B2 Opportunity Fund, LLC v. Trabelsi et al
Judge Richard G. Stearns: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered granting 96 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Lloyd and Kirton McKonkie's motion to dismiss (Dkt #96) is ALLOWED. (RGS, law1)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-10043-RGS
B2 OPPORTUNITY FUND, LLC
NISSIM TRABELSI ET AL.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANTS
C. PARKINSON LLOYD AND KIRTON MCCONKIE, P.C.
August 28, 2017
Defendants C. Parkinson Lloyd, a Utah attorney, and Kirton McConkie,
P.C., Lloyd’s Utah law firm, jointly move to dismiss this lawsuit brought by
B2 Opportunity Fund, LLC.
Defendants contend that this court lacks
personal jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the court will allow the
The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint and an
affidavit from Lloyd. Lloyd practices law in Utah. In January of 2013, he
began representing a company called Boston Investment and Development
Corp. (BIDC), a Nevada corporation headquartered in Massachusetts and led
by Nissim Trabelsi, a Massachusetts resident. In December of 2013, Lloyd
moved from his previous law firm to Kirton McConkie (KM), also based in
Utah. He brought BIDC with him as a client. In February of 2014, BIDC
changed its name to Mazzal Holding Corp.
Trabelsi continued as the
president and CEO of the rechristened company. Invoices for the legal
services provided by Lloyd and KM to Mazzal were mailed to either Israel or
In the summer of 2015, Trabelsi told Lloyd that he was interested in
selling Mazzal. In August of that year, Lloyd spoke with Peter Peterson, the
managing member of B2. When Peterson expressed interest in purchasing a
publicly traded company, Lloyd mentioned that he had a client who had such
a company to sell. On August 18, 2015, Lloyd told Peterson that Mazzal was
still on the market and offered to introduce Peterson to Trabelsi.
September 10, 2015, Lloyd emailed Trabelsi and Peterson to make the
Lloyd remained involved as Trabelsi and Peterson negotiated several
complex transactions. The transaction at issue began to take shape when
Peterson contacted Lloyd in mid-November of 2015 to express an interest in
purchasing Trabelsi’s shares in Mazzal.
Lloyd communicated this to
Trabelsi. Subsequently, Lloyd drafted and revised a term sheet and provided
comments on a letter of intent. To enable Trabelsi to complete some of the
terms of the deal, he assisted the filing of Mazzal’s 10-Q report for the third
quarter of 2015. Lloyd drafted and circulated to the parties a draft stock
purchase agreement and an escrow agreement, and then followed up with
emails and amended documents, as needed, through the closing of the deal
on February 5, 2016.
The transaction proved ill-fated.
The finalized stock purchase
agreement (SPA) called for Trabelsi to transfer 45.8 million restricted shares
and 9.5 million “free-trading shares” held by a “Shawn Telsi,” who Trabelsi
held out to be his brother-in-law. B2 alleges that Telsi was merely an alias
for Trabelsi, and that the alias was instrumental in Trabelsi’s alleged fraud:
Trabelsi transferred 9.5 million of the 45.8 million restricted shares into
Telsi’s name, and then transferred those shares to B2, while representing
them as the free-trading shares. Trabelsi afterwards sold a substantial
number of the free-trading shares in the open market.
The parties to the SPA — B2, Mazzal, and Trabelsi/Telsi— also entered
into an escrow agreement appointing KM (and, by extension, Lloyd) as the
escrow agent for the transaction. In that capacity, KM held $315,000 in a
Utah escrow account. The funds were to be released to Trabelsi after KM
either received all of the shares covered by the agreement or was “informed
by VStock Transfer, LLC, [Mazzal]’s Transfer Agent . . . that the [shares] have
been returned to the Transfer Agent for transfer to the Buyer.” In response
to an email from Lloyd, a VStock representative reported on February 8,
2016 that “it appears we have all necessary paperwork to process” the stock
transaction. Lloyd and KM transferred the escrow funds to Trabelsi the same
day. B2 alleges that VStock never possessed the requisite documents, and
that Lloyd and KM failed to take steps to confirm that Trabelsi had provided
the correct type of shares and accompanying documentation to VStock. This
failure, B2 says, amounted to a breach of the escrow agreement, breach of
fiduciary duty, and gross negligence to boot. In addition, B2 contends that
Lloyd and KM effectively represented both sides to the SPA.1
Lloyd and KM moved to dismiss, asserting that this court lacks
personal jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, B2 filed its Amended Complaint as
of right, and Lloyd and KM responded by again moving to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
The parties open with a skirmish about the relationship between the
SPA and the escrow agreement. B2 asserts that Lloyd and KM are bound by
B2 brings this suit on its own behalf and as the assignee of claims held
by Mazzal (now known as Znergy, Inc). The Amended Complaint therefore
contains two claims each for breach of fiduciary duty (Counts VII and VIII)
and gross negligence (Counts IX and X). B2 alone asserts the breach of
contract claim (Count XVI).
