Louhghalam et al v. Trump, et al

Filing 1

PETITION for Writ of Habeas Corpus (2241), filed by ARGHAVAN LOUHGHALAM, MAZDAK POURABDOLLAH TOOTKABONI. Filing fee: $ 400, receipt number 0101-6472534 (Fee Status: Filing Fee paid) (Demissie, Derege) Modified docket text on 1/30/2017 (adminn, ). (Main Document 1 replaced on 1/31/2017 to reflect signatures of all counsel) (Caruso, Stephanie).

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

MAZDAK POURABDOLLAH
TOOTKABONI and
ARGHAVAN LOUHGHALAM,
Case No. 17-cv-10154
Petitioners,
v.
DONALD TRUMP, President of the United
States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY (“DHS”); U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
(“CBP”); JOHN KELLY, Secretary of DHS;
KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, Acting
Commissioner of CBP; and WILLIAM
MOHALLEY, Boston Field Director, CBP,

Date: January 28, 2017

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 2 of 15

INTRODUCTION
Petitioners Mazdak Pourabdollah Tootkaboni and Arghavan Louhghalam, two lawful
permanent residents of United States, are being unlawfully held at Logan Airport as a consequence
of an Executive Order recently issued by President Donald Trump. Both Petitioners are associate
professors at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth, Iranian nationals, and Muslims. Both
Petitioners landed at Logan at approximately 5:30 p.m. on January 28, 2017, and, on information
and belief, have been detained since then. They were returning from an academic conference and
was outside the United States for fewer than 180 days.
As lawful permanent residents, and as set forth in detail below, Petitioners have a
constitutional right to return home to the United States after a brief trip abroad, and cannot be
deprived of their lawful permanent status without justification and due process protections.
Even though Petitioners were returning home to the United States as lawful permanent
residents, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) blocked them from exiting Logan and
detained them therein. No magistrate has determined that there is sufficient justification for the
continued detention of Petitioners. Instead, CBP is holding them at Logan solely pursuant to an
executive order issued by President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017.
Because the executive order is unlawful as applied to Petitioners, their continued detention
based solely on the executive order violates his Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due
process rights, violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause, is ultra vires under the
immigration statutes, and violates the Administrative Procedure Act and Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. Further, Petitioners’ continued unlawful detention is part of a widespread policy,

2

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 3 of 15

pattern, and practice applied to many refugees and arriving aliens detained after the issuance of
the January 27, 2017 executive order. Therefore, Petitioners respectfully apply to this Court for a
writ of habeas corpus to remedy his unlawful detention by Respondents, and for declaratory and
injunctive relief to prevent such harms from recurring.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1361, 2241, 2243, and the Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This court
has further remedial authority pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.
2.

Venue properly lies within the District of Massachusetts because a substantial part

of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred in the District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
3.

No petition for habeas corpus has previously been filed in any court to review

Petitioner’s case.
PARTIES
4.

Petitioner Tootkaboni is an Iranian national and a lawful permanent resident of the

United States. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth.
5.

Petitioner Louhghalam is an Iranian national and a lawful permanent resident of the

United States. She is an Associate Professor at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth.
6.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) is a cabinet department of the

United States federal government with the primary mission of securing the United States.

3

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 4 of 15

7.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) is an agency within DHS with the

primary mission of detecting and preventing the unlawful entry of persons and goods into the
United States.
8.

Respondent John Kelly is the Secretary of DHS. Secretary Kelly has immediate

custody of Petitioners and other members of the proposed class. He is sued in his official capacity.
9.

Respondent Kevin K. McAleenan is the Acting Commissioner of CBP. Acting

Commissioner McAleenan has immediate custody of Petitioners and other members of the
proposed class. He is sued in his official capacity.
10.

Respondent James T. Madden is the Director of the New York Field Office of CBP,

which has immediate custody of Petitioners and other members of the proposed class. He is sued
in his official capacity.
11.

Respondent Donald Trump is the President of the United States. He is sued in his

official capacity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order
12.

