawful
interferences with plaintiff’s relationship with his children”.
Plaintiff also contends that Younger is inapplicable
because the DCF is an executive agency rather than a judicial
body. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368.

Custody and visitation

determinations are, however, part of the ongoing care and
protection case in Juvenile Court. See Care & Prot. of Isaac,
646 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Mass. 1995)(concluding that Juvenile
Court Judges should review challenges to DCF custodial decisions
“for legal error or abuse of discretion”).

Accordingly, the

requested injunction involves a civil judicial proceeding
uniquely suitable for state court resolution and the first prong
of the Younger analysis is met. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368.
With respect to the second step, this case meets the three
Middlesex factors.

First, the state proceeding is ongoing.

Second, although plaintiff makes conclusory accusations about
the unfairness of that proceeding, he has provided no evidence
that overcomes the strong presumption that his federal claims
can be addressed in the state proceeding. Casa Marie, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Puerto Rico for Dist. of Arecibo, 988 F.2d
252, 262–63 (1st Cir. 1993).

Third, “[f]amily relations are a

traditional area of state concern” and there is a “compelling
state interest” in protecting victims of child abuse. Moore, 442

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U.S. at 435 (internal quotations omitted).

Therefore, the

Middlesex factors are satisfied here.
Finally, under the third step of the analysis, no
exceptions to Younger apply.

Plaintiff contends that there is

evidence of bad faith and harassment and consequently this court
may hear his claims under Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 490.

The

supposed harassment, however, is the cessation of his visits
with his children.

Defendants have explained that the visits

were suspended because of erratic and irrational behavior of the
plaintiff and that he has not requested that they resume.
Plaintiff also alleges that Judge McManus is biased but a
claim of judicial bias requires “more than the frenzied
brandishing of a cardboard sword.” Brooks, 80 F.3d at 639.
Plaintiff has provided no plausible evidence to support his
claim and this Court therefore adheres to the
historic presumption that judges are men [and women] of
conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging
a particular controversy fairly . . . .
Id. at 640 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975)
(internal quotations omitted).
In sum, the Younger doctrine applies to both plaintiff’s
previous claims and his new claims.

When abstention is

warranted under Younger, “there is no real possibility—let alone
a likelihood—that the plaintiff will succeed in his action.”
Brooks, 80 F.3d at 637.

Therefore, there is no need to address
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the other grounds defendants offer in support of their
contention that plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits.
2. Other Factors
As for the other factors, plaintiff is, no doubt, harmed by
not seeing his children.

Nevertheless, the balance of hardships

weighs against a preliminary injunction because Massachusetts
has a compelling interest in ensuring that its court system is
able quickly to remove children after allegations of abuse and
an investigation. See Moore, 442 U.S. at 435.

There is also a

strong public interest in respecting the integrity of the courts
of the Commonwealth.

Thus, because plaintiff is unlikely to

succeed on the merits, the balance of interests weighs against
an injunction and there is a substantial public interest in
comity, a preliminary injunction is unwarranted.
VIII. Motions to Dismiss
Defendants’ first motion to dismiss will be denied as moot
because of the amended complaint.

With respect to the second

motion, the parties are instructed to submit memoranda as to
whether the Court should stay the case and reserve its decision
on that motion until after the First Circuit has ruled on
plaintiff’s appeal.

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ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing, plaintiff’s motions for
injunctive relief, for injunctive relief ex parte, for an order
to show cause and to strike (Docket Nos. 2, 9, 18 and 20) are
DENIED and defendants’ motion to dismiss (Docket No. 11) is
DENIED as moot.

Defendants are directed to submit a memorandum

on or before April 18, 2017 as to whether the case should be
stayed pending the resolution of plaintiff’s appeal in First
Circuit Court of Appeals, Case No. 16-1960, and plaintiff shall
respond on or before May 9, 2017.

So ordered.

/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated March 28, 2017

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