the SPA’s choice of forum and its recital of a consent to jurisdiction in
Massachusetts. B2 points out that the SPA specifically provides that “[e]ach
party . . . consents to the personal jurisdiction of any state or federal court
located in Suffolk County, Massachusetts . . . in any proceeding arising out of
or relating to any transaction document.” Dkt 77-2, ¶ 6.6. The opening
paragraph of the SPA defines “parties” and “party” as including Nissim
Trabelsi, Shawn Telsi, the Mazzal Trust, and B2. Id. at 1. The problem posed
by this definition for B2 is obvious: although the SPA provides that each
“party” to the SPA consents to jurisdiction in Massachusetts, the term “party”
does not include Lloyd or KM.
The escrow agreement, which is
unquestionably binding on Lloyd and KM, contains no consent to
B2 attempts to overcome this hurdle by arguing that the escrow
agreement and SPA must be read as an integrated whole, and that Lloyd and
KM are thus bound by the SPA’s consent to jurisdiction provision. As the
escrow agreement specifies Utah as the choice of law, and B2 does not
contest its validity or applicability, the court will apply Utah law.2 See Oahn
Nguyen Chung v. StudentCity.com, Inc., 854 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir. 2017).
B2 cites both Utah and Massachusetts law, but its surreply relies
chiefly on Utah law, and at oral argument it did not contest the assertion that
Utah law governs. In any event, B2 has provided no argument for why
Under Utah law, the interpretation of the terms of a contract is a
question of law. McNeil Eng’g & Land Surveying, LLC v. Bennett, 268 P.3d
854, 857 (Utah Ct. App. 2011). The court must “look to the contract’s four
corners to determine the parties’ intentions, which are controlling.”
Bakowski v. Mtn. States Steel, Inc., 52 P.3d 1179, 1184 (Utah 2002). In
ascertaining intent, as B2 argues, two agreements “executed substantially
contemporaneously and . . . clearly interrelated . . . must be construed as a
whole and harmonized.” Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat’l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229
(Utah 1987). This interpretive principle has force where, as here, it would be
nonsensical to give identical terms in the SPA and the escrow agreement —
such as “Trabelsi Shares” or “Telsi Shares” — different meanings. But in
most circumstances this aphorism is an interpretive principle, not a rule
altering the contractual obligations of non-parties. See, e.g., Paracor Fin.,
Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 1996). It is
therefore unsurprising that B2 points to no Utah case in which this rule has
been invoked to hold a party to one agreement to the terms of a second
agreement to which it is not a party. Instead, Utah cases import terms from
one agreement into a separate agreement where both parties have signed the
Massachusetts would not honor the escrow agreement’s choice of law clause.
See Taylor v. E. Connection Operating, Inc., 465 Mass. 191, 195-196 (2013).
relevant agreements, see, e.g., Shields v. Harris, 934 P.2d 653, 657 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997), or where a “clear and unequivocal” incorporation by reference
has occurred, Consol. Realty Grp. v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 273
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 97
n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). No incorporation of the jurisdictional provision
with the “degree of specificity” required by Utah law, Hous. Auth. of Cty. of
Salt Lake v. Snyder, 44 P.3d 724, 729 (Utah 2002), occurred here.3
B2 musters one additional argument in an effort to apply the terms of
the SPA to Lloyd and KM. It points to the SPA’s specification that “[e]ach
party” waives any objections to venue or forum non conveniens and “agrees
The result would be the same under Massachusetts law.
Massachusetts courts have occasionally held that a contract’s terms can bind
nonparties under the “read together” rule, but in circumstances wholly
unlike those here. In Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 32 Mass. App. Ct.