On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump was inaugurated as the forty-fifth President of

the United States. During his campaign, he stated that he would ban Muslims from entering the
United States.
13.

On January 27, one week after his inauguration, President Trump signed an

executive order entitled, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States,” which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and is hereinafter referred to as the “EO.”

4

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 5 of 15

14.

In statements to the press in connection with his issuance of the EO, President

Trump stated that his order would help Christian refugees to enter the United States.
15.

Citing the threat of terrorism committed by foreign nationals, the EO directs a

variety of changes to the manner and extent to which non-citizens may seek and obtain entry to
the United States. Among other things, the EO imposes a 120-day moratorium on the refugee
resettlement program as a whole; proclaims that “that the entry of nationals of Syria as refugees is
detrimental to the interests of the United States”; and therefore singles out Syrian refugees for an
indefinite “suspension” on their admission to the country.
16.

Most relevant to the instant action is Section 3(c) of the EO, in which President

Trump proclaims “that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens from
countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), would be detrimental
to the interests of the United States,” and that he is therefore “suspend[ing] entry into the United
States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, of such persons for 90 days from the date of this order,”
with narrow exceptions not relevant here.
17.

There are seven countries that fit the criteria in 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12): Iraq, Iran,

Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. According to the terms of the EO, therefore, the “entry
into the United States” of non-citizens from those countries is “suspended” from 90 days from the
date of the EO.
Petitioner Tootkaboni
18.

Petitioner Tootkaboni is an Iranian national and a lawful permanent resident of the

United States.

5

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 6 of 15

19.

Petitioner Tootkaboni is Muslim.

20.

Petitioner Tootkaboni joined the Department of Civil Engineering at the Johns

Hopkins University in 2004 and earned his PhD degree in Structural Mechanics in May 2009
21.

Petitioner Tootkaboni is now an Associate Professor at the University of

Massachusetts-Dartmouth.
22.

Petitioner Tootkaboni arrived at Logan Airport on January 28, 2017, following a

trip out of the country to attend an academic conference.
23.

Petitioner Tootkaboni has been detained since that arrival.

24.

Counsel for Petitioner Tootkaboni have attempted to make contact with him at

Logan Airport but have been unsuccessful due to Petitioner Tootkaboni’s detention.
25.

Upon knowledge and belief, Petitioner remains in the custody of CBP at Logan

Airport.
26.

Petitioner Tootkaboni is being detained at Logain Airport and not being permitted

to go home, in violation of the U.S. law.
Petitioner Louhghalam
27.

Petitioner Louhghalam is an Iranian national and a lawful permanent resident of the

United States.
28.

Petitioner Louhghalam is Muslim.

29.

Petitioner Louhghalam holds a Ph.D. and a M.S. in Engineering Mechanics from

the Johns Hopkins University.

6

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 7 of 15

30.

Petitioner Louhghalam is now an Associate Professor at the University of

Massachusetts-Dartmouth.
31.

Petitioner Louhghalam arrived at Logan Airport on January 28, 2017, following a

trip out of the country to attend an academic conference.
32.

Petitioner Louhghalam has been detained since that arrival.

33.

Counsel for Petitioner Louhghalam have attempted to make contact with her at

Logan Airport but have been unsuccessful due to Petitioner Louhghalam’s detention.
34.

Upon knowledge and belief, Petitioner Louhghalam remains in the custody of CBP

at Logan Airport.
35.

Petitioner Louhghalam is being detained at Logain Airport and not being permitted

to go home, in violation of the U.S. law.
36.

Congress has provided that lawful permanent residents in Petitioners’ situation are

entitled to enter the United States. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C), a lawful permanent resident
is regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws”
only if he or she “has abandoned or relinquished that status,” id. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(i), has been
absent from the United States for more than 180 days continuously, is in removal proceedings, has
committed one of a class of enumerated offenses, or has attempted to enter without inspection.
37.

