Saintcome v. Tully et al

Filing 18

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ENDORSED ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDERFor the foregoing reasons,1) plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel (Docket No. 16) is DENIED, and2) defendants motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 14) is DENIED.So ordered.(Caruso, Stephanie)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
William Saintcome,
Plaintiff,
v.
Jason Tully, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No.
16-12490-NMG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This case arises from an alleged incident of excessive
force against a restrained, pre-trial detainee.

Plaintiff

William Saintcome (“Saintcome” or “plaintiff”) asserts that two
defendant correctional officers, Officer Jason Tully (“Tully”)
and Officer C. Perrin (“Perrin”), deprived him of his civil
rights.

Saintcome alleges that while he was awaiting release

from the segregation unit of the Billerica House of Corrections
(“BHOC”) in Billerica, Massachusetts, the defendant officers
used improper, excessive force against him in violation of his
constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.

He also alleges

state tort claims of assault and battery against both
defendants.

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Pending before the Court are defendants’ motion to dismiss
and plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel.

For the reasons that

follow, plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel will be denied and
defendants’ motion to dismiss will also be denied.
I.

Background
Plaintiff is a prisoner at Massachusetts Correctional

Institution - Concord appearing pro se.

Prior to his

incarceration in that facility, he was imprisoned awaiting trial
at the BHOC.
Saintcome alleges that on November 12, 2014, he was
scheduled to be released from the BHOC’s segregation unit.
Defendant Perrin and a third corrections officer, Officer
Corindina (“Corindina”), had placed Saintcome in restraints
before his daily recreation time.

When time came to remove the

restraints, defendant Tully appeared.

Saintcome requested that

Corindina, rather than Tully, remove the restraints.

He did so

because of a prior verbal confrontation with Tully, when the
officer allegedly denied him a meal that satisfied his religious
dietary restrictions and Tully made derogatory remarks about
plaintiff’s Islamic faith.
According to the complaint, when Saintcome requested that
Corindina remove his restraints, Tully slammed his head into the
cell wall and pushed him onto the bunk where his head hit the
metal frame.

Perrin then allegedly entered the cell and elbowed
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Saintcome four times in the face before Corindina intervened and
commanded Tully to leave, at which time Tully allegedly engaged
in another tirade of racial and religious epithets.
On October 14, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging
violations of his civil rights against Officers Tully and
Perrin.
II.

Analysis
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a defendant may move

to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint

contain “sufficient factual matter” to state a claim for relief
that is actionable as a matter of law and “plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007)).

A claim is

facially plausible if, after accepting as true all nonconclusory factual allegations, the court can draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuno–Burset, 640 F.3d
1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
A. Application
Defendant claims that the complaint should be dismissed
because 1) defendants’ alleged use of force did not rise to the
level of a deprivation of a constitutional right, 2) defendants
are shielded by qualified immunity, 3) plaintiff’s cause of
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action is not properly pled and 4) plaintiff’s state law claims
cannot be sustained.

Plaintiff has claimed a deprivation of a

civil right and seeks money damages.

In order to sue an

official acting under color of law for money damages for
deprivation of a constitutional right, the sole remedy available
under federal law is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To succeed on a § 1983 claim for excessive force against a
pretrial detainee, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
purposely or knowingly used objectively unreasonable force
against him. Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-Davila, 813 F.3d 64, 70
(1st Cir. 2016).
1.

The reasonableness of the force used

Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges that excessive force
was used by corrections officers on an incarcerated pretrial
detainee, the Supreme Court has held that the appropriate
standard of review is objective reasonableness. Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473–74 (2015).

To prevail in such

an action, plaintiff must show that the offending officer
“purposely or knowingly used [force] against him[, which] was
objectively unreasonable” and the court must take into account
whether the action was needed to “preserve internal order and
discipline.” Id. at 2473.
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, all well-pled
factual allegations are taken as true. Ocasio-Hernandez, 640
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F.3d at 12.

Given that Saintcome was restrained at the time of

the incident, a factfinder could plausibly infer that the
alleged acts of Tully and Perrin did not constitute an
objectively reasonable use of force.

Furthermore, plaintiff has

alleged that the motivation for the force was racial and
religious animus on the part of Tully, rather than a desire to
preserve order and discipline.

Thus, plaintiff has properly

stated a claim of excessive force against both defendants.
When a pretrial detainee makes an allegation of excessive
force, there is an open question concerning the specific civil
right which has been infringed. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 395 (1989).

The Court in Graham reserved the question of

whether the Fourth Amendment’s protection of arrestees against
excessive force extends to pretrial detainees, or whether such
claims should be analyzed under Fourteenth Amendment due
process. Id.
The 1st Circuit has yet to resolve the question but some
district courts within the Circuit have analyzed the issue under
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures.
See Miranda-Rivera, 813 F.3d at 70; see also Rivera–García v.
Román–Carrero, 938 F.Supp.2d 189, 198–99 (D.P.R. 2013)
(rejecting application of Fourteenth Amendment due process
protection for arrestee).

