Hale et al v. Pan Am Railways, Inc. et al

Filing 43

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ENDORSED ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. For the foregoing reasons, defendant Pan Ams motion to dismiss (Docket No. 18 ) is DENIED and defendant Cryo-Transs motion to dismiss (Docket No. 20 ) is ALLOWED. Plaintiffs are permitted to file an amended complaint as to defendant Cryo-Trans, if at all, on or before Friday, April 20, 2018.So ordered.(Franklin, Yvonne)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
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)
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Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
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PAN AM RAILWAYS, INC., AMERICOLD )
LOGISTICS LLC and CRYO-TRANS,
)
INC.,
)
)
Defendants.
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)
MICHAEL HALE and ALLA HALE,

Civil Action No.
17-10855-NMG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This case arises from an accident that occurred during the
unloading of a railcar in February, 2015.

Plaintiffs Michael

and Alla Hale (“plaintiffs” or “the Hales”) bring this action
against Pan Am Railways, Inc. (“Pan Am”), Americold Logistics
LLC (“Americold”) and Cryo-Trans, Inc. (“Cryo-Trans”)
(collectively “defendants”), alleging that defendants were
negligent in their operation of Railcar CRYX 5017 which caused
Mr. Hale’s injuries.
Pending before the Court are the motions to dismiss of
defendants Pan Am and Cryo-Trans (Docket No. 18 and 20).

For

the following reasons, Pan Am’s motion to dismiss will be denied
but Cryo-Trans’s motion to dismiss will be allowed.

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I.

Background
Plaintiffs are Connecticut residents and Mr. Hale was an

employee of C&S Wholesale Grocers (“C&S”) at its facility in
Hatfield, Massachusetts from 1996 until the time of the
accident.

C&S operates regional distribution centers where it

receives food products and ships them to supermarkets and other
retail stores.
Mr. Hale alleges that on February 3, 2015, he was
instructed to unload Railcar CRYX 5017 which was loaded with
pallets containing frozen tater tots shipped from Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.

Mr. Hale states that the railcar arrived and was

rejected by C&S due to weight distribution issues.

Because the

car was unbalanced, it could not be moved and Mr. Hale and other
employees of C&S were instructed to unload the railcar.

During

the process of unloading, several packages of frozen tater tots,
weighing approximately 80 pounds, fell on Mr. Hale.
In the complaint, Mr. Hale details the injuries he suffered
as a result of the incident, including injuries to both feet,
requiring surgery, and injuries to his ankles, knees, neck and
back.

Mr. Hale also notes that he suffers from post traumatic

stress disorder, has been unable to return to work and has been
determined to be partially disabled.
Defendants Americold and Pan Am are Delaware corporations
with their principal places of business in Atlanta, Georgia and
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Billerica, Massachusetts, respectively.

Defendant Cryo-Trans is

a Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in
Maryland.
Plaintiffs filed this action in May, 2017, alleging that
defendants were negligent in the operation of the railcar.

Ms.

Hale brings a claim for loss of consortium against all
defendants.

Defendant Americold filed its answer and cross-

claims for contribution against Cryo-Trans and Pan Am in June,
2017.

Cryo-Trans and Pan Am separately moved to dismiss the

complaint in July, 2017.

Americold and the Hales separately

opposed those motions which are the subject of this memorandum.
II.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
A.

Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

In considering the merits of

a motion to dismiss, the Court may look only to the facts
alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or
incorporated by reference in the complaint and matters of which
judicial notice can be taken. Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court
of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208 (D. Mass. 2000), aff’d, 248
F.3d 1127 (1st Cir. 2000).

Furthermore, the Court must accept

all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
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reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Langadinos v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000).

If the

facts in the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of
action, a motion to dismiss the complaint must be denied. See
Nollet, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 208.
Although a court must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in a complaint, that doctrine is not
applicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009).

Threadbare recitals of the legal elements which are

supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice to state
a cause of action. Id. Accordingly, a complaint does not state a
claim for relief where the well-pled facts fail to warrant an
inference of any more than the mere possibility of misconduct.
Id. at 1950.
B.

Analysis
1.

Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of
1995

Defendants Cryo-Trans and Pan Am move to dismiss the
complaint on the basis that the Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act of 1995 (“ICCTA”), 49 U.S.C. § 10501, preempts
the Hales’ state law claims.