None of the foregoing circumstances applies to Petitioners and therefore they are

not deemed to be seeking admission and have a right to enter. In In re Collado–Munoz, 21 I.
& N. Dec. 1061, 1065-1066 (1998) (en banc) (requiring immigration judge to look to 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(13)(C) in determining whether lawful permanent resident was applicant for admission);

7

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 8 of 15

Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012) (citing In re Collado-Munoz and recognizing that the
definition supersedes previous statute’s definition of entry).
38.

Respondents are also detaining Petitioners in violation of the Due Process Clause.

In Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963), the Supreme Court held that “an innocent, casual,
and brief excursion by a resident alien outside this country's borders may not have been intended
as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status and therefore may not subject him to the
consequences of an entry into the country on his return.” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1953) (assimilating status,
for constitutional purposes, of lawful permanent resident who had been abroad for five months to
that of one continuously present). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this constitutional principle in
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 31 (1982) (describing Chew as standing for the proposition that
“a resident alien returning from a brief trip has a right to due process just as would a continuously
present resident alien”).
39.

As a lawful permanent residents of the United States, Petitioners are attempting to

return home. They have been left in limbo while detained by the Respondents for no reason other
than the discriminatory and unconstitutional EO
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT ONE
FIFTH AMENDMENT – PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

40.

Petitioners repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained

in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

8

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 9 of 15

41.

Procedural due process requires that the government be constrained before it acts

in a way that deprives individuals of liberty interests protected under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, due process requires that arriving immigrants be afforded
those statutory rights granted by Congress and the principle that “[m]inimum due process rights
attach to statutory rights.” Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2003) (alteration in original)
(quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996)).
42.

In particular, returning lawful permanent residents have constitutional due process

rights with respect to their return to the United States. In evaluating the due process rights available
to a lawful permanent resident, “courts must consider the interest at stake for the individual, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well as the probable
value of additional or different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the government in using
the current procedures rather than additional or different procedures.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
43.

Respondents’ actions, taken pursuant to the EO, violate the procedural due process

rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
COUNT TWO
FIRST AMENDMENT – ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
44.

Petitioners repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained

in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
45.

The EO exhibits hostility to a specific religious faith, Islam, and gives preference

to other religious faiths, principally Christianity. The EO therefore violates the Establishment

9

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 10 of 15

Clause of the First Amendment by not pursuing a course of neutrality with regard to different
religious faiths.
COUNT THREE
FIFTH AMENDMENT – EQUAL PROTECTION
46.

Petitioners repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained

in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
47.

The EO discriminates against Petitioners on the basis of their country of origin and

religion, without sufficient justification, and therefore violates the equal protection component of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
48.

Additionally, the EO was substantially motivated by animus toward—and has a

disparate effect on—Muslims, which also violates the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Jana-Rock Const., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Econ. Dev.,
438 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2006); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
49.

Respondents have demonstrated an intent to discriminate against Petitioners on the

basis of religion through repeated public statements that make clear the EO was designed to
prohibit the entry of Muslims to the United States. See Michael D. Shear & Helene Cooper, Trump
Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7 Muslim Countries, N.Y. Times (Jan. 27, 2017), (“[President
Trump] ordered that Christians and others from minority religions be granted priority over
Muslims.”); Carol Morello, Trump Signs Order Temporarily Halting Admission of Refugees,
Promises Priority for Christians, Wash. Post (Jan. 27, 2017).
50.

Applying a general law in a fashion that discriminate on the basis of religion in this

way violates Petitioner’s rights to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment Due Process

10

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 11 of 15

Clause. Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). Petitioners satisfy the Supreme Court’s test to determine whether a
facially neutral law – in the case, the EO and federal immigration law – has been applied in a
discriminatory fashion. The Supreme Court requires an individual bringing suit to challenge the
application of a law bear the burden of demonstrating a “prima facie case of discriminatory
purpose.”Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-7 (1977). This
test examines the impact of the official action, whether there has been a clear pattern unexplainable
on other grounds besides discrimination, the historical background of the decision, the specific
sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, and departures from the normal
procedural sequence. Id.
51.