248 (1992), a bank and a corporation entered into a loan agreement that
provided that two of the company’s principals would guarantee the debt. Id.
at 249. The loan agreement included a jury waiver clause. Id. The principals
and the bank entered into a separate guarantee agreement which did not
include the jury waiver clause. Id. Relying on cases involving sureties and
guarantors, the Appeals Court concluded that the jury waiver clause bound
the principals as well because the various “documents were part of one
transaction and were . . . to be read together,” the bank sought “personal
guarantees because [the defendants] were the principals of the corporation
borrowing money,” and “[t]he defendants were the ones who negotiated the
loan on behalf of [the corporation], and they could easily monitor and
control” performance. Id. at 251. Nothing comparable occurred here: Lloyd
and KM are not guarantors, did not negotiate the terms of the SPA, and could
not control the performance contemplated by the SPA.
not to initiate any proceeding arising out of or relating to any transaction
document (unless otherwise stated to the contrary in any transaction
document) in any other court or forum.”
Dkt 77-2 ¶ 6.6.
“transaction document” is likewise defined: “[A]ny other required
documents or agreements . . . to which [either Trabelsi or Telsi] is a party.”
Id. ¶ 2.1. These provisions, B2 contends, bar it from bringing suit against
Lloyd and KM in any other forum, as its claims “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to”
the escrow agreement, a “transaction document.”
Once again, however, the provisions B2 identifies embody the
agreement of “[e]ach party” to the SPA. Id. ¶ 6.6. Lloyd and KM are not
parties to the SPA, either colloquially or in the manner in which the SPA
defines that term. Consequently, the prohibition against suits in other fora
does not bar B2 from suing Lloyd and KM elsewhere. Even if the provision
were read (illogically) to apply to suits against nonparties, Lloyd and KM
would lack standing to enforce it.4 See Cumis Ins. Soc., Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale
Club, Inc., 455 Mass. 458, 464 (2009) (“That the plaintiffs derive a benefit
B2 has an additional layer of protection: Lloyd and KM would likely
be judicially estopped from relying on the terms of the SPA in raising a
jurisdictional challenge to B2’s suit in another forum, given the position they
have taken regarding the applicability of the key provisions of the SPA here.
See generally Perry v. Blum, 629 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2010) (describing
elements of judicial estoppel).
from a contract between others does not make them intended third-party
beneficiaries and does not give them the right to enforce that agreement,”
and an “express and unambiguous” exclusion of third-party beneficiaries
will be honored); Sullivan v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 85 Mass. App. Ct. 202,
206 (2014) (“[A] nonparty who does not benefit from a contract generally is
without standing to enforce rights under it.”).
With the contractual niceties put to the side, the court must turn to the
more pertinent question of personal jurisdiction. It is the plaintiff’s burden
to demonstrate that personal jurisdiction exists. Adelson v. Hananel, 510
F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2007). District courts may employ any of several
methods to evaluate the adequacy of a plaintiff’s proof. See Boit v. Gar-Tec
Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675-678 (1st Cir. 1992). As the parties have
expressed no preference among methods, the court will employ the most
common: the “prima facie” approach. Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt,
Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2002). Under this
approach, the court does not engage in factfinding, but instead examines
whether the plaintiff has provided “evidence which, taken at face value,
suffices to show all facts essential to personal jurisdiction.” Baskin-Robbins
Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2016).
The court will thus “‘accept the plaintiff’s (properly documented) evidentiary
proffers as true,’ and construe those facts ‘in the light most congenial to the
plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim.’” Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275, 279 (1st
Cir. 2008) (quoting Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51). The court also considers
uncontradicted facts put forward by the defendants. Daynard, 290 F.3d at
B2 must demonstrate that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Lloyd and KM meets the requirements of both the Massachusetts long-arm
statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Cossart v. United Excel Corp., 804 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2015). Although for
the most part these two requirements overlap, some daylight can be found
between the two. See id. Here, however, the court can bypass the long-arm
statute, as no personal jurisdiction exists under the constitutional standard.
“In order for a . . . court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit’ must
‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Calif., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780
(2017) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014))
(emphasis omitted). To satisfy this standard, “the defendant’s suit-related
conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.” Walden
v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014). Thus, “specific jurisdiction is confined
to adjudication of issues arising from, or connected with, the very
controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct.
at 1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
Courts employ a three-part approach when analyzing specific
jurisdiction, asking “(1) whether the claim ‘directly arise[s] out of, or relate[s]
to, the defendant’s forum state activities;’ (2) whether the defendant’s instate contacts ‘represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of that state’s laws and making the defendant’s involuntary
presence before the state’s courts foreseeable;’ and (3) whether the exercise
of jurisdiction is reasonable.” Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 35 (quoting C.W.
Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir.
2014)). All three elements of the test must be met in order to establish
personal jurisdiction. Id.
At the outset, B2 faces an uphill climb. Courts have generally been
unwilling to find that out-of-state attorneys are subject to personal
jurisdiction in the state where a client is located, at least where the legal
services at issue occurred outside of that state. See Newsome v. Gallacher,
722 F.3d 1257, 1280-1281 (10th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases and joining the
majority view “that an out-of-state attorney working from out-of-state on an
out-of-state matter does not purposefully avail himself of the client’s home
forum’s laws and privileges”); see also Companion Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Palermo, 723 F.3d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 2013); Austad Co. v. Pennie &
Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223, 226-227 (8th Cir. 1987). The First Circuit is no
exception to this rule. See Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381 (1st Cir. 1995).
B2 first must demonstrate that the claims it has against Lloyd and KM
arise out of or relate to Lloyd and KM’s contacts with Massachusetts.
Emphasizing that this is a “flexible, relaxed standard,” Pritzker v. Yari, 42
F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 1994), B2 points to several facts in an attempt to establish
relatedness: 1) emails between Lloyd and Trabelsi, known to be a
Massachusetts resident; 2) invoicing Mazzal in Massachusetts; 3) effecting
the introduction between Trabelsi and Peterson that led to the transaction;
4) drafting the relevant documents for the deal; and 5) wiring the $315,000
purchase price to a Massachusetts bank account.
These contacts, however, are weaker than those facing the First Circuit
in Sawtelle. There, two New Hampshire residents brought suit against their
attorneys, alleging malpractice in the handling of a wrongful death
settlement in a court in Florida. The attorneys — one based in Virginia, and
the other in Florida — successfully moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The attorneys’ contacts with New Hampshire consisted of
phone calls with their clients and “numerous letters” addressed to the
plaintiffs in New Hampshire. Id. at 1386.
The First Circuit viewed the plaintiffs’ argument on the “arising out of”
element of the personal jurisdiction test “as tenuous at best.” Id. at 1391. It
observed that among all the phone calls and letters, only two were relevant
to the claims: the Virginia attorney’s letter stating “that he believed it to be
in the [plaintiffs]’ best interests to accept the . . . settlement offer,” and the
Florida attorney’s “telephone call to New Hampshire in which he concurred
in the settlement recommendation.” Id. at 1389. The court made two related
observations about these contacts. First, it noted that the alleged negligence
occurred almost entirely out of state — specifically, the lawyers’ investigation
of the claims in Florida and Virginia. Id. at 1390. Second, it concluded that
the fact that the attorneys “directed negligent settlement advice into New
Hampshire” did not alter this conclusion: “[t]he communications sent into
New Hampshire were ancillary to the allegedly negligent non-forum
activities, and . . . those communications were the only relevant contacts with
the forum for purposes of the . . . malpractice claim.” Id. at 1390-1391.
This case tracks Sawtelle in several important respects. First, like the
attorneys in Sawtelle, Lloyd and KM are not licensed to practice in
Massachusetts, have no offices here, and never traveled to Massachusetts
during the representation. Second, all of Lloyd and KM’s services were
performed in Utah, and the alleged misconduct — negligence and breach of
fiduciary duties in handling the escrow funds — occurred in Utah as well. See
Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 289, 291 (1st
Cir. 1999) (“A breach of fiduciary duty occurs where the fiduciary acts
disloyally.”). Third, the contacts at issue — emails and phone calls in the
course of the attorney-client representation — are fundamentally
indistinguishable from the contacts the First Circuit viewed as “tenuous” in
Sawtelle. Moreover, the allegations here are a step removed even from the
tenuous contacts that figured in Sawtelle. Two of the forum contacts in
Sawtelle could be characterized as “ancillary to the allegedly negligent nonforum activities,” because they were a continuation or completion of a course
of negligent conduct. Id. at 1390. The same is not true of the allegations here
— the alleged misconduct took place entirely in Utah, and none of the actions
Lloyd and KM took under the escrow agreement bear any relation to the
Massachusetts contacts B2 identifies.5 Thus, B2’s claims do not arise out of
or relate to Lloyd and KM’s forum contacts.
