Rimini v. J.P Morgan Securities LLC

Filing 27

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ORDER entered. granting 13 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. A copy of this Order has been mailed to the Plaintiff. (Montes, Mariliz)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

THOMAS RIMINI,
Plaintiff,
v.
J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC,
Defendant.

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Civil No. 17-10392-LTS

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. No. 13)
December 13, 2017

SOROKIN, J.
Thomas Rimini, appearing pro se, filed a Complaint against J.P. Morgan Securities LLC
(“JPMS”) asserting violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).
Rimini filed his claims using the form complaint for a civil case, to which he attached a two-page
statement of his claim. 1 Docs. No. 1 and 1-1. JPMS has filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No.
13), which Rimini has opposed (Doc. No. 20).
Despite JPMS’s assertion that Rimini is a licensed attorney, the Court nonetheless
reviews his filings liberally in light of his pro se status. JPMS’s Motion is ALLOWED as to
Rimini’s claims for violations of the ADA and Title VII. Rimini’s Complaint is utterly devoid of

1

Rimini’s attached statement, in one sentence, alleges a breach of contract by virtue of David Duzyk’s (Rimini’s
former manager) violating JPMS’s neutral reference policy in a November 8, 2011 email. Doc. No. 1-1 at ¶2. The
complaint form fails to mention or assert a breach of contract claim. Doc. No. 1. This claim is DISMISSED.
Rimini has not alleged sufficiently the existence of a contract that JPMS could have breached.

any reference to those statutes or factual allegations giving rise to even a conceivable, never
mind plausible, claim. Further, Rimini’s opposition to the Motion to Dismiss fails to address
these claims. Accordingly, they are DISMISSED.
As for his SOX claim, Rimini alleges that he made a complaint with the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration and permissibly and timely brought this action in federal court
for de novo proceedings after the close of SOX’s statutory window for the Secretary of Labor to
issue a final decision. In further support of this claim, Rimini alleges that JPMS has prevented
his reemployment in retaliation for SOX-related whistleblowing and other complaints that he
made during and since his employment. Specifically, Rimini alleges that his former manager
David Duzyk has thwarted Rimini’s employment search in Duzyk’s responses to employment
verification inquiries. Rimini cites a specific November 8, 2011 email from Duzyk that Rimini
first learned of on October 25, 2016. Doc. No. 1-1 at 1.
In order to state a claim for SOX retaliation, Rimini must allege, among other things, that
he engaged in SOX-protected activity and that JPMS retaliated against him as a result of this
activity. 18 U.S.C. §1514A. Rimini advances such allegations only in the most conclusory
fashion; he alleges no facts whatsoever regarding his alleged protected activity or any causal link
to retaliation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain a short and
plain statement of the plaintiff’s claim, which means that the plaintiff must advance some factual
allegations. Although liberally construed when applied to a pro se complaint, Rule 8 requires
more than Rimini’s mere conclusory assertion. Put another way, Rimini has failed to allege
sufficient facts that, accepted as true, “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d
1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). 2 The Court therefore DISMISSES Rimini’s SOX retaliation claim.
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13) is ALLOWED. 3
SO ORDERED.

/s/ Leo T. Sorokin
Leo T. Sorokin
United States District Judge

2
In opposition to the Motion, Rimini submits a declaration (Doc. No. 21) setting forth some factual detail
supporting his SOX claim. In opposing the motion, the declaration suffers from two problems. First, it is the
Complaint, not various supplemental later-filed documents, that defines a plaintiff’s claim. Second, the declaration
pleads Rimini out of court. On the four corners of the declaration, Rimini has failed to plausibly allege a timely
claim—i.e., one filed within the 180-day statute of limitations for SOX retaliation claims. 18 U.S. Code
§1514A(b)(2)(D). The only specific retaliation identified by Rimini is the November 8, 2011 email. Rimini states
under oath in his declaration that he interviewed for a job in November, 2011, that the interview went well, that one
of the interviewers “explained in our interview” that the interviewer “would contact Mr. David Duzyk for a
reference,” that Rimini had been “told to expect an offer,” and that Rimini was two weeks later “informed by HR
that no offer would be extended.” Doc. No. 21 at ¶¶ 58-63. Given these facts, Rimini’s 2015 administrative law
filing and 2017 civil action are long past the 180-day filing deadline. Rimini’s further assertion that Rimini knew in
2014 of Duzyk’s “efforts to prevent [Rimini] from securing employment” also demonstrates that the July 7, 2015
administrative complaint was past the 180-day filing deadline. Thus, the declaration fails to save Rimini’s
Complaint.
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Plaintiff’s request for oral argument on the motion is DENIED.

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