Here, President Donald Trump and senior staff have made clear that EO will be

applied to primarily exclude individuals on the basis of their national origin and being Muslim.
See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump Statement On Preventing Muslim Immigration, (Dec.
7,

2015),

https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-

preventing-muslim-immigration (“Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown
of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is
going on.”); Abby Phillip and Abigail Hauslohner, Trump on the Future of Proposed Muslim Ban,
Registry: ‘You know my plans’, Wash. Post (Dec. 22, 2016). Further, the President has promised
that preferential treatment will be given to Christians, unequivocally demonstrating the special
preferences and discriminatory impact that the EO has upon Petitioner. See supra.

11

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 12 of 15

52.

Thus, Respondents have applied the EO with forbidden animus and discriminatory

intent in violation of the equal protection of the Fifth Amendment and violated Petitioner’s equal
protection rights.
COUNT FOUR
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
53.

Petitioners repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained

in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
54.

Respondents detained and mistreated Petitioners solely pursuant to an executive

order issued on January 27, 2017, which expressly discriminates against Petitioners on the basis
of their country of origin and was substantially motivated by animus toward Muslims. See supra
Count Five.
55.

The EO exhibits hostility to a specific religious faith, Islam, and gives preference

to other religious faiths, principally Christianity.
56.

The INA forbids discrimination in issuance of visas based on a person’s race,

nationality, place of birth, or place of residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).
57.

The INA and implementing regulations, including 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (expedited

removal), 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.3(b)(4), 208.30, and 1003.42; 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (asylum), and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) (withholding of removal), and the United Nations Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), implemented in the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”),
Pub.L. No. 105-277, div. G, Title XXII, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (1998) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1231 note), entitle Petitioner to an opportunity to apply for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief.

12

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 13 of 15

58.

Respondents’ actions in detaining and mistreating Petitioners were arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, in violation of APA §
706(2)(A); contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity, in violation of APA §
706(2)(B); in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right,
in violation of APA § 706(2)(C); and without observance of procedure required by law, in
violation of § 706(2)(D).
COUNT FIVE
RELIGIOUS FREDOM RESTORATION ACT
59.

Petitioners repeat and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained

in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
60.

The EO will have the effect of imposing a special disability on the basis of religious

views or religious status, by withdrawing an important immigration benefit principally from
Muslims on account of their religion. In doing so, the EO places a substantial burden on
Petitioner’s exercise of religion in a way that is not the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioners prays that this Court grant the following relief:
(1) Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus requiring Respondents to release Petitioners;
(2) Issue an injunction ordering Respondents not to detain any individual solely on the
basis of the EO;

13

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 14 of 15

(3) Enter a judgment declaring that Respondents’ detention of Petitioners is and will be
unauthorized by statute and contrary to law;
(4) Award Petitioners reasonable costs and attorney’s fees; and
(5) Grant any other and further relief that this Court may deem fit and proper.

DATED: January 28, 2017
Boston, Massachusetts
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Derege Demissie
_____________________________
Derege B. Demissie
Demissie & Church
929 Mass. Ave., Suite 101
Cambridge, MA 02139
[phone]
/s/ Kerry E. Doyle
Kerry E. Doyle (BBO# 565648)
Graves & Doyle
100 State Street, 9th Floor
Boston, MA 02109
[phone]

/s/ Susan Church
Susan Church
Demissie & Church
929 Mass. Ave., Suite 101
Cambridge, MA 02139
[phone]
/s/ Matthew R. Segal
Matthew R. Segal (BBO# 654489)
14

Case 1:17-cv-10154-NMG Document 1 Filed 01/28/17 Page 15 of 15

Sarah Wunsch
Jessie J. Rossman
Laura Rotolo
Adriana Lafaille
ACLU Foundation of Massachusetts
211 Congress Street
Boston, MA 02110
[phone]
[e-mail]

15