They contend that the allegations

in the complaint fall within the definition of “transportation
by rail carriers” which, according to defendants, puts the

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claims exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Surface
Transportation Board (“STB”).
The Hales suggest that the preemption argument of
defendants Cryo-Trans and Pan Am is premature at the motion to
dismiss stage.

Plaintiffs also dispute the merits of that

argument, contending that to defend a negligence suit would not
unreasonably burden the companies’ railroad operations and,
therefore, this action does not fall within the jurisdiction of
the ICCTA.

In its opposition, Americold adds that the

jurisdiction of the STB does not encompass personal injury or
negligence actions and that Congress instead targeted economic
and regulatory matters with its enactment of the ICCTA.
The ICCTA vests the STB with exclusive jurisdiction over
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies
provided in this part with respect to rates,
classifications, rules (including car service, interchange,
and other operating rules), practices, routes, services,
and facilities of such carriers; and
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment,
or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or
side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located,
or intended to be located, entirely in one State.
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b).

Under the statutory scheme, the remedies

provided by the ICCTA are exclusive “and preempt the remedies
provided under federal or state law”. Id.
When tasked with interpreting a statute containing language
that expressly preempts state law, a court must define the scope

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of that preemption by “identify[ing] the domain expressly
preempted by that language”. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 484 (1996) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).

Even where a federal statute completely

preempts certain state law claims, the court must still
determine “which claims are so preempted”. Fayard v. Northeast
Vehicle Servs., LLC, 533 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2008) (emphasis
in original) (examining the scope of the ICCTA’s preemption
provision in the context of a common law nuisance claim removed
from state court by the defendant).

The First Circuit Court of

Appeals (“the First Circuit”) has held that
the critical question is whether federal law provides an
exclusive substitute federal cause of action that a federal
court (or possibly a federal agency) can employ for the
kind of claim or wrong at issue.
Id.

In Fayard, the First Circuit determined that the ICCTA did

not provide private redress for the kind of nuisance claims
brought by the plaintiffs and that state nuisance law continues
to apply to railroads. Id. at 48.

Because the ICCTA did not

“automatically immunize[] railroads from state nuisance claims
[or] provide a federal cause of action amounting to nuisance”,
complete preemption was not applicable and the state law claims
could proceed in state court.
Pan Am and Cryo-Trans have not shown that the ICCTA
immunizes them from negligence claims in personal injury actions

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or that it provides a federal cause of action for those claims.
Contrary to the moving defendants’ suggestion, the application
of Massachusetts negligence law in the instant case would not
have the effect of displacing regulation of rail transportation.
See e.g., Fla. East Coast Ry. Co. v. City of West Palm Beach,
266 F.3d 132, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that Congress
“narrowly tailored the ICCTA pre-emption provision to displace
only regulation, i.e., those state laws that may reasonably be
said to have the effect of managing or governing rail
transportation, while permitting the continued application of
laws having a more remote or incidental effect on rail
transportation”).
Contrary to the contention of the moving defendants that
the complaint implicates rail carrier’s core operations,
adjudication of the personal injury claim here will “address
garden variety issues of negligence” and preemption is not
appropriate. New England Cent. R.R., Inc. v. Springfield
Terminal Ry. Co., 415 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (D. Mass. 2006); see
also Elam v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 813
(5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff’s simple negligence
claim arising from a railway crossing accident were not
preempted but finding that the ICCTA did preempt the negligence
per se claim based on a state antiblocking statute); Watkins v.
RJ Corman R.R., No. 08-cv-114, 2010 WL 1710203, at *3 (E.D. Ky.
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Apr. 27, 2010) (finding that state law negligence and nuisance
claims were not preempted because the relief sought by
plaintiffs “would not implicate economic regulation of rail
transportation”).

The preemption provision of the ICCTA and,

specifically, the lack of an express superseding federal claim
dissuades this Court from concluding that Congress intended the
ICCTA to completely preempt state tort claims such as those at
hand. Trejo v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. 10-cv-00285, 2011 WL
309614, at *4 (E.D. Ark. July 14, 2008) (citing Medtronic, 518
U.S. at 487)).
Accordingly, Pan Am and Cryo-trans have not met their
burden of showing that Mr. Hale’s personal injury negligence
claim is preempted by the ICCTA.
2.

Negligence Claim

Cryo-Trans asserts that Counts III and IV of the complaint
must be dismissed because plaintiffs fail to allege the
essential elements of a negligence claim.