For the purpose of this motion, we

accept as pled the plaintiff’s uncontested claim that the civil
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right implicated in this instance of purported excessive force
was his right to be free of unreasonable seizure.
Defendants maintain that the use of force described in the
complaint cannot rise to the level of a constitutional violation
because the quantum of force used was de minimis.

To support

that contention, they cite the Supreme Court’s holding in Hudson
v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) and a string of subsequent
cases.
Those cases are inapposite, however, because they deal with
the Eighth Amendment’s bar on corrective punishment of convicts.
Because, at the time of the incident, plaintiff was not
convicted of a crime but rather was a pre-trial detainee, it is
the Fourth, not the Eighth, Amendment that is implicated.

The

proper standard in this case is to examine whether, in the
context of the incident, the level of force used against
Saintcome was objectively reasonable. See Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at
2473.

An attempt to quantify the harm suffered by plaintiff has

little bearing on whether the force was necessary or reasonable.
Taking these facts as true, plaintiff has pled facts that
plausibly constitute a claim of excessive force.

Accordingly,

plaintiff’s cause of action will not be dismissed on these
grounds.

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2.

Defendants’ immunity defense

Section 1983 is the sole method under federal law to sue
for money damages for the deprivation of constitutional rights
against individuals who would otherwise be protected by Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

However, § 1987 does not allow

for awards of money damages against officials acting in their
official capacities, as they are not “persons” as defined by the
statute. Id.

Defendants contend that by identifying defendants

as corrections officers, plaintiff has brought this action
against them in their official capacities, and therefore they
are protected by sovereign immunity.

That contention is

unavailing.
Although all parties are required to adhere to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff are to be read
liberally. Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 188 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.
1997).

Plaintiff is explicit in his complaint that he is

bringing suit against Tully and Perrin solely “in their
individual capacities”, rendering them susceptible to suit for
money damages.
To the extent that they are sued in an individual capacity,
defendants are provided no shield of immunity by the Eleventh

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Amendment, and plaintiff’s claims will not be dismissed on that
ground.
3.

The sufficiency of plaintiff’s complaint

To prevail on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for excessive force,
a plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of state
law subjected them to a deprivation of rights secured by the
constitution. See Will, 491 at 64.

Defendants contend that

because 1) plaintiff did not specifically invoke § 1983 and
2) there exists no independent cause of action under the
Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff’s pleading was insufficient and
must be dismissed.1
Federal pleading rules call for “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

They do not, however, require

that a plaintiff enumerate every statute empowering their cause
of action. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S. Ct. 346, 347
(2014)(per curiam).
A cursory review of plaintiff’s complaint reveals that he
has properly pled the elements of a § 1983 claim for excessive
force.

A finder of fact could plausibly determine that the

force used against Saintcome was not objectively reasonable

Plaintiff has clarified in his memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motion
to dismiss that his complaint is meant to allege a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
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given the allegation that he was restrained and compliant at the
time.

The Supreme Court has held that it is sufficient for a

plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate substantive
plausibility.

There is no requirement to invoke § 1983 by rote

in order to state such a claim. See id.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) will be denied.
4.

Plaintiff’s state law claims

Defendants, anticipating dismissal of the federal claim in
this case, have asked this Court to dispose of the state law
claims as well.
Federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate
pendent state claims arising from the same case or controversy
as a plaintiff’s federal claims. 18 U.S.C. § 1367.

Because this

Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts which
plausibly allege a cause of action under § 1983, plaintiff’s
state tort claims will be considered as well. See RodriguezReyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 2013)
(reversing summary judgment on federal claim and reinstating
state law claims).

For that reason, defendants’ motion to

dismiss the state law claims will be denied.
5.

Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel

Plaintiff requests that counsel be appointed to aid him in
preparation of his claim.

That request will be denied.
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Civil

litigants have no constitutional right to counsel. Cookish v.
Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986).

A district court has

discretion, however, to appoint counsel to indigent civil
litigants in “exceptional circumstances” based upon the kind and
complexity of factual and legal issues involved and the ability
of the individual bringing it 1) to conduct whatever factual
investigation is necessary and 2) to present his or her case.
Id. at 2–3.
“Exceptional circumstances” warranting the appointment of
counsel for the plaintiffs are lacking in this case. See id. at
2.

The plaintiff is already familiar with the facts of this

case and therefore no lengthy investigation is required.
Moreover, his case does not present complex or novel questions
of law.

At this nascent stage the Court finds plaintiff capable

of proceeding pro se.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel is
denied.

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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons,
1) plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket
No. 16) is DENIED, and
2) defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 14) is DENIED.
So ordered.

/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton______
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated November 8, 2017

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