Although the First Circuit has recommended analyzing relatedness
separately for breach of contract and tort claims, see Phillips Exeter Acad.,
196 F.3d at 289, 291, there is nothing separate to analyze here: the breach of
contract claim is pressed by B2 alone (not by Mazzal, the only Massachusetts
party to the escrow agreement), and nothing indicates that Lloyd and KM’s
B2 also fails to demonstrate that Lloyd and KM purposefully availed
themselves of doing business in Massachusetts.
involves two subinquiries: voluntariness and foreseeability.
Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2008).
Lloyd and KM’s contacts with Massachusetts were voluntary: they
contracted to represent a company with its principal place of business in
Massachusetts,6 billing the company there at times, and knew Trabelsi was
located in Massachusetts during that representation.
It is clear, however, that awareness of a party’s presence in a particular
forum “is not, on its own, enough to create personal jurisdiction over a
defendant,” id.; something more than simple awareness is required. Thus,
contacts with Massachusetts “were instrumental either in the formation of
the contract or in its breach,” id. at 289.
Lloyd and KM suggest that Mazzal’s principal place of business
during the relevant period was Israel, where KM often sent invoices and
which was listed as the company’s principal executive office on some SEC
filings. B2 points out that Mazzal’s SEC filings during the relevant period
sometimes listed a Massachusetts address. Beyond Trabelsi’s alleged
presence in Massachusetts during the relevant period, nothing beyond this
evidence is adduced to determine where Mazzal’s “nerve center” was located.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010); cf. id. at 97 (concluding
that SEC filings alone are insufficient to demonstrate principal place of
business in response to a jurisdictional challenge). In keeping with the
plaintiff-friendly approach of the prima facie test, see Hannon, 524 F.3d at
279, the court assumes that Mazzal’s principal place of business was
Massachusetts throughout the time of the events leading to this suit, and
thus that Lloyd and KM represented a Massachusetts client.
“[t]he mere existence of an attorney-client relationship, unaccompanied by
other sufficient contacts with the forum, does not confer personal
jurisdiction over the non-resident in the forum state.” Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at
1392. The foreseeability inquiry demands contacts such that a defendant
could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in the forum. Adelson,
510 F.3d at 50 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). “A purpose of the foreseeability requirement is that
‘personal jurisdiction over nonresidents . . . is a quid for a quo that consists
of the state’s extending protection or other services to the nonresident.’”
Phillips, 530 F.3d at 29 (quoting Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1392).
Although it acknowledges Sawtelle’s conclusion that an attorney-client
relationship, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate purposeful
availment, B2 contends that jurisdiction in Massachusetts was reasonably
foreseeable based on a familiar set of facts: because 1) Lloyd and KM
represented Mazzal for an extended period of time for multiple issues; 2) the
SPA, as drafted, included a Massachusetts choice of forum and choice of law
clause; 3) Lloyd arranged an introduction for Peterson and Trabelsi; 4) Lloyd
sent or received multiple emails related to the transaction; and 5) the money
was transferred to a Massachusetts account.
At least three of these facts — Lloyd and KM’s representation of Mazzal,
the drafting of documents pursuant to that representation, and sending and
receiving emails in the course of the representation — are part and parcel of
any attorney-client relationship with an out-of-state client and do not make
jurisdiction in the forum foreseeable. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1394; see also
Newsome, 722 F.3d at 1280-1281. Although B2 places great stress on the
fact that Lloyd arranged the initial contact between Peterson and Trabelsi,
this, too, flowed from the already-existing attorney-client relationship, and
Peterson apparently initiated the conversation about purchasing Mazzal.
Nor does Lloyd and KM’s wiring of money to an account in
Massachusetts suffice for foreseeability. The location of the bank account to
which the funds were wired is precisely the sort of “random, fortuitous, or
attenuated” contact that courts refuse to consider in the personal jurisdiction
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). No other allegations suggest that
Lloyd or KM “availed [themselves] of any of the protections of Massachusetts
law or any other services provided by the state.” Phillips, 530 F.3d at 29.
Under the circumstances, Lloyd and KM have not purposefully availed
themselves of the privilege of conducting business in Massachusetts.
For the foregoing reasons, Lloyd and KM’s motion to dismiss (Dkt #96)
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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