Cryo-Trans suggests

that plaintiffs do not allege that Cryo-Trans (1) owed a duty to
Mr. Hale that it (2) breached thereby (3) causing his injuries.
According to Cryo-Trans, the loss of consortium claim (Count IV)
is dependent on the negligence claim (Count III) and must also
fail.

Mr. Hale responds that the complaint sufficiently alleges

the required elements of a negligence claim and satisfies the
notice pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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To succeed on a claim for negligence under Massachusetts
law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed a legal
duty to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, (3) the
breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury and (4)
the plaintiff suffered actual damage or injury. Go-Best Assets
Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 463 Mass. 50, 54 (2012) (quoting
Leavitt v. Brockton Hosp., Inc., 454 Mass. 37, 39 (2009)).

The

existence of a duty is a question of law for the courts. Cottam
v. CVS Pharm., 436 Mass. 316 (2002) (internal citation omitted).
Absent a duty of care, “there can be no actionable negligence”.
Dhimos v. Cormier, 400 Mass. 504, 507 (1987).
Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to sustain a
negligence action against Cryo-Trans.

The complaint contains no

facts from which the Court could determine that Cryo-Trans owed
a duty to Mr. Hale and fails to state even basic facts such as
Cryo-Trans’s relationship to Mr. Hale or his employer, C&S, or
Cryo-Trans’s role in transporting, operating or loading Railcar
CRYX 5017.

Mr. Hale, therefore, does not plausibly allege that

Cryo-Trans owed a duty to him or make clear how any duty of
reasonable care was breached. See e.g., Williams v. Mass. Coll.
Of Pharm. and Allied Health Sci., No. 12-10313, 2013 WL 1308621,
at *7 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2013).
Although the facts in the complaint are construed in favor
of the plaintiffs, the Court has insufficient information to
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decide if, as a matter of law, Cryo-Trans owed a duty to Mr.
Hale because the facts alleged do not permit the Court to
determine the nature of the relationship.

Instead, the

complaint simply states as a general proposition that Cryo-Trans
is the owner, operator or entity responsible for loading,
packing, packaging, shipping or transporting Railcar CRYX 5017
and that Cryo-Trans completed one or more of those various tasks
negligently. See e.g., Agard v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.,
No. 12-10472, 2012 WL 448906, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 2, 2012)
(making clear that “[t]he mere use of the term ‘negligent’,
without more, is insufficient to support a negligence claim”).
Because the loss of consortium claim brought by Mrs. Hale is
dependent on Mr. Hale’s negligence claim, that count will also
be dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly, Cryo-Trans’s motion to dismiss will be allowed
without prejudice to plaintiffs amending their complaint.
3.

Pan Am

Citing no law, Pan Am contends that it is not a proper
party to this action because Pan Am is a parent holding company
and is not a rail carrier providing any services cited by the
Hales in the complaint.

The Hales rejoin that the motion to

dismiss is not the proper vehicle to resolve this issue and
state that they will add a Pan Am subsidiary if discovery in the
case reveals that a subsidiary is a more appropriate defendant.
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Plaintiffs allege that Pan Am negligently owned and
operated Railcar CRYX 5017 and that, as a result of Pan Am’s
negligence, Mr. Hale sustained significant injuries.

In

considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept as true
all well-pleaded facts . . . and make all reasonable inferences
in the plaintiff’s favor”. Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 64
(1st Cir. 2010).

Unlike the conclusory allegations against

Cryo-Trans, the Hales allege specific facts supporting their
negligence claim against Pan Am, including that C&S informed Pan
Am about its concerns with the safety of Railcar CRYX 5017 due
to its weight imbalance.

The Hales also contend that the

director of freight claims for Pan Am, Mark Ormond, rejected the
return of the railcar and suggested that it be unloaded by fork
lift or by hand.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a plausible entitlement to
relief against Pan Am and the Court agrees that Pan Am’s
contention that it is not a proper party because it is simply a
holding company and does not provide rail carrier services is
premature and more appropriately reserved for a motion for
summary judgment.

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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Pan Am’s motion to
dismiss (Docket No. 18) is DENIED and defendant Cryo-Trans’s
motion to dismiss (Docket No. 20) is ALLOWED.

Plaintiffs are

permitted to file an amended complaint as to defendant CryoTrans, if at all, on or before Friday, April 20, 2018.

So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton_____
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated March 30, 2018

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